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IN THE BEGINNING 
The genre of science fiction is widely considered to have started with Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, published in Great Britain in 1818. However, as Rob-
ert Scholes and Eric Rabkin note in a brief history of science fiction, “When 
Mary Shelley wrote Frankenstein, science fiction had neither a name or any 
recognition as a separate form of literature [and t]his situation lasted for a 
century” (7). Such generic ambiguity and critical retrospection mark the field 
of science fiction studies. In a more comprehensive history of science fic-
tion, Edward James highlights the sharp rise in English language texts deal-
ing with the future from the 1850s onward. He states that “[t]hroughout the 
[19th] century, most of the respected (male) writers of fiction in the United 
States had dabbled in what we could call science fiction” (Science 33)1. How-
ever, “[s]f was first named, and first became a genre, in the science fiction 
magazines published in the United States before the Second World War” (E. 
James, Science 66). In such a literary context, early writers of science fic-
tion were not consciously writing within the genre. In fact, many wrote with 
other genres in mind. For example, when Edgar Rice Burroughs began his 
writing career in the 1910s, he wrote adventure fiction for all-fiction maga-
zines. We simply classify many of his texts as science fiction from a con-
temporary critical vantage point. ERB merits special attention from Edward 
James because he is “probably the most influential of the writers who began 
in the pulps” (Science 45). Given the lack of generic formation before the 
first decades of the twentieth century, it is not surprising that “[m]any of the 
important names in the early science fiction magazines had already written 
science fiction for several years in the general fiction pulps” (ibid). The sci-
ence fiction texts were simply published alongside other popular adventure 
tales—the westerns of Zane Grey, the African adventures of H. Rider Hag-
gard, and the northern stories of Jack London, for example.2
In the United States, the combination of a “fin de siecle” feeling (E. 
James, Science 31), an increase in literacy, and a growing interest in “science 
and technology” led first to the inclusion of science fiction in cheap, all-fic-
tion pulp magazines and then the increasing specialization of these magazines 
up through the 1930s (Scholes and Rabkin 35). In his book, The Creation of 
Tomorrow: Fifty Years of Magazine Science Fiction, Paul Carter chronicles the 
rise of the pulps and their association with science fiction. Carter begins the 
first chapter with Hugo Gernsback because he founded and edited Amazing 
Stories, “the first periodical in the world devoted solely to science fiction” 
(4). In addition, as the editor of several pulp magazines in the 1920s and 
1930s, Gernsback had a formative effect on the evolution of the genre. As 
Edward James asserts, “The creation of specialist science fiction magazines 
was a recognition of the existence of a genre, and once that genre was named, 
in the late 1920s—first as ‘scientifiction,’ and then as ‘science fiction’—we 
get our first attempts at definitions. It is no coincidence that the first defini-
tions came with the coiner of those names, Hugo Gernsback” (Science 52). 
Both Carter and James emphasize Gernsback’s scientific positivism and the 
tremendous influence of the “Gernsback-Sloane-Tremaine-Campbell [edi-
torial] guidelines” on science fiction (Carter 18). Education of the public, 
progress, and extrapolation were all key components of the editors’ focus on 
science. However, despite this scientific emphasis and attempts to define the 
genre accordingly, science fiction has always had a dual nature in which the 
fictional format is equally important as the science. Gernsback, for example, 
suggested that the ideal science fiction text would be one quarter science 
and three quarters romance (E. James, Science 52). In this context, Carter 
notes that some science fiction writers “were simply impatient at the neces-
sity for interrupting their storylines to get the science straightened out. They 
were, after all, writing for cash for magazines published as men’s-adventure 
pulps in which fast action was the sine quo non” (19). Edgar Rice Burroughs 
was one such writer. He serves as a representative early science fiction writer 
in his incredible output and the multi-generic aspect of his work. Due to 
the generic ambiguity of early science fiction—its lack of theoretical defini-
tion and roots in other literary genres—Burroughs combined adventure fic-
tion, romance, and science fiction, often in one text. In fact, despite giving 
Burroughs a prominent place in their histories of the science fiction field, 
both Carter and James oppose ERB to Gernsback’s scientific focus. Edward 
James asserts that “[t]here was little or no pretence at scientific correctness in 
Burroughs” (Science 45–6), and he follows the lead of Brian Aldiss, another 
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science fiction historian, in labeling Burroughs’ work as escapist and thought-
stifling (Trillion 164–5).
While the debate over the definition and generic boundaries of science 
fiction continues to this day, 3 a strong uniformity of perspective existed in 
other key areas of the early science fiction field. First, a single, highly individ-
ualistic action hero took center stage in the majority of the texts due to the 
literary roots of American science fiction in adventure fiction. This heroic 
protagonist was almost always male and of Anglo descent. The protagonist’s 
textual dominance, heroic nature, and representative status all combined to 
convey the normalcy and universalism of the Anglo male perspective. The 
hero represented not only his country and/or race, but also ideal manhood 
and the entire human race (in opposition to aliens).4 Many times the protag-
onist also narrated the story, obscuring even the possibility of competing per-
spectives. Within western culture, explorers and adventurers were historically 
white males. However, the gender and racial/national origin of the protago-
nist stemmed from that of the authors, editors, and readers of early science 
fiction as well. In effect, a triangle of racial and gender similarity existed, 
composed of the protagonist, the authors and editors, and the audience.
The science fiction authors and editors are the second element in this 
Anglo male triangle. Female authors were the exception in the science fiction 
field up through the 1960s due to the general sexism existing in patriarchal 
western culture, the professional fields, and the publishing industry. More 
specifically, the strong exclusion of women from the sciences and the over-
whelmingly male audience of adventure fiction and science fiction promoted 
male authorship. Paul Carter notes that, prior to 1940, author C. L. Moore 
“stood virtually by herself ” in the science fiction field (180). As most writers 
promote their own values and beliefs, and these are usually grounded in their 
personal identity and experiences, the uniformity of perspective between the 
male authors of science fiction and their protagonists should not be surpris-
ing. John Taliaferro, for example, calls Burroughs’ protagonists “his fictional 
alter-egos” (22) and explores the connections between Burroughs’ pride in 
his “Anglo-Saxon lineage” and the similar background of his protagonists 
(19). Taliaferro also links the personal beliefs of Burroughs to the larger cul-
tural context of early twentieth-century America: “All of his plots [ . . . ] 
boil down to survival of the fittest [ . . . ]. Burroughs, like so many of his 
contemporaries, believed in a hierarchy of race and class” (19). Like their 
readers, the science fiction authors were heavily influenced by the Anglo-
centric, patriarchal society in which they lived. Not only did they cater to 
the masculine ideals of their young, male audience, but also the authors held 
similar ideals due to the shared culture. In addition, the large and continuous 
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output required of authors by the pulp magazines hindered the creation of 
less stereotypical characters. Few authors had the time or motivation to move 
beyond generic formulas or to question accepted social norms. Furthermore, 
some science fiction editors actively promoted an Anglo male protagonist. 
For example, Isaac Asimov describes the influential editor of Astounding 
magazine, John Campbell, as “tak[ing] for granted, somehow, the stereotype 
of the Nordic white as the true representative of Man the Explorer, Man the 
Darer, Man the Victor” (qtd. in Carter 77). The close gender and racial cor-
relation between the science fiction triangle of editors and authors, protago-
nists, and readers fostered the universality of the Anglo male perspective.
As they tried to sell their material, science fiction authors and editors 
catered to an overwhelmingly young, male audience. In the chapter Paul 
Carter devotes to the “Feminine Mystique in Science Fiction,” he acquiesces 
with Joanna Russ’ characterization of the typical science fiction reader as an 
adolescent boy, at least in the early years (Carter 173). Even as Carter points 
out the general aging of science fiction readers by the end of the 1940s, he 
maintains the over-all masculine make-up of the audience (ibid). Edward 
James explicitly, and somewhat condescendingly, links Edgar Rice Burroughs 
with a young, masculine audience:
he was published in Britain as a writer of stories for boys; tales of inter-
planetary derring-do were suitable for boys and Americans, but not for 
British adults. And, it is fair to say, those intrigued by Burroughs’s brand 
of romance tend to be captured young: few young males can resist rid-
ing in their imagination on a six-legged thoat across Barsoom’s dry sea-
beds [ . . . ] alongside John Carter. (Science 46)
John Carter, the protagonist of Burroughs’ Mars series, was not a “boy,” since 
only adult males could completely fulfill the multiple functions of a hero—
including great physical strength in adventure fiction. Yet, the young men 
reading such texts clearly identified themselves with the hero. The authors 
and editors of science fiction texts knew this identification and vicarious par-
ticipation would be limited by a heroine.
Furthermore, one day these young male readers would grow into men 
and positions of adventure and power would be open to them. While inter-
planetary exploration was not feasible in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, the young men could realistically envision themselves as adventur-
ers, explorers, and national envoys. In her book Primate Visions: Gender, 
Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science, Donna Haraway titles the 
first chapter “Teddy Bear Patriarchy” because Teddy Roosevelt was a real-life 
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icon of turn-of-the-century western man. Haraway explores the connections 
between “Nature, Youth, Manhood, [and] the State” in the Roosevelt Memo-
rial atrium of the African Hall, located in the American Museum of Natural 
History, and she highlights the close association of young males of this time 
period with powerful and world-renowned men like Roosevelt (27). The for-
mer president’s rough and dangerous adventures, including safaris to Africa 
and explorations of the Amazon, served as an ultimate, but real-life example 
of manhood. After reading one of the many accounts of Roosevelt’s life, the 
adventures of John Carter would not seem so farfetched to young science 
fiction fans.5 In fact, Haraway draws such a fictional parallel in her text 
by prefacing the chapter on Roosevelt with a quote from Burroughs. Both 
Brian Street and Edward James connect juvenile males, adventure fiction, 
and imperialism in their discussion of turn-of-the-century British literature 
as well. Within this context, young male readers not only identified with the 
Anglo male protagonist, but also sought to emulate him in the real world. 
Thus, the authors created protagonists with the readers’ ideals in mind and, 
conversely, the readers utilized the protagonists as role models. With such a 
close association between the audience and the protagonists, early science 
fiction readers normally did not question the primacy of the Anglo male 
perspective.
In addition, the dominance of this Anglo male perspective combined 
with an emphasis on science and technology to restrict the speculative ele-
ment of early American science fiction. Since inventions and technical gad-
gets were the primary focus of early speculation, more abstract concepts like 
identity, gender, or race often were neglected. Paul Carter, for example, sets 
up the first installment of Edgar Rice Burroughs’ Mars series as the progeni-
tor of a long line of stereotypical science fiction. From the Old West hero, 
John Carter, to the Western American setting of Mars, to the Indians dis-
guised as Martians, “[t]his Western Mars [ . . . ] was to reappear again and 
again in pulp science fiction” (62). According to Paul Carter, “this Western 
Mars,” and its Anglo-American male perspective, dominated the large sub-
genre of Martian science fiction up through the first half of the twentieth 
century. It was not until 1970 that John Campbell wrote a eulogy for Bur-
roughs’ Mars, entitled “Goodbye to Barsoom” (Carter 69). Furthermore, this 
tendency to superficially and stereotypically transform Earth and terrestrial 
culture from the Anglo male perspective extended across the solar system: 
“Mars as nineteenth-century frontier America and Venus as nineteenth-cen-
tury frontier Africa had a mythic appeal that pushed aside all demands of 
scientific exactitude” (Carter 65). Mercury and Jupiter were exoticized as 
“Asian port cities” as well (Carter 68). Paul Carter’s summary of the “general 
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archaizing and Westernizing of the space frontier” foregrounds the stereotyp-
ical tendencies and multi-generic roots of early science fiction, as well as its 
lack of scientific focus (72). It also emphasizes the importance of the Other 
to early science fiction.
Paul Carter begins the second section of his chapter, “Under the Moons 
of Mars: The Interplanetary Pastoral,” with a quote from Leslie Fiedler which 
grounds the Anglo-American male perspective in the Other of American 
“Indians” (66). Although clearly not the main focus in early science fiction, 
such Other(s) were essential for the formation of the Anglo male perspec-
tive. The heroism of the Anglo male protagonist required a negative type 
against which to be gauged, and the tension between the protagonist and the 
Other(s) provided the textual action or conflict. For example, females served 
as secondary characters for romantic purposes and sexual titillation. In addi-
tion, the women provided both a foil and a motivation for the characteristics 
culturally ascribed to males: courage, power, and action. Characters of eth-
nic, racial, or national backgrounds other than Anglo-American or Anglo-
European usually functioned as villains or stereotyped representatives of an 
exotic locale. Finally, aliens were mostly a thinly disguised substitute for any 
of these multiple Others. In her book Aliens and Others: Science Fiction, Fem-
inism, and Post-modernism, Jenny Wolmark links all three of these character 
groups and discusses how “the alien has been used to represent Otherness” 
in science fiction texts (28). Including an Other, however, always creates the 
potential for subversion of the primary viewpoint. To forestall such a possi-
bility, the science fiction authors subordinated, caricaturized, and/or vilified 
the Other(s). For example, in his discussion of the exceptional science fiction 
writing of Stanley G. Weinbaum in the early 1930s, Paul Carter asserts that, 
“[u]ntil Weinbaum’s time, the reader’s choice in extraterrestrial life-forms was 
usually between human beings (some of whom were very, very good) and 
monsters (most of which were very, very bad)” (73). Weinbaum merits atten-
tion from Carter, despite his extremely short career, because he created an 
alien character who “has an intellect at least as good as the hero’s own” and, 
as a result, broke “clean away from both the Burroughs and the Wells stereo-
types of life on Mars” (ibid).
Throughout American history, dominant Anglo-American male iden-
tity has been constructed in contrast to the multiple Others of Native Ameri-
cans, African-Americans, women, Asians, and Euro-Americans of other 
national origins.6 However, when science fiction was emerging in the United 
States at the beginning of the twentieth century, a new Other was devel-
oping—a massive influx of eastern and southern European immigrants in 
what became known as the New Immigration. The same technological and 
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scientific changes which inspired science fiction combined with this New 
Immigration to fuel racialism and the increasing popularity of the eugenics 
movement. In Bordering on the Body: The Racial Matrix of Modern Fiction 
and Culture, Laura Doyle provides a useful summary of the eugenics move-
ment in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Overtly 
combining science and politics, eugenics connected scientific theories with 
social reform: 7 “Eugenics held that ‘racial degeneration’ in Western nations 
threatened what the contemporary political writer Benjamin Kidd called 
‘the struggle of the Western races for the larger inheritance of the future.’ 
According to eugenicists, only racially responsible reproduction could reverse 
this trend and ensure success in the global economic struggle” (Doyle 11). 
As a result, outspoken anti-immigration advocates formed the Immigration 
Restriction League in 1894. “IRL leaders believed there was a racial founda-
tion to American nationality, that heredity was more powerful than environ-
ment, and that the new immigrants were racially inferior” (American). Acting 
on these beliefs, the anti-immigration leaders wrote articles and books with 
titles like Edward Ross’ “American Blood and Immigrant Blood” (1913) and 
Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race (1916). Politically, their efforts 
culminated in the passing of the Immigration Act of 1924, which imposed 
stringent quotas on southern and eastern European countries. The legisla-
tion heavily restricted the immigration of national and ethnic groups like 
Italians, Poles, and Jews, while encouraging immigration from western Euro-
pean countries. It also formalized the complete exclusion of Asians initiated 
earlier with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. At the same time, the Indian 
Citizenship Act of 1924 forced Native Americans to assimilate completely 
to Anglo-American ideals, like private land ownership, or lose their tribal 
territory completely. These simultaneous, multiple examples of American 
racialism and nativism reveal the increasing pressure being applied to the 
Anglo-American male position at the turn-of-the-century. Threatened, the 
Anglo-American men asserted their normalcy, universality, and superiority 
through the discourses of science and race.
The dual aspect of science reflects the paradoxical position of Anglo 
men. The need to prove their normalcy and universality called for a uni-
form standard and overt scientific objectivity. On the other hand, the need 
to assert their superiority led to the underlying subjectivity of their scientific 
practice and discourse. In Primate Visions, Donna Haraway begins with the 
historically dominant association of science with fact and literature with fic-
tion (3–4). From this position, “the natural sciences seem to be crafts for 
distinguishing between fact and fiction” (4). In most early science fiction, 
the viewpoint of the protagonist is allied with Western science. Therefore, it 
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seems completely reliable, without bias, and the unquestioned norm. This 
emphasis on objectivity combined with the scientific positivism of most early 
science fiction paradoxically to both support and erase the dominance of the 
Anglo male perspective. As Haraway chronicles in Primate Visions, the his-
tory of western science tells a story of progress which entails the ever-increas-
ing suppression of its own fictional nature (4).
Within the rapidly developing sciences of biology and anthropology, 
for example, race became a scientifically constructed term with overtly objec-
tive and authoritative connotations. Natural and social scientists tied both 
race and ethnicity to the physical body, and biology served as an anchor 
for individual and collective identity. It was widely believed that behavior, 
intelligence, and even morals had their foundations in ethnicity or race.8 
For instance, Madison Grant, head of the New York Zoological Society and 
trustee of the Museum of Natural History, claimed that,
New York is becoming a cloaca gentium which will produce many amaz-
ing racial hybrids and some ethnic horrors that will be beyond the pow-
ers of future anthropologists to unravel. One thing is certain: in any 
such mixture, the surviving traits will be determined by competition 
between the lowest and most primitive elements and the specialized 
traits of Nordic man; his stature, his light colored eyes, his fair skin and 
light colored hair, his straight nose and his splendid fighting and moral 
qualities, will have little part in the resultant mixture. (“New”)
Prescott F. Hall placed this “Nordic man” within the “Teutonic” or “Baltic 
race, [ . . . ] which has always been distinguished for energy, initiative, and 
self-reliance” (297). In contrast, the New Immigration consisted of “entirely 
different races—of Alpine, Mediterranean, Asiatic, and African stocks. These 
races have an entirely different mental make-up from the Baltic race” (ibid). 
Edward Ross, future president of the American Sociological Association, 
collectively defined the new immigrants as “the lowest and most primitive 
elements” of humanity, including the “Caliban type”: “from ten to twenty 
per cent are hirsute, lowbrowed, big-faced persons of obviously low mental-
ity.”9 He classified the new immigrants as atavistic ancestors of prehistoric 
humans: “clearly they belong in skins, in wattled huts at the close of the 
Great Ice Age.” Furthermore, Ross described the new immigrant “soul [as] 
burn[ing] with the dull, smoky flame of the pine-knot struck to the soil.” 
Such racial essentialism firmly linked culture and biology. Personal identity 
was conceived as a whole and stable entity with its roots in collective racial 
‘types.’
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As the preceding examples vividly illustrate, the subjective aspect of 
this scientific discourse becomes most clear in the ranking of these ‘types’ 
within a racial hierarchy which supports the dominant Anglo male position. 
In her book, The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain 1800–1960, Nancy 
Stepan discusses the replacement of the religious Great Chain of Being by a 
racial chain of progressive development, with primitive, darker races at the 
bottom and civilized, fairer races at the top. The physical components of 
this classification and division served as a static, essentialist base for the cul-
tural and historical ranking. As Nancy Stepan argues, it is not coincidental 
that this scientific discourse, constructed by western European males, bol-
stered the existing hierarchy of race, culture, gender, and nationality.10 Doyle 
joins Stepan and Haraway in emphasizing the subjective aspects of scien-
tific discourse in her study of the connections between the eugenics move-
ment and literature of the twentieth century. Discussing both American and 
British texts, Doyle asserts that “the contemporaneous development, on the 
one hand, of eugenics and, on the other hand, of the Harlem Renaissance 
and modernism—with their common focus on racialized mother figures—
emerges as no mere coincidence” (9). The scientific focus and exotic locales 
of science fiction made this popular genre susceptible to these racial theories 
as well. As a result, the racial triangle of science fiction was connected to and 
supported by a pervasive current of racialist discourse. Ostensibly objective 
yet fundamentally subjective, these racial theories were commonly utilized 
by scientists, popular writers, and literary authors to bolster the dominant 
position of the Anglo-American male.11
EDGAR RICE BURROUGHS
At the convergence of these generic and racial elements lies Edgar Rice Bur-
roughs. As noted earlier, even as science fiction historians downplay the 
scientific foundation of Burroughs’ work and connect it with a juvenile audi-
ence, they give ERB a prominent place in their histories because of his tre-
mendous popularity and literary and cultural influence. Scholes and Rabkin, 
for example, join Edward James in calling Burroughs “the most popular” of 
adventure writers (Scholes and Rabkin 11). Burroughs’ latest biographer, 
John Taliaferro, asserts that since “the most conservative estimate [of Bur-
roughs’ total sales] is thirty million books sold during his lifetime” and his 
books “have been published in more than thirty languages [ . . . ], there 
can be little question that he was the most widely read American author of 
the first half of the twentieth century” (13–4). Much of Burroughs’ popular-
ity stems from his immensely famous and influential Tarzan series. However, 
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Burroughs also wrote scientific romances, including four series taking place 
on Mars, Venus, the moon, and within the Earth’s core. In fact, his first pub-
lished work was the first book of his Mars series, A Princess of Mars, serialized 
in Munsey’s all-fiction pulp magazine, All-Story, in 1912. In addition, Bur-
roughs wrote four westerns and a realistic melodrama entitled The Girl From 
Hollywood. Two of Burroughs’ westerns, The War Chief and its sequel The 
Apache Devil, differ from Burroughs’ other works in that he conscientiously 
researched them, striving for historical authenticity, and they are written pri-
marily from a Native American point of view.12 The two Apache westerns 
and The Girl from Hollywood reflect Burroughs’ desire to be taken more seri-
ously as a writer and to escape the “pulp ghetto” (Taliaferro 15). However, 
while all three novels were published, Burroughs’ Tarzan and science fiction 
series remained the staple of his literary oeuvre. Furthermore, as Taliaferro 
aptly observes, “his work is not taught in schools or welcomed in the Ameri-
can canon” (ibid). In the age of pulps, Burroughs was king. Yet, he has only 
gained even qualified recognition in the science fiction field, while science 
fiction itself has struggled for the same type of literary respectability.13
Burroughs’ association with popular culture and juvenile literature has 
hindered a serious critical discussion of his work and suppressed the signifi-
cant racial component of his texts. Before the advent of popular culture as 
a field of study within the academic community, texts such as Burroughs’ 
were not considered worthy of serious critical attention. Furthermore, the 
Anglo-American male triangle of protagonist, author, and audience com-
bined to obscure racial issues within early science fiction texts, and often 
literature more broadly.14 The widespread connection between science and 
objectivity has compounded the problem. Today, Tarzan has taken on a 
life of his own and has escaped from a connection to his original author. 
Whereas almost everyone in contemporary western society has heard of Tar-
zan, the name of Edgar Rice Burroughs is largely unknown outside liter-
ary circles. When critics and popular audiences alike are more familiar with 
the many multi-media spin-offs of his Tarzan series than Burroughs’ books 
themselves, the racial foundation of his texts is lost. For example, how many 
viewers of Walt Disney’s latest retelling of the Tarzan story realize that the 
original, textual Tarzan “is also the son and rightful heir of England’s Lord 
and Lady Greystoke” and, “he flies a plane, quotes Latin, and oversees Eng-
lish and African estates” (Taliaferro 15)?15 Tarzan’s racial heritage was critical 
to Burroughs’ texts. As Burroughs himself explained, “I selected an infant 
child of a race strongly marked by hereditary characteristics of the finer and 
nobler sort, and [ . . . ] I threw him into an environment as diametrically 
opposite that to which he had been born as I might well conceive” (qtd. in 
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Taliaferro 14). Even those who realize Burroughs created Tarzan usually do 
not connect him with science fiction as well. For example, the hero of Bur-
roughs’ Mars series, John Carter, is the neglected step-brother of Tarzan, the 
international celebrity. Finally, the science fiction community itself has come 
belatedly to an examination of the issue of race. As late as 2003, for example, 
science fiction historian De Witt Douglas Kilgore claims that, “[i]n the study 
of popular science and science fiction, [ . . . ] despite its ubiquitous influ-
ence, race is virtually an undiscovered country” (9).16 Completely ignored 
by the literary establishment during his career, Burroughs has only gained 
limited critical attention in the later half of the twentieth century by science 
fiction historians and, more recently, by scholars interested in post- colonial 
studies and popular culture.
A more detailed and textual-based investigation of Burroughs reveals his 
interest in the scientific theories of race gaining popularity during his career. 
While Scholes and Rabkin correctly note that Burroughs “was a formula 
writer,” many of his texts contain a depth and detail of racial investigation 
that is surprising for such a prolific and popular writer of this time period, 
especially within the genre of American science fiction (12). John Taliaferro 
admits that Burroughs did not go “beyond sketching a monkey on the title 
page” of the copy of Darwin’s The Descent of Man he owned (14). However, 
Taliaferro insists that “[n]evertheless, he had acquired a layman’s grasp of 
one of the burning issues of the post-Victorian era”—”the contest between 
heredity and environment” (ibid). As noted earlier, Burroughs investigates 
this issue most directly in his Tarzan character. An analysis of Burroughs’ sci-
ence fiction texts reveals many of the Anglo-American male biases associated 
with the eugenics movement in the United States as well. It is no coincidence 
that the same year A Princess of Mars was serialized, the First International 
Eugenics Conference was held in London (Taliaferro 227). In fact, Taliaferro 
chronicles how Burroughs’ interest in eugenics continued to grow, even as 
the topic became more controversial in the scientific community (228). “At 
one point, he even wrote a column for the Los Angeles Examiner calling for 
the extermination of all ‘moral imbeciles’ and their relatives [ . . . , and i]n 
an unpublished essay, ‘I See a New Race,’ Burroughs offered his own Final 
Solution to the world’s problems” (19). As seen here, Taliaferro goes so far as 
to connect Burroughs’ position on eugenics with that of Adolf Hitler (ibid). 
While Burroughs rarely explicitly utilized eugenics in his fiction, evolution-
ary theory appears sporadically and racial typing plays a prominent role in all 
of his texts.
In Burroughs’ fiction, his belief in racial theories primarily took the 
form of stereotypical racial characterization. For instance, all of Burroughs’ 
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heroes are Anglo males. Even the hero of his relatively inclusive Apache series, 
Shoz-Dijiji, finally discovers he is the kidnapped son of Anglo parents. This 
opens the way for a romantic and sexual relationship with a white woman, 
and Burroughs “nimbly sidestep[s] the unspeakable eventuality of miscege-
nation, a well-exercised Burroughs taboo” (Taliaferro 224). Furthermore, 
Shoz-Dijiji, inexplicably refrains from some traditional aspects of Apache 
culture, such as scalping, before he learns of his biological ancestry.17 A bio-
logical member of the Anglo race, Shoz-Dijiji represents a legitimate racial 
type according to scientific theories of the time period. Therefore, he can-
not betray his civilized white blood, no matter his cultural environment. As 
Taliaferro succinctly observes, “[b]lood [ . . . ] always tells, an axiom that 
Burroughs stresses in nearly all of his stories” (15). Conversely, Burroughs 
often negatively characterizes members of differing races. “[I]n the Tarzan 
stories,” for example, “blacks are generally superstitious and Arabs rapacious” 
(Taliaferro 19). True to his adventure story roots, Burroughs utilizes racial 
Others as foils for his Anglo heroes. Taliaferro also notes that, “[o]n Mars, 
the races descend from a Tree of Life and, like fruit, are color-coded red, 
green, yellow, and black” (ibid). The “color-coded” Martian races Taliaferro 
lists here are literally aliens, in contrast to Burroughs’ Anglo, terrestrial hero. 
Although Burroughs does create a white Martian race, they remain relatively 
hidden and secretive. A Martian creation myth of a Tree of Life reveals Bur-
roughs’ interest in evolutionary theory as well.
The negative connotations of racial theory and its fictional utiliza-
tion are often well deserved. Yet, when Taliaferro associates Burroughs with 
Adolph Hitler and a “radical fringe” of science, an exceptional area of his writ-
ing is eclipsed (19). In addition to the stereotypical and hierarchical aspects 
of racial theory, Burroughs utilized the speculative potential of science fic-
tion to question and revise accepted notions of race. First, during Burroughs’ 
early career eugenics was widely popular. It had connotations of objectivity 
and authority because of its scientific associations, and many considered it 
an important tool in progressive social reform. While certainly biased, preju-
diced, and often scientifically inaccurate, Burroughs should not be judged 
by post-Holocaust standards. As Taliaferro himself admits, “[e]ven as he was 
stressing Tarzan’s and John Carter’s superior bloodlines, [Burroughs] honored 
the Algeresque notion of the common man pulling himself up by the boot-
straps”(19). It is this side of Burroughs, the more democratic and egalitarian 
side, that surfaced in his science fiction and not the Tarzan stories.
Because the science fiction genre emphasizes invention, exploration, 
and speculation, authors can utilize the genre to question traditional 
boundaries, social conventions, and hierarchies. As mentioned earlier, 
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the speculative element of early American science fiction usually took the 
form of technical inventions and exotic extraterrestrial settings. Burroughs’ 
more extensive, detailed, and sometimes egalitarian investigation of race in 
the Mars series was not the norm in early science fiction. A racial analysis 
of Burroughs’ science fiction texts, while often illustrating the societal and 
scientific biases of the time period, also reveals some sites of more open and 
truly imaginative racial exploration. In an extraterrestrial setting, largely free 
from Earth history and cultural norms (on a narrative level), science fiction 
authors have more license to construct alternative realities. The convergence 
of new, science fiction elements with the terrestrial concept of race could 
lead to a more egalitarian ethos. The fiction can combine with the science to 
revise even the most objectively or subjectively entrenched theories. The new 
context for ethnicity and race not only places it outside of Earth history, but 
also the larger and more inclusive galactic and/or global setting makes more 
narrowly national or ethnic/racial differences seem of lesser importance. 
In addition, race itself expands in definition: biological or ethic ‘races’ are 
joined by the more inclusive ‘human race.’ Within a multi-planet context, 
the races of Earth become united in a single human race with a common 
terrestrial culture. The Other is no longer terrestrial but extraterrestrial.18 
The more imaginative and expansive space offered by science fiction allows 
authors to create alternative relationships which challenge or undermine 
traditional power hierarchies. For example, whereas Tarzan can never escape 
the ramifications of his noble blood, John Carter can acceptably marry a red 
Martian princess, be the proud father of hybrid terrestrial/alien offspring, and 
ultimately renounce terrestrial society entirely for a life on Mars. Burroughs’ 
characters or ‘types’ representing specific, scientifically-authorized racial 
groups remain largely essentialized, separate, and hierarchically positioned; 
however, some individual (exceptional) platonic, romantic, and/or sexual 
relationships do develop in the science fiction. These relationships cross and 
blur social and biological racial boundaries and, as a result, challenge the 
traditional hierarchies which exist in other areas of Burroughs’ text(s) and the 
stability of racialist identity.
Burroughs’ first science fiction series best illustrates these generic and 
racial characteristics. The first installment of the Mars series, A Princess 
of Mars, was not only Burroughs’ first published work (1912), but also 
contains the seeds of his later writing—topically, generically, and in choice of 
protagonist. First, a basic topic or theme of Burroughs’ fiction is the concept 
of progress, with its foundation in European ideology and subsequent 
growth in America. Both the genre(s) and the protagonist of A Princess of 
Mars are intimately linked to this progress as well. A multi-generic narrative, 
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A Princess of Mars begins with the (relative) realism of the western genre and 
then moves to an extraterrestrial setting which combines aspects of colonial 
literature, the scientific romance, and adventure stories. Burroughs uses the 
literal geographical and chronological progress of his protagonist, John Carter, 
as a vehicle for charting this generic movement. Carter’s personal progress 
symbolizes the larger progress of western civilization as well—historically, 
culturally, and racially. As a typical Anglo-American hero, the character of 
John Carter foregrounds the ideological base of the concept of progress, 
specifically progress defined as positive, inevitable, and racially/ culturally-
based. Of course, progress also entails a continual dynamic of change and 
movement; progress can never end. The result is the almost compulsively 
restless movement of the text generically and Carter physically, both of which 
translate to constantly changing settings as well. By the turn of the century, 
when Burroughs begins his writing career, there remained few areas of the 
globe ‘unknown’ to the western world. Therefore, this desire for constant 
movement, and the exploration and expansion it inspires, engendered the 
increasing popularity of extraterrestrial settings for adventure stories. Kilgore 
combines the concept of western progress and outer space in this desire 
for a new “frontier” (11). Building on “the nineteenth-century notion that 
conquest and empire are the logical modus operandi of any progressive 
civilization,” the extraterrestrial focus of science fiction “represents twentieth-
century American culture’s attempts to deny the possibility of limits to its 
physical and metaphysical reach” (ibid).19
In Primate Visions, Donna Haraway more broadly discusses the restless-
ness of “civilized man” and its connection to both the tropics and outer space: 
“Space and the tropics are both utopian topical figures in western imagina-
tions, and their opposed properties dialectically signify origins and ends for 
the creature whose mundane life is outside both: civilized man. Space and 
the tropics are ‘allotopic’; i.e. they are ‘elsewhere,’ the place to which the trav-
eler goes to find something dangerous and sacred” (137). While Burroughs’ 
Tarzan series directly reflects such an investigation of the origins of man 
through the intersections of the tropics, primates, and “civilized man,” his 
Mars series embodies similar interests within the larger scope of space. Paul 
Carter focuses exclusively on the (American) western aspects of Burroughs’ 
Mars. However, Burroughs constructed a Martian bricolage of modern and 
ancient, multi-generic elements. Mars is a habitable planet with dead seas 
and ruins, barbarous green people, jungles, and lost civilizations. Much like 
the tropics of Tarzan, this Mars reflects the archaic tendencies of fantasy and 
some science fiction. Simultaneously, Mars supports a civilized culture of red 
people who possess advanced weapons, technology for atmospheric control, 
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and mechanical travel. John Carter both fights with a sword and travels by 
air.20 By combining the tropics and space in one planet and one narrative, 
Burroughs combines the past and the future of mankind, man’s origins and 
his destiny. This allows Burroughs to chart the progress of humankind from 
beginning to end from a Euro-American perspective. Such progress entails 
many diverse and often intertwined elements: the social, cultural, historical, 
and geographic, as well as material, technological, religious, and biological. 
The great length of this list effectively highlights the pervasive and founda-
tional role progress plays in western civilization.
Burrroughs’ American focus in the Mars series adds a unique spin to 
the Western European concept of progress. While the Tarzan series deals 
with many of the more traditional European colonial issues, in the Mars 
series, Burroughs places these issues within the American colonial context of 
slavery and western expansion. The American West is the equivalent of the 
European tropics. Burroughs clearly subscribes to American exceptionalism, 
situating the United States as the pinnacle of western progress. In this way, 
Burroughs uses his protagonist to build on, and sometimes revise the western 
concept of progress. As Burroughs charts the development of the United 
States, from eastern slavery to the western frontier to the technological future 
of twentieth-century America, he creates a New World hero, John Carter, 
who far outstrips an Old World Tarzan. Burroughs begins with the American 
West as a third “elsewhere,” an elsewhere embodying both the future of 
Americans in the form of manifest destiny and also the past, as the frontier 
or Wild West has effectively ended by the time Burroughs writes his first 
Mars book. He examines the specific characteristics of American progress, 
utilizing ethnic comparisons and hierarchies to promote American values 
such as individualism, the cultivation of land, and capitalism. In his choice 
of protagonist, Burroughs illustrates the centrality and mastery of Anglo 
men in the origins of humankind or man’s past and also man’s destiny or the 
future. As a prospector, adventurer, and Indian fighter, as well as a former 
Confederate soldier, John Carter is the epitome of the warrior hero. Yet, lest 
he be perceived as uncivilized or a savage, Burroughs personally attests that 
Carter represents the ideal gentleman. Thus, Carter confronts and conquers 
rather than internalizes and values the wilderness or the savage. Nature and 
the ethnic Other are resources for developing and/or illustrating Carter’s 
masculinity and the frontier characteristics of physical conflict, a strong 
physique, courage, and individualism. While the native Other remains an 
anachronism, incapable of change or adaptation, John Carter embodies 
progress and swiftly and easily moves between environments and cultures 
and embraces the futuristic elements of the modern world.
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The generic and geographical movement of the text to Mars entails the 
transformation of a racial Other into an alien Other. The Native Americans 
of the West become a multi-racial Martian society. On one level, an extrater-
restrial Other is a welcome replacement for terrestrial othering focused on 
ethnicity, race, nationality, or gender. As mentioned earlier, the existence of an 
alien Other can foreground the unity of the human race. Yet, such a fictional 
transformation also suppresses the importance of race to human society. The 
real prejudice and oppression experienced by many groups is eclipsed, and 
any explicit discussion of race is effectively forestalled. Simultaneously, the 
guilt of oppressors is obscured and any redress of grievances becomes more 
difficult. In the creation of aliens, science fiction authors avoid specific details 
of ethnic or racial Others as well. The creation of an alien entails no research, 
let alone understanding or empathy for an oppressed group of people. In 
fact, due to the fictional license of the imaginative character, an alien Other 
can be either more negative or more positive than a racial Other. Burroughs, 
for example, represents the norm for early science fiction authors when he 
transforms the existing, highly negative stereotype of Native Americans, from 
the western segment of his Mars series, into even more terrible and alienat-
ing green Martians. On the other hand, his representation of red Martians 
is more favorable than that of the natives in many American and European 
colonial and post-colonial texts (whether Native American or Indian). In 
either case, however, the science fiction author can stress the fictional basis 
of the extraterrestrial character if anyone questions the similarity to existing 
terrestrial groups. With all of these underlying motivations, as well as the 
generic impetus of alien plausibility, it is no wonder that the portrayal of 
characters representing real-life racial Others was uncommon in early science 
fiction. While Burroughs clearly utilizes such a racial/alien transformation, 
he is atypical for an early science fiction author in his extensive portrayal of 
Native Americans and aliens based on specific racial groups. In addition, the 
multi-generic and geographic setting of A Princess of Mars explicitly draws 
attention to the racial/alien transformation rather than suppressing it. Bur-
roughs directly and extensively explores race and racial theories in his texts 
and, in doing so, creates the potential for dialogue and change.
In A Princess of Mars, as Carter moves from the American West, and 
the historical, social, and literary limitations of Earth, Burroughs’ vision 
expands. In addition to existing terrestrial hierarchical relations privileging 
Anglo men, western progress is increasingly associated with the American 
‘progressive’ ideals of equality and diversity. In this way, Burroughs maintains 
the concept of American exceptionalism while undermining some aspects of 
western progress in the Mars context. Furthermore, the single, ethnographic 
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viewpoint and Anglo-American bias of John Carter are challenged by the 
creation mythology of one of the Martian races and the history of Mars 
itself. Burroughs utilizes the imaginative, liberating potential of the literal 
unknown—the future elsewhere of outer space and its complementary liter-
ary genre of science fiction—to explore, question, and revise the cultural and 
racial hierarchies established in other areas of the text.
THE AMERICAN WEST
Writing in the early 20th century, Burroughs chooses to begin the Mars series 
within a specifically American past—the western frontier. Taking part in the 
turn-of-the-century “wilderness cult,” Burroughs followed prominent Amer-
icans such as Theodore Roosevelt in promoting a return to frontier charac-
teristics (Nash 141). With the frontier “moribund,” “the qualities of solitude 
and hardship that had intimidated many pioneers were likely to be magneti-
cally attractive to their city-dwelling grandchildren” (Nash 143). The mecha-
nization and urbanization of western progress were considered by some to 
be fostering decadence and a general weakening of masculine and national 
virility.21 For example, Roosevelt’s “trips to the West where the virile virtues 
abounded were real-life pilgrimages in search of the ‘race-hardening’ experi-
ence of the frontier” (Dyer 169). This wilderness nostalgia, and its roots in 
sexual, gender, and racial insecurities, helps explain why Burroughs chose the 
American West and elements of the western genre for the beginning of his 
first published narrative. He logically started with the wilderness geographi-
cally closest, most familiar to himself and his readers, and most fundamen-
tally and uniquely American. It is no coincidence that Zane Grey and his 
westerns rivaled the popularity of Burroughs at the turn of the century.
Within the context of science fiction, Burroughs reminds Americans of 
their virile past as a springboard to their equally virile, imperialistic future. 
John Carter needs a Wild West in order to demonstrate his physical abilities, 
his self-reliance, and his superiority in comparison to the ethnic Other of 
Native Americans. He cannot be a warrior hero in the geographical and social 
confines of a modern city; in pre-WWI, at-peace American society, violence 
and physical conflict were largely unacceptable modes of behavior. Nor could 
Carter as easily demonstrate his superior cultivation and civilized nature 
without the extremity of contrast offered by natural savages.22 In addition, 
for Burroughs’ modern (urban) reader, an exotic or unfamiliar locale would 
be essential for the adventure and escapism of both the main character and 
the reader’s own vicarious participation. It is telling that Burroughs personally 
fits the template of the urban dweller who writes of thrilling adventures and 
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manhood-developing hardships on the frontier.23 Burroughs did have some 
personal contact with the American West: as a youth he visited his older 
brothers on their cattle ranch in Idaho, and he served in the Seventh Cavalry 
at Fort Grant in the Arizona Territory for 10 months. However, he had no 
contact with Indians beyond those in the U.S. military, he saw no actual 
combat, and his wilderness forays were of short duration.24 The American 
West was an elsewhere for Burroughs, as it was for his main character, John 
Carter, and his readers.25 Furthermore, like Roosevelt, Burroughs does not 
promote a Romantic or spiritual oneness with nature or the concept of the 
noble savage. The primitive does not have any intrinsic value in and of itself; 
the wilderness and savages are resources for the construction of a superior 
white, western manhood. The comparisons between civilized and savage 
or primitive people this process entails illustrate the general rightness, the 
historical actuality, and the inevitability of western, American progress.
Frederick Jackson Turner had heralded the end of the frontier in his 
highly influential essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in American His-
tory.” He first read his essay at the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition 
in July of 1893, an exposition that Burroughs actually attended as a youth 
growing up in Chicago. The expo was organized as “a celebration of the 
remarkable progress the United States had made since Columbus’s arrival 
four hundred years earlier. [ . . . T]hey built a neoclassical ‘White City’ 
along the shores of Lake Michigan, which they packed with a vast array of 
marvelous displays of American know-how” (Taliaferro 34–5). Although 
there is no record of the specific exhibits or events Burroughs attended, 
the expo as a whole illustrates a complex nexus of themes running through 
Burroughs’ later writing. First, the expo portrayed the future of western 
man culminating in dominant white American society, as the White City 
reflects, and its technological/scientific progress. Also, the urban location 
of the expo promoted the development of large, cultured urban centers 
like Chicago. Since progress can only be measured by the opposite, how-
ever, the expo also embodied man’s past. A more positive past took the 
form of the neoclassical revival. Within this context, America is the heir 
of ancient Greek civilization, represented as the root of western civiliza-
tion. Conversely, exhibits of various primitive cultures represented a more 
negative past: “America brashly announced its arrival at the summit of the 
human pyramid [; . . . i]n the Anthropological Building, [ . . . ] dis-
plays of ethnic costumes and handicrafts from around the world served as 
quaint counterpoint to the brilliant American inventions of the surround-
ing White City” (Taliaferro 35). This cultural ‘progress’ was supported 
by scientific exhibits as well. “Science spoke even louder than trinkets in 
18 The Subject of Race in American Science Fiction
the Anthropological hall, and thousands of tourists, curious to see where 
they ranked on the scale of human progress, lined up to have their heads 
measured—‘anthropometry,’ it was called—by a team of anthropologists” 
(ibid). Within this ‘progressive’ cultural and scientific context, Turner’s 
essay on the end of the American frontier becomes another example of 
the superiority of Anglo people and culture, as well as the inevitability of 
their succession of all other people. Primitive, native, generally darker-
skinned cultures and people were the first to face elimination or subjuga-
tion. In the ‘natural’ and ‘universal’ evolution of people and cultures such 
a model of progress entails, Native Americans become anachronisms who 
are destroyed or assimilated and the (western) frontier ends as Anglo, par-
ticularly American, civilization expands and develops (Turner 11).
This larger cultural picture and its progressive, western values are 
symbolized on a smaller scale in the characters of the Mars series. John 
Carter represents the civilized white American male whose identity is 
simultaneously based on the rough frontier and comparison to culturally, 
historically, and biologically primitive natives—Native Americans and 
Africans. Turner’s history of the American frontier fleshes out the picture 
of Carter as a frontiersman—that unique American who combines the 
characteristics of both the civilized European and the savage Native Amer-
ican:
the frontier is the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between 
savagery and civilization. (3)
The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. 
The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, 
industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. [ . . . ] It strips off 
the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the 
moccasin [ . . . H]e shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in ortho-
dox Indian fashion.26
In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. 
He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish [ . . . ]. Lit-
tle by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old 
Europe. [ . . . H]ere is a new product that is American. (4)
Turner emphasizes the changes that take place as the European comes into 
direct and sustained contact with the “wilderness” and its native occupants. 
However, like Burroughs, he rejects total assimilation, or in European 
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ideology, reversion to the primitive. First, the strenuous, perilous, and 
unfamiliar conditions of the American wilderness and the savage behavior 
of the Indians justify an eye-for-an-eye, savage physical response from the 
civilized Europeans. If European settlers occasionally lapsed from their 
civilized natures and were guilty of Indian massacres, it could be justified by 
the pressures of the environment and the savagery of their opponents—all 
external factors. Furthermore, the most important element in the process 
of making an American is the “transformation” of the wilderness. Through 
confrontation with and civilization of the primitive, Europeans became 
Americans—a “new product” superior to the old European type.
Foreshadowing Theodore Roosevelt and the Wilderness Cult, Wash-
ington Irving touted the benefits of American frontier life in 1835. “Sev-
eral weeks of camping convinced him that nothing could be more beneficial 
to young men than the ‘wild wood life . . . of a magnificent wilderness’” 
because it encouraged the positive American values of independence, mas-
culinity, and bodily strength (Nash 73). Irving wrote, “we send our youth 
abroad to grow luxurious and effeminate in Europe; it appears to me, that 
a previous tour on the prairies would be more likely to produce that man-
liness, simplicity, and self-dependence most in unison with our political 
institutions’” (ibid). Physical confrontation with the primitive environment 
and native occupants was believed to foster the ideals of hard work, self-reli-
ance, virility, and physical conquest. This connection between individual-
ism and masculinity in American ideology is not a coincidence. European 
males, women, slaves, poor white men, children and Native Americans were 
perceived as dependent, physically weaker, or lazy; they were not capable of 
achieving true individualism or self-reliance, and therefore, were not included 
in American democracy. Conversely, ideal American men must be self-reliant 
and individualistic; men were associated with the frontier; and white, prop-
erty-owning American men were the only persons worthy of full access to the 
democratic system and the rights it entailed. Turner argues that the frontier 
inspired the fundamental American values of individualism and democracy: 
“the frontier is productive of individualism [ . . . ]. The tendency is anti-
social. It produces antipathy to control. [ . . . ] The frontier individualism 
has from the beginning promoted democracy” (30).
As the ideal American hero, John Carter embodies all of these positive 
characteristics. As a frontiersman, John Carter is a thoroughly civilized man 
who confronts and conquers savage environments and native people. The 
influence of the primitive on the Euro-American male is not (normally or 
ideally) the creation of an amalgamation—a semi-civilized human. Rather, 
the essential civilized nature of a European acquires uniquely American, 
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positive characteristics through exposure to the primitive. In a complex 
intersection of sexual, gender, racial, and national hierarchies, particularly 
after the wilderness and the American savages have been largely subdued or 
destroyed, we see the primitive, the natural becoming positive influences 
in the creation of a unique and superior (white) American male type. John 
Carter represents on an individual level what the Chicago World’s Columbian 
Exposition represented on a collective level—America and Americans are the 
next step in the geographic, cultural, racial, political, and historical progress 
of western civilization.
The fundamental and pervasive nature of the biases and hierarchies 
involved in the creation of Anglo-American manhood is most apparent 
when investigating a highly influential and positively constructed concept 
like individualism. Burroughs follows Irving and Turner in associating indi-
vidualism with the American West; however, John Carter’s individualism 
also springs from the American South. Before his foray into the American 
West, Carter grew up in the antebellum South and was known as a “typical 
southern gentleman of the highest type” (Princess v). Within this context, the 
hierarchical, slave-based individualism of the plantation ‘aristocracy’ plays an 
equal role in Carter’s character as the democratic individualism of the fron-
tier.27 Hence, Carter’s individualism is connected with a more civilized soci-
ety and one in which the racial othering is, paradoxically, more obscured. As 
a fictional narrator and character within the text, Burroughs asserts that “our 
slaves fairly worshipped the ground [Carter] trod” (ibid). Burroughs’ uncriti-
cal affirmation of slavery here, particularly the constructed complicity of the 
African-American slaves in their own oppression, coincides with his personal 
connection to the southern, slave-owing class. Using the first-person and 
signing his own name to the Foreword, Burroughs places himself with the 
story: “My first recollection of Captain Carter is of the few months he spent 
at my father’s home in Virginia, just prior to the opening of the civil war” 
(ibid). This allows Burroughs to emphasize a branch of his family tree of 
which he was excessively proud: he “preferred to stress those relatives of Mary 
Evaline Zieger Burroughs [his mother] who had settled in Virginia in the 
eighteenth century, including John Coleman, after whom Burroughs named 
his second son” (Taliaferro 27). He felt that “he was the direct descendant 
of the fighting cavaliers of the Old Dominion, and in several of his novels 
he attributes the gallantry and valor of his heroes expressly to their Virginia 
lineage” (ibid).
John Carter fits this template perfectly, even down to his part in the 
Civil War—a captain in the Confederate Army.28 By placing Carter within 
the context of the antebellum South, Burroughs intends to emphasize 
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Carter’s highly civilized nature and his superiority as a civilized, white 
male in comparison to the less privileged members of hierarchical southern 
society (slaves, blacks, women, poor whites, etc.). As a character in the text, 
Burroughs would embody similar characteristics through his connection to 
John Carter. Likewise, the authorial Burroughs would occupy an elevated 
position in turn-of-the-century, New Immigration American society.
A more critical reader questions this highly positive perspective on 
Carter and the relationship between his position in society and his personal 
attributes. The American individualism and democracy of the frontier are 
different from that of the antebellum South. Furthermore, both the ante-
bellum South and the frontier are based on ethnic and racial othering and 
power hierarchies. Whereas Burroughs and Turner participate in and even 
promote these in their writing, many (particularly current) readers note the 
discrepancy between the American ideals of individualism and democracy 
and their historical basis in racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism. Contempo-
rary critic Kristin Herzog, for example, argues that “The frontier [ . . . ] 
more than any other influence, made the American novel more individual-
istic and more male-centered than English fiction of the nineteenth century. 
[ . . . ] The violence and vigor of the frontier world and the lack of a native 
cultural tradition fostered the American Adam’s disregard for persons dif-
ferent from himself ” (xvii-xviii). In a similar manner, British author D.H. 
Lawrence undermines the “blood brother theme” (56), “democracy,” and the 
“nucleus of a new society” (59) offered in James Fenimore Cooper’s Leather-
stocking novels. A 19th-century precursor of John Carter, the protagonist of 
the Leatherstocking series, Natty Bumppo, embodies the frontiersman—the 
essentially civilized white man who is also “hard, isolate, stoic, and a killer” 
(68). Like John Carter, Bumppo is a “man who turns his back on white soci-
ety. A man who keeps his moral integrity hard and intact [ . . . ], who lives 
by death, by killing, but who is pure white” (69). Cooper, Turner, and Bur-
roughs promote the frontier-stimulated, American values of individualism 
and democracy, but by associating these values exclusively with (male) whites, 
they illustrate the hierarchical basis of these values in America. In addition, 
Turner and Burroughs (in terms of the West and the South) gloss over the 
oppression, conflict, violence, and death, particularly of the ethnic or racial 
other, that occurs when such discrepancies exist. Burroughs’ brief mention 
of the Civil War and Turner’s “series of Indian wars” (9) and his metaphor of 
the frontier as “a military training school” (15) remind the reader of the cost 
involved in the creation of white, male heroes.
This combination of hierarchies and biases that underlies purported 
American ideals is illustrated in the self-reliance of the American hero as 
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well. In a brief synopsis of the American literary tradition of the American 
Adam and its “white” and “male-centered[ness],” Kristin Herzog asserts that 
“egalitarianism in America casts the individual in a lonely role without heri-
tage or tradition. The American Adam has to achieve everything he does or 
becomes” (xvi). Unlike his European counterpart, the “American folk hero 
has ‘no parents, no past, no patrimony, no siblings, no family, no life cycle 
[ . . . ]. He seldom dies’” (ibid).29 In A Princess of Mars, Carter begins the 
narrative by denying his past before the age of thirty, insisting that he does 
not age normally, and admitting he has died several times: “I am a very old 
man; how old I do not know. [ . . . ] I cannot tell because I have never 
aged as other men do, nor do I remember my childhood. So far as I can 
recollect I have always been a man, a man of about thirty. [ . . . ] I do 
not know why I should fear death, I who have died twice and am still alive” 
(Princess 11). Carter does later marry and have a child, continuing the “life 
cycle,” because Burroughs included an element of the romance genre in 
the series as well. However, this focus on individualism and self-reliance, as 
well as the indestructible or immortal nature of the American hero, coin-
cides with Donna Haraway’s argument that white travelers to elsewheres are 
usually portrayed as lone, intrepid individuals. They courageously enter an 
unknown space (like the tropics, outer space, or the American West) without 
the direct assistance of others. As representatives of civilized, western (white) 
culture, they are insistently portrayed as “alone” despite their interaction 
with ethnic or racial Others (Haraway 154). Thus, Carter begins his story 
cut off from white, western civilization—his family, his native South and the 
eastern United States, and even his mining partner—as he fights for survival 
against Native American Others. Even as Carter builds relationships with the 
Martians over time, he remains the sole representative of Earth and always is 
set apart—physically, culturally, and nationally.
Logically, Carter should be defined as the Other in the American west-
ern context and the alien in the Martian context, since he is within a society 
different from his own. However, within western ideology, from the Anglo 
male perspective (author, publisher, protagonist, and historically audience as 
well), Carter is the unquestioned normative hero. Haraway highlights this 
contradictory repression of historically-specific racial, gender, and cultural 
markers in an attempt to collapse white, western man with “universal man” 
(i.e. all humans) (186). On one level (precisely because he is an egalitarian 
American), John Carter is a universal hero with universal cultural values. On 
the other hand, Burroughs goes out of his way in the Foreword to give us 
some historical and biographical background which clearly situates Carter 
as a white, cultured southern American. As Haraway notes, the implicit or 
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indirect racial, gender, and cultural markers are essential for the construction 
of ethnic, racial, and national hierarchies (153). John Carter is a universal 
hero precisely because he is a white southern gentleman and former Captain 
in the Confederate Army.
Closely examining the representation of Native Americans and Cart-
er’s relationship to this first ethnic Other reveals the importance of other-
ing to the construction of Anglo male identity and the material progress 
so fundamental to western, particularly American ideology. According 
to Haraway, Carter would be searching for “something dangerous and 
sacred” in his travels; he finds both in the same ethnic Other—Native 
Americans (137). Carter finds “danger” in the threat of hostile Indians, 
who kill his partner and chase him to an abandoned and mysterious cave. 
Here he escapes from the “danger” through the “sacred”: as the “savage 
face[s]” peered into the cave, “[e]ach face was the picture of awe and fear”; 
as a “low moaning sound issued from the recesses of the cave,” the Indi-
ans departed so hastily that one of them was accidentally pushed from 
the steep trail to his death (Princess 17–8). Playing on the convention(s) 
of first contact between Europeans and natives, Burroughs sets up this 
scene as if the Native Americans were deathly in “awe and fear” of Carter 
himself, reacting as if he were a god or of supernatural origin (ibid). Cer-
tainly such a response from the natives would reflect the Europeans’ con-
struction of their own superior, rational identity and the inferior, gullible, 
superstitious nature of primitives. Burroughs’ representation of the super-
stitious nature of Native American people reflects the larger Euro-Ameri-
can conception of both women and ethnic or racial Others: “From earliest 
times until today, women have been described, like the nonwhite races, 
as more passive, less logical; more imaginative, less technically inclined; 
more emotional, less incisive; and more religious, less scientifically ori-
ented” (Herzog xi-xii). On this mysterious note, Burroughs leaves the 
American West and turns to Mars. Using the American West as a framing 
device maintains the illusion of Carter’s god-like nature and heightens the 
narrative suspense as well, for we leave Carter’s body in the cave until the 
very end of the text.
We do not find out the true reason for the Native Americans’ fears 
until the last chapter of A Princess of Mars: the darkness of the cave hid 
“the dead and mummified remains of a little old woman with long black 
hair, and the thing [she] leaned over was a small charcoal burner upon 
which rested a round copper vessel containing a small quantity of green-
ish powder” (158). Furthermore, “[b]ehind her, depending from the roof 
upon rawhide thongs, and stretching entirely across the cave, was a row 
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of human skeletons. From the thong which held them stretched another 
to the dead hand of the little old woman [ . . . ]. It was a most gro-
tesque and horrid tableau” (ibid). It was not Carter, then, who prompted 
the fearful response of the Native American men but a powerful, deadly, 
and perhaps sacred place. From Carter’s Anglo-American perspective, a 
gravesite becomes a “grotesque and horrid tableau.” Burroughs symbol-
izes the mystery or Otherness of the Native Americans as an old witch or 
shaman with magic powders, a kettle, and human skeletons. This associa-
tion of Native Americans with age, immobility, decay, and death empha-
sizes the anachronistic quality and destiny of natives within the concept of 
western progress. Burroughs’ choice of a (dead) woman as the symbol for 
Native American culture and the connection between women and “non-
white races” foreground the feminization of Others also (Herzog xi). For 
example, Laura Doyle examines the scientific theory of paedomorphism 
and its “alignment of all women with the ‘lower races’ by suggesting that 
both embodied the childhood of humanity. [ . . . ] Certain races and 
the female sex represent, in this theory, ‘older’ evolutionary forms beyond 
which other ‘younger’ races and the male sex have evolved” (65). Thus, 
cultural anachronism is conjoined with and proven by a biological anach-
ronism. This biological basis for cultural differences, or sexual and racial 
essentialism, served as a scientific rationale for the oppression of these 
groups.
Burroughs further emphasizes the feminization of the Other through 
a complex native matrix composed of the unknown, the sacred, the dan-
gerous, and the “grotesque and horrid” (Princess 158). This matrix serves 
as a resource for the spiritual and physical rebirth of Euro-Americans. 
Having mysteriously lost his ability to move, Carter lies in the dark cave 
(a ‘womb’) until “possibly midnight” (Princess 18). Then, giving a “super-
human effort” of the mind (and specifically not the body), Carter feels 
“something g[i]ve, [ . . . ] a momentary feeling of nausea, a sharp click 
as of the snapping of a steel wire,” and he realizes that he has separated 
from his body (18–19). In a literal manifestation of the mind/body split 
of western culture, Carter becomes totally mind or spirit and remains dis-
connected from his physical body until the end of the text. Conversely, 
the feminine racial Other is only represented by a body, with no mind or 
spirit attached. As Burroughs utilizes a feminine and racially-other body 
for the concentration and strengthening of his male protagonist’s meta-
physical qualities, we see the gender and racial hierarchies attached to the 
western mind/body division.30 Carter assures himself, and the reader, that 
he is not dead; he has been physically reborn in another body, exactly 
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like his old one except it was “naked as at the minute of [his] birth” (19). 
Finally escaping from the “grotesque and horrid” womb of the cave/a 
Native American/woman, Carter is mysteriously teleported to the planet 
of Mars in a spiritual rebirth. John Carter not only shares the same initials 
as Jesus Christ, then; he similarly ‘rises from the dead,’ emerges from a 
dark ‘tomb,’ and asserts his immortality. The mind/body split and its hier-
archical connotations in western society stem, in large part, from the valo-
rization of the spirit and denigration of the body in Christian theology. In 
the Martian context, John Carter mirrors Jesus Christ in the emphasis on 
his difference from the people and society surrounding him as well. Carter 
may be alone in an alien world, but he is perfect, more powerful, a ‘mes-
siah’ to others, and ultimately invincible.
Of course, the mind/body division experienced by Carter hints that 
he may only be dreaming the subsequent Mars sequences. While such a 
theory is plausible, it would only reinforce the power of the male intel-
lect or spirit, as Carter mentally creates another whole world. In contrast 
to the Native American woman and her “grotesque and horrid” womb, 
Carter would be associated with the mental and artistic abilities of the 
authorial Burroughs in this case. Furthermore, Carter returns to Mars on 
many occasions over the course of the series. It is rare in science fiction 
or u/dystopian writing for a dream motif to happen more than once. In 
fact, some critics argue that science fiction should not utilize the dream 
motif at all because it undermines the rational or scientific foundation 
of the genre. In contrast to the European legacy of writers such as Jules 
Verne and H.G. Wells, Burroughs chooses racial othering to facilitate 
space travel, rather than modern technology and science. It is through 
the exoticism and appropriation of a native or ethnic Other that Bur-
roughs empowers his hero. Because of the long history of ethnic othering 
in the United States, particularly of Native Americans by Euro-Americans, 
Burroughs’ readers generally do not question the logic or credibility of 
this maneuver. One elsewhere gives birth to another elsewhere; one ethnic 
Other is a stepping stone to a more distant planetary racial Other.
Certainly, Carter cannot stay in the West indefinitely, even with 
the author’s fictional ability to go back in time. Carter must move on as 
the West is settled and cultivated by pioneers and the Native Americans 
restricted to reservations and battled into ‘submission.’ The Other, the 
source of power and identity for the hero, has been destroyed—through 
disease, warfare, isolation, and assimilation. The western frontier may be 
ended, as Turner notes in the last paragraph of his essay “The Significance 
of the Frontier in American History,” yet “[h]e would be a rash prophet 
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who should assert that the expansive character of American life has now 
entirely ceased. Movement has been its dominant fact, and [ . . . ] 
American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise” 
(37).
THE AMERICAN WEST INTO MARS
If the United States was the next step in the geographical and social progress 
of western civilization, and Euro-Americans had already fulfilled their duty 
to reach from coast to coast and “displace inferior races,” as well as create an 
advanced cultural and technological society, then what was the next logical 
step (Dyer 60)? European colonialism had merged into American imperial-
ism and, at the turn of the century, United States foreign policy was encom-
passing greater and greater physical boundaries. From the east to the west 
coast, from the North to the South, and from the North American Con-
tinent to Latin America and the Pacific islands, the United States was con-
quering physical territory and establishing a military, political, and cultural 
hegemony. Following American history, Burroughs moves from the South 
to the West and from the West to a combination of the imperial elsewheres 
of the tropics and outer space—merging them in his characterization of the 
planet of Mars. Burroughs’ choice of an interplanetary rather than terres-
trial setting, specifically of Mars, is not surprising in light of the following 
factors. First, by the turn of the century, most areas of the terrestrial world 
had been not only ‘discovered’ and explored, but also colonized by European 
countries. There was no room, no ‘blank spaces’ left for an American hero to 
conquer in the terrestrial present or future. Therefore, once out of the past 
of the American West, modern, cutting-edge, nationalistic American society 
called for the most ambitious movement of all—outside of the known world. 
“Space, the final frontier” is a well-known phrase to contemporary Americans 
thanks to the Star Trek series of the second half of the twentieth century.
The planet of Mars was a logical choice for the specific interplanetary 
setting, as Mars was named after the Roman god of war and John Carter 
represents the ideal warrior. From his 20th-century perspective, influenced 
by the national obsession with virility and physical activity, Burroughs 
could be speaking autobiographically when he has Carter reminisce: “My 
attention was quickly riveted by a large red star close to the distant horizon. 
As I gazed upon it I felt a spell of overpowering fascination—it was Mars, 
the god of war, and for me, the fighting man, it had always held the power 
of irresistible enchantment” (Princess 20). Furthermore, Mars had been 
attracting the attention of scientists and popular writers for sometime 
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previous to Burroughs’ writing of the Mars series. John Taliaferro chronicles 
the astronomical interest in possible Martian life starting in 1879 and 
connects Burroughs’ fictional depiction of Mars to that of Gustavus W. Pope 
in 1894 and H.G. Wells in 1898 (67).
Burroughs choice of an interplanetary setting for his first science fic-
tion series reflects his specifically American bias as well. While the United 
States was a colonial and imperial power, like its Old World predecessors, 
Americans chose to foreground their superiority over Europeans in terms of 
the revolutionary values of freedom and equality. In other words, they chose 
to ignore their own imperial attitudes and activities or interpret them in a 
more benevolent light than that of other European peoples. This can be seen 
in Burroughs’ own work as he chooses a European, specifically a member of 
the English nobility, as his main character in the Tarzan series because it takes 
place in colonial Africa. On the other hand, as an egalitarian and freedom-
loving American, John Carter travels alone, outside of a specifically delin-
eated colonial or imperial context and, once on Mars, supposedly outside 
of terrestrial history altogether. Furthermore, in moving from the historical 
context of the American West to the imaginative setting of Mars, Burroughs 
transforms Carter’s perspective as narrator from that of an interested, clearly 
biased frontiersman to a more detached, objective observer of alien native 
life. Burroughs attempts to ground the narrative and its hierarchies in more 
modern, scientific language and theory. The Mars series becomes science fic-
tion not only in terms of an interplanetary setting but also in the narra-
tive perspective and interests and the technological and cultural features of 
the various Martian societies. Thus, Americans are associated with the most 
modern, enlightened, and unbiased characteristics—socially, materially, and 
in literature. Like Burroughs’ construction of America’s frontier past, then, 
American ethnocentrism played a large role in Burroughs’ movement from 
the American West to Mars. The interplanetary imperialism is a continuation 
of the geographical and cultural aspects of western progress, while the post-
terrestrial setting elides American imperialism and foregrounds the Ameri-
can political values of freedom and equality, also a part of western progress. 
In either case, (white) Americans become the chosen people of the chosen 
mode of living—western progress.
Thus, while Burroughs may be moving to a locale and genre which 
promise freedom from the boundaries of terrestrial life, in promoting Euro-
American progress, he largely retains the infrastructure of existing ethnic, 
racial, gender, and cultural hierarchies. As a result, Mars becomes a unique 
and complex mixture of all three elsewheres—the American West, the trop-
ics, and outer space—as well as the (European) Old World. As Brian Steet 
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notes, “It is significant that both Edgar Rice Burroughs and Conan Doyle 
also wrote science fiction. There is something in common between creating 
an alien society in remote parts of this earth and on distant planets” (21). In 
many ways, Burroughs’ Mars becomes an exaggerated version of the Ameri-
can Dream—an ideal American hero/colonizer struggles but quickly rises to 
the very top of a foreign society because of his physical prowess, merit, and 
his participation in (and embodiment of ) western progress. Burroughs’ spe-
cifically American ethnocentrism is first revealed in the changes he makes in 
the existing concept of Mars as a habitable, evolutionarily older planet, as 
civilized or more civilized than Earth. The writings of astronomers Giovanni 
Schiaparelli (1879), Camille Flammarion (1892), and Percival Lowell (1885–
1908) had helped to form the turn-of-the-century theory that “the present 
inhabitation of Mars by a race superior to ours is very possible” (Taliaferro 
66). Burroughs begins with this model, but manipulates the time element 
involved, making the older, more advanced civilizations of Mars representa-
tive of the Old World. Therefore, the American hero allies himself with the 
most recent, melting pot culture/race on Mars—the red Martians, who have 
striking similarities to Americans and American culture—and quickly proves 
himself the superior of every Martian he encounters, regardless of race or 
culture. Burroughs’ continuation of the terrestrial status quo is most evident 
in the analogy he creates between the American West and Native Ameri-
cans and literally another world with alien life forms. He emphasizes the 
difference or Otherness of the native Earthlings as they are literally trans-
formed into aliens, while John Carter remains the same. The hierarchy of 
races and cultures is exaggerated within the imaginative setting; as the Native 
Americans are transformed into insect-like Martians, Carter’s superiority 
and “universal” or normative nature become even more pronounced. John 
Carter−American, Anglo/universal hero−not only conquers the New World, 
but the Old World (via the Mars inversion) and another entire planet.
Before turning to specific elements of Burroughs’ transformation of the 
American West into Mars, a brief examination of his fictional revision of the 
existing model of Mars would be helpful. Burroughs’ celebration of prog-
ress and maintenance of existing hierarchies, and the western optimism and 
American bias these reveal, are brought into sharp relief by comparison to an 
earlier fictional account of the planet of Mars which follows the Flammarion 
model more closely. In H.G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds (1898), he creates 
Martians who embody the full and horrifying fruition of western progress. 
Burroughs reverses this model in order to promote western and particularly 
American values. Mars is utilized by both Burroughs and Wells as a means 
of cultural comparison and social critique, but from Wells’ British, socialist 
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perspective, Mars becomes a dystopic warning about western progress, while 
from Burroughs’ individualistic, capitalist perspective, Mars becomes yet 
another frontier which proves the validity of western progress. Wells exposes 
the hypocrisy and unreality of Burroughs’ idealistic emphasis on freedom, 
equality, democracy, and capitalism.
Wells’ Martians are contemporaneously more intelligent, civilized, and 
technologically advanced than Earthlings, and it is the Martians who invade 
Earth for the purpose of colonization. Wells first places the Earthlings in the 
position of less developed life forms within an evolutionary framework:
And we men [ . . . ] must be to [the Martians] at least as alien and 
lowly as are the monkeys and lemurs to us. The intellectual side of 
man already admits that life is an incessant struggle for existence, and 
it would seem that this too is the belief of the minds upon Mars. Their 
world is far gone in its cooling and this world is still crowded with life, 
but crowded only with what they regard as inferior animals. To carry 
warfare sunward is, indeed, their only escape from the destruction that, 
generation after generation, creeps upon them. (War 14–15)
Thus, the Martians are only following the ‘laws of nature’; it is ‘survival of the 
fittest,’ and they are more advanced than humans in every way. The detached 
and objective perspective of Wells’ narrator allows him to note the hypocrisy 
of Europeans as well. Reversing the position of Europeans within colonial 
ideology and power hierarchies, he vividly reminds them of their own violent 
subjugation of natives:
And before we judge of them too harshly we must remember what 
ruthless and utter destruction our own species has wrought, not only 
upon animals, such as the vanished bison and the dodo, but upon its 
inferior races. The Tasmanians, in spite of their human likeness, were 
entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermination waged by Euro-
pean immigrants, in the space of fifty years. Are we such apostles of mercy 
as to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit? (War 15)
This colonial reversal reveals the ruthlessness, destruction, and materialism 
of western imperialism and also stimulates sympathy and understanding for 
native people.31 In contrast to Burroughs, Wells utilizes Darwinian theory and 
language to reveal the moral inferiority rather than superiority of Europeans 
[Americans] and the hypocrisy of their civilized behavior. Europeans, and 
all imperialist powers, become “nasty” “monster[s]” who inspire “disgust 
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and dread” (23). Furthermore, while initially successful in their colonial 
ambitions, eventually the Martians succumb to unexpected natural forces 
which destroy them completely and leave the humans/natives decimated but 
capable of survival. This is a dire warning indeed about the possible fate of 
imperialist powers; perhaps they too are not invincible, ‘naturally’ destined to 
prevail because of their more developed historical, cultural, and technological 
evolution. Whereas Wells reveals the negative underside of colonialism and 
ethnic othering, Burroughs’ belief in American equality, democracy, and 
manifest destiny allows him to overlook the same aspects in an American 
context.
Burroughs continues the American tradition begun when Europeans 
first started immigrating to North America and which reached full force with 
the colonial rebellion from England—the concept of America as a fresh start, 
as a more perfect embodiment of western ideals, and the final fruition of 
western culture. Hector St. Jean de Crévecoeur, for example, described colo-
nial America as “the most perfect society now existing in the world. Here 
man is free as he ought to be, nor is this pleasing equality so transitory as 
many others are” (44). In terms of western progress, de Crévecoeur explained 
that “[h]ere individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, 
whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world. 
Americans are the western pilgrims who are carrying along with them that 
great mass of arts, sciences, vigour, and industry which began long since 
in the East; they will finish the great circle” (46). Burroughs continues the 
expansionist policy of western society, while eliding its colonial/imperialistic 
aspect, by having John Carter travel to Mars where he meets intellectually, 
culturally, physically, and technologically inferior Martians. Even though 
there are a few examples of more advanced Martian technology, like the fly-
ing ships, Carter’s general superiority is illustrated by his position of promi-
nence and power throughout the entire planet; every new group of people 
he meets eventually recognizes him as an equal or superior. In the case of 
the “black pirates of Barsoom,” Carter reveals their superstition and religious 
fraud and they offer him their throne after their defeat (Gods 57, 189; War-
lord 8). Without the extreme contrast of Wells’ earlier dystopic, European 
vision of western progress, however, the utopic nature of Burroughs’ Ameri-
can vision in the Mars series would be obscured.
Burroughs begins the analogy between the frontiers of Earth and Mars 
through the setting or planetary environment. Brian Street emphasizes the 
“unreality which pervades many descriptions of exotic land and their inhab-
itants” (21). Within this context, Carter’s descriptions of the Arizona land-
scape clearly reflect the “unreality” of another world and foreshadow the 
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similar descriptions of the Mars landscape contained on the same page: “Few 
western wonders are more inspiring than the beauties of an Arizona moonlit 
landscape [ . . . ,] as though one were catching for the first time a glimpse 
of some dead and forgotten planet” (Princess 20). A few moments later Carter 
remarks, “I opened my eyes upon a strange and weird landscape. I knew that 
I was on Mars” (ibid). To reinforce the interplanetary analogy, Carter himself 
immediately notes the similarity between the sun in Arizona and on Mars: 
“It was midday, the sun was shining full upon my naked body, yet no greater 
than would have been true under similar conditions on an Arizona desert” 
(21). The common unreality of the West and Mars illustrates the othering of 
native cultures, their anachronistic quality, and the “alienation” of the west-
ern hero/reader/writer from native peoples and cultures (Street 21–2).
All of these elements are embodied in Roy Harvey Pearce’s examination 
of American attitudes towards Native Americans and the importance of the 
concept of “savagism” to American identity. Pearce’s analysis provides a more 
detailed, 19th century western context for John Carter, in contrast to Paul 
Carter’s brief summary of the stereotypical western Mars Burroughs created. 
Pearce observes,
For the American before 1850—a new man, as he felt, making a new 
world—was obsessed to know who and what he was and where he was 
going, to evaluate the special society in which he lived and to know its 
past and its future. One means to do this was to compare himself with 
the Indian who, as a savage, had all past and no future. The final result 
was an image of the Indian as man out of society and out of history. 
(135)
It is important to note the self-centered and imaginative use of natives by 
Anglo men emphasized in this passage. As fictional characters and as objects 
of scientific and historical study, natives or primitives are constructed by and 
for the needs and desires of Anglo men. In this case, like Haraway, Pearce 
analyzes the association of primitive people from foreign lands with the past 
and stagnation and Anglo men with the future and progress. The American 
West and Native Americans provide an early American version of the primi-
tive, exploration, and colonialism; other terrestrial natives, like the Philip-
pinoes during the Spanish-American War, and extraterrestrial natives provide 
subsequent venues for similar ideology and actions. In his book, Wilderness 
and the American Mind, Roderick Nash highlights an additional factor in the 
perceived unreality of “exotic lands and their inhabitants” (Street 21). Bur-
roughs’ description of the American West participates in the Euro-American 
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ideology which criticizes Native American cultures for not properly utilizing 
the land; civilization involves transforming this ‘empty’ and ‘unused’ land 
(i.e. wilderness) into farmland and towns. As Nash summarizes, for “primi-
tive man [ . . . , s]afety, happiness, and progress all seemed dependent on 
rising out of a wilderness situation [ . . . ]. Gradually man learned how 
to control the land and raise crops. Clearings appeared in the forests. This 
reduction of the amount of wilderness defined man’s achievement as he 
advanced toward civilization” (9).32 Again, Native Americans are associated 
with the past and the primitive in terms of a lack of civilization and also in 
their association with American wilderness (Nash 28). The (perceived) prim-
itive, anachronistic qualities of the Native Americans and their ‘improper 
use’ of the land and natural resources both served as justifications for west-
ern colonialism. As Native Americans were not a part of western progress, 
(Anglo-Americans believed that) they did not deserve their land, and their 
culture(s) must give way before a ‘superior’ mode of living—future-oriented, 
developmental western progress.
Pearce’s insights into the connections between (white) Americans and 
ethnic Others foreground the importance of hierarchical comparisons to 
the construction of Anglo manhood, as well as the development of specifi-
cally American identity, values, and concepts. First, a brief overview of John 
Carter’s relationship to both the terrestrial and extraterrestrial natives is in 
order, setting up the more extended analysis of the similarities between the 
Native Americans and the Martian natives which follows. Once the common 
setting has been established, Carter meets the first Martian natives/aliens, a 
race of green, insect-like humanoids, who bear a striking resemblance to the 
Native Americans he has just encountered. In case the green skin coloring 
and insectile features confuse the reader, Carter himself calls the green men 
“warriors, for I could not disassociate these people in my mind from those 
other warriors who, only the day before, had been pursuing me” (Princess 
24). In this way, Burroughs uses the green men as an imaginative vehicle 
for promoting fundamental values and concepts involved in the ideology of 
western progress: Christianity, individualism, capitalism, and evolutionary 
progress. By transforming the Native Americans of the American West into 
insect-like aliens, Burroughs emphasizes the (assumed) lower physical order, 
more primitive culture, and lesser intelligence of native peoples. This leaves 
Carter (white, southern male) as the representative of American society and 
its ideals.
Consequently, Carter often analyzes the Martian natives and their 
culture(s) as if he were Haraway’s (contradictory) “universal” and superior 
Anglo-scientist. As he notes biological and cultural characteristics, Carter 
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takes part in the western discourse of scientific discovery, exploration, and 
classification associated with colonialism, empire, and ethnic othering. The 
cultural bias of the observer or ethnographer is most evident in the descrip-
tive language used in the representation of the natives. It is through Carter’s 
interested/privileged point of view and his representation of native cultures 
and peoples that Burroughs indirectly reinforces dominant, Anglo, Chris-
tian, ‘American’ values and beliefs. Much like the creation of many imagina-
tive u/dystopias, the multiple elsewheres of the Mars series involve a biased 
observer. From the home culture of the author/audience, the observer’s main 
focus is a foreign society and its difference. Without this (direct or indirect) 
comparison and the hierarchy of cultural values it creates, without the ethnic 
or racial Other in Burroughs’ texts, Anglo manhood and American identity 
could not be constructed. Due to the first-person narrative; the exaggerated 
portrayal of Carter as a hero; the construction of Carter as both a universal 
and a white, southern male hero; and the lack of alternative viewpoint, the 
text as a whole promotes the same cultural hierarchy—ethnic/racial, national, 
economic, gender, political—as does John Carter.
Burroughs first utilizes the American valorization of Christianity to 
promote western progress. Similar to earlier representation of Native Ameri-
cans in the West, the Martian natives are viewed and judged through a 
spiritual lens. Carter’s descriptions of the green men augment the negative 
qualities of such a native association, reveal a dominant ideology underlying 
native representations, and emphasize the motivation behind the construc-
tion of Others. Further developing the spiritual representation of the Native 
Americans, begun in the darkness and unreality of the cave scene and the 
Arizona landscape at night, Carter describes his first view of a large encamp-
ment of “half a thousand red warriors” and the body of his (Anglo) friend 
Powell “[u]nder the clear rays of the Arizona moon” (Princess 14). Previously 
Carter and Powell “were wont to ridicule the stories [they] heard of the great 
numbers of these vicious marauders that were supposed to haunt the trails, 
taking their toll in lives and torture of every white party which fell into their 
merciless clutches,” but Carter becomes “positive” that the Apaches “wished 
to capture Powell alive for the fiendish pleasure of torture” (12–3). Simi-
lar to these descriptions of Native Americans, the green Martian natives are 
described as “devils,” “huge and terrific incarnation[s] of hate, of vengeance 
and of death,” and a “materialized nightmare” (23). In addition, “[t]he death 
agonies of a fellow being are, to these strange creatures [the green Martians], 
provocative of the wildest hilarity, while their chief form of commonest 
amusement is to inflict death on their prisoners of war in various ingenious 
and horrible ways” (29). In this way, both native groups are portrayed as 
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embodying a spiritual darkside. They are “devils” (or witches) associated with 
darkness, night, the moon, nightmares, and the negative qualities of hatred, 
torture, revenge, and death. Within this context, natives are the antithesis of 
the positive qualities and symbols associated with Christianity—light, love, 
angels, forgiveness, compassion, life, and divine revelation.
Although Burroughs does not promote Christianity directly in his 
writings, his language and characterization here take part in the larger 
good/evil discourse stemming from the western/American valorization 
of Christianity and the intersection of religion with morality, national-
ity, race, and imperialism. In a complex web of associations, the ‘pagan’ 
spiritual beliefs and practices of native peoples are an evaluative criteria for 
their classification by Europeans as savages or primitives. Conversely, their 
characterization as savages, primitives, and/or natives includes a histori-
cal, ideological, and linguistic legacy of spiritual/moral denigration and/
or demonization. From the Puritan perspective, for example, “the natives 
were not merely heathens but active disciples of the devil” (Nash 36). 
Thus, the association of native peoples with spiritual darkness, mysticism, 
and superstition is a criterion for their classification as uncivilized—such a 
definition reflecting the comparison and hierarchical cultural values being 
utilized in such classification (Christianity, progress, land ownership/culti-
vation, etc.). Furthermore, the long tradition of primitivism and savagism 
in European and Anglo-American thought and practice usually entails the 
representation of natives as spiritually inferior, deviant, and/or anachronis-
tic. Burroughs’ Mars series is a good illustration of this cultural, linguistic, 
and literary legacy.
Finally, the spiritual othering of natives justifies the suppression of 
their culture and/or race. Within the larger historical picture, we see the 
immorality and pagan classification of native peoples serving as a ratio-
nale for Euro-American colonialism and imperialism. Renowned American 
forefather, Benjamin Franklin once wrote of Native Americans:
Their dark-coloured bodies, half-naked, seen only by the gloomy light 
of the bonfire, running after and beating one another with fire-brands, 
accompanied by their horrid yellings, formed a scene the most resem-
bling our ideas of hell that could be well imagined. [ . . . I]f it be the 
design of Providence to extirpate these savages in order to make room 
for the cultivators of the earth, it seems not improbable that rum may 
be the appointed means. It has already annihilated all the tribes who 
formerly inhabited all the seacoast . . . (Lawrence 21)
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Franklin illustrates his western, American bias as he attributes the demise of 
the Native Americans solely to their own immorality and divine intervention, 
eliding the material contact and conflict between the Native Americans and 
Euro-Americans. Burroughs’ southern slavery, western expansion, Indian 
fighting, and representation of the green Martians are logical extensions of 
such colonial American views. Because the Apaches and the green natives are 
immoral—they attack innocent, out-numbered whites solely for the purpose 
of torture—Carter is justified in killing as many of the natives as possible.
The negative spiritual and moral representation of natives allows them 
to act as a foil to the hero as well. They provide an enemy or adversary to 
illustrate the hero’s extraordinary attributes and the superiority of his race and 
cultural values. For example, John Carter illustrates his heroism, his good-
ness and morality by attempting to rescue his friend, even after it is clear that 
Powell is dead. Furthermore, Carter’s attempt is in the face of overwhelming 
odds and the extraordinary viciousness and cruelty of his native opponent. 
Whereas the natives attack, unprovoked and for the purpose of torture only, 
Carter loyally rescues a friend. The American natives “mutilat[e]”; Carter 
saves from mutilation (Princess 14). The green natives attack a peaceful flying 
ship (43) and plan to torture and kill a defenseless young woman for enter-
tainment (49); Carter protects and eventually frees the previously unknown 
prisoner. In addition, Thomas Dyer’s analysis of Theodore Roosevelt and 
his relationship to Native Americans clarifies the paradox at the heart of the 
Wilderness Cult: how to promote fighting abilities, while also maintaining 
cultural hierarchies. As Dyer notes, “[i]f the white advance were to be heroic, 
and the white frontiersman were to be judged an able, virile fighter in the 
idealistic mold Roosevelt cast for him, then the foe must be a redoubtable 
warrior too” (75). One answer is to portray the natives as physically power-
ful, skilled in warfare, and cunning to serve as worthy adversaries, but also 
spiritually/morally deviant or inferior in order to justify the hero’s actions as 
he fights, kills, and/or conquers them.
Carter, and the larger text, reflects the complex ideology of western, 
American superiority by acknowledging the simplistic virtues of primitive 
societies, but overwhelmingly critiquing such societies in so far as they deviate 
from the accepted cultural, i.e. universal, norms of American society and its 
privileging of western progress. This complex and powerfully ethnocentric 
viewpoint is most clearly seen in the description and evaluation of native 
cultures and their collectivity or communalism. Because the natives refute 
the individualism and property ownership valued by western culture, they 
are perceived as unnatural and lower in the social order. In a move similar to 
the internalized and obscured oppression of the slaves on Burroughs’ family 
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plantation, the green natives are most overtly censored by a Martian of 
another race—a red Martian princess named Dejah Thoris. Her impassioned 
and highly critical speech embodies the values and hierarchies of western, 
American progress without jeopardizing the scientific detachment of John 
Carter:
must you ever go on down the ages to your final extinction but little 
above the plane of the dumb brutes that serve you! A people without 
written language, without art, without homes, without love; the victim 
of eons of the horrible community idea. Owning everything in com-
mon, even to your women and children, has resulted in your owning 
nothing in common. You hate each other as you hate all else except 
yourselves. (Princess 54)
Within western ideology, individualism and property are essential for civili-
zation and culture—a written language and the arts, a stationary abode, the 
nuclear family, and romantic love. Although Thoris is a Martian, her speech 
is an adaptation of early colonial, Euro-American descriptions of Native 
Americans. According to Reverend Samuel Purchas, for example, “[t]he 
Indians are ‘so bad people, having little of Humanitie but shape, ignorant of 
Civilitie, of Arts, of Religion; more brutish then the beasts they hunt, more 
wild and unmanly then that unmanned wild Countrey, which they range 
rather than inhabite; captivated also to Satans tyranny in [ . . . ] wicked 
idlenesse’” (qtd. . in Pearce 7–8).33 This passage emphasizes the nomadic 
existence, the animality, and the lack of culture observed in the green natives 
by Thoris. Implied in the negative evaluations of both the Native Americans 
and the green Martians is the necessity to convert them to western, Ameri-
can values. They “need to be matured in rich, complex, civilized humanity. 
The primary means to this are private property and the division of labor, as 
these mark the end of human progress toward its goal of high civilization” 
(Pearce 85).
According to western, American ideology, a lack of individualism 
retards progress because communalism stifles industry, competition, and 
invention—the cornerstones of capitalism. Highly successful capitalist, 
Andrew Carnegie makes these connections clear: “Individualism, Private 
Property, the Law of Accumulation of Wealth, and the Law of Competition 
[ . . . ,] these are the highest result of human experience [ . . . ,] the 
best and most valuable of all that humanity has yet accomplished” (400). 
Without these values, the green natives will never progress. In fact, as 
Thoris emphasizes, they are actually regressing towards extinction. Carter 
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himself notes the impact of a nomadic, communal lifestyle on the material 
advancement of the green natives; they are ill-suited culturally and physically 
for civilized environments:
the creatures were entirely out of proportion to the desks, chairs, and 
other furnishings; these being of a size adapted to human beings such as 
I, whereas the great bulks of the Martians could scarcely have squeezed 
into the chairs, nor was there room beneath the desks for their long legs. 
Evidently, then, there were other denizens on Mars than the wild and 
grotesque creatures into whose hands I had fallen. (Princess 28)
Instead of a stationary existence in which the natives would construct per-
manent homes for themselves and develop urban areas (i.e. become civi-
lized), the green men wander Mars and temporarily (and rather pathetically 
and laughably) occupy the cast-off and clearly ill-suited abodes of civilized, 
“fair-haired” humans more like John Carter (Princess 62). The commu-
nalism of the natives hinders their development, their cultural and mate-
rial progress toward western norms and ideals. While the increased size 
of the green Martians may give them a physical advantage in the ‘wilds,’ 
this bodily focus fits the previously mentioned native stereotype of great 
strength combined with moral weakness.34 Rather than material and cul-
tural progression, then, terrestrial and extraterrestrial communalism pro-
motes the negative characteristics of hatred, animality, and “extinction.” In 
Thoris’ speech this extinction is placed within the context of Social Dar-
winism, making it seem natural and inevitable, and this elides the conflict 
between terrestrial natives and the expansion of western peoples and cul-
ture. However, the direct connections to western, American progress reveal 
the threat of extinction for native peoples through conflict with dominant, 
white America and its values of individualism, property, capitalism, and 
progress.
In his position as explorer and scientist, Carter reinforces the negative 
evaluation of the green Martians and their communalism. He observes,
[t]heir mating is a matter of community interest solely, and is directed 
without reference to natural selection. The council of chieftains of each 
community control the matter as surely as the owner of a Kentucky rac-
ing stud directs the scientific breeding of his stock for the improvement 
of the whole.
In theory it may sound well, [ . . . ] but the results of ages of this 
unnatural practice, coupled with the community interest in the offspring 
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being held paramount to that of the mother, is shown in the cold, cruel 
creatures, and their gloomy, loveless, mirthless existence.
It is true that the green Martians are absolutely virtuous, [ . . . ] but 
better far a finer balance of human characteristics even at the expense of 
a slight and occasional loss of chastity. (Princess 67)
In this way, the natives are ‘scientifically’ classified as uncivilized or lower in 
the social and natural order because of their unnatural and animal-like cultural 
practices. In their rejection of both romantic love and sexual attraction, the 
natives foster a collective ideal which actually places them below the natural ani-
mals. Carter’s emphasis on the importance of the mother mirrors Thoris’ earlier 
speech as well; the concept of the nuclear family underlies both their definitions 
of “home,” love, and ‘proper’ reproduction (Princess 54). Even a ‘virtue’ such 
as chastity, whose acknowledgement should illustrate the objective viewpoint 
of the western observer/scientist, is contorted to become another characteris-
tic which classifies the natives as subhuman. In a lengthy explication of The 
Sexual Life of Savages (1929) by ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski, Marianna 
Torgovnick emphasizes a similar combination of overt cultural bias with “sub-
stantial faith in [the scientist-observer’s] authority and in the power of neutral 
observation” (4). Burroughs constructs Carter not just as a universal and repre-
sentative white, American hero; in his position as first-person narrator, Carter 
becomes an explorer and scientist who observes and writes as an ethnographer. 
In this way, Carter moves beyond the tradition of gentlemen explorers such as 
Henry M. Stanley and Theodore Roosevelt.35 His authority is not only cultural, 
historical, and/or political, but also scientific. The factual, impersonal, objec-
tive reputation of science reinforces the reliability of Carter’s narrative posi-
tion and disguises cultural bias as natural hierarchies. In addition to Carter as 
an ethnographic narrator, Burroughs constructs a reproductive system for the 
green Martians which reinforces the hierarchy of western, white, and civilized 
as superior to native, colored, and primitive. As insect humanoids, the green 
Martians lay eggs which are incubated collectively, in isolation from the adults, 
in large enclosures resembling reptile nests. Thus, the green Martians are liter-
ally cold-blooded insects or reptiles who are lower in the evolutionary order 
than mammals—animal or human. Their biological inferiority is seconded by 
their cultural inferiority, as they differentiate themselves from even many cold-
blooded life forms by not individually (or as a nuclear family, husband-wife 
couple) caring for a single ‘nest.’
The systematic and sustained resistance by native peoples to conversion 
attempts by Euro-Americans contradicted and hindered the western, American 
concept of progress—cultural, historical, geographic, economic, biological, etc. 
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Like the denigration and demonization of natives because of their resistance 
to Christianity and the moral and cultural norms of Euro-Americans, natives 
were placed within larger historical, cultural, and biological continuums which 
often had devastating effects. Roy Harvey Pearce explains the historical and 
cultural continuums of progress utilized in evaluating Native Americans and 
the price paid for their resistance to assimilation or ‘uplifting’: “The idea of 
history as progress made it possible fully to comprehend the culturally earlier 
as the morally inferior, even as an environmentalist analysis of societies made 
it possible to account for the contemporaneity of that which should have been 
part of the past. Savagism could be known only in terms of the civilization to 
which, by the law of nature, it had to give way” (104). In a similar manner, 
John Carter first evaluates the green natives in terms of their deficient cultural 
progress, but then he adds a biological component as well. In describing the 
reaction of the green natives to Thoris’ civilizing speech, Carter links the natives’ 
inferior cultural “customs” to their (presumably inferior) biological “heredity”:
that they were moved I truly believe, and if one man high among them 
had been strong enough to rise above custom, that moment would have 
marked a new and mighty era for Mars.
I saw Tars Tarkas rise to speak, and on his face was such an expression 
as I had never seen upon the countenance of a green Martian warrior. It 
bespoke an inward and mighty battle with self, with heredity, with age old 
custom [ . . . ]. (Princess 54)
It seems there is the real potential for change, for progress, for civilization for 
native people. However, true to the experiences of Euro-American missionaries, 
this optimism quickly turns into an even more extreme and entrenched negativ-
ity as the natives resist conversion/civilization/assimilation.
When another green warrior strikes Dejah Thoris (an unarmed and peace-
ful woman) to the ground and places his foot upon her in a gesture of superior-
ity and contempt, he reasserts the common, primitive, non-chivalrous cultural 
values of the green natives. Thus, the green men prove their resistance to change 
and to thinking and acting independently of one another—rejecting the west-
ern ideal of individualism and maintaining their collectivity. Furthermore, the 
hereditary basis for their primitive, collective behavior emphasizes their biologi-
cal inability to progress. In contrast to John Carter’s freedom from the past, 
individualism, and self-reliance (represented by his lack of ancestors and solitary 
status), the natives are fundamentally shaped by their past, by their collective 
ancestral group. Within western ideology, this episode proves that the natives 
are and always will be “historically anterior and morally inferior” to western 
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society, as well as biologically anachronistic and stagnant (Pearce 105). Euro-
American ethnocentrism and their pervasive belief in western progress prevented 
them from comprehending or accepting the resistance of natives to their way 
of life. If the elements of western progress actually meant beneficial, sustained, 
and natural change or development (i.e. the definition of progress), then it was 
incomprehensible to Euro-Americans that anyone would reject such elements. 
As a result, Euro-Americans used the biological components to explain the con-
tinued resistance of natives to their ‘logically beneficial’ changes. Rather than 
admit that western progress was a faulty concept, Euro-Americans constructed a 
biological essentialism for native races. In resisting the concept of progress, then, 
the natives were perceived by Euro-Americans not as simply different or neutral 
factors, but as vital threats to the western, American way of life; they retarded 
western progress as a whole. Furthermore, because native resistance was based 
on immutable, biological factors, the only real solution was the eradication of 
the race or extinction of the native groups.
In addition to the hereditary basis of the native resistance, Burroughs 
more directly utilizes the biological theory of progress, generally conceived as 
evolution, through Carter’s ethnographic perspective. Placing Carter’s scien-
tific evaluations within the turn-of-the-century context of biological evolution 
and American immigration highlights the hierarchical and exclusionary basis of 
‘objective’ science and the continued subjectivity of ‘progressive’ thought. First, 
Morse Peckham asserts that “evolution may be considered as a fairly straight-
forward metaphysical theory with a long history” that existed prior to Darwin’s 
1859 Origin of the Species (23). In fact, Peckham observes that this existing 
metaphysical evolution “was not so much confirmed by [Darwin’s] theory of 
natural selection as embarrassed by it” (ibid).36 Thus, Burroughs (Carter) actu-
ally takes part in a long tradition of misreading Darwin’s work, choosing to 
promote metaphysical or Social Darwinism which incorporates “values into a 
descriptive construct” (Peckham 20).37 In contrast to Darwin’s “accident” (29), 
imperfect adaptation (31), and the impossibility of total human comprehension 
of the physical world (3), metaphysical evolution substitutes a “goal-directed 
process” of “simple to complex means from good to better” (Peckham 29). The 
distinction Peckham makes between Darwinism and Darwinisticism (Social 
Darwinism being a primary form of the later) highlights the hierarchical and 
biased nature of the Euro-American viewpoint, even when encased in scientific 
language and theory. Carter, for example, embodies Social Darwinism in his 
description of the head chieftain of the green men:
this monster was the exaggerated personification of all the ages of cruelty, 
ferocity, and brutality from which he had descended. Cold, cunning, 
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calculating; he was, also, in marked contrast to most of his fellows, a 
slave to that brute passion which the waning demands for procreation 
upon their dying planet has almost stilled in the Martian breast.
The thought that the divine Dejah Thoris might fall into the clutches 
of such an abysmal atavism started the cold sweat upon me. Far better 
that we save friendly bullets for ourselves at the last moment, as did 
those brave frontier women of my lost land, who took their own lives 
rather than fall into the hands of the Indian braves. (Princess 65)
Carter’s use of the term atavism appeals to the objective authority of science. 
However, Carter reveals his Social Darwinism in such highly negative, evalu-
ative words as “cruelty, ferocity, and brutality.” His reference to the American 
West and the Native American/pioneer conflict only emphasizes the biased 
or subjective nature of the purported objective, universal perspective of scien-
tific discourse. The scientific concept of atavism relies on a hierarchical, value-
motivated biological continuum as well—the concept of progress. Finally, as 
mentioned previously, Euro-Americans used the biological basis of the social 
behavior and cultural norms of the natives to foreground their inability to 
change as well.
These same issues become even more relevant in the context of the anti-
immigration debate at the turn of the century. If inferior ‘races’ are unable 
to change, to assimilate, or in other words, to become good (like dominant, 
Anglo) Americans, then their physical presence becomes a threat to American 
progress through the possibility of interbreeding. American biological prog-
ress becomes a matter of protecting the ‘white’ race from the inferior blood of 
darker-skinned races. The threat of rape in Carter’s passage reflects this con-
cern. Similar to the arguments of many Anglo-American, anti-immigration 
advocates at the turn of the century, Burroughs privileges blood over environ-
ment. In 1912, Prescott Hall wrote, “Recent investigations in eugenics show 
that heredity is a much more important factor than environment as regards 
social conditions—in fact, that in most cases heredity is what makes the envi-
ronment” (300). The context of the anti-immigration debate reveals the rac-
ist basis of such biological arguments. Hall and Burroughs utilize biology, 
heredity, and/or race to scientifically ‘prove’ the inferiority of people-of-color 
and the superiority of Anglo-Americans. Hall targets the “barbarians” from 
Africa, Asia, and the “defective and delinquent classes of Europe” (298)—those 
from “entirely different races—of Alpine, Mediterranean, Asiatic, and African 
stocks” (297). In A Princess of Mars, Burroughs constructs the green natives 
as hereditarily, biologically atavistic—anachronistic and inferior. Not only are 
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the green natives not progressing towards civilization, they are actually ‘throw-
backs’ to past biological and cultural types.
Within this biological context, the natives are represented as anachro-
nisms who threaten civilized society, especially through interbreeding. The anti-
immigration emphasis on heredity over environment and the existence of racial 
characteristics imply such a process for the United States. Prescott Hall quotes 
Professor Karl Pearson: “‘You cannot change the leopard’s spots, and you cannot 
change bad stock to good; you may dilute it, possibly spread it over a large area, 
spoiling good stock, but until it ceases to multiply it will not cease to be’“ (Hall 
300). When a green Martian threatens to rape Dejah Thoris, it is not simply 
the emotional and physical trauma she would experience that concerns Carter. 
As a representative of western progress, she symbolizes the pure and privileged 
blood of white, American womanhood which must be protected from contami-
nation by the recessive biological characteristics of natives, of people-of-color, of 
non-Anglo-Americans.38 She is the “race mother” upon whose procreative func-
tion rests the entire race (Doyle 5, 27). The theory of evolution here is used to 
illustrate the progressive racial characteristics of the white race and the static or 
regressive racial characteristics of people-of-color, thereby justifying or explain-
ing their extinction or destruction and the continued and expanded power of 
Anglo-Europeans.
The pre-existing ethnocentrism of the Euro-American observer(s) com-
bines with the ideology of historical, cultural, and biological progress to pre-
vent an unbiased analysis of native cultures. As cultural theorist Renato Rosaldo 
argues, “the detached observer’s authoritative objectivity resides more in a 
manner of speaking than in apt characterizations of other forms of life” (109). 
Houston Baker likewise foregrounds the connection between the ethnogra-
pher and the larger cultural and political forces of her or his home country. For 
Baker, ethnography is “a writing of the ‘Other’ out of relationship to his or her 
native ground and into the sexual, commercial, voyeuristic fantasies of imperial-
ism” (386). Donna Haraway supports both of these critiques of ethnographic 
objectivity in Primate Visions. As mentioned earlier, she discusses the similarities 
between the traditionally diametrically opposed categories of ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ 
(3): “Scientific practice is above all a story-telling practice in the sense of his-
torically specific practices of interpretation and testimony” (4). In this way, Har-
away, Rosaldo, and Baker go one step beyond Peckham as they undermine even 
the objective, scientific, rather than metaphysical, nature of Darwin’s work. By 
analyzing the (always) subjective element of scientific study and the privileged 
viewpoint of (western, Anglo, generally male) scientists, these authors highlight 
the hierarchical basis of science.
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Using primatology as an especially fruitful lens for examining these issues, 
Haraway also emphasizes the importance of the concept of progress to scientific 
study:
It is a story of progress from immature sciences based on mere description 
and free qualitative interpretation [Carter’s method] to mature science 
based on quantitative methods and falsifiable hypotheses, leading to a 
synthetic scientific reconstruction of primate reality. But these histories 
are stories about stories, narratives with a good ending; i.e., the facts 
put together, reality reconstructed scientifically. These are stories with 
a particular aesthetic, realism, and a particular politics, commitment to 
progress. (4)
Thus, the material progress is enmeshed in the progress of the mediating 
tools as well. Although many contemporary writers and theorists are criti-
cal and/or wary of such value-laden “narratives,” traditional western observ-
ers/scientists would feel doubly justified by them, since both their methods 
and the material illustrate their superiority, their continued progress. In A 
Princess of Mars, the material and historical progress experienced by John 
Carter is reflected in the narrative progress as well; the science of outer space 
is reflected in the science of Carter’s narrative stance and style. The idea of 
the progress of science−away from superstition, emotion, values, and bias 
and towards a greater factual ‘truth’−lends authority to Carter and his text. 
The irony, of course, is that Haraway’s observations reveal the fictional foun-
dation of Burroughs’ science. Carter’s position and viewpoints as a scientist 
are doubly fictional—science itself is a “story” and the Mars series is science 
fiction.39
MARS
While Burroughs (re)creates a cultural and racial hierarchy in the Mars series 
which privileges western man, there are several key areas in which this pyramid 
is undermined. As discussed earlier, the imaginative setting of Mars allows 
Burroughs to construct a planet which reflects his personal beliefs and views. 
In turning to science fiction and outer space, Burroughs has a much greater 
creative license than in the American West or even the tropics. One area he 
manipulates actually contradicts the science-focus of the outer-space setting: 
Burroughs creates a Mars which embodies an ‘ideal’ synthesis of the civilized 
and the primitive—through the red Martians and their society. Although this 
setting, contradictorily, illustrates the superiority of Carter as an ideal warrior 
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hero, it also undermines some aspects of western progress. In addition, free 
from earth history, Burroughs creates an egalitarian brotherhood of fighting 
men, composed of various Martian races. This band of Carter’s personal friends 
embodies the American ideals of freedom and equality, outside of the hierarchical 
boundaries of actual American society. The red Martians also represent the 
ideal of the American melting pot, as they are a composite race made up of 
various, older ‘primary’ Martian races. The red race stands in marked contrast 
to the strict boundaries between races and the fear of interbreeding exposed 
in Carter’s observations on the green Martians. Finally, Martian mythology 
reverses the evolutionary hierarchy of black/primate/stagnant/less developed to 
white/human/progressive/advanced. In this way, Burroughs utilizes the story-
making potential of science, revealed by Haraway, to question the racial and 
cultural hierarchy he upholds elsewhere. The elsewhere of outer space and the 
genre of science fiction, then, offer the possibility of a revision of traditional 
power hierarchies, for a literal ‘progressive’ change.
The lack of a historical legacy in the Mars context allows Burroughs 
to create a specifically American hero who represents ‘progressive’ American 
ideals, such as equality and diversity, and whose relationships with Martian 
natives undermine some aspects of western progress. Hence, we have greater 
discrepancy and conflict between a more inclusive, egalitarian social model and 
traditional hierarchies in the Mars series than in Burroughs’ Tarzan series or 
most other African narratives by European writers. Marianna Torgovnick traces 
a progression in Burroughs’ Tarzan series from “expos[ing] the shaky basis of 
[existing] hierarchies” to the increasing “affirm[ation of ] existing hierarchies, 
including the hierarchy of male over female, white over black, West over rest” 
(46). Because Tarzan is British aristocracy and the Tarzan series takes place in 
Africa, the narrative(s) participates historically and fictionally in the colonial 
ideals and practices of Europeans. As Tarzan matures, he cannot retain the 
innocence of childhood; as he comes to understand who he is and his place in 
the world, racial and cultural hierarchies are learned as well. Earlier European 
narratives of Africa also set a pattern for Burroughs to follow. From Henry M. 
Stanley to Rider Haggard, non-fiction and fiction authors had utilized Africa 
as a resource—for colonialism and imperialism, for the construction of white 
manhood, and for the construction of narratives.40 In the Mars series, there is 
no such historical legacy. In fact, the pre-existing scientific and literary concept 
of Mars as a more civilized society than that of Earth meant that Burroughs 
actually had to modify the existing template in order to make Carter a western 
hero at all. In moving away from the specific historical past of the American 
West and the actual history of Earth completely, Burroughs reverses the pro-
gression Torgovnick analyzes in the Tarzan series.
Burroughs 45
In the Mars context, Burroughs revises the turn-of-the-century 
wilderness nostalgia associated with the American West and also the 
terrestrial tropics. Outside of the bounds of American history and society, 
Burroughs can create a native society which is the ideal synthesis of primitive 
and civilized, that of the red Martians. The Martians have developed 
advanced air transportation and atmospheric technology, and the red 
Martians are interested in scientific activities (Princess 53). However, even 
the red Martians, who represent the most developed (living) culture on 
Mars, exist in a medieval society, with castles, hand-to-hand combat, and 
an aristocracy. Furthermore, they do not have any industrial components to 
their society. The red Martians are not as civilized as the ancient white race 
of Martians whose ruins dot the Martian landscape, but their largely pre-
modern society is the ideal combination of primitive and civilized elements 
to appeal to Carter, and to a turn-of-the-century audience as well. Within 
this cultural bricolage, Americans can both maintain their social privilege and 
physical comfort and establish a pre-industrial relation to nature, complete 
with an opportunity to prove their physical prowess. The red skin color of 
this composite group could be modeled on eastern earth cultures generally 
perceived by westerners as “a midway stage between the primitive and the 
civilized,” Egypt and India in particular (Torgovnick 60). Thus, the green 
Martians represent the complete primitive, like the Native Americans in the 
American context, serving as an ignoble enemy for Carter to battle so his 
heroism can be continuously illustrated. The red Martians are constructed as 
an intermediary race/culture so that Carter can both prove his superiority as 
a Euro-American and take part in a romance.
This intermediary state is reflected in the climate, the clothing, and the 
technological advancement of the Martians. First, the atmosphere is not only 
habitable for humans, but the climate is semi-tropical. Therefore, the major-
ity of Martians, and John Carter, regularly live in a semi- to fully nude state 
of (un)dress. Certainly this Martian social norm owes much to sex appeal, 
the fantasy genre, and western narratives about the (usually colonial or impe-
rial) tropics. However, the pre-modern, pre-industrial state of the Martians 
(or their selective technological development) appeals to John Carter to the 
extent that he becomes an active member of their community, establishes 
a family, and pines for Mars when he involuntarily returns to Earth. Simi-
lar to Burroughs’ subsequent hero, Tarzan, Carter is metaphorically ‘born,’ 
completely naked and without weapons, and finds himself in a dangerous, 
threatening foreign society. Both protagonists have lost their technological 
advantage as Europeans. In becoming a member of the foreign society, they 
both continue their primitive state of dress and hone their physical qualities. 
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However, the imaginary setting, combined with the red Martian synthesis of 
primitive and civilized characteristics, allows Carter to more fully integrate 
into this foreign culture than the Native American culture of the American 
West or Tarzan within the colonial context of Africa. Likewise, Burroughs 
portrays Carter’s cultural assimilation and racial interbreeding as natural and 
positive developments. Thus, the limited or selective technological develop-
ment of the red Martians and Carter’s unprecedented level of accepted cul-
tural assimilation undermine some elements of western progress.41
As Brian Street notes, however, the lack of clothing is a complex fac-
tor in that it illustrates an acceptance of the cultural norms of the ethnic 
Other, while simultaneously proving the physical equality or superiority of 
the Euro-American hero. Again, like Tarzan, Carter “represents the merg-
ing of the accepted intellectual superiority of the Englishman [American] 
with great physical qualities” (Street 20). Furthermore, like the intermediate 
frontiersman of the American West, Carter’s genteel background and Anglo 
blood ensure his position of superiority in a primitive or semi-primitive soci-
ety. As a result, Carter quickly becomes the most famous warrior on all of 
Mars, feared by his enemies and revered by his friends. Without advanced 
technology or armor, armed with only a sword, Carter ‘conquers’ a more 
primitive society on its own terms; his only advantage is a more developed 
physical system due to the lessened Martian gravity.
Carter’s warrior adventures also allow Burroughs to challenge the hier-
archies established in other areas of the Martian series through the creation of 
a diverse brotherhood of fighting men centered around John Carter. Carter 
slowly accumulates friends from among all the races of Mars—green, red, 
black, yellow, and white—as his adventures take him to the corners of the 
globe. Toward the end of the second book in the Mars series, The Gods of 
Mars, Carter takes stock of his companions: “In that little party there was not 
one who would desert another; yet we were of different countries, different 
colours, different races, different religions—and one of us was of a different 
world” (135). These are the democratic, egalitarian ideals of American society 
clearly expressed by an American, narrator and author. Adventure, fighting, 
male bonding, and most importantly, the influence, leadership, ideals, and 
superiority of an Anglo-American man unite otherwise separate and often 
conflicting societies.42 Returning to the concept of American exceptional-
ism, John Carter symbolizes the unique and highly ‘progressive’ cultural fac-
tors associated with American society. Like the United States itself, Carter 
represents tolerance, equality, and unity based on individual attributes and 
personal worth, rather than external factors like heredity or material prosper-
ity. Thus, Carter embodies the complex American contradiction of hierarchy 
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based on equality—because of American exceptionalism, Americans deserve 
positions of greatest power. In fact, it is the “duty” of Americans to prac-
tice colonialism and imperialism because they must bring American civiliza-
tion, including freedom and democracy, to others (Roosevelt, “Nation” 245). 
Carter’s physical prowess, fighting abilities, and ‘military’ leadership reflect 
the conflict and native resistance usually involved in instituting these egali-
tarian ideals through such hierarchical systems.
Burroughs’ choice of a male, quasi-military group for the embodiment 
of American egalitarian ideals illustrates his own experiences as well. It was 
only in the American military that Burroughs associated with ethnic Others 
on a roughly equal level—blacks, Native Americans, and foreign immigrants 
(Taliaferro 40, 42). Thus, Burroughs experienced ethnic and racial equal-
ity through a highly hierarchical institution founded on physical force and 
conquest (in this case the continued submission of Native Americans in the 
American West).43 The military foundation of Burroughs’ American equality 
reveals the individual nature of this equality. For example, individual Native 
Americans, like the Apache scouts Burroughs met in the calvary, could prove 
themselves worthy Americans by disassociating themselves from their tribes 
and joining an official American institution like the United States military. 
Cultural assimilation was the key to equality and acceptance; natives, Afri-
can-Americans, and immigrants were expected to embrace American indi-
vidualism and reject their particular cultural, ethnic, or racial (collective) 
heritage. Thus, they became like John Carter in the construction of Anglo-
American heroes as solitary wanderers, without pasts or homes. Likewise, 
individual members of various Martian races could prove themselves worthy 
of a close, egalitarian relationship with John Carter by disassociating them-
selves from their particular cultural/racial communities. In this way, Bur-
roughs can simultaneously promote hierarchical racial theories as applied 
to collective groups and egalitarian ideals as applied to particularly worthy 
(ethnic Other) individuals. He follows Theodore Roosevelt in “feeling com-
fortably consistent with evolutionary ideology and the rhetoric of equipo-
tentiality alongside Republican politics in that [Roosevelt] allowed for the 
progress of individuals to the level of white men even if the race as a whole 
remained backward” (Dyer 105).
The biological characteristics of Martian evolution pose the most 
devastating challenge to existing terrestrial hierarchies. A striking exam-
ple of American diversity and egalitarianism is the red race of Martians. 
As observed earlier, the red Martians are the most civilized living race on 
Mars. They are also a composite race, the result of “[a]ges of close relation-
ship and intermarrying” among the white, the “very dark, almost black, and 
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also with the reddish yellow race” (Princess 62). Furthermore, it is with the 
“fair and beautiful daughter” of this racial mix, Dejah Thoris, that Carter 
falls in love, marries, and produces a further racially-mixed child (ibid). In 
this case, Carter not only breaks existing terrestrial racial taboos (including 
the miscegenation laws existing in many states during this time period), but 
also terrestrial/extraterrestrial racial boundaries.44 Only the green Martians 
are excluded from this environmentally motivated and apparently positive 
racial intermixing. Within the American context, such a racial philosophy is 
known as the melting pot, and Native Americans were conspicuously absent 
from the mix.45 Thus, Burroughs retains one race (the green Martians/Native 
Americans) to represent the primitive, the race most relevant to America, 
reputed to be inassimilable, and the one from which Euro-Americans desired 
the most materially. Nonetheless, the inclusive racial theory embodied in the 
fictional evolution of the red race stands in marked contrast to the other 
hierarchical, race-based tenets expressed in the narrative. I would argue that 
it is only within the highly imaginative space of another planet that Bur-
roughs was willing or able to visualize the diverse, intimate community of 
the fighting band discussed above and the more radical, racial intermixing 
of the red Martians. Within the context of actual American society, as with 
the Native Americans/green Martians discussed earlier, Burroughs maintains 
racial boundaries that are discarded outside of the specifics of American soci-
ety or Earth history more generally.
Other biological or racial examples foster a more egalitarian ethos as 
well. For example, the Martians perceive Carter himself as combining fea-
tures of the different Martian races: he has the white skin of the white race 
but the dark hair of the black race (Gods 67). Furthermore, Burroughs sub-
tly undermines the evolutionary tenets found in other areas of the narrative 
through the alternative perspective of a “Dator” or prince of the First Born, 
the black race of Mars (68). As explained to Carter, the First Born are so 
called because their “race is the oldest on the planet” and the emergence of all 
the other races was dependent on the action of the “first black man” (ibid). 
Although there is no other substantiation of this creation myth, created by 
the black race itself, Burroughs never contradicts it or offers an alternative 
myth by a member of another racial group. Burroughs also reverses the evolu-
tionary hierarchy of (black) primate to (white) western man in transforming 
the apes of Mars into great white apes and placing the black race in a posi-
tion of prominence. It is the twisted remnants of the white race, the therns, 
that are the most corrupt race on Mars. The ancient white race of Martians 
also serves as an example of strict Darwinian biological theory rather than 
the Spencerian theory of progressive biological and cultural evolution found 
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in other areas of the text.46 It is explained that the highly specialized white 
race, a “highly cultivated and literary race,” was forced to integrate with the 
other races in order to survive changes in the Martian environment (Princess 
62–3). Over the centuries “much of the high civilization and many of the 
arts of the fair-haired Martians had become lost” (62). All that remains is 
the composite red race, with its more “practical civilization”; numerous ruins 
which dot the Martian landscape; and the inbred, bald, and corrupt white 
therns (ibid). The ancient white race can serve as an example of the heights 
of western civilization and be used as a comparison to the primitive culture of 
the green Martians, as noted earlier. However, Burroughs also illustrates the 
fragility and vulnerability of such a specialized ‘organism’ in the face of larger 
environmental factors. He turns Spencer’s theory of “‘survival of the fittest’“ 
on its head as he redefines “‘the fittest’“ to be the most primitive, uncivilized 
(green) race rather than the white, ruling elite (Hofstadter 392–9).
PROGRESS
Examining Burroughs’ use of the western concept of progress reveals the 
multiple inspirations, contexts, and applications such a nebulous term can 
have. On one side, Burroughs illustrates the ethnocentrism and ethnic oth-
ering involved in western progress. On the other, some of the ideals associ-
ated with American progress, like equality, are actually realized in Burroughs’ 
science fiction. Torgovnick traces the strangled potential of Burroughs’ Tar-
zan series but does not attempt to explain either why Burroughs would be 
interested in exploring less oppressive and hierarchical relationships or why 
he then felt compelled to reassert the existing hierarchies. Perhaps the illogi-
cal nature of the development stymies such an investigation. The concept 
of western progress itself reflects the primacy of change in western culture, 
from bad to good, undesirable to desirable, primitive to civilized. Within this 
framework, Burroughs would be expected to move from more conservative 
to more liberal and from a promotion of dominant hierarchies to the pos-
sibility of alternative relationships. He should leave behind the prejudices of 
the Old World, as de Crévecoeur asserts, and take part in the new, improved 
American, egalitarian melting pot. Not only does Burroughs not follow this 
western, American blueprint of progression in his Tarzan series, but also the 
alternation of the writing and publication of his Mars and his Tarzan series 
(along with other series) reveals a continuous and pervasive inconsistency in 
his political, social, and racial viewpoints. The increasing emphasis on egali-
tarianism in the Mars series, for example, was continually undermined by 
the increasing social and racial rigidity of the Tarzan series. With no actual 
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progression, either positive or negative, to follow, critics generally react in 
one of two ways. First, many do not address the inconsistency of Burroughs’ 
views, usually choosing to focus on his infamous racism or solely on his pop-
ularity as an adventure writer.47 Others, like Torgovnick and Taliaferro, more 
accurately note the inconsistencies but do not attempt to explain why they 
exist. Both of these critical responses overlook the complexity of Burroughs 
and his writing, leading to a one-sided characterization or a confusing, con-
tradictory list of quotes.
Looking at the convergence of the western concept of progress with 
Burroughs’ writing reveals some possible origins of his inconsistencies. The 
multifarious definitions and applications of the term itself lead to inconsis-
tent usage. As I have tried to illustrate with various American authors from 
across the centuries, American ideology and society have been split, from 
the very beginning of European colonization, between the reality of hierar-
chical power relations and the ideals of individualism, democracy, freedom, 
and equality. Acknowledging this contradiction or paradox, Toni Morrison 
argues that “[t]he concept of freedom did not emerge in a vacuum. Nothing 
highlighted freedom—if it did not in fact create it—like slavery” (38). Bur-
roughs continues to embody this contradictory stance in his writings of the 
twentieth century. As a western, American hero, John Carter is both ideal 
representative of egalitarian opportunity and also southern gentleman and 
Confederate war hero. Western progress embodies primitive/civilized hier-
archies, as well as increasing diversity and egalitarianism. Furthermore, the 
multiple contexts, the progress of elsewheres in the Mars series—historically, 
spatially, and generically—changes the definition and possibilities of western 
progress. In the American West, egalitarianism only applies to John Carter, 
as a frontiersman, and western progress means the eradication of the native 
Indian population. On Mars, egalitarianism applies to a wider range of 
natives and races, and western progress means cultural and racial assimilation 
with the natives. Western progress involves the concept of the ever-expand-
ing frontier; it necessarily leads from the western frontier to terrestrial impe-
rialism to extraterrestrial imperialism and the imagined, possibly utopian 
space of another planet. The setting, the time period, and the genre influ-
ence the author. With the expanded possibility of outer space and science 
fiction, Burroughs emphasizes different elements of western progress. The 
single narrator/protagonist unites the elsewheres, while personally enacting 
these changes. John Carter’s contradictions and inconsistencies, as well as the 
continual flux of his life, make him a more representative American than if 
he embodied a single, static concept of American society.
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While Burroughs certainly subscribes to many of the oppressive ideolo-
gies of his time period and his personal racial, socio-economic, and gender 
positions, his science fiction contains the seeds of ‘progressive’ change. He 
offers an example of the liberating potential of science fiction as his view-
point becomes more egalitarian, diverse, and inclusive when writing in the 
extraterrestrial space of another planet. While the science fiction field as a 
whole continued to avoid and suppress the issue of race throughout much 
of the twentieth century, an increasing number of individual science fiction 
authors followed in Burroughs’ footsteps. They not only addressed the issue 
of race in their texts directly and in depth, but also many of these authors 
expanded the small element of potential found in Burroughs’ writing to 
include more inclusive and radical reevaluations of existing hierarchies. Writ-
ing in the 1930s, George S. Schuyler was the next author chronologically to 
develop this aspect of Burroughs’ work. Utilizing the science fiction genre 
to explore race in American society, however, Schuyler broke away from the 
Anglo male triangle of protagonist/audience/author reflected so strongly in 
Burroughs’ oeuvre. Likewise, he revised Burroughs’ racial essentialism. Con-
sidering the time period and the powerful exclusion of race from the science 
fiction genre, it is not surprising that Schuyler’s contribution to the field 
has not been generally recognized as a result. In extreme contrast to Bur-
roughs’ popular adventure texts, the literary community consistently associ-
ates Schuyler with criticism of the Harlem Renaissance. Despite their widely 
differing literary reputations, however, Burroughs and Schuyler shared a lit-
tle-known interest in both science fiction and racial theories, which makes a 
comparison of their texts a fruitful area of critical inquiry.




Prior to the discovery and republication in 1991 of George S. Schuyler’s seri-
als “The Black Internationale” and “Black Empire,” his fiction was thought 
to be limited to the 1931 satire Black No More.1 The linking of Schuyler to 
multiple pseudonyms revealed a large new body of popular serial fiction he 
wrote during the 1930s.2 “The Black Internationale: Story of Black Genius 
Against the World” and its sequel “Black Empire: An Imaginative Story of 
a Great New Civilization in Modern Africa” are two such serials Schuyler, 
using the pseudonym Samuel I. Brooks, contributed to the popular black 
weekly the Pittsburgh Courier between 1936 and 1938.3 In “A Fragmented 
Man: George S. Schuyler and the Claims of Race,” a 1992 New York Times 
Book Review, Henry Louis Gates Jr. used these newly discovered texts as a 
vehicle to reexamine Schuyler and his widely-fluctuating literary reputation. 
Gates begins his article by quoting some of Schuyler’s most controversial 
statements critiquing Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights Move-
ment and Malcolm X (31). After a review of Schuyler’s two science fiction 
serials, Gates returns to the controversy surrounding Schuyler within the 
African-American community and asserts that “[i]f George Schuyler’s place 
as a major figure in black letters has not been fully acknowledged, it is in part 
because his conception of the intellectual’s role has never fully been appre-
ciated” (43). For Schuyler, “skepticism, independent critical thinking and 
iconoclasm were part and parcel of the intellectual’s calling, and [ . . . ] 
‘race loyalty’ depended on just these qualities of mind” (ibid). While Gates 
does not excuse or elide Schuyler’s extremely conservative viewpoints, espe-
cially later in life, he does place Schuyler squarely in the context of “the pres-
sures of ideological conformity among blacks” (ibid). As the subtitle of Gates’ 
article emphasizes, Schuyler has been and continues to be treated popularly 
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and critically largely in terms of “the claims of race,” judged according to his 
“race loyalty,” or lack thereof (43). Furthermore, Gates claims that the evalu-
ative criteria of “race loyalty” “haunts the lives of African-American intel-
lectuals and public figures” more broadly (ibid). Gates seems to see hope 
in a “new generation of black intellectuals who are more likely than their 
forebears to recognize in the productive clash and contest of perspectives a 
source of strength” (ibid).
The most recent critical analysis of Schuyler, however, does not illus-
trate this ideal black intellectual response envisioned by Gates. In a lengthy 
critical response to Gates, aptly published in an anthology entitled Race Con-
sciousness: African-American Studies for the New Century, Jeffrey A. Tucker 
asserts “the claims of race” and criticizes Schuyler and his texts directly 
and solely within a political context (Gates 31). Tucker focuses on both of 
Schuyler’s major fictional texts: the aforementioned Black No More (1931) 
and the recently discovered serials, “The Black Internationale” and “Black 
Empire,” which were collectively entitled Black Empire when republished in 
book form in 1991. Tucker claims that, “[a]n analysis of Schuyler’s career 
reveals how Schuyler’s racial theories anticipated those of the black neocons 
[of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s] and illustrate the logical limits and political 
inadequacies of such theories” (“Can” 137). In fact, Tucker refutes Gates’ 
characterization of Schuyler as “a fragmented man” (Gates 32), who embod-
ied W. E. B. Du Bois’ theory of a black double-consciousness, and concludes 
that “by portraying Schuyler only as a victim of ‘race,’ Gates’s portrait deac-
tivates Schuyler’s agency. As ‘victim,’ Schuyler seems less accountable for his 
always provocative but frequently fallacious, insupportable, and ultimately 
dangerous claims” (Tucker, “Can” 140). Gates’ contextual information and 
Tucker’s response to it symbolize the larger ideological struggles played out 
in response to Schuyler and his texts throughout his lengthy career.
Michael Peplow provides a useful overview of the critical reaction to 
Schuyler and his texts prior to the rediscovery of the two Black Empire seri-
als.4 In his 1976 article “The Black ‘Picaro’ in Schuyler’s Black No More,” 
Peplow first notes the generally favorable contemporary reactions to the 
original 1931 publication of Black No More. Linked to the Harlem Renais-
sance, Black No More was praised by W. E. B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, and 
Arthur Davis.5 Peplow doesn’t deny that “these men and others were quick to 
note the satire’s literary flaws” but emphasizes that “none of them challenged 
Schuyler’s racial loyalties” (“Black” 7). According to Peplow, it was not until 
later in Schuyler’s career that the so-called “‘assimilationism’ theory” was 
developed (ibid). Robert Bone fostered this view of Schuyler in his 1965 
critical text The Negro Novel in America, and Charles Larson reinforced the 
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negative assimilationist label in his introduction to the 1971 republication 
of Black No More. To gain an adequate understanding of the great fluctua-
tions in Schuyler’s critical valuation, a connection to the historical context is 
essential. The critics of the 1960s and early 1970s faulted Schuyler for not 
promoting a collective racial identity, specifically one grounded in the Black 
Pride and/or Black Power movements of that time period. By the 1960s, 
Schuyler also had become notorious for his extreme political conservatism, 
in his personal and professional life. His political and racial viewpoints were 
increasingly distanced from the mainstream of the African-American com-
munity. As a result of this historical context, Peplow could accurately assess 
in 1976 that “the critics have ignored [Schuyler] entirely or merely men-
tioned the historical significance of Black No More” (“Black” 7). Writing in 
the 1990s, Jeffrey A. Tucker builds on this side of the Schuyler critical debate 
when he bases his critical evaluation of Schuyler on the political implications 
of Schuyler’s racial theories.
Schuyler’s death in 1977 coincided with a general swing of the politi-
cal pendulum towards conservatism, and a more favorable critical evalua-
tion ensued during the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1978, for example, Ann 
Rayson argues on Bone’s own terms that “Schuyler, certainly not a black 
nationalist, is anything but an assimilationist” (102). In the same issue of 
the Black American Literature Forum, John M. Reilly places Black No More 
in the context of “the minor genre of the anti-utopia” (107). Taking issue 
with Larson’s specific definition of assimilation, Reilly qualifies the assimi-
lationist message of Black No More: “Assimilation, then, can only be an 
ideal. This, one might say, is nit-picking, and to a degree it is, but for the 
purpose of indicating that the logic of this anti-utopia neither leads to spe-
cific denigration of Blacks nor advocates mediocrity and the reduplication 
of white life-styles and culture” (108). Focusing on the same text, these 
critics produce more negative or more positive critical interpretations, 
largely based on the dominant political climate existing in the United 
States at the time of their writing.6 With his 1976 article, “The Black ‘Pic-
aro’ in Schuyler’s Black No More,” Peplow set the stage for Rayson and 
Reilly and their critique of the earlier assimilationism theory. Peplow gives 
three reasons for his refutation: the political basis of the literary criticism, 
the lack of historical contextualization, and the need to “examine the novel 
as satire” (7). All three of these are vital tools for a critical re-evaluation of 
Schuyler’s texts, especially one not based solely on politics. When Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr. calls for a more inclusive critical environment in the field 
of African-American studies, he allies himself with this side of the Schuyler 
critical debate.
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From the predominance of the assimilationism theory to a refutation 
of this theory based on its own theoretical terms and the less politically dog-
matic and more literary-oriented evaluation of Peplow, this gradual shift in 
Schuyler criticism during the last half of the 20th century logically leads to 
an expanded connection between Schuyler and the field of science fiction in 
the 21st century. Schuyler’s 1931 text, Black No More, always could have been 
defined as science fiction. However, because of its racial topic and the racial 
identification and professional affiliations of Schuyler, the text has been con-
sistently discussed solely in the context of African-American literature. Even 
after the rediscovery of his additional science fiction serials, Schuyler’s pri-
mary critical context remains African-American literature. The centrality of 
the political debate in Schuyler criticism continues to obscure both the radi-
cal nature of Schuyler’s racial vision and the connection(s) of his major works 
to science fiction. The critical response to Schuyler’s texts clearly reveals the 
distinct, mutual separation of the two literary fields of African-American 
literature and science fiction. This separation has led several science fiction 
critics to ask, “How do you account for the lack of involvement by blacks in 
science fiction and fantasy?” (Bell 91). Even after the professional establish-
ment of several other black authors in the science fiction genre in the second 
half of the 20th century, and their reference to Schuyler as a predecessor, the 
generic separation remains strong.7 A discussion of Schuyler’s texts and the 
critical response to them within a science fiction context is essential for three 
reasons. First, the reasons behind the artificial separation of the two genres, 
science fiction and African-American literature, must be addressed. Second, 
such a context will reveal new and fruitful areas of Schuyler criticism. Finally, 
placing Schuyler’s texts firmly within the science fiction genre contributes 
to a more accurate representation of the contributions of African-American 
writers to the science fiction genre.8
The ‘science’ half of the science fiction literary genre is the primary rea-
son African-Americans, by-in-large, have avoided the genre. For example, the 
aforementioned debate between Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Jeffrey A. Tucker 
not only reflects the basic conflict within Schuyler criticism, but also it repre-
sents in miniature the larger debate currently taking place in the field of Afri-
can-American studies. Writers and critics like Tucker and, more famously, 
Houston A. Baker promote the “claims of race” in the face of increasing sci-
entific and poststructuralist challenges to the more traditional, essentialist 
concepts of race existing at the turn of the 19th century (Gates 31).9 For 
instance, both Tucker and Baker address the writing of Kwame Anthony 
Appiah and take issue with his science-based critique of W. E. B. Du Bois 
and Du Bois’ use of race. Tucker writes that “both Appiah and Schuyler base 
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their arguments on the emptiness of ‘race’ as a scientific signifier, from which 
Appiah concludes that ‘race’ is an unnecessary evil” (“Can” 147). Tucker dis-
agrees with such a stance because “‘Race’ is indeed a mirage scientifically 
speaking, and a construct socially, culturally, politically, and ideologically; 
but making this claim does not elide its power to shape human lives in very 
real ways” (148). Tucker seeks to maintain race as a viable concept despite its 
current lack of scientific credibility and faults Schuyler for utilizing science 
in his texts to deconstruct race.
In his essay, “Caliban’s Triple Play,” Houston A. Baker criticizes the sci-
entific community more directly, sharing his concerns about the ideological 
foundations of the scientific discipline and its history of racial inequality. He 
summarizes the last approximately 150 years of modern science as follows: 
“Biology, anthropology, and the human sciences in general all believed, in 
former times, that there was such a phenomenon as ‘race.’ Current genetic 
research demonstrates that there is no such thing” (384). Similar to Tucker, 
Baker goes on to connect science and race with negative conservative politi-
cal movements. Placing the scientific, social, and political challenges to the 
meaningfulness of race within the context of a threatened end to programs 
like Affirmative Action, Baker asserts: “The scenario [Appiah and evolution-
ary biologists] seem to endorse reads as follows: when science apologizes and 
says there is no such thing, all talk of ‘race’ must cease. Hence ‘race,’ as a 
recently emergent, unifying, and forceful sign of difference in the service of 
the ‘Other,’ is held up to scientific ridicule as, ironically, ‘unscientific’” (385). 
In other words, as science was used as a new method of supporting a hier-
archy of races in the 19th and first half of the 20th century, so science is now 
being used to undermine racial solidarity on the part of oppressed groups. It 
is a scientific Catch-22, highly problematic for not only racial groups, like 
African-Americans, but gender/sexual groups like women and homosexu-
als. If critics reject an essential biological difference as scientifically fallacious 
and historically oppressive, upon what do individuals base their membership 
within a particular group?
It is Schuyler’s answer to this question in his fiction and non-fiction 
texts that Tucker, and others, finds so disconcerting and objectionable. As 
Tucker accurately summarizes, Black No More “is designed to emphasize the 
scientific meaninglessness of ‘race’ and the arbitrariness of color conscious-
ness” (“Can” 143). The moral of the satire is that individuals should not 
participate in groups based upon race, for the above reasons. A key aspect 
of Schuyler’s scientific deconstructions of race is the extensive racial inter-
mingling taking place in the United States from the beginning of its his-
tory. Even before science came along to prove it, the so-called “races” had 
Schuyler 57
interbred to the point of the color line being founded on absurd percent-
ages like one/sixteenth of African blood. Schuyler’s dedication for Black No 
More highlights this cultural context: “THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO 
ALL CAUCASIANS IN THE GREAT REPUBLIC WHO CAN TRACE 
THEIR ANCESTRY BACK TEN GENERATIONS AND CONFI-
DENTLY ASSERT THAT THERE ARE NO BLACK LEAVES, TWIGS, 
LIMBS OR BRANCHES ON THEIR FAMILY TREES.” Within the text, 
Schuyler creates an Anglo-Saxon Association of America which undertakes a 
genealogical study its members hope will authenticate their pure racial ori-
gins. However, the head of the study, aptly named Dr. Buggerie, summarizes 
the results of the study as follows:
“these statistics we’ve gathered prove that most of our social leaders, 
especially of Anglo-Saxon lineage, are descendants of colonial stock 
that came here in bondage. They associated with slaves, in many cases 
worked and slept with them. They intermixed with the blacks and the 
women were sexually exploited by their masters. [ . . . ] There was so 
much of this mixing between whites and blacks of the various classes 
that very early the colonies took steps to put a halt to it. They managed 
to prevent intermarriage but they couldn’t stop intermixture.” (196–7)
Dr. Buggerie goes on to assert that this process has led to the intermixture 
of at least “fifty million” ‘white’ Americans by the time of his report (197). 
Throughout Black No More, Schuyler completely revises the essentialist, bio-
logical theories of race common at the time, in both scientific and popular 
circles, to more accurately reflect the literal melting pot of American soci-
ety.10
Furthermore, Schuyler utilizes the ‘what-if,’ or speculative technique 
of science fiction to transform the cultural phenomenon of skin-whitening 
and hair-straightening products, targeted at African-Americans, into a bio-
logical medical procedure. The superficial consumer goods are replaced by 
a biological process which lightens skin, straightens hair, and reconfigures 
facial features to replicate Caucasians. While permanent and impossible to 
discern, the process cannot be inherited biologically. In this way, Schuyler 
highlights the phenomenon of ‘passing’—very light-skinned blacks living 
socially as whites.11 More generally, Schuyler portrays a desire on the part of 
many persons of color to become lighter skinned in order to reap the social 
and economic benefits associated with being white in a racist society.
In contrast to personal identity based primarily on a stable, static con-
cept of race(s), with a foundation in a collective identity, Schuyler creates 
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personal identity based on individual choice. In Black No More, blacks can 
chose to become white. Conversely, in a highly ironic cultural backlash, 
many whites begin tanning to prove their natural whiteness. At the end 
of the text, one of the few remaining naturally black women is considered 
highly attractive precisely because of her rarity in the United States, and for-
eign black women are ‘imported’ by businesses in order to attract customers. 
The cultural basis of race becomes glaringly obvious in such a topsy-turvy 
environment. Once freed from biology, race becomes unstable and open to 
both cultural and individual variables. Racist whites would be threatened and 
angered by such an ambiguous and fluid theory of race, based solely on cul-
tural norms. Conversely, Afro-centric theories and activities are undermined 
by Schuyler’s emphasis on ‘whitening the race’ in the text and his portrayal 
of the vast majority of African-Americans actively choosing to become white. 
Schuyler vividly reveals his characteristic iconoclasm in the cultural concept 
of race permeating Black No More.
Tucker’s objections to Schuyler exemplify this second, Afro-centric reac-
tion to Schuyler’s racial iconoclasm. While often informative and insightful, 
Tucker’s overwhelmingly political reading of Schuyler’s texts sometimes leads 
to key mis-readings. Furthermore, Tucker oversimplifies complex phenom-
ena and misuses scientific terminology in his general discussion of Schuyler’s 
literary career and, more specifically, his analysis of Black No More. Tucker 
argues that “Schuyler’s career in total reveals certain patterns of his thought,” 
and the most important of these “is Schuyler’s faulty theories about the way 
‘race’ works in modern American society” (“Can” 140). The exact nature 
of Schuyler’s “fault” is most clearly articulated at the beginning of Tucker’s 
article: “This logic promotes the faulty notion that awareness of and atten-
tion paid to racial difference cause racial strife and division; and it justifies 
itself by making claims to a rational, scientific, and supposedly nonparti-
san objectivity” (137). In sum, then, Tucker objects to Schuyler’s rejection 
of race as a logical or beneficial concept and his use of science to undermine 
race. Unfortunately, Tucker’s first objection leads him to misconstrue the sec-
ond—Schuyler’s reliance on and portrayal of science in his texts.
Before turning specifically to Black No More, Tucker offers Schuyler’s 
1944 essay, “The Caucasian Problem,” as the best example of these two 
objectionable characteristics. Tucker briefly acknowledges Schuyler’s display 
of “wit” in the reversal of a “Negro Problem” into a “Caucasian Problem” but 
asserts, “much of the essay dwells on a slightly different topic: the scientific 
bankruptcy of ‘race,’ its meaninglessness as a category in the context of the 
natural sciences. The essay correctly states that ‘race’ ‘began as an anthropo-
logical fiction and has become a sociological fact.’ But it demonstrates no 
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awareness of ‘race’ beyond this scientific bankruptcy”(“Can” 141). Tucker’s 
specific quotation from “The Caucasian Problem” seems to support his larger 
assertion about the scientific focus of the text. However, a closer reading of 
the essay reveals a very limited reliance on science as a foundation for Schuy-
ler’s argument. The only time Schuyler mentions the “natural sciences” is in 
the one sentence quoted by Tucker and in one earlier paragraph also men-
tioning anthropology (285).12 In a 17-page essay, Schuyler utilizes the natu-
ral sciences and, more broadly, an argument specifically based on science in 
approximately one half of a page. The actuality of the essay’s scientific usage, 
then, varies greatly from Tucker’s portrayal of “much of the essay.” Similarly, 
Tucker quotes a lengthy excerpt from the end of “The Caucasian Problem” 
as evidence of Schuyler’s belief in “the power of scientific reason to combat 
racism” (141). However, the quotation does not make reference to science 
or reason, nor logic, facts, or the objectivity Tucker emphasizes elsewhere. 
In other words, Tucker locates a “scientific reason” in the passage which does 
not exist. This localized misreading quickly leads Tucker to erroneous asser-
tions about Schuyler’s general connections to science.
Tucker utilizes the perceived scientific focus in “The Caucasian Prob-
lem” as a bridge to make the larger claim that “Schuyler’s overemphasis on a 
narrowly defined scientific ideal stemmed from his faith in scientific rational-
ity’s ability to overcome racial antagonisms” (“Can” 141). As we have seen, 
Tucker’s claim that Schuyler believed in a “scientific ideal,” let alone that he 
overemphasized such an ideal, lacks sufficient textual support from Schuyler’s 
essay. However, Tucker does go on to offer one other example from Schuyler’s 
career as evidence of his scientific idealism: “his creation in the early 1940s 
of the Association for Tolerance In America, an organization whose mission 
was ‘to recondition the white masses by scientific propaganda’” (ibid). Tucker 
utilizes a quote from Schuyler’s autobiography here, in which Schuyler actu-
ally uses the word “scientific,” to further support Tucker’s claims of scientific 
idealism. However, the actual activities associated with the Association simi-
larly have nothing to do with science: the use of new advertisement mediums 
like billboards and radio to emphasize the patriotic contributions of African-
Americans during the war and to combat negative social stereotypes of Afri-
can-Americans. Schuyler himself apparently used “scientific” as a synonym 
for rational or logical. However, the term “scientific propaganda,” in which 
science is linked with propaganda, suggests Schuyler was well aware of the 
ideological foundations of science even as he utilized the larger cultural con-
nection made between science and objectivity. It may be that when Tucker 
uses words like “scientific rationality” and “scientific reason,” he is mirror-
ing Schuyler’s own linguistic usage. If so, he should pay closer attention to 
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the specific linguistic connotations of Schuyler’s sentence. First, with “scien-
tific” as a synonym for “reason” and “rationality,” both of Tucker’s phrases are 
redundant. Furthermore, Schuyler’s association of propaganda with science 
undermines Tucker’s premise of scientific idealism.
The key to Tucker’s misreading and misrepresentation of Schuyler’s sci-
entific beliefs and textual usage lies in his political objections to Schuyler’s 
racial views. After a summary of Schuyler’s racial views, and their scientific 
basis, Tucker voices his primary concern—his belief that there are “serious 
problems with the uses to which Schuyler put his racial theory. Schuyler 
used the claim that ‘race’ is merely a socially constructed illusion to critique 
black race leaders as frequently as white supremacists” (“Can” 141). Tucker 
ends his discussion of Schuyler’s general racial viewpoint with examples of 
two of Schuyler’s most famous early critiques, that of W. E. B. Du Bois and 
Langston Hughes. It is symptomatic that Tucker’s straightforward political 
analysis is adequately supported with several examples from Schuyler’s texts. 
The first half of Tucker’s thesis, then, does not involve any misrepresenta-
tion or elisions; he clearly and convincingly argues that Schuyler wished to 
discard the concept of race altogether and, more importantly, that Tucker 
believes such an attitude is “politically inadequate” (137). However, Tucker is 
so focused on his political objections to Schuyler that he does not provide an 
adequate discussion of the second half of his thesis—Schuyler’s justification 
of his racial views through “claims to a rational, scientific, and supposedly 
nonpartisan objectivity” (ibid).
Tucker’s misreading of Schuyler’s essay and subsequent focus on Schuy-
ler’s representation of black leaders foreshadows his lengthier analysis of 
Black No More. Of the three paragraphs devoted specifically to the novel, 
the first two paragraphs largely summarize the text. In the third paragraph, 
however, Tucker discusses the satiric nature of Black No More. He first refutes 
John M. Reilly’s assertion that Black No More is anti-utopian, a “novel that 
features scientific deconstructions of ‘race’ but places little faith in human-
ity’s ability to use that knowledge to create a better society” (“Can” 143). 
As Tucker correctly notes, “satiric and utopian impulses are not mutually 
exclusive. A satire is by definition a humorous critique intended to change 
behavior or thinking” (ibid). That said, Tucker misses Reilly’s larger point 
behind emphasizing the anti-utopian nature of the novel—the all-encom-
passing satiric viewpoint of the text. Schuyler critiques every aspect of society 
implicated in race—which is, in fact, every aspect. The pervasive nature of 
the novel’s satire affects Tucker’s reading in two ways. First, Tucker argues 
that science is the one element of the novel not satirized: “Schuyler’s satire 
is not aimed at the transformative potential of science itself, but is instead 
Schuyler 61
tightly focused on specific white supremacist and black ‘race’ organizations. 
The novel’s parodies of Du Bois and Garvey are perfect examples” (143). 
Similar to his reading of Schuyler’s other texts, Tucker’s reading of Black No 
More involves an erroneous claim about science, one which, therefore, can-
not be supported with evidence from the text. For example, Tucker does not 
discuss the characterization of Dr. Crookman—a major character and sci-
entist. Furthermore, Tucker specifically admits in his summary of the novel 
that Crookman’s scientific procedure is not portrayed as an idealistic solution 
to the ‘race problem’: “However, instead of solving the nation’s racial prob-
lems, Black No More, Inc., creates chaos” (142). Where, then, does Tucker 
locate the “transformative potential of science” he describes?
Secondly, Tucker again focuses exclusively on Schuyler’s negative 
characterization of black race leaders. Two thirds of the sole analytic paragraph 
on Black No More deals with the characterizations of W. E. B. Du Bois and 
Marcus Garvey. To make his main point crystal clear, Tucker not only ends 
this paragraph but his entire discussion of the novel with a restatement of 
his primary objection to the text: “The ‘racial chauvinism’ that these figures 
represent to Schuyler, not science, is his principal target. Perhaps science 
cannot ‘succeed where the Civil War had failed,’ but according to Schuyler, 
that is only because of what he sees as the reprehensible insistence on ‘race’ by 
the race leaders, such as Du Bois and Garvey, that his novel sharply satirizes” 
(144). Tucker argues here that Schuyler targets “only” black leaders as 
obstacles to achieving racial equality and harmony. Such an argument elides 
the “white supremacist” organizations Tucker mentioned once earlier in the 
paragraph, and it misrepresents Schuyler’s satiric treatment of science in the 
text. The importance of Reilly’s anti-utopian, satiric emphasis resurfaces here. 
Reilly places his analysis directly in the context of the assimilationist debate 
surrounding Schuyler, and he emphasizes that “the logic of this anti-utopia 
neither leads to specific denigration of Blacks nor advocates mediocrity and 
the reduplication of white life-styles and culture” (108). In this way, Reilly 
specifically addresses Tucker’s accusations of partiality. For example, unlike 
most Afro-centric readings of Schuyler, Reilly’s reading focuses primarily on 
the equally, if not more, negative portrayal of white characters. According 
to Reilly, “every white person in the book is an ass; every institution created 
by whites is debased” (ibid). Furthermore, Reilly offers an explanation for 
the critics’ overemphasis of the negative portrayal of black characters: “Black 
characters are more easily identified with actual persons than are white 
characters, so the Black satire hurts more. The novel, however, is not anti-
Black. It is simply anti-utopian, written, as befits a conservative author, in 
the tradition of rationalist satire” (ibid). Reilly’s inclusive, literary approach 
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to characterization serves as a model for a more accurate and productive 
analysis of Schuyler’s scientific usage in Black No More.
While Tucker accurately summarizes the thesis of Black No More, he 
oversimplifies and misrepresents Schuyler’s scientific connections. Tucker 
glosses over key aspects of scientific history, the complex portrayal of science 
in Schuyler’s texts, and their connection to the science fiction genre. First, 
Tucker utilizes Donna Haraway’s theories of scientific subjectivity to indict 
Schuyler. Tucker claims that “Schuyler overinvests in the notion of scientific 
objectivity, that science is a transparent medium providing clear access to 
truth” (“Can” 146). In contrast, Haraway argues for the subjective, the fic-
tional aspect of science. Scientific discourse tells stories, embodies particular 
points of view, and supports particular belief systems.13 Unfortunately, Tuck-
er’s use of Haraway has several major flaws. First, as previously discussed, 
Schuyler’s association of science with propaganda in his autobiography sug-
gests he would fully agree with Haraway’s ideological emphasis. In addition, 
as we will see in more detail shortly, Schuyler’s actual use of science in Black 
No More supports such a reading of scientific subjectivity.
Furthermore, despite the fact that Tucker quotes Haraway to critique 
Schuyler, he himself falls into the objectivity trap in his discussion of sci-
ence. Tucker asserts that, “‘Race’ is indeed a mirage scientifically speaking, 
and a construct socially, culturally, politically, and ideologically; but making 
this claim does not elide its power to shape human lives in a very real way” 
(“Can” 148). When Tucker separates science from the other constructed con-
cepts of race he lists here, he is accepting the better known, factual, objective 
representation of science Haraway combats. According to Tucker’s statement, 
within the context of science, race either exists or it does not. The complex 
and multiple definitions and uses of race within the various scientific disci-
plines, and the conflict often taking place between these concepts and enti-
ties, are elided here. “Scientifically speaking,” race is a construct also and 
certainly has “power to shape human lives in very real ways.” Tucker criticizes 
Schuyler for overemphasizing science, yet Tucker himself dismisses it too 
quickly. In utilizing a monolithic definition of science, Tucker also overlooks 
the historicizing of science Haraway’s scientific theories entail. For example, 
in her 1989 text, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of 
Modern Science, Haraway chronicles the history of race in the American sci-
entific community.14 Nancy Stepan similarly investigates the evolving scien-
tific concept of race in Britain in her book, The Idea of Race in Science: Great 
Britain 1800–1960. If Tucker’s assertion that “‘Race’ is indeed a mirage sci-
entifically speaking” were placed in such a historical context, the resulting 
translation would be: “The biological essentialism at the heart of scientific 
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racial theories emerging and developing in the 19th century and first half of 
the 20th century has been gradually discredited as biologically inaccurate and 
culturally biased.” Such a historicized statement, stressing the long process of 
change involved, more accurately places Schuyler’s fictional works.
George H. Daniels’ Science in American Society: A Social History pro-
vides a useful, broad historical context for Schuyler’s use of science in Black 
No More. In the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, when Schuyler wrote much of his fic-
tion, science was in the process of transforming American society—from 
national defense, to religious beliefs, to every American’s day-to-day living. 
In fact, from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, the scientific disci-
pline has grown exponentially in size, as well as cultural power and influence. 
According to Daniels, “[s]cience and technology by the beginning of the 
twentieth century had begun to permeate all of life” (290). More specifically, 
“[i]n the nineteenth century, despite the frequent obeisance made to science 
and technology, social forces in America tended to shape, or at least restrict, 
the development of science. In the early years of the twentieth century, the 
relationship became more reciprocal, and in important ways: science had a 
substantial influence upon American social policy” (295). This “influence” 
was largely possible “because the American public in the twentieth century 
has been marked by a childlike faith in science” (293). At this point, the 
connection between science and progress comes into focus. Because western 
ideology is based in large part on the concept of progress—cultural, techno-
logical, and political—science is generally viewed as part of a progressively 
better world as well. This progressive, positive concept of science is called sci-
entism, and it accurately reflects the general view of science at the turn of the 
century within the scientific community and the larger American public.
A key element of scientism is the promotion of the scientific method 
and its application to areas of life besides science and technology: “The belief 
that science contributed to the intellectual progress of mankind by encour-
aging habits of thinking which tended to make men more rational, to make 
them base their thinking on facts, observations, and experiments, was gen-
erally accompanied by the assumption that the scientific method could be 
applied to mental and social areas of study” (Daniels 297). Sociology, psy-
chology, ethnology, education, and conservation were just some of the fields 
impacted by scientism and the application of the scientific method. Fur-
thermore, “[b]y the beginning of the twentieth century, science was firmly 
entrenched in dozens of government agencies and legislation based on sci-
ence was becoming more common” (291). Because science was synonymous 
with technology to the general public, it was also “upheld as a wonder-worker 
that promised more of the startling innovations they had experienced during 
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their own time” (290-91)—”telephones, telegraphs, and electric lights,” for 
example (290). Daniels acknowledges that this pervasive and overwhelm-
ingly positive “enthusiasm” for science was “naïve,” but attests that the basic 
premise of the Progressives was accurate—”America in the twentieth century 
has become, as W J McGee observed two years before this century began, ‘a 
nation of science’” (315).
Tucker portrays Schuyler as one such naïve believer in scientism. 
Indeed, Schuyler’s emphasis on science and use of the science fiction genre 
for Black No More do illustrate an understanding of the twentieth century as 
a century of science. Furthermore, Schuyler’s infamous promotion of logic 
and rationality parallels the importance of the scientific method to scientism. 
Robert A. Hill and Kent Rasmussen, for example, note Schuyler’s call for 
more scientists among black students, rather than the prevalent teachers and 
preachers (Hill and Rasmussen 301–2). In his 1936 essay, “New Job Fron-
tiers for Negro Youth,” Schuyler states, “This is the age of technics and the 
key man is the technical scientist” (qtd. in Hill and Rasmussen 301–302). 
Schuyler believes such a vocational shift is necessary “not only because we 
are living in an age dominated by science but because the psychology of the 
engineer is more likely to incline to Negro integration in American life and 
less toward tacitly accepting and promoting segregation” (Hill and Rasmus-
sen 302). Here Schuyler exhibits the belief, discussed above, “that science 
contributed to the intellectual progress of mankind by encouraging habits of 
thinking which tended to make men more rational” (Daniels 297). Certainly, 
such a belief can be labeled naïve, and the vocational shift Schuyler desired 
did not occur. However, the context of scientism aids our understanding of 
Schuyler’s use of science in several ways besides Tucker’s single proposition of 
naïve idealism.
First, Schuyler’s main literary activity takes place as American society 
was coming to terms with the scientific developments Daniels discusses. 
Given the overwhelmingly positivistic climate of the United States, it is not 
surprising that Schuyler utilized some of the same practical and ideological 
arguments as the Progressives. Nancy Stepan and Sander Gilman emphasize 
the great difficulty of distancing one’s self from the dominant ideology dur-
ing this time period:
What we are arguing is that in the era of the successful establishment 
of science as an epistemologically neutral and instrumentally successful 
form of knowledge, standing “outside of” or ignoring science was very 
difficult. With the triumph of “positive” science and positivist ideology, 
even those with the most radical intellectual and political philosophies 
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and programs—alternate world views—tended to exempt science from 
their criticisms and to posit science as the one positive form of knowl-
edge that escaped contamination from political and personal factors. A 
hard-hitting critique of science, as itself a political form of knowledge 
reflective of power, was, relatively speaking, absent. (Stepan and Gilman 
101–2)
According to Daniels, even “the most respected thinkers of the day, and the 
most important movements of the period, were wholly captured by the magic 
of ‘science’” (295). In such a context, even Schuyler’s limited connection 
between science and propaganda, or science and politics, is unusual. In addi-
tion, science was a relatively new tool for anti-racist arguments. Given the 
excruciatingly slow progress of equality for African-Americans in the United 
States, an untried technique might appear an attractive option. The rational 
emphasis of science and scientism coincided with Schuyler’s general empha-
sis on logic as a tool to undermine racism as well. All of these factors help 
to more fully explain Schuyler’s use of science without simplistically labeling 
it idealistic. Furthermore, even with Schuyler’s more balanced view of sci-
ence and its potential, he could tap the wide-spread scientism of the general 
American public to combat racism. Schuyler could utilize the tremendous 
power and influence of the scientific community as a tool to undermine 
race, racial essentialism, and racial categorization. As Daniels attests, “[s]uch 
concrete evidences of the potency of science increased the authority—both 
within the scientific community and without—of anyone who spoke in the 
name of science” (293).
A final reason for utilizing science in anti-racist arguments is precisely 
the negative connection between science and racism. As the multiple histo-
ries of science and race uniformly highlight, science has been used extensively 
to promote racist viewpoints.15 Furthermore, as Houston Baker’s synopsis 
highlighted, the scientific community was heatedly debating the earlier, 
essentialist concept of biologically distinct and hierarchical races at the time 
of Schuyler’s major literary activity. Racial typology and the racial basis of a 
cultural hierarchy, from primitive to civilized, were still accepted scientific 
theories. The biological evolutionism of Darwin was mirrored in a theory of 
cultural evolutionism, or Social Darwinism. Science historians Nancy Stepan 
and Sander Gilman, for example, focus on the period between 1870 and 
1920 not only because it was “the period of transition to modern science,” 
but also because it was the period when “the claims of scientifically estab-
lished inferiority were pressed most insistently by the mainstream scientific 
community” (Stepan and Gilman 72). Scientific racism, as it was called, was 
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the accepted norm for the turn of the century (73). In her 1982 book on the 
history of race in Great Britain, Stepan further argues that the scientific con-
cept of race developed hand-in-hand with the growth of western imperialism 
and the subjugation and enslavement of people of color around the world 
(Idea). Writing approximately forty years earlier, Schuyler noticed this same 
connection in “The Caucasian Problem” (1944). Schuyler asserts that the 
general racial categories of “‘Negro’ and ‘Caucasian,’ ‘black’ and ‘white’ are 
convenient propaganda devices” which “very conveniently follow the line of 
colonial subjugation and exploitation, with the Asiatics and Africans lumped 
together smugly as ‘backward peoples,’ ‘savages,’ ‘barbarians,’ or ‘primitives’: 
i.e., fair prey for fleecing and enslavement under the camouflage of ‘civiliza-
tion’” (285). Clearly, Schuyler had a critical and sophisticated understanding 
of the ideological underpinnings of race and the political and material uses 
to which race(s) could be applied. Science’s increasing power in western soci-
ety combined with its use as a justification for colonialism, imperialism, slav-
ery, and racism to form a formidable hurdle to racial equality. Consequently, 
when some scientists began to question the established essentialist theories of 
race, their controversial theories became the best way to combat the scientific 
justification of racism, as well as racism more generally. Given Americans’ 
positivistic belief in science in the early 20th century, the scientific commu-
nity’s recantation of its previous racial theories could have a powerful impact 
on racial ideology in the United States.
A chronological pairing of Schuyler’s literary career with the scientific 
career of early anthropologist Franz Boas will illustrate more specifically 
the newness and radical nature of Schuyler’s racial theories, as well as the 
authors’ shared sense of the usefulness of science for social reform. Born in 
Germany in 1858, Boas pioneered the field of modern anthropology during 
the first half of the twentieth century.16 After moving to the United States in 
1887, Boas was appointed assistant chief of the department of anthropology 
at the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago (1894). Edgar Rice Bur-
roughs’ biographer John Taliaferro describes Boas’ activities in the Anthro-
pological hall of the exposition: “thousands of tourists, curious to see where 
they ranked on the scale of human progress, lined up to have their heads 
measured—’anthropometry,’ it was called—by a team of anthropologists 
led by Franz Boas, who would soon thrust himself into the middle of the 
debate over eugenics and racial determinism, a topic that Burroughs himself 
would be drawn into” (35). Boas and Burroughs’ common attendance at the 
World’s Columbian Exposition accurately places Boas’ early career. He had 
already dedicated himself to the scientific study of the connection between 
physical and cultural characteristics in humans, and this study took place 
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in the context of racial essentialism, racial hierarchies, and specifically the 
growth of eugenics as a scientific, political, and popular discourse. As his sci-
entific studies in physical anthropology continued over the next fifty years, 
Boas generated scientific data challenging the prevailing theories of racial 
essentialism. In fact, he was “at the forefront of those who combatted the 
transfer of principles of biological evolution to the manifestations of man’s 
learned behavior” (Herskovits, Franz 6). Boas, then, had a crucial impact on 
both of these fields—physical and cultural anthropology—making up the 
larger discipline of anthropology.
For example, during the heated debate over the ability of immigrants 
to assimilate successfully to American society, Boas completed a study for 
the Dillingham Commission on Immigration of the U.S. Congress (1907–
1910). His findings, published in 1911, emphasized the role of environmen-
tal factors in contrast to the established theory of biological inheritance and 
distinct, static racial types (Herskovits, Foreword 9). As Boas’ biographer, 
Melville J. Herskovits, notes, Boas’ “analysis of changes in head-form of 
immigrants [ . . . ] was the best-know, and the most controversial research 
he conducted” because it revealed the dynamic nature of the human form 
(Franz 39).17 Head-form was the foundation of racial identification and 
classification, the primary objective of physical anthropologists, as a whole, 
during this time period (ibid). Therefore, Boas’ research challenged the 
prevailing theories of the physical anthropologists, as well as the biologists’ 
“doctrine of the autonomy of genetic determinants of physical type” (ibid). 
Not surprising, then, Boas faced a protracted and largely unsuccessful fight 
to gain acceptance for his controversial findings. When no other scientist 
stepped forward to repeat the massive project, Boas initiated several similar 
studies to support his findings (Herskovits, Franz 42). Finally, in 1928 he 
published the “raw data” from his study of the immigrants so that it would 
be available for other scientists to analyze (40). The scientific community’s 
reaction to Boas’ Dillingham study illustrates the radical nature of dynamic 
and fluid theories of race during this time period and how entrenched racial 
essentialism was even among professional scientists.
Working to change these essentialist racial beliefs within the scientific 
community, as well as in the larger American public, Boas became a prolific 
writer and lecturer. Boas’ 1911 book, The Mind of Primitive Man, embodies 
his critical racial approach. Herskovits asserts that it wasn’t until this text’s 
publication that “antiracists could refer to a single work” to support a posi-
tion critical of essentialist theories of race (Foreword 6). Boas summarized 
his findings in The Mind of Primitive Man as follows: “[a] close connection 
between race and personality has never been established. The concept of racial 
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type as commonly used even in scientific literature is misleading and requires 
a logical as well as biological definition” (9). Here Boas cautiously refutes 
racial determinism due to a lack of reliable scientific evidence. This racial 
critique may seem hesitant and partial from a contemporary perspective, but 
Herskovits points out that such “scientific realism and methodological cau-
tion” was characteristic of Boas (Franz 71). More importantly, Herskovits 
emphasizes the importance of Boas’ text by contrasting it with the preced-
ing scientific theories of race. Herskovits identifies two major branches: one 
used in the United States to justify slavery and one used on the Continent 
to promote the superiority of an Aryan race (Foreword 5). In this way, Her-
skovits joins Stepan in connecting racialist science with “the era of European 
expansion over the world” and emphasizes the political motivation behind 
the newly-emerging scientific field (ibid).18
Furthermore, The Mind of Primitive Man was published contempora-
neously with the rise of the eugenics movement. Utilizing the fundamental 
western notion of progress, eugenicists believed human biology and heredity 
should be systematically manipulated in order to achieve specified social ide-
als. Biological evolutionism translated into social evolutionism. Prominent 
American biologist Charles B. Davenport, for example, believed “[s]ocial and 
physical evolution were one. Attempts to improve man by changing his envi-
ronment were [ . . . ] doomed to futility” (Rosenberg 94). This biologi-
cal and cultural immutability lay behind the concept of racial determinism. 
For instance, two of Davenport’s “major research interests were the effects 
of race-crossing and the comparative social traits of different races. Daven-
port never doubted that racial traits were as immutable as the genes which 
produced them” (Rosenberg 95). Therefore, Davenport squared off against 
Boas in using “the prestige of his scientific position” to support the immigra-
tion restriction movement (ibid). More broadly, science historian Charles E. 
Rosenberg does not locate a general break between American scientists and 
the eugenics movement until “the late twenties and early thirties” (96). Laura 
Doyle specifically names Boas and W. E. B. Du Bois as two dissenting voices 
among the dominant current of “racialist and deterministic science” (238).19 
Within this context, Herskovits attests that Boas’ The Mind of Primitive Man 
“foreshadowed a trend that was to change almost completely the sub-science 
of physical anthropology from one concerned primarily with the classifica-
tion of human types into a specialized science of human biology” (Foreword 
9). This broad view situates Boas on the cutting edge of the slow and con-
tested evolution of anthropology as a modern scientific discipline.
At his death in 1942, Boas was working on a collection of his works, 
posthumously published as Race and Democratic Society in 1945. “[D]irected 
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at lay audiences,” the collection embodies Boas’ primary goal of using scien-
tific theories of race and culture to undermine world-wide racism and preju-
dice, especially in the context of the increasing influence of “Fascist and Nazi 
ideology” during the 1930s and 1940s (E. Boas). Not only was the Nazi use 
of science to support an extreme eugenics program increasingly criticized by 
the scientific community generally, but also Boas, as a Jew, had a personal 
connection to the issue(s).20 As Nancy Stepan and Sander Gilman note, 
“[a]fter 1850, critics of scientific racism and/or sexism from within science 
were often themselves in one way or another members of marginal groups” 
(74). Within the text of Race and Democratic Society, then, Boas began 
with the subcategory of “Race,” the first article of this category is entitled 
“Prejudice,” and the very first sentence refers to the ghettoizing of American 
Negroes. More broadly, the second portion of Boas’ title, Democratic Society, 
reflects his promotion of positive American values, as well as his address of 
the disjuncture between these positive values and racial issues within Amer-
ican society. In sum, Boas sought to promote the rights of individuals in 
opposition to the collective, essentialist racial theories still playing a powerful 
role in the world.
Boas’ critical revision of the field of anthropology coincided with 
Schuyler’s major literary activity. For example, Black No More was published 
in 1931, the Black Empire serials in 1937 and 1938, and “The Caucasian 
Problem” in 1944. This historical scientific context illustrates the relative 
newness and controversial nature of Schuyler’s racial theories, even within 
the scientific community. If someone in the field, like Boas, thought pub-
lic dissemination of scientific findings important up through 1942, surely 
Schuyler’s emphasis on science for a lay audience was a logical and, perhaps, 
necessary step as well. The gap between the scientific community and the 
African-American community, even more pronounced during the era of Jim 
Crow segregation, further increased the relevancy of such scientific informa-
tion for Schuyler’s primary audience. In “The Caucasian Problem,” Schuyler 
alludes to the relatively recent chronology of racial questioning: “[n]ot only is 
the superiority of one race being vigorously denied but the whole concept of 
race is being effectively challenged. This phenomenon dates chiefly from the 
First World War” (294). When Schuyler concludes “The Caucasian Prob-
lem” with the assertion that racism must be addressed or “[t]he alternative 
here and abroad is conflict and chaos,” he places his arguments in a similar 
context as Boas’ Race and Democratic Society. First the “abroad” corresponds 
with the highpoint of a global eugenics movement, with its connections to 
fascism and genocide, and the ever-increasing spread of western imperialism 
and the rise of the United States as a world power. Second, the “here” refers 
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to the connection of these global trends to the specific issues of race within 
the United States, in particular the status of African-Americans. Schuyler’s 
creation of The Association for Tolerance in America and its use of popular 
advertisement mediums corresponds with Boas’ lay outreach as well (Tucker, 
“Can” 141).
Furthermore, Black No More embodies an even more extreme view-
point on race than Boas’ scientific texts. In contrast to Boas’ cautious sci-
entific skepticism, Schuyler confidently asserts the complete biological 
intermingling of the so-called “Negro” and “Caucasian” races in the United 
States and playfully theorizes about the ability to change races through an 
exterior physical process (“Caucasian” 285). If anything, Schuyler’s social-
constructionist theory of race anticipated the direction eventually taken not 
only by the scientific community as a whole but also the literary community. 
Sociologist Gunnar Myrdal supports this anticipatory view in his study of 
race in America:
[Myrdal] found that he was able to call upon a long tradition of sci-
entific work produced by African-American physicians, educators, and 
social scientists about their own identity, meaning, and status. Myrdal 
remarked upon the environmentalist emphasis found in these black sci-
entific studies of the Negro, in contrast to the innatist tendencies of the 
white academy. That emphasis gave black writing, he said, a much more 
modern tone than white writings of the same period. (Stepan and Gil-
man 103)
Schuyler’s constructionist viewpoint, then, coincided with the larger Afri-
can-American scientific community. More specifically, Myrdal highlighted 
the importance of black social scientists, like W. E. B. Du Bois, to this scien-
tific counter discourse. Myrdal “noted that from the beginning black social 
scientists took the stand that the American dogma of race inequality was a 
scientific falsehood” (Stepan and Gilman 98). Schuyler and Du Bois, in fact, 
shared a common interest in science and rationalism as an anti-racist tool.
Schuyler, Boas, and Du Bois all utilized scientific theories to interrogate 
race during this time period. Therefore, adding Du Bois to the pairing of 
Schuyler and Boas will reveal Tucker’s political bias, as he defends Du Bois 
but criticizes Schuyler. First, as a social scientist, Du Bois subscribed to the 
same basic scientific tenets as Boas—the importance of rationality, objectivity, 
and the scientific method to modern science.21 Furthermore, Du Bois and 
Boas are often cited as leaders of the resistance against scientific racism 
because their work as scientists predominantly promoted a constructionist 
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theory of race.22 Anthony Appiah’s controversial article, criticized by Tucker, 
chronicles Du Bois’ evolution from an essentialist to a constructionist 
perspective. Similarly, Nancy Stepan and Sander Gilman chart Du Bois’ 
multiple, evolving strategies of resistance to scientific racism. These critical 
readings are supported by Du Bois’ 1940 autobiography, Dusk of Dawn: an 
Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept, in which Du Bois compares 
his evolving personal views on the definition of race to those of the scientific 
community and American society more generally.
In Dusk of Dawn, Du Bois gives an overview of the racial changes from 
the 19th to the 20th century. According to Du Bois, race was not a self-con-
scious term in the 19th century; it was used “as a matter of course without 
explanation or definition” by Americans generally (100).23 In addition, race 
referred to both “physical traits and cultural affinity” (ibid). By the turn-
of-the-century, race had become a self-consciously studied term within the 
sciences and a biological basis was emphasized, due to Darwinist evolution-
ary theory (Du Bois, Dusk 98). For example, Du Bois’ early paper, “The 
Conservation of Races” (1897), was his “first extended discussion of the con-
cept of race,” and he utilizes biological elements in his larger “sociohistorical” 
argument (Appiah 23). As Appiah notes, “what Du Bois attempts [ . . . ] 
is not the transcendence of the nineteenth-century scientific conception of 
race—as we shall see, he relies on it—but rather as the dialectic requires, a 
revaluation of the Negro race in the face of the sciences of racial inferior-
ity” (25). According to Du Bois, the “psychic-biological” difference(s) of the 
Negro race simply meant it had a unique and positive contribution to make 
to American society (Stepan and Gilman 93). Stepan and Gilman identity 
this technique of resistance a “transvaluation of the terms of the dominant 
discourse”: “[t]he significance of biological race differences was accepted, but 
the ‘inferior’ element in the hierarchy revalued and renamed” (92). Stepan 
and Gilman’s scientific context provides an explanation for Du Bois’ use of 
the “norms and standards of science” in a period when this meant the oxy-
moronic combination of objectivity and racialism found in scientific racism 
(84–5).24 First, scientists had to utilize ostensibly objective language and the 
scientific method to be taken seriously by other scientists. In addition, “to 
admit that race, especially one’s own, was an issue in science was to make 
the writer immediately less than fully ‘objective’ and therefore less than fully 
‘scientific’” (86). Finally, most scientists shared a common view of “science as 
a progressive, instrumental, and objective form of knowledge” (ibid). There-
fore, minority scientists “were tempted simultaneously to embrace and reject 
the field: to embrace science’s methods, concepts, and the promise it held 
out for discovering knowledge, and to reject, in a variety of ways, the conclu-
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sions of science as they appeared to apply negatively to themselves” (87).25 
The two prominent scientists who strenuously resisted scientific racism, Du 
Bois and Boas, fit this template—Du Bois as an African-American sociolo-
gist and Boas as a Jewish anthropologist.26
By the early decades of the 20th century, race became more a “question 
of comparative culture” than biology (99), and Du Bois “began to emphasize 
the cultural aspects of race” (Du Bois, Dusk 102). For example, in the same 
year as Boas’ 1911 publications, Du Bois wrote an editorial in The Crisis 
addressing the scientific community’s increasing critique of racial essential-
ism: “The leading scientists of the world have come forward [with . . . ] 
a series of propositions which may be summarized as follows: 1. (a) It is not 
legitimate to argue from differences in physical characteristics to differences 
in mental characteristics. (b) The mental characteristics differentiating a par-
ticular people or race are not (1) unchangeable [ . . . ]” (157). Moreover, 
Du Bois joins Schuyler and Boas in connecting the cultural, and therefore 
“changeable” basis of race, to a larger educational program. Since “5. (a) 
The deepest cause of misunderstanding between peoples is perhaps the tacit 
assumption that the present characteristics of a people are the expression of 
permanent qualities,”
[b . . . ] anthropologists, sociologists and scientific thinkers as a class 
could powerfully assist the movement for a juster appreciation of peo-
ples by persistently pointing out in their lectures and in their works the 
fundamental fallacy involved in taking a static instead of a dynamic, a 
momentary instead of a historic, a fixed instead of a comparative, point 
of view of peoples; (c) and such dynamic teaching could be conveniently 
introduced into schools [ . . . and] also into colleges [ . . . ] (157)
Finally, most damning, Du Bois’ 7th summary point states that, “[s]o far at 
least as intellectual and moral aptitudes are concerned, we ought to speak 
of civilizations where we now speak of races” (158). As we shall see shortly, 
Du Bois was not willing to apply fully this last scientific assertion. Yet, he 
believed that the discrepancies between these scientific claims, as a whole, 
and the reality of “racial philosophy” in the United States revealed a “fifty 
year” gap (157). In this editorial, Du Bois utilizes the progressive ideology 
of science and implicitly connects positive progress and a cultural concept of 
race.
In addition, Du Bois’ editorial summary was based on a complex web 
of interconnections with Boas. According to Appiah, Du Bois’ editorial was 
prompted by the work of G. Spiller, presented at the First Universal Races 
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Congress in London in July, 1911.27 However, Boas also presented a paper at 
the Congress, attended by Du Bois.28 Therefore, Boas is one of the “leading 
scientists” to whom Du Bois refers as a basis for his entire summary and one 
of the “anthropologists” to whom Du Bois appeals in his fifth point on lay 
outreach (157). Du Bois had several other connections to Boas during this 
time period as well. For example, Boas came to Atlanta University in 1906, 
at Du Bois’ invitation, to “deliver the university’s commencement address 
and take part in its annual Negro conference” (Beardsley 261). Du Bois 
quoted extensively from this address in The Health and Physique of the Negro 
American: Report of a Social Study Made Under the Direction of Atlanta Uni-
versity; Together with the Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference for the Study 
of the Negro Problems, held at Atlanta University, on May the 29th, 1906.29 
Furthermore, Boas delivered a paper on “The Anthropological Position of 
the Negro” at the 1910 conference of the National Negro committee; this 
paper was reprinted as “The Real Race Problem” in The Crisis the same year 
(Beardsley 262). While in this paper Boas presented “a veiled endorsement of 
racial intermarriage as the best long-run solution to problems of race” (262), 
he also tried to establish an African museum (Beardsley 259–261). These 
tensions in Boas’ work—between biology and culture, between a negative 
and positive view of race, between an American and an African identity for 
American Negroes—mirror those found in Du Bois’ work. Overall, the sci-
entific connections between Boas and Du Bois are much stronger than those 
of Boas and Schuyler, illustrating the (positive) importance of science to Du 
Bois’ concept of race.
By 1940, in Dusk of Dawn: an Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race 
Concept, Du Bois explicitly rejects a biological basis for race: “[i]t is easy 
to see that scientific definition of race is impossible; it is easy to prove that 
physical characteristics are not so inherited as to make it possible to divide 
the world into races” (137). Yet, Du Bois continues to emphasize the impor-
tance of race and of a collective racial identity through the substitution of 
a socio-historical theory of race. Trying to formulate a historical and politi-
cal connection to Africa, Du Bois writes, “the real essence of this kinship is 
its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage 
binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends through yellow 
Asia and into the South Seas. It is this unity that draws me to Africa” (117). 
However, as Appiah notes, Du Bois’ cultural definition of race continues to 
rely on biology, for “[h]ow can something he shares with the whole nonwhite 
world bind him to only a part of it?” (Appiah 34–5). Therefore, Appiah con-
cludes that Du Bois “never quite managed to complete” his racial argument, 
the “logic” of which “leads naturally to the final repudiation of race as a term 
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of difference and to speaking instead ‘of civilizations where we now speak of 
races’” (Appiah 35). Appiah’s analysis of Du Bois highlights the key differ-
ence between Schuyler and Du Bois. It is not their general use of science or 
belief in rationalism or objectivity, but the degree to which they applied the 
scientific information and to which they emphasized culture as a substitute 
for biology.
Schuyler “complete[s]” the argument Du Bois does not—he 
“repudiat[es] race as a term of difference” and “speak[s] instead ‘of civiliza-
tions’” (Appiah 35). Schuyler’s “repudiation” of race is well-traversed area. 
However, his use of “civilizations” and racial oppression as unifying tech-
niques in “The Caucasian Problem” (1944) is often overlooked because of 
the focus on his conservative political agenda as a whole. Tucker, for example, 
highlighted the (supposed) scientific foundations of the article and Schuyler’s 
use of science to “throw out the concept of ‘race’ altogether” (“Can” 140–1). 
Yet, Schuyler connects, in detail, the oppression of Negroes (whether in the 
United States or in Africa) to that of “Asiatic colored folk, “ the “Indo-Afri-
can masses” of Latin America (287), and people-of-color in the Caribbean 
(“Caucasian” 288–9). Although his emphasis is slightly different than that of 
Du Bois, Schuyler’s common tie of oppression mirrors that of Du Bois’ “social 
heritage of slavery, the discrimination and insult”: “the so-called Negro race 
is a melange representing every known variety of human being with nothing 
whatever in common except a common bondage and a common resentment 
against enforced poverty and pariahdom, and an increasing determination 
to rid the world of the Caucasian problem which hampers its progress and 
development” (“Caucasian” 286). Therefore, collective racial resistance and 
reform is necessary. Unlike Du Bois, Schuyler does not undermine the con-
nection between Negroes and Asians, or any other group oppressed due to its 
color. He emphasizes the importance of “civilizations,” rather than race, to a 
greater degree than Du Bois.
Yet, within the concept of “civilizations,” the overarching similarity of 
oppression is joined also by many specific cultural differences. Therefore, 
Schuyler believed that the geographic, historic, and linguistic differences 
between the many groups composing the so-called Negro race are equally as 
important as their common oppression. For example, “[p]rior to the rise of 
present imperialist Powers on the wings of piracy and conquest” and “[b]efore 
the inauguration of the slave trade,” blacks were perceived by Europeans as 
members of more specific nationalist groups (like Moors, Ethiopians, or 
Yorubas) and as representing particular, varied vocations like “warriors, mer-
chants, physicians, sailors and artists” (“Caucasian” 286). Schuyler objected 
to the general racial category “Negro” because “it facilitates acceptance of the 
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fiction of similarity and identity which is easily translated into a policy of 
treating all colored people everywhere the same way” (284). If white racism 
and oppression were ended, for example, nothing would connect American 
Negroes to Africa. American Negroes would be a part of American civiliza-
tion alone. The key to Schuyler’s qualified racial collectivism seems to be 
Diana Fuss’ assertion that “we can still work with ‘race’ as a political category 
knowing it is a biological fiction” (91). At this point in his career, Schuyler 
advocates collective social reform to correct a problem of international pro-
portions. Yet, he simultaneously emphasizes the false basis of the common 
oppression of people of color—race. In other words, he is forced to acknowl-
edge and address the continued collective operation of race (in a negative 
sense), even as he personally advocates its dismissal.
Overall, then, while different in degree of application, Schuyler and 
Du Bois’ use of science was substantially the same. Both before and, more 
significantly, after Schuyler published his full-length fictional works, Black 
No More (1931) and the Black Empire serials (1937–38), Du Bois pres-
ents similar scientific issues as if they are on the cutting edge of American 
intellectual thought. Furthermore, Du Bois places these scientific decon-
structions of race in a positive light—as a useful tool to counteract rac-
ism. Du Bois’ usage here is the same as Schuyler’s. Therefore, Tucker and 
Appiah’s description of Du Bois applies to Schuyler as well: “Du Bois was 
attempting ‘a revaluation of the Negro race in the face of the sciences of 
racial inferiority’” (Tucker, “Can” 147). Unfortunately, Tucker does not 
place Schuyler into the same historically-specific scientific context as Du 
Bois. Tucker takes issue with Appiah’s discussion of Du Bois’ racial views 
and their connection to science, while simultaneously criticizing Schuyler 
for his similar use of science. Therefore, the key to Tucker’s criticism must 
lie in the first half of his overall argument—the “faulty logic” of a nega-
tive approach to race consciousness—rather than the second half: the use 
of “rational, scientific, and supposedly nonparitisan objectivity” to sup-
port such an argument (“Can” 137). Once again, Tucker’s emphasis on 
Schuyler’s political views leads him to misrepresent scientific issues and 
connections.
Schuyler, Du Bois, and Boas all shared the sense of a ‘mission’ to 
end racism and the important role science could play in such an endeavor. 
Tucker admits that Schuyler’s conclusion to “The Caucasian Problem” is 
“genuinely moving,” but does not give an adequate historical and scien-
tific context to more fully explain, and perhaps justify, Schuyler’s usage 
of science (“Can” 141). Because Tucker places Schuyler in the political 
context of the 1980s and 1990s, as a predecessor to the “‘new black con-
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servatism’” of figures like Clarence Thomas, Thomas Sowell, and Shelby 
Steele, Tucker misses the genuine newness of the scientific questioning of 
race in the first half of the 20th century (136). Utilizing hindsight, Tucker 
judges Schuyler for a lack of race consciousness and belief in scientific 
rationalism in the 1930s and 1940s. It may seem naive from a contempo-
rary perspective, but at the time, science seemed a promising new tool in 
the fight to end racism. Furthermore, given the intense modernization of 
the first half of the 20th century, many saw science as the most appropri-
ate reform technique for an increasingly modernized and scientifically-
oriented society.
Furthermore, Schuyler clearly did have a sense of race consciousness, 
just not the same type in which Tucker and Baker believe. For Schuy-
ler, race consciousness had primarily negative connotations. He was ‘con-
scious’ of racism and the necessity of working to end racial prejudice and 
violence, for example. Tucker acknowledges that Schuyler did not lack 
“an awareness of white racial hatred toward black America” (140), and 
the lynching scene Tucker discusses from Black No More emphasizes this 
awareness (“Can”). However, Tucker believes Schuyler’s arguments “ignore 
the role ‘race’ plays as a building block around which political and cultural 
identities are created” (147). Tucker does not directly use the words posi-
tive or beneficial in conjunction with race consciousness, but his argument 
relies on such an implied meaning. Post-1960s, Tucker takes such a posi-
tive interpretation largely for granted: the concept of race consciousness 
offers the possibility of political and personal empowerment for oppressed 
groups. Yet, the critical controversy over Schuyler’s texts reveals the evolv-
ing and contested history of the term during the twentieth century. The 
Harlem Renaissance, for example, was a period of intense, generally posi-
tive race consciousness for the black artistic community. Schuyler’s infa-
mous debate with Langston Hughes, in which he questions the autonomy 
of black American art, symbolizes Schuyler’s negative response to such a 
project.30 However, this does not mean Schuyler “ignore[d] the role ‘race’ 
plays as a building black around which political and cultural identities are 
created,” as Tucker argues (“Can” 147). In fact, Schuyler had a very sophis-
ticated understanding of how race operates in the formation of identity. 
Unlike Tucker, however, he thought its influence was negative.31 Schuy-
ler does address race’s “power to shape human lives in very real ways,” as 
Tucker desires (Tucker, “Can” 148). In the highly caustic Black No More, 
Schuyler illustrates how a comprehensive understanding of the way race 
operates scientifically and socially, politically, and romantically/sexually is 
essential to survival and ‘success’ in the United States.
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BLACK NO MORE
Tucker focuses on the negative portrayal of “specific white supremacist and 
black ‘race’ organizations” in Black No More and asserts that “Schuyler’s satire 
is not aimed at the transformative potential of science itself ” (“Can” 143). 
Yet, every character in the novel has an invested interest in race, manipulates 
race, and tries to utilize race for his/her own gain, including those characters 
associated with science. Schuyler’s highly caustic wit and satiric gaze are all-
encompassing in Black No More. Not only does this seem to stem from his 
individual personality and beliefs, his chosen role as “debunker,” but from 
the nature of satire itself (Gates 31). Satire complements Schuyler’s perspec-
tive perfectly. The complete absurdity of American race relations affects 
every American, coloring almost every situation with both ironic humor and 
tragedy. Contemporary science fiction writer Samuel R. Delany accurately 
observes this oxymoronic aspect of American culture in his discussion of the 
same lynching scene mentioned by Tucker: “[t]hough the term did not then 
exist, here the ‘humor’ becomes so ‘black’ as to take on elements of inchoate 
American horror” (“Racism” 384).
The protagonist of Black No More, Max Disher, serves as an excellent 
example of Schuyler’s definition of race consciousness. Disher manipulates 
race in romantic/sexual, economic, and political contexts and lives ‘happily 
ever after.’ Whether this makes him a subversive hero, a “black Picaro” or 
trickster figure, or an assimilationist opportunist depends largely on the critic, 
as well as the time period (Peplow, “Black”). First, Schuyler places Disher’s 
decision to become white through Dr. Crookman’s scientific treatment in 
the context of his desire for a racist white woman. The novel begins with 
Disher’s failed advances towards Helen Givens, a Southern belle who comes 
North for ‘polishing.’ Disher’s immediate decision to undergo the racial pro-
cess includes a desire to meet her again under more favorable circumstances, 
and once white, his first action is to go South in order to find her. Disher is 
similar in this respect to Sam, the (formerly) white female character of Sam-
uel Delany’s Trouble on Triton. During the course of the novel, Sam reveals 
the physical reconstruction s/he underwent to become a black man in order 
to attract blond, white women (126).32 The two characters of these texts 
manipulate race based on an understanding of culturally-influenced sexual 
desires. In Disher’s case, he understands that the racism of his Southern belle 
has made him romantically taboo and that he must show a white exterior in 
order to become a potential mate.
Whether Disher is as conscious of the cultural basis of his own sex-
ual desires remains ambiguous. Neither he, nor the narrator, ever directly 
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addresses the reason(s) that Disher “swore there were three things essential 
to the happiness of a colored gentleman: yellow money, yellow women and 
yellow taxis” and had never been seen with a girlfriend who didn’t look white 
(Schuyler, Black No More 3). However, a scene from Schuyler’s Black Empire 
serials reveals some possible reasons behind this culturally-motivated desire. 
In a description of a sumptuous bedroom belonging to the notorious Afri-
can-American Dr. Belsidus, Schuyler highlights the cultural connections 
between sexuality and race:
Between the rear windows in a concave, softly lighted recess stood an 
amazingly life-like male phallic symbol made of translucent porcelain 
and fully six feet in height. In a similar recess between the two front 
windows stood a statue of three nude young women in the full bloom 
and vigor of life with their arms on each other’s shoulders. They were 
obviously made of the same porcelain. One was a Caucasian, one an 
African and the other a Mongolian. (23)
Belsidus’ artistic decorations reflect his sexual activities and preferences. He 
explicitly seduces his wealthy, white patients in order to support his black 
nationalist activities, for example. The obviousness and extremity of Belsi-
dus’ sexual decoration, and activities, suggest other implicit motivation as 
well. For instance, Dr. Belsidus’ relationship with Martha Gaskin, a white 
woman, “symbolize[s] his subjugation of the white race” (240).33 Gaskin, 
and the other white women, are not only wealthy, but racially forbidden or 
taboo. They symbolize all that is denied African-American men on account 
of their race. Within a specifically sexual context, Belsidus and Gaskin’s 
relationship highlights the stereotype of the extraordinary sexual appetites 
and virility of black men also.34 The single,’six-foot penis’ as a counterpart 
to three nude women, of various ‘races,’ obviously refers to this racial ste-
reotype. Here Schuyler simultaneously parodies and exploits the white, par-
ticularly male, fears of miscegenation. As an ‘evil genius,’ Belsidus is more 
self-conscious and manipulative of these sexual/racial/cultural intersections 
than Disher. Yet, Gaskin remains by Belsidus’ side at the end of the text, 
similar to the ‘happy ending’ of Disher and Helen Givens in Black No More. 
As Hill and Rasmussen suggest, Schuyler’s own inter-racial marriage might 
have motivated this persistent inter-racial theme (282).
As his own white alter-ego, then, Disher courts and marries the white 
woman who had spurned him. The fact that Helen Givens’ father is the 
Imperial Grand Wizard of The Knights of Nordica, a modern reincarnation 
of the Ku Klux Klan, does not deter Disher, and the only racial problem he 
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encounters is the threat of their child emerging too dark-skinned. Disher 
avoids this potential problem as well, however, as his wife reveals the recently 
discovered, remote black ancestry of her family. Helen, in fact, begs Disher 
not to leave her on account of this racial intermixing. The text ends with 
a happy snapshot of Disher, Helen, the Imperial Wizard, and his wife on 
the beach in France—all “as dusky as little Matthew Crookman Fisher who 
played in the sandpile at their feet” (Schuyler, Black No More 250). Black has 
become the culturally preferred color and racial prejudice has transformed 
into anti-white ideology. It is interesting to note here that despite the general 
racial inversion, Schuyler still places the openly interracial couple outside of 
the United States. This coincides with his interracial couple in Black Empire, 
Martha Gaskin and Dr. Belsidus, who finally reside together in Africa. Like-
wise, Edgar Rice Burroughs’ earlier interracial couple, John Carter and Prin-
cess Dejah Thoris, live ‘happily ever after’ on Mars. These examples reveal the 
potential, as well as the limits, of the speculative element of science fiction. 
Most importantly, the speculative element of science fiction allows writers 
(and readers) to imagine how racial relations could become more fluid and 
inclusive. The geographic displacement of the interracial couples, however, 
highlights the strength and tenacity of racial prejudice. Schuyler’s racial egali-
tarianism, even within an imaginative construct, was constrained by divisive 
racial ideologies.
Disher also reveals a sophisticated knowledge of the complex eco-
nomic, social, and political mechanics of race in the United States, and he 
uses this knowledge to his personal benefit. Running out of money and find-
ing “[b]eing white [ . . . ] was no Open Sesame of employment,” Disher 
discerns the economic potential in the threat to Southern business of the 
whitening treatment (Schuyler, Black No More 58). Therefore, he passes him-
self off as a Northern anthropologist, an expert on race, and quickly rises to 
prominence within The Knights of Nordica. As the Grand Exalted Giraw of 
the racist organization, Disher benefits financially both from the dues of the 
white laborers and from the contributions of the white businessmen. Playing 
both sides of the economic fence, Disher distracts the laborers with the racial 
threat and simultaneously assures the businessmen that his organization is 
firmly against organized labor. To keep the money flowing in, he actively 
antagonizes the economic and racial situation in the South, sabotaging strikes 
and planting “Communistic tracts” to frighten the business owners (111).
In addition to the economic field, Disher manipulates the socio-politi-
cal elements of American society. He allies himself overtly with the organi-
zations of the racist whites, while covertly working to keep the whitening 
treatment organization, Black-No-More, in operation. As he explains the 
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complex strategy to his friend Bunny, a “status quo” must be maintained 
in order to ensure their continual financial gain (Schuyler, Black No More 
120). Disher’s complex schemes culminate in politics. Asked to help the 
Southern Democrats win the upcoming presidential elections, Disher tells 
Bunny, “We’ll try the old sure fire Negro problem stuff ” (147). Although 
his party does not ultimately win the election, Disher, his family, and his 
friend Bunny escape to Mexico unscathed and with a large monetary cache. 
In marked contrast, the Democratic vice-presidential candidate is lynched 
by a white mob because of the revelation of his remote black ancestry. In all 
of these situations, Disher achieves his goals because, “[t]he most successful 
propagandist is one who thoroughly understands the ideology of those to be 
propagandized” (Fields 111).
The ending of Black No More has led to the “assimilationism” theory 
within Schuyler theory (Peplow, “Black” 7). Disher’s racial maneuverings 
finally come to an end as he flees the country and reveals his former black 
identity to his family. Yet, as Disher reminisces, he “had had such a good 
time since being white: plenty of money, almost unlimited power, a beau-
tiful wife, good liquor and the pick of damsels within reach” (Schuyler, 
Black No More 205–6). Furthermore, his wife stays with him despite his 
revelation, undergoing a type of racial transformation herself: “Helen felt a 
wave of relief go over her. There was no feeling of revulsion at the thought 
that her husband was a Negro. [ . . . ] To hell with the world! To hell 
with society! Compared to what she possessed, [ . . . ] all talk of race and 
color was damned foolishness” (214). Disher, in other words, is never ‘pun-
ished’ for his racial manipulations—the exploitation of racism, promotion 
of racial divisions, and antagonism of racial conflict. As the protagonist 
of the story, Disher and his generally unrepentant and unpenalized color 
change have inspired the “assimilationism” theory of critics like Bone and 
Larson (Peplow, “Black” 7). Because readers are accustomed to the valo-
rization of the perspective of a text’s protagonist, Disher has often been 
falsely placed in the context of traditional heroism and his viewpoint has 
been collapsed with that of the author. The logic of such a reading goes 
something like this: because Disher is the protagonist, he must be the hero 
of the text; since the hero, Disher, seems to adopt an assimilationist atti-
tude, racial assimilation must be valorized by the text; and finally, because 
the text promotes racial assimilation, so too must its author. In fact, popu-
lar and/or pulp fiction often embodies such a traditional heroic approach. 
For example, in Edgar Rice Burroughs’ straightforward melodrama, John 
Carter is simultaneously the protagonist, the narrator, and a hero, and his 
viewpoints correspond with those of the author.
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In contrast to the assimilationism theorists, Michael Peplow and John 
M. Reilly offer a more complex and, therefore, more accurate representation 
of Black No More and its author. First and foremost, both Peplow and Reilly 
correctly place Black No More in the context of satire. Peplow discusses the 
protagonist as a black Picaro or trickster figure and argues, “we must examine 
the novel as satire, as a piece representative of a genre in which the foibles and 
vices of man are attacked, often harshly” (“Black” 7). Likewise, Reilly asserts, 
“since a character such as Max Disher is given the most effective dialogue in 
the novel and is shown as roguishly clever, Blacks come off somewhat better 
than whites in Schuyler’s narrative. But perhaps that is less significant than 
the fact that Schuyler, for the most part, deals out his scorn evenhandedly” 
(108). Both critics, then, note a somewhat more favorable portrayal, over-
all, of the protagonist but emphasize the generally biting nature of satire in 
assessing both Disher and Schuyler. The literary technique of satire opens 
up a critical gap between the author and the protagonist, the text as a whole, 
and the audience. Therefore, the relationships between each must be more 
carefully scrutinized for the greatest possible critical accuracy.
In contrast to a more straightforward and traditionally heroic reading 
of the protagonist, Peplow’s reading of Disher as a black Picaro or trickster 
figure emphasizes his subversive nature. Instead of the overt, absolute honesty 
and virtue of a traditional hero, Disher “is a rogue, a ‘rascal of low degree’ 
[ . . . ]. He is wily, cunning, a confidence artist” (Peplow, “Black” 8). As a 
trickster figure, Disher “uses ‘wit, guile and cunning . . . to turn a situa-
tion to his own advantage’” and “‘outwits by any means necessary him who is 
stronger and more powerful.’ It is [ . . . ] a ‘recognized survival technique 
in the black community’” (ibid).35 The traditional hero is strong and power-
ful, righting wrongs and always triumphing over evil in the end. John Carter, 
for example, single-handedly conquers an entire planet, killing lecherous bad 
guys and rescuing virtuous princesses with nothing more than a sword. On 
the other hand, the black Picaro or trickster figure uses his wit for his own 
gain and with the ultimate goal of survival against a stronger opponent. In 
an imperfect world, then, Disher is one of the most sympathetically por-
trayed characters, and a reader might share his grim humor as he “laugh[s] at 
the white folks up his sleeve” and reveals the ignorance and absurdity at the 
heart of America’s ‘race problem’ (Schuyler, Black No More 38).
Yet, Disher works by indirection and covert manipulation, he actively 
aggravates social ills, and he primarily cares for himself. Not only is Disher a 
representative of a black Picaro figure, then, but also he illustrates qualities of 
the anti-hero of modern western literature.36 Robert Hill and Kent Rasmus-
sen similarly note the importance of the trickster figure and the anti-hero 
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to an accurate understanding of Schuyler’s other main character, Dr. Belsi-
dus, of the Black Empire series: “[v]iewed through the prism of black folklore 
and mythology, therefore, Schuyler’s Belsidus is not a deranged personality. 
He is, rather, simultaneously a hero and an authentic anti-hero who, like 
the African trickster, turns weakness into strength, upsets the machinery of 
domination, [and] deals out retribution” (Hill and Rasmussen 288). In this 
context, Belsidus is a darker and more powerful version of Disher as trickster 
or anti-hero. In both texts, the alternative point of view offered by the trick-
ster or anti-hero challenges the monolithic, ‘universal’ point of view of the 
traditional hero protagonist.
However, the melodramatic context of Belsidus’ characterization does 
not open up the same critical gap between the protagonist and the author 
as the satiric context of Black No More. Satire is the perfect medium for the 
imperfect world, or “black anti-utopia,” Schuyler portrays in Black No More 
(Reilly). In such a context, traditional heroes are impossible because racism, 
and even race consciousness, negatively effects every person in the United 
States. Disher might be the closest thing to a hero in a race conscious society, 
but that does not mean Schuyler holds him up as an ideal model of human 
behavior or as representative of a solution to racism. The more Disher reveals 
his knowledge and mastery of all the ways race operates in American society, 
the more he reveals how he has been negatively changed by just such a race 
consciousness. As a trickster figure, Disher is the ideal vehicle to illuminate 
the intricate and illogical mechanics of race in American society, while at the 
same time entertaining the reader with his wit and antics.
Comparing Schuyler’s two science fiction protagonists, Disher and Dr. 
Belsidus, raises a central problem for every Schuyler critic—reconciling the 
assimilationist Disher and the Afro-centric Belsidus. Tucker, for example, 
chooses a straightforward interpretation of Disher and a satiric interpretation 
of Belsidus. He believes Schuyler reveals his true assimilationist views 
through Disher and intended Black Empire as a closet joke on his audience: 
“what Hill and Rasmussen suggest tentatively deserves confident assertion, 
that ‘‘the Black Empire may have been a cynical joke that Schuyler played 
on his readers” (“Can” 146). Tucker’s disassociation between Schuyler and 
the Afro-centric perspective of Belsidus, and the Black Empire serials more 
generally, has merit. As Tucker notes, Schuyler’s “favorite rhetorical mode” 
was satire (145). However, several critical disclaimers must be attached to 
a satiric reading of Black Empire. First, even if Schuyler personally did not 
believe in the Afro-centric perspective embodied in Black Empire, the text 
itself is melodramatic. Therefore, outside of the critical debates surrounding 
Schuyler as an author and person, the point is moot. Secondly, if the overtly 
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melodramatic Black Empire is read as a satire, the overtly satiric Black No 
More must logically be read as a satire as well. Tucker, for example, qualifies 
his satiric reading of Black No More, explicitly omitting science and implicitly 
omitting the protagonist. Why would the protagonist of the melodrama be 
read as satiric while the protagonist of the satire is read as a traditional hero?
Finally, if the Black Empire serials are read satirically, Tucker’s thesis of 
Schuyler’s scientific idealism and objectivity is undermined further. If Belsi-
dus’ black nationalism is a joke, so too is his status as a scientist and doctor. 
Furthermore, how could Belsidus be a black nationalist when as a rational 
scientist he should not logically believe in race at all? Of course Belsidus, 
like Disher and Crookman, could be knowingly and falsely manipulating the 
‘black masses’ for his own financial and political gain. This scenario would 
help explain the troubling relationship between Belsidus and Martha Gas-
kin, a white woman. Despite Dr. Belsidus’ professions of contempt for and 
ill-usage of many white women37, Martha Gaskin proves herself loyal and 
valuable to the black cause throughout the course of the text and is actually 
the last image of the entire serial, “looking odd among those Negroes” but 
apparently finally accepted despite her ‘race’ (Schuyler, Black Empire 258). In 
addition, a satiric or critical reading of Belsidus has the advantage of qualify-
ing the violence and possible moral offense of some of his actions: his policy 
of killing off white women after they have served their purpose to the orga-
nization, for example, and his authorization of bio-chemical warfare for a 
mass killing of whites. Finally, a negative reading of Belsidus corresponds 
with Schuyler’s satiric portrayal of scientists in Black No More.
In marked contrast to Tucker’s assertion of idealism, scientists and sci-
ence are overtly linked with capitalism, consumerism, and the hypocrisy of 
Afro-American race consciousness in Black No More. Schuyler continues his 
typical role as debunker in the scientific field, as well as in African-Ameri-
can literature. Dr. Cornelius Crookman, for instance, espouses scientific 
theories undermining biological essentialism, so he should be the hero of this 
drama according to Tucker’s formula. Yet, Crookman’s name signifies that 
he, like Disher, is selling something, is swindling someone for his own profit. 
Dr. Crookman’s cronies, a “‘Numbers’ banker” and a realtor, symbolize the 
close ties between science and capitalism (12). The Numbers banker actu-
ally refers to their new business, “Black-No-More, Incorporated” (49) as “the 
best and safest graft I’ve ever been in” (39). In addition, the elaborate adver-
tisement outside of the very first “Black-No-More” sanitarium embodies the 
commercialism and consumerism of America’s capitalist society and the ties 
between economics, science, and race. Schuyler goes to great lengths to viv-
idly describe “the large, electric sign hung from the roof to the second floor”: 
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“It represented a huge arrow outlined in green with the words BLACK-NO-
MORE running its full length vertically. A black face was depicted at the 
lower end of the arrow while at the top shone a white face to which the arrow 
was pointed” (32). Schuyler even describes the elaborate system of delayed 
lighting portraying the actual scientific process of “black face” to “white 
face.” At this point, it becomes glaringly obvious that not only Dr. Crook-
man, but also science more broadly is not portrayed as the objective ideal 
Tucker imagines. If science is a solution to the ‘Negro problem,’ it is only 
through selling African-Americans a physical exterior which will be cultur-
ally undesirable soon after.
Schuyler’s emphasis on the connection(s) between science and capital-
ism highlights the hypocrisy of Afro-American race consciousness as well. In 
the preface to Black No More, Schuyler refers to the invention, marketing, and 
distribution of Kink-No-More38 around the turn-of-the-century. He empha-
sizes the increasing success of such endeavors due to “the avid search on the 
part of the black masses for some key to chromatic perfection,” and then goes 
on to assert that “science is on the verge of satisfying them” (vii). “Science” 
then takes the form of excerpts from an interview with a Japanese doctor and 
an Italian engineer’s letter to the NAACP in which both men claim to be 
able to physically change darker-skinned ‘races’ into lighter-skinned ones.39 
Why does Schuyler place his science fiction text within the context of these 
real-world elements? The Kink-No-More synopsis illustrates the desire on 
the part of African-Americans to physically look more like whites and links it 
to capitalism, profit, and technology. Schuyler is emphasizing the hypocrisy 
of any Negro-centered activity here. Schuyler believes not only Disher, but 
also almost every Negro in the United States desires to be white; they have 
been indoctrinated by the repeated assertions of white superiority and have 
internalized the cultural racial hierarchy.
Crookman is a good example of this type of racial internalization. The 
doctor is known as a “Race Man” (47), and he “prided himself above all on 
being a great lover of his race” (Schuyler, Black No More 46). Yet, he attempts 
to solve the problem of racism by eradicating the very race he supposedly 
values. Furthermore, Crookman “was wedded to everything black except the 
black woman” (47). Crookman marries a woman “able to pass for white” and 
has “liaisons with comely and available fraus and frauliens” while abroad, 
researching Black history of all things (ibid). Schuyler’s sarcasm is heavy 
in his description of Dr. Crookman and the discrepancy between his ‘race 
consciousness’ on various issues. Schuyler reinforces his irony and satire with 
a similar description of Dr. Shakespeare Agamemnon Beard, a caricature of 
W. E. B. Du Bois: “the learned doctor wrote scholarly and biting editorials 
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in The Dilemma denouncing the Caucasians whom he secretly admired 
and lauding the greatness of the Negroes whom he alternately pitied and 
despised” (89). Beard mirrors the gender relationships of Crookman and 
Disher as well: “[l]ike most Negro leaders, he deified the black woman but 
abstained from employing aught save octoroons” (ibid). All of these examples 
reinforce Schuyler’s scientific critique of race consciousness. Not only is there 
no such thing as race from a scientific standpoint, but also even the most 
race conscious Afro-Americans covertly or subconsciously subscribe to the 
existing racial hierarchy privileging white physical features. The scientists’ 
lack of scientific objectivity is the basis of Schuyler’s satire here. Clearly, this 
negative portrayal of the doctor/scientists does not support Tucker’s reading 
of scientific idealism.
Finally, science as a discipline is portrayed as equally variable and 
biased as the specific concept of race itself. Schuyler not only highlights the 
close connection between science and capitalism, but also science and social 
norms. Tucker asserts that “Schuyler’s satire is not aimed at the transforma-
tive potential of science itself ” (“Can” 143). However, as discussed earlier, 
Crookman’s belief that science alone will provide an answer to racism is sati-
rized.40 Tucker himself admits that the text as a whole illustrates that Crook-
man’s process is not a total or ideal solution, as the color line simply reverses 
at the end. In addition, it is no coincidence that Disher chooses anthropol-
ogy as his new occupation after becoming white. This scientific field allows 
Disher to ‘sell’ highly biased and erroneous racial ideas to his racist white 
audience. Through his protagonist, Schuyler satirizes the emerging scien-
tific field of anthropology, highlighting its common use as a political and 
ideological tool. Disher’s impersonation of an anthropologist also highlights 
Schuyler’s decision to divide his protagonist and his scientist into two sepa-
rate characters (Disher and Dr. Crookman). Disher’s outsider perspective—as 
a lay person and as an African-American—allows him to challenge the false 
objectivity and positivism of the scientific discipline. In contrast, Edgar Rice 
Burroughs’ protagonist, John Carter, embodies an ethnographic perspective; 
Burroughs collapses the protagonist and the scientist into a single character. 
A traditional hero as scientist does not allow for the same scientific critique 
as Disher as a trickster figure.
Furthermore, Schuyler uses the general cultural color reversal at the end 
to emphasize the subjective and culturally variable basis of anthropology:
Prof. Handen Moutthe, the eminent anthropologist (who was well 
known for his popular work on The Sex Life of Left-Handed Morons 
among the Ainus) announced that as a result of his long research among 
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the palest citizens, he was convinced they were mentally inferior and 
that their children should be segregated from the others in school. 
Professor Moutthe’s findings were considered authoritative because he 
had spent three entire weeks of hard work assembling his data. Four 
state legislatures immediately began to consider bills calling for separate 
schools for pale children. (Black No More 247–8)
This brief passage contains biting satire of the research techniques and popu-
lar outreach of the scientific community, as well as the political and social 
influence of scientific findings (scientism). In his reversal, Schuyler draws 
attention to the historic use of science to justify racism and oppression. There 
is nothing objective or idealistic in this representation of science. In fact, 
Schuyler’s satire here resembles an early strategy of resistance to scientific rac-
ism identified by Stepan and Gilman—“the employment of wit, irony, or 
parody” (82–3).
Dr. Crookman and Disher, the two most sympathetically portrayed 
characters in Black No More, manipulate scientific, social, cultural, economic 
and political concepts of race; they are, in fact, highly ‘race conscious.’ For 
Schuyler, however, clearly race consciousness does not have the positive con-
notations Tucker ascribes to it. Because of the biological falsehood of race, 
its legacy for African-Americans of oppression, and the melting pot ideal of 
American society in which Schuyler obviously believed, race can only have 
negative implications—biologically, politically, socially, and culturally. Any 
act based upon a consciousness of race is only perpetuating a falsehood and, 
therefore, must involve manipulation of some sort—you can either be the 
manipulator, like Crookman and Disher, or be the manipulated, like the 
African-American and white ‘masses.’
Even Schuyler, in his understanding of racial operations, becomes a 
manipulator. Tucker quotes Schuyler’s private opinion of his second fictional 
text: “I have been greatly amused by the public enthusiasm for ‘The Black 
Internationale’ [the first half of the Black Empire] which is hokum and hack 
work of the purest vein. I deliberately set out to crowd as much race chauvin-
ism and sheer improbability into it as my fertile imagination could conjure. 
The result vindicates my low opinion of the human race” (“Can” 146). Like 
the inventor of Kink-No-More, Schuyler is selling a racially-implicated prod-
uct to the African-American ‘masses.’ If they are gullible enough to buy it, 
if they put stock in race, than he, like Disher, is doing no more than teach-
ing them a lesson and no less than personally profiting from their erroneous 
thinking. The common focus of Schuyler’s satire seems to be the racial fan-
tasies or desires of his black audience—in the first text, a desire to be white 
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and in the second text, a desire to be black.41 In Schuyler’s ideal of a raceless 
world, both of these extremes of the racial spectrum are false and obstructive. 
He utilizes science fiction and dystopic fiction as a means of wish fulfill-
ment, illustrating the folly of these race-based desires. When Tucker criticizes 
Schuyler for assuming “that ‘race’ just does not matter anymore,” he misses 
the forward focus of Schuyler’s beliefs, symbolized by his interest in specula-
tive fiction (“Can” 148). Schuyler’s detailed and continuous focus on race 
in his fiction and non-fiction alike illustrates a ‘race consciousness,’ even as 
it takes the form of an attempt to rid the world of notions of race. Schuyler 
does chronicle race’s “power to shape human lives in very real ways” in his 
fictional texts, but in satirizing the effects of this power, he shows the error of 
acting this way (Tucker, “Can” 148).
Pairing Schuyler’s works with that of a third influential author and sci-
entist, Frantz Fanon, highlights additional aspects of Schuyler’s scientific con-
nections, as well as his “poststructuralist sensibility” (Joyce, “Black” 342).42 
Writing largely within the fields of psychiatry and cultural studies, Fanon 
examines the complex process of colonial identity formation in his 1952 text 
Black Skin, White Masks. While significant generic and geographic differ-
ences exist between Black No More and Black Skin, White Masks, both texts 
share a radical deconstruction of racial identity and a promotion of individu-
alism. The striking similarities between Tucker’s critical analysis of Schuyler’s 
Black No More and Diana Fuss’ critical analysis of Fanon’s Black Skin, White 
Masks highlight the common threads existing between the two primary texts. 
First, both Tucker and Fuss focus on a summary statement near the end of 
two texts by the primary authors. Where Schuyler writes, “At best, ‘race’ is 
a superstition” (Black and Conservative 352), Fanon concludes, “The Negro 
is not. Any more than the white man” in his text Black Skin, White Masks 
(231). Therefore, when Tucker quotes the conclusion of Schuyler’s autobiog-
raphy as the epitome of his “faulty theories about the way ‘race’ works,” he 
could be describing Frantz Fanon and his text as well (Tucker, “Can” 140). 
In addition, Fuss notes the “enigmatic” nature of Fanon’s conclusion, won-
dering if he is “suggesting, perhaps, that there is no such thing as race?” (76). 
Fuss seems confused because the title of Fanon’s text “allows simultaneously 
for an essentialist and a constructionist reading; it unhinges ‘race’ from skin 
color at the same time it reinscribes the problematic association of race with 
biology” (75). As we will see, Schuyler too promotes a constructionist read-
ing of race while maintaining a connection between race and the physical 
body or biology. Fuss’ discussion as a whole, however, promotes a construc-
tionist reading of Fanon’s text. For example, Fuss utilizes Fanon’s Black Skin, 
White Masks as an introduction to “the many arbitrary significations of ‘race’” 
88 The Subject of Race in American Science Fiction
(74). As Tucker’s earlier critical assessment of Schuyler applies to Fanon, so 
Fuss’ assessment of Fanon here applies to Schuyler. Not surprisingly, then, 
Fuss’ assertion that Black Skin, White Masks “provides us with something of 
a running commentary on the arbitrariness of the racial signifier in Western 
culture” (74) is strikingly similar to Tucker’s summary of Schuyler’s Black 
No More: “The novel is designed to emphasize the scientific meaningless of 
‘race’ and the arbitrariness of color consciousness” (“Can” 143). In this way, 
Schuyler and Fanon both reflect “the poststructuralist sensibility” of much 
contemporary science fiction dealing with race and racial identity (Joyce, 
“Black” 342).
Furthermore, Fuss’ larger theoretical and generic context applies to 
Tucker and Schuyler, as well as Fanon. First, Fuss clearly articulates the threat 
some readers find in the poststructuralist stance of the primary authors: “The 
charge, then, is clear: to deconstruct ‘race’ is to abdicate, negate, or destroy 
black identity” (77). Tucker’s criticism of Schuyler is a manifestation of this 
critical stance. In addition, Fuss begins her chapter on poststructuralist Afro-
American literary theory by articulating the broad questions which underlie 
Tucker’s analysis of Schuyler: “Is race a matter of birth? of culture? both? 
neither? What, exactly, are the criteria for racial identity? Are there criteria for 
racial identity? What, we might finally ask, is ‘race’?” (73–4). More impor-
tant for our discussion of Schuyler and his critical reputation, Fuss places 
these questions at the heart of current African-American literary criticism. 
Asserting that “the deconstruction of ‘race’ and its implications for read-
ing literature by or about Afro-American subjects has emerged as one the 
most controversial questions in the field of Afro-American Studies today,” 
Fuss focuses on the “three scholars at the center of the current debates on 
‘race’”—Anthony Appiah, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Houston Baker (74). 
It is not surprising, then, that these three names continually arise in both 
Tucker’s work on Schuyler and my own.
Turning specifically to the primary texts, Schuyler’s Black No More is 
basically an exploration of Fanon’s theme within a science/fictional format. 
Whereas Fanon explores the non-fiction psychological and cultural process 
of racial construction, Schuyler utilizes the fictional aspect of science fiction 
to create an actual scientific process physically embodying Fanon’s abstract 
phenomenon. Fanon describes the process and implications involved in the 
metaphoric “white masks” developed by colonized blacks. With Max Disher, 
Schuyler takes Fanon’s black man, his body and his psyche, and actualizes the 
psychological process which Fanon analyzes. Disher’s physical transforma-
tion into his white alter-ego of Matthew Fisher mirrors the process by which 
the “black skin” of an Antillean gradually develops a “white mask.” Fanon 
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opens Black Skin, White Masks with an explanation of the divided nature 
of black subjectivity very similar to that denoted by W. E .B. Du Bois’ term 
“double- consciousness.” In The Souls of Black Folks, Du Bois writes: “It is a 
peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at 
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of 
a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-
ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body [ . . . ]” (8–9).43 Similarly, 
Fanon writes, “[t]he black man has two dimensions. One with his fellows, 
the other with the white man. A Negro behaves differently with a white man 
and with another Negro. That this self-division is a direct result of colonial-
ist subjugation is beyond question” (17). Within this context, Disher’s white 
skin represents the consciousness of white society acquired by people-of-
color in order to survive in a hierarchical and oppressive society. Disher’s 
white skin/white consciousness, then, allows him to effectively blend into 
the white social nexus.
Schuyler’s use of science fiction literary techniques in Black No More 
allows him to paradoxically make the construction of racial identity simulta-
neously more distanced from the reader and more vivid. Known as “estrange-
ment,” this concept is allied in science fiction with “cognition” to form 
the basis of all science fiction. In Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, Darko 
Suvin utilizes Bertolt Brecht’s definition of estrangement as the foundation 
for his expanded theory of cognitive estrangement: “A representation which 
estranges is one which allows us to recognize its subject, but at the same time 
makes it seem unfamiliar” (qtd. Suvin 6). The primary advantage to cogni-
tive estrangement is that a phenomenon so familiar that it is usually taken 
for granted becomes more distinct and discernable in an unfamiliar setting. 
Thus, the complex, yet subtle interaction between racial construction and 
identity formation can become more obvious and immediate in a science 
fiction context. Schuyler utilizes the “novum,” or speculative element of a 
scientific procedure for racial transformation to estrange the reader from the 
ubiquitous yet rarely directly-confronted machinations of race in American 
society (Suvin 4). The readers of Schuyler’s text are practically slapped in the 
face with the cultural basis of race and its implications. Even for those read-
ers familiar with the concept of double-consciousness, for example, the lit-
eral chromatic transformation of the African-American characters is jarring, 
if not outright shocking. Not only the biting nature of Schuyler’s satire and 
the highly volatile issue of racial identity make Black No More controversial, 
but also the extreme vividness and forcefulness of Schuyler’s ideas as viewed 
through the cognitive estrangement of science fiction.
90 The Subject of Race in American Science Fiction
Schuyler’s deconstruction of race is so effective that the reader might 
overlook the specter of essentialism raised by Schuyler’s choice of novum. 
In the transformation of Fanon’s psychological process into a physical or 
biological process, Schuyler runs the risk of undermining his larger cultural 
argument, for he maintains the traditional connection between biology and 
race. Schuyler counteracts this biological connection to race in several ways. 
First, the biological aspects of race manipulated in the scientific process are 
all external features. Dr. Crookman does not reveal his scientific procedure 
in full detail, but he does outline the features effected—facial features, skin 
color, and hair color and texture. 44 Schuyler logically utilizes the physical fea-
tures commonly used to categorize race. Within traditional racial essential-
ism, these exterior physical features reflect the interior, static racial identity 
of a person which corresponds to a racial collective. However, the paradox at 
the heart of Schuyler’s racial deconstruction is that these physical characteris-
tics are only exterior and do not correspond to any essential racial difference. 
For example, the racial transformation does not affect the genetic structure 
of the patients, as evidenced by the failure of the process to be passed on to 
offspring. This means that even the physical characteristics associated with a 
particular race are exterior signifiers only. There can be no ‘essence’ involved 
when a process of bleaching and what now would be called plastic surgery 
effect racial categorization. Crookman’s procedure literalizes Fanon’s “white 
mask,” then, one which conceals a genetic code for facial features signifying a 
second race. The essentialist racial connection between exterior and interior, 
as well as biology and psychology, explodes under the pressure of such diverse 
plurality. Distinct, static racial types are the foundation of racial essential-
ism and, therefore, the concept of essentialism cannot withstand Schuyler’s 
extreme fluidity, plurality, and ambiguity of racial construction.
Continuing in this vein, Schuyler utilizes Dr. Crookman as a vehicle for 
espousing racial theories which both explain why his procedure is effective 
and why it is largely unnecessary from a scientific standpoint. For example, 
Dr. Crookman asserts that even if his process didn’t affect facial characteris-
tics, like nose and lip width, the racial transformation would still be effective 
because “the wide difference in Caucasian and Afro-American facial charac-
teristics that most people imagine” do not actually exist (Schuyler, Black No 
More 19). This would leave color as the sole remaining physical characteristic 
upon which to distinguish race. The superficial nature of traditional, physi-
cal racial signifiers means that they can be manipulated and are also unreli-
able indicators of racial categorization. For example, Samuel Delany writes of 
his family’s experience with lynching, uncomfortably like the lynching scene 
near the end of Black No More, when a pregnant cousin, “[a] woman who 
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looked white,” was traveling with her much darker-skinned husband (“Rac-
ism” 385). The group of white men who lynched them obviously believed 
the couple’s relationship to be miscegenous. Similarly, Schuyler creates a 
character in Black No More, Mr. Walter Williams, who “was known to be 
a Negro among his friends and acquaintances, but no one else would have 
suspected it” (94) due to his “pale blue eyes, wavy auburn hair,” and light 
skin (93).45 Schuyler goes on to connect such ambiguity of racial features 
to the extensive interbreeding of the so-called races in the United States: 
Williams’ “great-grandfather, it seemed, had been a mulatto” (94). With his 
typical satiric wit, Schuyler describes Williams as a member of the National 
Social Equality League, a “militant Negro organization” (86). Yet, Schuyler 
calls Williams, and another member of the N.S.E.L., a “white man” based 
on the same physical features used by racial essentialists to categorize race. 
In this way, Schuyler emphasizes his belief in both the logical failings of a 
racial essentialism founded on exterior physical features and the absurdity of 
basing racial identity on such a tiny portion of an individual’s ancestry. The 
satire of this segment rests on the discrepancy between the chimeric nature 
of race as traditionally defined in the U. S. and the undue significance placed 
upon it in this country and elsewhere.
Finally, Dr. Crookman completes his deconstruction of race by 
addressing the issue of language. After his thorough defense of the efficacy 
of the procedure, Crookman’s business associate asks him, “How about that 
darky dialect? You can’t change that” (Schuyler, Black No More 17). Crook-
man replies, “There is no such thing as Negro dialect [ . . . ]. There are 
no racial or color dialects; only sectional dialects” (17–18). As support, 
Crookman cites the “purest French” of the “educated Haitian” and Eng-
lish accent of the “Jamaican Negro” (18). These examples parallel Frantz 
Fanon’s more complicated analysis of “The Negro and Language” in Black 
Skin, White Masks, in which he discusses the connection between language 
acquisition and racial categorization. Fanon notes, “In any group of young 
men in the Antilles, the one who expresses himself well, who has mastered 
the language, is inordinately feared; keep an eye on that one, he is almost 
white. In France one says, ‘He talks like a book.’ In Martinique, ‘He talks 
like a white man’” (20–1). Elevated and sophisticated language skills, espe-
cially those reflecting the linguistic norms of the colonizer and/or academic 
discourse, are racial signifiers linked to the white colonizers. At this point, 
we have come full circle, back to the issue of black subjectivity and dou-
ble-consciousness discussed earlier. The black man who masters the French 
language/academic discourse of the colonizer in Fanon’s example reflects 
the larger concept of a double-consciousness Fanon describes in the text as 
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a whole. Part of the “white masks” acquired by blacks are these linguistic 
characteristics.
Like the young black Antilleans, Max Disher conveys a particular racial 
identity due to his linguistic double-consciousness. First, utilizing his under-
standing of the linguistic expectations of his largely uneducated, southern 
white audiences, Disher/Fisher tells them exactly what they want to hear in 
a manner designed to impress them.46 Disher was born in the South, and 
“[h]e knew what would fetch their applause and bring in their memberships 
and he intended to repeat it over and over” (Schuyler, Black No More 74). 
In fact, Disher’s ability to imitate the racist viewpoints of his poor white 
audience and the discourse associated with scientists enables him to be the 
trickster figure Peplow discusses. Again, “[t]he most successful propagan-
dist is one who thoroughly understands the ideology of those to be propa-
gandized” (Fields 111). The Imperial Grand Wizard’s response to Disher’s 
anthropological ‘pitch’ most clearly illustrates the efficacy of his racial pre-
sentation: “He nodded his head as Matthew [Disher], now glorying in his 
newly-discovered eloquence made point after point, and concluded that this 
pale, dapper young fellow, with his ready tongue, his sincerity, his scientific 
training and knowledge of the situation ought to prove a valuable asset to the 
Knights of Nordica” (65). Disher’s imitation of a racist, white scientist wins 
him the hand of Given’s daughter Helen as well: “She had always longed for 
the companionship of an educated man, a scientist, a man of literary ability. 
Matthew to her mind embodied all of these” (109). In all of these situations, 
Disher utilizes his “white mask,” or understanding of the norms of the white 
society he infiltrates, to deceive and manipulate white characters who do not 
have a reciprocal understanding of black society and black identity construc-
tion. The monolithic, integrated nature of white identity, as portrayed here, 
facilitates their deception.47
Schuyler largely reveals Disher’s other “consciousness” through covert 
conversations with his friend Bunny, who has also undergone Crookman’s 
racial procedure. Reunited post-operation in the South, Bunny immediately 
becomes Disher’s confidant and right-hand man. Disher reveals his racial 
manipulations to Bunny as he does to no one else. Similarly, he confides his 
sticky romantic problems to Bunny; Disher worries about his wife becom-
ing pregnant and bearing a dark-skinned child. This overtly white/covertly 
black set-up reflects Fanon’s initial observation that a “Negro behaves differ-
ently with a white man and with another Negro” (17). Schuyler’s portrayal 
of a covert black consciousness raises the issue of ‘authentic’ racial identity, 
like the essentialism threatened by his concretion of the psychological phe-
nomenon of double-consciousness. During their conversation about Disher’s 
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paternal fears, for example, Bunny says, “You know, sometimes I forget who 
we are” (Schuyler, Black No More 147). Disher responds, “Well, I don’t. I 
know I’m a darky and I’m always on the alert” (ibid). Does this statement 
mean that, despite the emphasis on racial construction provided by Crook-
man’s procedure, there exists an essential racial identity after all? That despite 
the flux and fluidity of racial identity described elsewhere in the text, racial 
identity is ultimately distinct and static?
A closer examination of the context of Disher’s statement miti-
gates such an essentialist reading. First, Disher’s statement stems from his 
fears that his former identity as an African-American will be discovered if 
his wife gives birth to a child significantly darker-skinned than both of its 
parents. Such a revelation would have dire consequences for Disher, as he 
has intimate connections with ultra racist persons and organizations. Like 
the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who (unconsciously) ‘pass’ 
themselves off as white, Disher runs the risk of a loss of his career and repu-
tation at the minimum and a horrible death by lynching at the maximum. 
In this context of always-threatening discovery and reprisals, Disher’s state-
ment could mean nothing more than an acknowledgement of how he would 
be racially categorized if his full history was known and, more importantly, 
the terrible consequences of such a discovery. As his immediately following 
statement emphasizes, his black racial identity (whether essential, authentic, 
or socially-imposed) means he must always be “on the alert.” Along a similar 
line, Disher could be referring to his genetic make-up and the physical char-
acteristics which he knows will be passed on to his offspring. No matter how 
he constructs his own identity, psychologically and physically, his offspring 
will initially reflect his past physical identity as a “darky.”
Both of these interpretations of Disher’s statement reflect the psy-
chological theory of double-consciousness Schuyler sets up. Disher must 
maintain a specifically black consciousness in conjunction with a white con-
sciousness because race still operates powerfully in American society, despite 
the ambiguity, fluidity, and inversions heightened by Crookman’s procedure. 
As long as racism exists, Disher must maintain this division of his psyche 
in order to survive in a segregated and oppressive society. After his physical 
transformation, for example, Disher’s double-consciousness enables him to 
manipulate the racial situation in the Unites States to his economic advan-
tage. As discussed earlier, however, this ‘success’ does not make Disher an 
ideal hero. Rather, it illustrates how he has been negatively influenced by 
the racial environment of the United States. Disher maintains his physical 
and psychological racial dichotomies until he leaves the United States at the 
end of the story. The first breakdown of the dichotomies doesn’t occur until 
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Disher’s ‘white family’—his wife and her parents—are exposed as multi-racial 
and the entire family is preparing to flee the county. At that point, he feels he 
can reveal his own racial background. Finally, the ‘happy’ snapshot of Disher 
and his family, equally tanned at the beach, takes place in Europe and after 
the general cultural inversion of racial preference in the United States.
Similarly, the point of Disher’s statement about being a “darky” is not 
that he possesses a single, authentic black identity despite his endeavors to 
the contrary, but that a race-conscious society can lead to an involuntary and 
possibly damaging psychological division within African-Americans. First, 
neither racial consciousness is more ‘authentic’ than the other.48 They both 
exist simultaneously and make an individual who he/she is, although they 
may exist generally in different degrees, dominate in different contexts, etc. 
As dichotomies, they form in relationship to each other and cannot exist 
without the opposite, either in the same individual or in someone else. In 
fact, as Chris Weedon explains in the context of feminist poststructuralism, 
“the individual is always the site of conflicting forms of subjectivity” (32). 
For example, Fuss theorizes that the same condition of fragmentation affect-
ing women could apply to African-Americans: “It does seem plausible that, 
like the female subject, the Afro-American subject (who may also be female) 
begins fragmented and dispersed, begins with a ‘double-consciousness,’ as Du 
Bois would say (1903, 215)” (95). However, all “forms” or parts of a person’s 
consciousness are not equally beneficial, and all individuals’ multiple forms 
do not conflict equally (Weedon 32). A multiple or fragmented subjectivity 
may be a reality, but that does not mean it is an ideal state for all individuals. 
For example, from the very beginning of his analysis of the formation of a 
double-consciousness in black Antilleans, Fanon emphasizes its foundation 
in colonial oppression and racism. Fanon briefly introduces the concept of 
a “self-division” in black individuals and then immediately asserts, “[t]hat 
this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond ques-
tion” (17). Schuyler and Du Bois similarly place the African-American for-
mation of a double- consciousness in the context of the racially segregated 
and oppressive society of the United States.
Therefore, the African-American concept of double-consciousness 
prefigures the contemporary, Postmodernist concept of a fragmented, 
multiple identity in both its multiplicity and its potential negativity. Not 
only race, but also gender, sexuality, religion, and nationality are possible 
forms or fragments of a person’s identity. For example, in the contemporary 
age of identity politics, a gay black woman could potentially identify with at 
least three different groups: women, people-of-color, and/or lesbians. This 
example illustrates the potential difficulty of reconciling multiple forms 
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of subjectivity, especially as the number of possible forms seems to be ever 
increasing in society as a whole. This difficulty, in turn, raises the question, 
is there a point past which this trend towards ever-smaller fragmentation, 
in an individual or in society more generally, should be resisted? Fuss, for 
example, asserts that “for both the female subject and the Afro-American 
subject, ‘the condition of dispersal and fragmentation that Barthes valorizes 
(and fetishezes) is not to be achieved but to be overcome’ (Miller 1986a, 
109)” (95). Fuss’ questioning here of a more traditional poststructuralist 
theory of identity formation raises two important issues. First, in suggesting 
that an alternate theoretical framework might be necessary for black 
subjectivity, Fuss joins other critics in highlighting the false universalism of 
current poststructuralist theories of subjectivity. Fuss ends her chapter on 
“Poststructuralist Afro-American Literary Theory” with a quote from cultural 
critic Andreas Huyssen in which he reveals the ideological underpinnings of 
poststructuralist theories of subjectivity in the same way Donna Haraway 
seeks to historicize the false universalism of the scientific community: “doesn’t 
poststructuralism, where it simply denies the subject altogether, jettison 
the chance of challenging the ideology of the subject (as male, white, and 
middle-class) by developing alternative and different notions of subjectivity?” 
(Huyssen 44). Both Huyssen and Fuss join Fanon and Schuyler, then, in 
seeking alternatives to the normative subjectivity for their time period due 
to its racial bias. Fuss’ analysis suggests that a more integrated consciousness 
might be beneficial for women and people-of-color due to the extremity of 
the fragmentation and conflict in their multiple forms of subjectivity.
Schuyler and Fanon utilize a similar technique to pave the way for 
an alternative subjectivity. In her book, Feminist Practice and Poststructur-
alist Theory, Chris Weedon explains the concept of “consciousness-raising” 
by which a woman learns the social foundations of her contradictory forms 
of subjectivity and more advantageous alternatives to the destructive forms 
resulting from patriarchy (33). Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks embodies a 
similar form of consciousness-raising, except in the field of race rather than 
gender. Similar to the Women’s Liberation Movement, Fanon emphasizes 
the social foundations of psychological phenomena, like the development of 
“white masks.” Fanon’s critique of Alfred Adler’s “psychology of the individ-
ual” is symptomatic of this social focus:
Here the difficulties begin. In effect, Adler has created a psychology 
of the individual. We have just seen that the feeling of inferiority is 
an Antillean characteristic. It is not just this or that Antillean who 
embodies the neurotic formation, but all Antilleans. Antillean society 
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is a neurotic society, a society of “comparison.” Hence we are driven 
from the individual back to the social structure. If there is a taint, it 
lies not in the “soul” of the individual but rather in that of the envi-
ronment. (213)
This last sentence reveals the motivation behind Fanon’s emphasis on the 
social—the removal of the ‘problem’ or neurosis from the individual. Like 
Schuyler, even as Fanon describes the negative aspects of a black double-con-
sciousness, he wishes to remove the label of pathological sometimes assigned 
to blacks as a racial group. More importantly, Fanon places the ‘problem’ 
in the individual’s social environment. This not only removes any blame or 
guilt from an individual, but also it opens up the potential for change. As 
Weedon explains,
The collective discussion of personal problems and conflicts, often pre-
viously understood as a result of personal inadequacies and neuroses, 
leads to a recognition that what have been experienced as personal fail-
ings are socially produced conflicts and contradictions shared by many 
women in similar social positions. This process of discovery can lead to 
a rewriting of personal experience in terms which give it social, change-
able causes. (33)
Especially in the context of race, essentialism is always an issue. With an 
individual comes a body and the potential for essentialist theories of psychol-
ogy which foreclose the possibility of change. Fanon’s social emphasis, on the 
other hand, not only locates the cause of a racial double-consciousness in 
colonial oppression but also offers the possibility of social reform as a vehicle 
to bring about alternate theories of subjectivity.
Schuyler too practices a form of consciousness-raising. In his explora-
tion of the cultural construction of race, he unhinges race from the biological 
and the individual. This performs the same function as in Fanon—it places 
the blame for any neuroses on the social environment rather than individual 
blacks, and it opens the door for change. In fact, Schuyler specifically refutes 
the association of pathology with African-Americans, despite his detailed 
description of a double-consciousness in Black No More: “I strongly question 
the view of many psychologists and sociologists that most colored people 
regard themselves as inferior. They simply are aware that their socio-economic 
position is inferior” (Black and Conservative 18). While the social emphasis 
is obvious here, this statement does not necessarily negate the psychological 
emphasis in Black No More. Schuyler is not denying double-consciousness is 
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negative; he is emphasizing the negative aspects of all racial identity. From 
this perspective, whites would be ‘pathological’ also. Where Fanon claims 
“Antillean society is a neurotic society,” Schuyler would claim American soci-
ety is a neurotic society (213).
Furthermore, in revealing the cultural basis of an individual’s forma-
tion of racial identity, Schuyler emphasizes the necessity for large-scale social 
reform. In his role as a satiric debunker, Schuyler refuses to create a race-
less utopia. However, his use of satire and consequent creation of a racially-
dystopic America illustrate the danger of racially fragmented and conflicting 
subjectivity.49 Like other modern science fiction, Schuyler’s Black No More 
is “a diagnosis, a warning, a call to understanding and action, and—most 
important—a mapping of possible alternatives” (Suvin 12). Schuyler’s por-
trayal of the negative extremes involved in a race-conscious society points 
the way to the more integrated perspective promoted by Fuss. Ironically, 
Schuyler’s refusal to actually create such an integrated consciousness, or more 
broadly a raceless utopia, in Black No More allows him to highlight the vari-
ability of race to an even greater degree. The racial inversion which takes 
place at the end of the text emphasizes the historical context of all racial 
theories and, therefore, the potential for change.50 In historicizing race and 
racial identity, Schuyler makes variable what once was considered static.51 
In this, he employs the second major characteristic of science fiction—cog-
nition. Darko Suvin distinguishes science fiction from myth in that, “SCI-
ENCE FICTION sees the norms of any age, including emphatically its own, 
as unique, changeable, and therefore subject to a cognitive view” (7). More 
specifically, science fiction “sees the mythical static identity as an illusion, 
usually a fraud, at best only a temporary realization of potentially limitless 
contingencies”(ibid). Science fiction, then, is a perfect medium to question 
essentialist theories of race and racial identity, as well as offer alternative sub-
jectivities. Suvin’s “potentially limitless contingencies” correspond with the 
“alternative and different notions of subjectivity” recommended by Huyssen 
and Fuss (Huyssen 44). Science fiction becomes a form of consciousness-
raising in this context.
While Schuyler doesn’t actually propose an alternative subjectivity in 
Black No More, it is clear from his negative argument that he would not endorse 
either aspect of the racial double-consciousness on its own. Schuyler’s denial of 
an authentic black identity has already been addressed, and his explicit rejec-
tion of an alternate black subjectivity is what Tucker objects to so strenuously. 
What some critics elide, however, is that in rejecting a specifically black iden-
tity, Schuyler also rejects the corresponding white identity. Disher, for example, 
maintains his white identity only so long as he profits by it. Once the cultural 
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norms invert, Disher tans along with the rest of his family. Schuyler wishes to 
throw out the dichotomous racial system in its entirety.52 Fanon too attempts 
to create a middle ground for himself rather than valorize either a black or 
white consciousness. After his lengthy exploration of the “white masks” put on 
by black Antilleans and the foundation of this phenomenon in colonial oppres-
sion and racism, Fanon briefly addresses the emerging Negritude movement. 
He asks, “What is all this talk of a black people, of a Negro nationality? I am a 
Frenchman. I am interested in French culture, French civilization, the French 
people. [ . . . ] What have I to do with a black empire?” (203). Fanon’s words 
here echo Schuyler’s scathing private evaluation of his science fiction series, the 
second part of which was actually titled “Black Empire.” Fanon and Schuyler 
refuse to accept an “either-or” proposition and, unlike Tucker and Baker, reject 
both aspects of a racial double-consciousness—a white consciousness and a 
black consciousness (ibid).53
The remarkable similarities between the arguments and racial perspec-
tives in Black No More and Black Skin, White Masks combine with Schuyler’s 
comments elsewhere to suggest Fanon and Schuyler held a common sub-
jective ideal. At the very end of his text, Fanon reveals the alternative sub-
jectivity he supports: “At the conclusion of this study, I want the world to 
recognize, with me, the open door of every consciousness” (232). Therefore, 
while Fanon recognizes the need for collective social reform in order to “cre-
ate the ideal conditions of existence for a human world,” he valorizes a sub-
jectivity based largely on individualism rather than a racial collective (231). 
Black Skin, White Masks ends like a personal manifesto of liberation: “In the 
world through which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself ” (229). Such a 
position mirrors Schuyler’s individualism, also in opposition to a collective 
racial identity. When Tucker quotes Schuyler’s infamous ending to this auto-
biography, he notes the scientific basis of this rejection of race (Tucker “Can” 
140–41). However, the context surrounding the quote reveals the individual-
ism upon which it rests. The sentence preceding Tucker’s quote reads, “Rele-
gating spurious racism to limbo, in our future American we need to stress the 
importance of the individual of whatever color” (Schuyler, Black and Conser-
vative 352). For Schuyler, individualism lies at the heart of freedom, intel-
lectual and political, as well as other positive American values. To him, racial 
solidarity is based on a scientific falsehood, and so intolerable to act upon as 
a truth. Furthermore, in “The Caucasian Problem,” Schuyler emphasizes the 
negative legacy of race and collective racial identities—global prejudice and 
oppression, including slavery, segregation, colonialism, and imperialism. In 
addition, however, Schuyler believes racial solidarity conflicts with individu-
alism and other positive values he holds up as national ideals.
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Schuyler’s relationship with his wife, Josephine, illustrates these values 
and provides further reinforcement of his rejection of race and racial soli-
darity. In a lengthy autobiography, Schuyler does not devote much space to 
his wife. However, it is symptomatic of his values that of the two sentences 
in which he addressed the cross-racial nature of their relationship, the sec-
ond full sentence reads, “She saw Negroes as I saw whites, as individuals” 
(Black and Conservative 163). Furthermore, Schuyler spends the remainder 
of the segment on his wife describing other specific attributes. While race is 
directly addressed throughout the majority of the autobiography, Schuyler 
consciously chooses to place the relationship with his wife largely outside of 
a racial context. They are explicitly not race conscious, but rather relate to 
one other as individuals. Similarly, Schuyler does not place his daughter in a 
racial context. Given Schuyler’s outspoken and prolific non-fiction address-
ing interracial relationships, his surprising silence in his autobiography seems 
to signal a desire to promote an individualism which transcends a collective 
racial identity.
Schuyler and Fanon both acknowledge a problem with black subjectiv-
ity brought about by oppression and racism and, by exploring the way race 
is constructed, they hope to bring about a world in which the concept of 
race becomes obsolete. In other words, Schuyler and Fanon are both race 
conscious, but not in the same way as Tucker. Schuyler and Fanon see race 
consciousness as negative, something to be overcome, something standing in 
the way of attaining individual freedom. Both authors do display a sophis-
ticated knowledge of the power of race “to shape human lives in very real 
ways” in their texts (Tucker, “Can” 148). Furthermore, that is Schuyler’s and 
Fanon’s primary theme in the texts discussed above. What nettles Tucker and 
confuses Fuss is the desire of both men to be free of race completely, in all its 
manifestations, and the authors,’ perhaps idealistic, belief that the best, and 
only, way to bring this about is to act as if it has already occurred. Barbara 
Jeanne Fields’ emphasis on the ideological basis of race supports this racial 
rejection. Making a clear distinction between race and biology, doctrine and 
ideology, Fields asserts:
race is neither biology nor an idea absorbed into biology by Lamarck-
ian inheritance. It is ideology, and ideologies do not have lives of their 
own. Nor can they be handed down or inherited: a doctrine can be 
[ . . . ] but not an ideology. If race lives on today, it does not live 
on because we have inherited it from our forebears of the seventeenth 
century or the eighteenth or nineteenth, but because we continue to 
create it today. (117)
100 The Subject of Race in American Science Fiction
If humans did not continually “reinvent and re-ritualize” race in their 
daily lives, then, it would cease to be a meaningful, powerful concept 
(Fields 118).54
There is no middle position on race for Schuyler and Fanon. The con-
cept of race was initially founded on biology so a cultural definition of race 
innately reveals the falseness, the fiction of race. From a strictly rational or 
scientific viewpoint, then, to perpetuate race as a cultural concept is illogical 
and misleading.55 Walter Benn Michaels explains the ramifications of a mid-
dle position, one which acknowledges the cultural basis of race but does not 
then reject race: “What it means, then, to accept the idea of racial identity 
as a function of ‘purely social and cultural perceptions’ instead of as biology 
is to accept the idea of racial identity as the codification of people’s mistake 
about biology” (132). A scientist or person with a strictly logical, rational 
mind tends to see race from this viewpoint and, therefore, would be hesi-
tant to endorse it. Fanon, for example, was a psychiatrist. Not coincidentally, 
Fanon joins Schuyler in mentioning scientific experiments associated with 
skin pigmentation and modifications of biological ‘race’ in Black Skin, White 
Masks, and also dismisses them as false solutions (111). While not a scientist 
by vocation, Schuyler was deeply interested in science and places science/sci-
entists at the heart of his fiction. It is not that Fanon and Schuyler necessarily 
believed in some ideal of scientific rationalism, as Tucker suggests, but that 
there is a connection between their idealistic and matter-of-fact response to 
race and their interest in science. Believing in the fictiveness, the falseness of 
race, the same analytic and factual turn of mind which attracted them to sci-
ence prevents them from acting upon race as if it were not constructed—per-
petuating a (negative) fiction, to their minds. If race is a fiction then it can 
have no positive manifestations.
In addition, Schuyler’s use of the science fiction genre would accentuate 
such a scientific viewpoint, as well as a forward focus. As Darko Suvin notes, 
science fiction is particularly interested in the “future-bearing elements from 
the empirical environment” (7). Robert Scholes and Eric S. Rabkin assert 
that “because of their orientation toward the future science fiction writers 
frequently assumed that America’s major problem in [the racial] area—black/
white relations—would improve or even wither away” (188). Within this 
context, “the matter of race [becomes] comparatively unimportant” (189). 
While Schuyler continues to address race directly in his texts, the “what if ” 
or speculative element of science fiction allows Schuyler to imagine a con-
temporaneous world in which a scientific development radically undermines 
the meaningfulness of race—in theory and in practice. Schuyler, then, more 
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accurately portrays race in his fiction than it exists in reality—the complete 
lack of (biological) anchoring and, therefore, the tremendous racial variabil-
ity. In concretizing the cultural basis of race, he highlights the illogical work-
ings of race in American society, as well as the extreme importance placed on 
race both then and now.
This contradiction between factuality and importance explains the 
paradox at the heart of much science fiction dealing with race. Like other 
contemporary science fiction writers who utilize race as a literary theme, 
Schuyler radically undermines race from a scientific and cultural standpoint. 
The paradox lies in Schuyler’s continued focus on race as his primary literary 
topic even as he explicitly rejects it. The rational or scientific mindset rejects 
the biological, or biological and cultural concepts of race. Furthermore, it 
exhibits a forward-looking tendency which sees a future idealistically with-
out race or one in which race is a vehicle for individual expression alone.56 
Disher’s decision to become white and then later to tan reflects such an indi-
vidualistic interpretation of a culturally-based concept of race. In such a con-
text, race becomes like hairstyle or clothing fashions; although grounded in 
collective social norms, it is used as an expression of a person’s individual per-
sonality or subjectivity. In the next chapter, we will see a similar utilization of 
race in Samuel R. Delany’s fiction. Schuyler, however, doesn’t use science—
in terms of scientific rationalism and/or the futuristic focus of the scientific 
and science fiction communities—to optimistically eradicate racism or race. 
The contemporary reality of race, in fact, counteracts this futuristic tendency 
of the scientific and science fiction communities, and Schuyler and others 
are forced to continually address race. Therefore, in his writing, Schuyler 
embodies this complex process of give-and-take whereby a scientific view-
point embodies both sides of racial rationalism—the factuality which rejects 
race and the practicality which cannot deny its continued importance within 
a larger society. In addition, these two sides of racial rationalism interact with 
the forward focus of a scientific viewpoint and the overt or latent idealism 
usually embodied in such a focus. In his oversimplification of Schuyler’s sci-
entific beliefs, Tucker elides these complex and contradictory impulses.
Schuyler’s combination of scientific interest, individualism, and racial 
deconstruction suit the science fiction medium. Furthermore, Black No More 
actually embodies the two characteristics essential to the science fiction liter-
ary genre—cognition and estrangement. However, Schuyler’s single catego-
rization in the Afro-American literary genre remains solid to this day. For 
example, the 1999 Modern Library Edition of Black No More lists “Afro-
Americans—Fiction” and “Human skin color—Fiction” as the only Library 
of Congress subject headings for the text. The literary history of Schuyler’s 
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texts, then, illustrates the very problem of racial identity and racial solidarity 
against which he worked so tirelessly. Schuyler’s texts are categorized solely 
on the basis of their racial theme and Schuyler’s own racial background. Sim-
ilarly, the assimilationist debates over Schuyler in African-American literary 
circles reveal not only the political foundation of Schuyler criticism, but also 
its racial basis.
Conversely, a discussion of race has been, and in some cases continues 
to be, viewed as antithetical to the science fiction genre. A glaring indication 
of this distinct separation is found in the lack of an entry for “Race” in the 
contemporary Encyclopedia of Science Fiction. Even the most current edition, 
published in 1995, subsumes race under the entry on “Politics.” In the Intro-
duction to Into Darkness Peering: Race and Color in the Fantastic (1997), Elisa-
beth Anne Leonard reveals that her motivation behind the anthology was the 
lack of critical attention paid to race in the genres of “fantasy, science fiction, 
and horror literature” (2). The collection of critical essays “is an attempt to 
break that silence” (ibid). The sub-title of Philip E. Baruth’s article, included 
in the anthology, directly addresses the elision of race in primary science fic-
tion texts: “Why No One Mentions Race in Cyberspace.” While Into Dark-
ness Peering does not include an essay on Schuyler, several contemporary 
science fiction and fantasy authors have attempted to give credit to Schuyler’s 
early writings in the field. Samuel R. Delany, for example, highlights Schuy-
ler’s Black No More and recently discovered Black Empire serials in his brief 
review of his predecessors in the field. Delany’s article, “Racism and Science 
Fiction,” appears alongside several other critical articles on race in Dark Mat-
ter: A Century of Speculative Fiction from the African Diaspora. Published in 
2000, Dark Matter also includes the first piece of Schuyler’s fiction to be 
published specifically in a science fiction (or speculative) context. An excerpt 
from Black No More and a piece of short fiction by W. E. B. Du Bois, titled 
“The Comet” (1920), appear with fictional works by contemporary authors 
such as Delany, Octavia Butler, Charles R. Saunders, and Nalo Hopkinson. 
The editor of Dark Matter, Sheree R. Thomas asserts that “[l]ike dark matter, 
the contributions of black writers to the science fiction genre have not been 
directly observed or fully explored” (xi). Therefore, “[b]y uniting the works 
of the early pioneers in the field with that of established and emerging new 
writers, [ . . . Thomas hopes] the necessary groundwork for the discussion 
and examination of the ‘unobserved’ literary tradition has been laid” (xii). 
These two recently published anthologies reveal the trend in science fiction 
towards a more open, accurate, and critical representation of race.
Much work remains to be done, however. In Schuyler’s case, the criti-
cism of Into Darkness Peering needs to be combined with the fiction of Dark 
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Matter. Discussing Schuyler’s science fiction connections results in both 
a more accurate portrayal of the science fiction field and a more positive 
critical perspective on Schuyler. First, Schuyler’s novel, Black No More, and 
serials, Black Empire, together represent a substantial contribution to the sci-
ence fiction field. When Delany qualifies his title as “the first African-Ameri-
can science-fiction writer,” he acknowledges Schuyler’s earlier work and the 
importance of its inclusion in larger science fiction histories for an accurate 
understanding of the field (“Racism” 383). Similarly, Schuyler’s works rep-
resents an early example of the overt ties between science fiction and race. 
Schuyler begins to break down the traditional white triangle of author, pro-
tagonist, and audience, as symbolized by Edgar Rice Burroughs. In this way, 
Schuyler highlights the false universalism and racelessness of both the literary 
genre and the scientific discourse (and community) with which it is con-
nected.
Finally, a science fiction context affords a more accurate and positive 
reading of Schuyler and his texts; rather than a political outcast, Schuyler 
becomes a generic and theoretical pioneer. From a contemporary perspective, 
we can see how later writers, in the science fiction field and beyond, have 
revised and expanded upon key elements of Schuyler’s texts. In addition to 
the inversion of the racial triangle mentioned above, Schuyler’s texts are early 
examples of a fragmentation of identity and a cultural construction of race. 
Subsequent authors have taken Du Bois’ theory of double-consciousness for 
African-Americans and expanded it dramatically through poststructuralist 
and postmodern theories of subjectivity. Similarly, the contemporary critical 
debate over Schuyler’s works reveals the controversy surrounding theories of 
racial construction. In his early embrace of the science fiction genre and his 
exploration of complex, controversial, and cutting-edge subjective theories, 
Schuyler serves as an intermediary stage for later racial developments within 
the science fiction community.




In his 1999 essay “Racism and Science Fiction,” Samuel R. Delany writes of 
his discomfiture with the oft-given title of “the first African-American sci-
ence-fiction writer” (383). In order to give a more accurate portrayal of the 
early contributions of African-Americans to science fiction, Delany briefly 
highlights the “proto-science fiction” writers M.P. Shiel and Martin Delany 
and the early alternate histories of Sutton E. Griggs and Edward Johnson 
(383–4). Delany also includes a lengthier review of George S. Schuyler’s 
twentieth-century texts (384–6). This short literary history reveals Delany’s 
desire to reform the science fiction community and its relationship to race; it 
is a first, small step towards increasing the inclusiveness of the science fiction 
field. While Delany acknowledges the generally liberal atmosphere of the 
science fiction community, he speaks of his experiences during his 40-year 
career in order to highlight how race and racism operate even within this lib-
eral environment (386). He ends with specific suggestions to “combat racism 
in science fiction” (396): “That means actively encouraging the attendance 
of nonwhite readers and writers at conventions [ . . . ,] actively presenting 
nonwhite writers with a forum to discuss precisely these problems [ . . . , 
and] encouraging dialogue among, and encouraging intermixing with, the 
many sorts of writers who make up the science fiction community. It means 
supporting those traditions” (397). Delany’s racial history, narratives, and 
call for action intermingle in his article, published in a 2000 anthology, Dark 
Matter: a Century of Speculative Fiction from the African Diaspora. Here Dela-
ny’s fiction joins that of Schuyler and W. E. B. Du Bois, complementing the 
historical revision Delany sketches in his essay. Likewise, the non-fiction sec-
tion of Dark Matter is a written “forum” for non-white writers to discuss the 
“problems” associated with race in the science fiction community (Delany, 
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“Racism” 397). More broadly, one goal of such an anthology must be to 
expand the “non-white readers” of science fiction and, of course, publishing 
these texts encourages non-white writers of science fiction as well, especially 
the younger and/or relatively unknown authors. In the introduction, editor 
Sherre R. Thomas writes, “[i]t is my sincere hope that Dark Matter will help 
shed light on the science fiction genre, that it will correct the misperception 
that black writers are recent to the field, and that it will encourage more 
talented writers to enter the genre” (xi). Dark Matter, then, in many ways 
embodies the corrective spirit Delany discusses in “Racism and Science Fic-
tion.” The 2000 publication date is an auspicious sign of a more inclusive 
century of science fiction to come. Yet, Delany baldly titles his essay “Racism 
and Science Fiction” with good reason. Whether past, present, or future, the 
“racism” of science fiction must be addressed in order for the science fiction 
community to truly come-of-age and realize its full potential.
Delany’s fictional and non-fictional inclusion in Dark Matter illustrates 
his foundational, pivotal, and still central role in the science fiction commu-
nity, particularly in its relationship to race. First, Delany entered the science 
fiction field and worked for 9 years as the sole publishing African-American 
writer of science fiction (“Racism” 386). From 1962 to 1971, he published 
nine full-length fictional texts, several of which won Nebula Awards.1 During 
the1970’s, Delany expanded the field of his writing to include non-fiction.2 
To date he has published seven volumes of criticism and two autobiographi-
cal texts.3 In addition, no less than five full-length critical texts have been 
written about Delany and his oeuvre.4 In Samuel R. Delany (1984), Seth 
McEvoy summarizes Delany’s career as follows: “Delany went from being a 
middle-class black youth in Harlem to become one of the top ten best sell-
ing science fiction writers by the age of 40” (11). Finally, Delany has been 
a teacher, writer-in-residence, speaker, and guest-of-honor, etc. at too many 
campuses, conferences, and conventions to name.5 Yet, even as Delany is 
a prominent member of the science fiction community, the steady divide 
between the African-American literary genre and the science fiction field 
has prevented his reciprocal acknowledgement in “the mainstream forums 
of Black Studies” (Freedman 160).6 In other words, his popular and critical 
position is Schuyler’s inverse. Therefore, Delany’s literary career provides an 
excellent heuristic tool for investigating the relationship between science fic-
tion and race after Schuyler’s career.
Most basically, Delany promotes a form of individuality, similar to 
Schuyler. However, rather than rejecting race altogether as a meaningful 
term, Delany uses the freedom of individuality to work in a genre which 
has not been associated with African-Americans and is still marginalized 
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from mainstream fiction. In “Meet Samuel R. Delany, Black Science Fiction 
Writer” (1979), for example, Michael W. Peplow explains the impetus behind 
his article: “Just over six months ago, a student in my black literature seminar 
asked me if there were any Afro-Americans who write SF (science fiction). ‘I 
don’t know,’ I said, ‘but I’ll find out’” (115). Similarly, Jeffrey A. Tucker shares 
a contemporary experience which illustrates the continued division of science 
fiction and African-American literature. After being questioned by an uncle on 
the subject of his graduate work, Tucker writes, “his words indicated that for 
many people—black as well as white—science fiction and African-American 
culture are mutually exclusive” (“Racial”). Delany’s career must be placed 
with this divisive context, with its racial expectations, in order to understand 
how unusual was his initial entrance and lengthy participation in the science 
fiction genre. In his discussion of Delany’s first science fiction novel, McEvoy 
chronicles Delany’s earlier, non-science fiction writing and his participation 
in a Breadloaf Writers Conference.7 McEvoy concludes, “[o]ne would have 
expected such a ‘young, gifted, and black’ writer to go on to become a member 
of the ‘literary’ establishment” (19). During this time period, Delany would 
have been expected to “become a member” of a particular segment of this 
literary establishment as well—the African-American literary community. 
Once race is added to the mixture, a ‘pull’ towards the general realism and 
race consciousness of African-American literature makes Delany’s ultimate 
choice of genre even more unusual. Likewise, the simultaneous Anglo-
centrism and racial elision of science fiction often ‘pushes’ away people-of-
color. Within this racial context, Delany’s prominent career in the science 
fiction genre resonates with additional meaning. First, his entrance into the 
science fiction community in the 1960’s highlights the long-time stability 
of the (white) racial triangle of author/protagonist/audience in the science 
fiction genre. On the other hand, Delany’s use of science, science fictional 
forms and conventions, and poststructuralist theories offers a challenge to 
more traditional theories of African-American literature and culture. Over 
time, Delany’s groundbreaking and influential work in the science fiction 
genre has opened up the field, allowing for more diverse writers and texts. He 
has brought science fiction several steps closer to realizing its full potential as 
the literature of possibility.
With his first published text, The Jewels of Aptor (1962), Delany con-
tinued the breakdown of the racial triangle began by Schuyler and the other 
writers he listed in “Racism and Science Fiction.” While Schuyler introduced 
a black protagonist to the science fiction genre in the 1930s, his audience 
was primarily African-American. A racial triangle was maintained, simply 
changing racial affiliation. After Schuyler, the trio of Edgar Rice Burroughs, 
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John Carter, and Anglo male teenagers remained the overwhelming norm 
in the science fiction genre. It was not until Delany’s emergence in the early 
1960s that the authorial element of the racial triangle changed significantly 
within the science fiction literary community and more diverse protagonists, 
and other characters, became increasingly commonplace. In “Racism and 
Science Fiction,” for example, Delany writes of his experience at the 1968 
Nebula Awards Banquet. While Delany won two Nebula Awards that eve-
ning, he (along with other ‘new’ writers like Roger Zelazny) faced opposition 
to his ‘experimental’ or more complex writing style. Within this tense envi-
ronment, Isaac Asimov told Delany in an aside, “You know, Chip, we only 
voted you those awards because you’re Negro . . . !” (390). Delany first 
acknowledges the good intentions underlying Asimov’s comment, but then 
goes on to verbalize the other meaning inherent in such a statement:
No one here will ever look at you, read a word you write, or consider 
you in any situation, no matter whether the roof is falling in or the 
money is pouring in, without saying to him- or herself (whether in an 
attempt to count it or to discount it), “Negro . . .” The racial situation, 
permeable as it might sometimes seem (and it is, yes, highly permeable), 
is nevertheless your total surround. Don’t you ever forget it . . . ! And 
I never have. (390–1)
Delany’s take on race consciousness is negative here. Rather than a 
voluntary or personal identification and a source of pride and enrichment, 
race consciousness is portrayed as an involuntary, pervasive, and external 
evaluative tool. It is used by others to judge Delany, regardless of the 
contextual warrant. Not surprisingly, then, Delany’s praise for the generally 
liberal and “permeable” environment of the science fiction community 
(in comparison to the mainstream literary community) emphasizes its 
sensitivity to overt racial labeling.8 In his 1979 article, Michael W. Peplow 
wrote, “[a]fter finding so few references to color in the anthologies of science 
fiction, I had assumed that [Delany’s] color must be a closely guarded 
secret” (119). Delany denied Peplow’s assumption and explained instead, 
“The SF publishing industry ‘is largely Jewish, liberal, and rooted in the 
tradition sometimes referred to as “30’s left.”‘ The editors have ‘known 
their share of prejudice [ . . . ] and they’re not anxious to be caught 
perpetuating it’“ (Peplow 119).9 Delany’s comments here underscore his 
desire to be viewed as a science fiction writer first and foremost, rather 
than a black writer. Such an attitude highlights his published (public) texts 
and not his (personal) racial status.
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Delany’s inclusive racial attitude was essential to the success of his early 
career in the science fiction field. Not only did Delany face discrimination 
as a black writer, but also he had to struggle against the racist norms of the 
generic conventions. Had he challenged these norms too directly or revised 
them radically, at this early stage, his texts would not have been published 
in the science fiction genre. Robert Elliot Fox’s comparison between Delany 
and LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka and Ishmael Reed is instructive here. Fox con-
trasts Delany with the other two writers within the African-American literary 
tradition because “while race is a factor in the worlds of Delany’s fiction, it is 
not a foregrounded concern” (Conscientious X). Likewise, Emerson Littlefield 
asserts that “Delany is assuredly not a one-dimensional ‘black writer,’ that 
is to say, a writer concerned only with racial identity, revenge motives, and 
expressing the frustrations of the oppressed. His fiction is too humane and 
too rich for so simpleminded an interpretation” (238). In a complex process 
of give-and-take, then, Delany subtly and slowly revised elements of the tra-
ditional white, male, heroic protagonist of science fiction.
Delany utilized several strategies to walk this racial tightrope. In his 
first published novel, The Jewels of Aptor (1962), Delany begins with the tra-
ditional quest convention and a seemingly traditional hero, Geo. Yet, as Seth 
McEvoy notes, the reader’s expectations are quickly baffled: “[t]he dramatic 
tension in The Jewels of Aptor does not follow the traditional quest form. 
The tension (involving the quest for the jewels) rises at first, but begins to 
fall at the mid-point. Geo does not really achieve the goal of getting the jew-
els by himself. [ . . . ] Nearly everything in the second half of the book is 
done for Geo; he does nothing” (15). Therefore, Geo does not embody the 
independence and agency or the active nature of a traditional science fiction 
hero. Delany also includes a diverse cast of characters in his text—male and 
female, multi-racial, and alien. In The Fall of the Towers trilogy (1963–65), 
for example, Delany’s nominal protagonist, Jon Koshar, is an Anglo male 
who undergoes a fairly traditional quest though the course of the texts.10 
However, he is joined in his journey by two other characters, equally impor-
tant to success: a white duchess named Petra and a dark-skinned giant named 
Arkor. The traditional male protagonist’s monolithic heroism, then, becomes 
a collective, cooperative endeavor. Furthermore, in their fight against an alien 
villain called the Lord of the Flames, the three characters continually change 
worlds and assume the identities of alien life forms. In his critical study of 
The Fall of the Towers, George Edgar Slusser rightly asks, “is this a tale of 
one hero, two adversaries, or three races?” (18). Delany replaces the tradi-
tional white male hero altogether in Babel-17 (1966), introducing a heroic 
female protagonist named Rydra Wong. In fact, when discussing his early 
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works, Delany emphasizes more his conscious attempt to revise sexist roles 
and characterization for women than racial stereotypes.11
With his seventh and eighth novels, The Einstein Intersection (1967) and 
Nova (1968), however, Delany directly tackles the racial norms for science 
fiction protagonists. In one of the few critical texts to deal specifically with 
race in Delany’s fiction, “The Mythologies of Race and Science in Samuel 
Delany’s The Einstein Intersection and Nova,” Emerson Littlefield argues that 
Delany’s characterization embodies a new “Afro-American mythology which 
began to emerge in the literature of the twentieth century” (235).12 Basically, 
the new mythology reverses the white represents good/black represents evil 
dichotomy of Western culture (235–6).13 Littlefield finds such a reversal in 
the darker-skinned protagonist of The Einstein Intersection, Lobey, and Lorq 
von Ray, the mulatto protagonist of Nova. “Further, and more importantly, 
each of these characters is engaged in mortal combat with an oppressor who 
is not only inhumanly vicious but almost inhumanly white”—Kid Death and 
Prince Red (Littlefield 236). At this point, Delany’s racial revisions stretched 
the protagonist past the breaking point for the “famous science fiction editor 
of Analog magazine, John W. Campbell, Jr. Campbell rejected[Nova, . . . ] 
explaining that while he liked pretty much everything else about it, he didn’t 
feel his readership would be able to relate to a black main character” (“Rac-
ism” 387). In this way, editors and publishers could use the largely young, 
white male readership of science fiction to justify the focus on Anglo-Euro-
pean characters, particularly the centrality of the Anglo male hero to science 
fiction texts. However, Littlefield qualifies his racial analysis of Delany’s texts 
by claiming that “his heroes tend to represent a careful blending of racial 
strains: Lobey is brown-skinned and red-haired[ . . . ]; Lorq von Ray is a 
red-haired mulatto; and Rydra Wong of Babel-17 is racially mixed” (238). 
Furthermore, “[i]n the plot structures of the novels themselves, [ . . . ] the 
characters seem completely unaware of any racial tension and hardly aware 
of any racial differences” (ibid). With these qualifications, Littlefield high-
lights the racially (and gender) inclusive nature of Delany’s fiction and the 
strictness of the racial norms in the genre, since even Delany’s modest revi-
sions were rejected.
When he creates fairly race-specific characters without a race-driven 
plot, Delany employs a relatively common strategy in science fiction that 
deals with race. Robert Scholes and Eric S. Rabkin offer Robert A. Heinlein’s 
Starship Troopers (1959) and Ursula Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness 
(1969) as other prominent examples of this technique (188–9). In both these 
cases, the male protagonists have dark skin, but no reference is made to their 
race and it plays no overt role in the story. Scholes and Rabkin describe this 
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strategy as a “tacit attack on racial stereotyping [ . . . which] has allowed 
science fiction to get beyond even ‘liberal’ attitudes, to make stereotyping 
itself an obsolete device and the matter of race comparatively unimportant” 
(189). Several factors make the science fiction authors’ subtle and dismis-
sive racial attitude possible. First, as previously mentioned, “because of their 
orientation toward the future science fiction writers frequently assumed 
that America’s major problem in this area—black/white relations—would 
improve or even wither away” (Scholes and Rabkin 188). Also, “[t]he pres-
ence of unhuman races, aliens, and robots, certainly makes the differences 
between human races seem appropriately trivial” (ibid). The speculative ele-
ment of science fiction, then, tends to highlight the collective human race 
rather than a multitude of human races, human commonality rather than 
difference. Campbell’s rejection of Nova clearly illustrates the necessity of uti-
lizing such inclusive strategies in the science fiction community. Campbell’s 
position is clarified by an exchange between Octavia Butler and an unnamed 
editor at a convention. In an interview, Butler relates that
[she] was sitting next to the editor of a magazine that no longer exists 
and he was also doing some science fiction stories. He said that he didn’t 
think that blacks should be included in science fiction stories because 
they changed the character of the stories; that if you put in a black, all 
of a sudden the focus is on this person. He stated that if you were going 
to write about some sort of racial problem, that would be absolutely the 
only reason he could see for including a black. (“Black”18)
Similar to Delany’s experience at the Nebula Awards ceremony, the editor 
perceives a black character as representative of a racial group first and fore-
most, and as an artist, space adventurer, or politician second. The pervasive-
ness of such ideological stances underlay Schuyler’s desire to be seen as an 
individual, rather than as a member of a racial group, as well as his denial 
of any pathology related to race. In suppressing this type of collective racial 
identification, Heinlein, Le Guin, and Delany can place a member of a his-
torically (and generically) marginal racial group in the normative position. 
In other words, the authors give the black character the privileged position, 
which includes the ability to elide race because no negative connotations or 
oppression are involved.
Potential drawbacks surface with such racial subtlety, however. First, 
readers might miss small racial clues in the description of a character, espe-
cially if it is not part of the larger plot. The largely white audience of science 
fiction, combined with the generic convention of an Anglo male hero, only 
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increases the possibility of such a misreading. Even when authors directly 
address a character’s race within a text, an illustration on the cover can mis-
lead readers. For example, Octavia Butler discusses the African-American 
ancestry of her heroine, Lilith Iyapo, on numerous occasions in the Xeno-
genesis trilogy.14 Yet, the infamous illustration on the cover of Dawn (the first 
novel in the trilogy) shows an Anglo woman performing the exact action 
of the heroine within the text.15 Furthermore, the scene chosen for the 
illustration has this Anglo Lilith standing, looking down (with her jumper 
unzipped revealingly), and peeling back a cover from the naked body of a 
reclining Anglo woman. This sexually-charged image was clearly chosen to 
appeal to the stereotypically young, white male audience of science fiction.16 
Without a careful reading of the text, however, any reader could be easily 
thrown off by this first impression of the book.17 More importantly, if race 
is “relatively unimportant,” some members of the science fiction community 
feel it need not be addressed at all (Scholes and Rabkin 189). Butler’s editor 
from the convention, for example, went on to suggest that black characters 
could be transformed into aliens as a means of avoiding the whole “racial 
problem” (“Black” 18). For this reason, Edward James questions Scholes and 
Rabkins’ overall positive interpretation of the manifestation of race in science 
fiction: a “cynic might wonder [ . . . ] whether the latent xenophobia of 
so many members of the human race—including SF writers—has not been 
transferred from the human to the alien” (“Yellow” 28). James joins Gary K. 
Wolfe in pinpointing robots and monsters as potential disguises for the Oth-
erness of race (James, “Yellow” 28).18 Within this context, “deciding whether 
the Other—an alien, a robot, an android—is actually intended as a meta-
phor is a crucial problem” (James, “Yellow” 39).
At this point, the “problem” is of a different nature for a (positive) race 
conscious reader. When racial discourse is so disguised that it is a matter of 
conjecture whether race is the intended topic, the question becomes moot 
for readers who value collective racial identity. The general elision of a black 
perspective and the normative white perspective of most science fiction, both 
embodied in the traditional Anglo male hero, would repel race conscious 
blacks, for example. As fantasy writer Charles R. Saunders noted in a 1984 
interview, “until recently there wasn’t much in science fiction and fantasy for 
black readers to identity with” (Bell 91). More specifically, Saunders explains 
that up to the late 1970s “science fiction was still in the process of freeing 
itself from the grasp of its so-called Golden Age in the 1930s–1950s, when 
hard science was a king whose court was closed to blacks. And fantasy was 
still frozen in an amber of Celtic and Arthurian themes” (“Why” 399). Sim-
ilarly, when asked “[w]hy is science fiction a literary form that black and 
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female writers have not sufficiently explored?,” Octavia Butler responded 
that “part of the reason [ . . . ] is that science fiction began as a boy’s genre. 
So it was white, it was adolescent and it involved a particular kind of ado-
lescent best described as a nerd. So this did not make it popular with blacks 
or adults or women for quite a long time” (“Black” 16). Furthermore, since 
most science fiction authors spring from science fiction readers, a negative 
cycle is perpetuated.19 In addition to the racial characterization in and racist 
image of science fiction, several other factors combined to repel many black 
readers from the genre.
The common interplanetary setting of science fiction extends or severs 
the connection to Earth and, therefore, race as it has historically functioned. 
The alternate history sub-genre of science fiction sometimes breaks the con-
nection to terrestrial concepts of race as well. Basically the function of science 
fiction as a ‘literature of possibility,’ whether through space or time ruptures, 
can result in a complete disavowal of race and usually necessitates a modifica-
tion of race at minimum. In Delany’s The Ballad of Beta-2 (1965), for exam-
ple, a multi-racial and ethnic group of humans evolves, over centuries spent 
in outer space, into a culturally and physically regressive ‘race’—the Star 
Folk. In contrast, Delany’s Dhalgren (1974) takes place in an alternate pres-
ent, in an American city, and maintains linguistic and cultural connections 
to historical human races.20 For some Anglo writers, like Edgar Rice Bur-
roughs, only in breaking the connection to Earth and terrestrial history can 
more egalitarian relationships be envisioned. However, for many people-of-
color this disassociation denies a basic element of their subjectivity and elides 
the lived reality of their day-to-day life. In addition, a (racial) history of col-
lective oppression, survival, and victories disappears entirely or is submerged 
within a larger terrestrial history.21 While the privilege of Anglo (especially 
male) writers allows them to ignore race, members of oppressed groups usu-
ally feel they cannot or should not attempt to deny the importance of race 
as a vital factor, as the virulent criticism of Schuyler reveals. Furthermore, 
within the (common and false) universalism of the Anglo male perspective 
in science fiction, the cultural specificity of particular racial groups would 
not be recognized. This general elision and/or modification of race in science 
fiction combines to create a radical deconstruction of race. For writers inter-
ested in a collective racial identity, these generic deconstructions are only 
compounded by the scientific, poststructuralist, and postmodern theories 
gaining precedence in the second half of the twentieth century.
The field of African-American studies offers an excellent site to explore 
these racial tensions and ideological conflicts. In a synopsis of the poststruc-
turalist debate within African-American Studies during the 1980s, Diana 
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Fuss describes a “mainstream of contemporary Afro-American criticism” (85), 
“concerned with preserving the ‘authentic’ nature of the Afro-American text.
All are wary that a preoccupation with language will de-nature black litera-
ture and culture, detach the text from its cultural roots. All attempt, in other 
words, to hold fast to the bedrock of essentialism” (86).22 Fuss highlights the 
particularly strong resistance of female black critics to “renounc[ing] essen-
tialist critical positions and humanist literary practices” (94–5). Within this 
context, Fuss discusses the controversy surrounding three contemporary male 
critics who utilize poststructuralist theory in the field of African-American 
studies: Anthony Appiah, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Houston A. Baker, Jr. 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., in particular, has born the brunt of the critical heat 
due to his “interest in the sign ‘black’ and its discursive production in literary 
texts” (Fuss 85). Even Baker has attacked Gates for his editorial acceptance of 
“subtle and searching modes of ‘reading’” in the anthology “Race,” Writing, 
and Difference (Baker 383). According to Baker,
what Gates intends by “reading” is a transcendent academic (rationalist?) 
discourse which escapes pitfalls of error and anachronism not through 
its devotion to the “vernacular” but rather through its allegiance to 
putatively achievable and supposedly empirical “scientific” models. In 
a sense (but not a cruel one), I am suggesting that Gates remains a pris-
oner to the Enlightenment dualism that he debunks at the outset of his 
introduction. (ibid)
Fuss, however, corrects Baker’s oversimplification of Gates’ linguistic posi-
tion here, reasserting Gates’ promotion of both the vernacular and theo-
retical/academic discourse (89). Further, Fuss notes the similar auditory 
essentialism of Baker and Gates in their emphasis on the black vernacular, 
as well as the scanty use of the vernacular in their own writings:
What we see in the work of both Gates and Baker is a romanticization 
of the vernacular. As their detractors are quick to point out, each of 
these critics speaks about the black vernacular but rarely can they be 
said to speak in it [ . . . ]. A powerful dream of the vernacular moti-
vates the work of these two Afro-Americanists, perhaps because, for 
the professionalized literary critic, the vernacular has already become 
irrevocably lost. [ . . . ] It is in the quest to recover, reinscribe, and 
revalorize the black vernacular that essentialism inheres in the work of 
two otherwise anti-essentialist theorists. The key to blackness is not 
visual but auditory [ . . . ]. (90)
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In a field founded on a collective racial identity, then, even ‘liberal’ critics 
promote a form of racial essentialism. The need to justify racial identity is 
so strong that these critics “hallucinate” an authentic racial past that can be 
recovered (Fuss 90).
In a footnote within his chapter on Delany, Carl Freedman briefly 
acknowledges Delany’s neglect by the African-American literary commu-
nity and attributes it to the pervasive marginalization of the science fiction 
genre (160). However, within the critical context sketched above, a multi-
tude of other factors surface. In addition to the generic conventions already 
mentioned, Delany’s general use of language does not meet the prescribed 
requirements for African-American literature or criticism. Furthermore, 
Delany’s reliance on scientific, poststructuralist, and postmodern theories 
conflicts with the general promotion in the African-American literary com-
munity of a collective racial ideal. The heated level of the debate within the 
community highlights the extent to which such theories threaten a genre or 
field founded on a collective racial identity, like African-American literature 
or Black Studies. This racial repulsion is only strengthened by Delany’s own 
individuality and his desire to be seen as a writer of science fiction first and 
foremost and a black writer secondarily.
THE ALTERNATIVES
Delany’s autobiography, The Motion of Light in Water: Sex and Science Fic-
tion Writing in the East Village, 1957–1965, chronicles his early life and 
his entrance into the science fiction community. The years covered fol-
low Delany from approximately the age of 15 to 23. During this relatively 
short time period, Delany wrote and published a substantial portion of his 
oeuvre, including The Jewels of Aptor (1962), The Fall of the Towers trilogy 
(1963–65), The Ballad of Beta-2 (1965), Babel-17 (1966), and The Ein-
stein Intersection (1967). The Motion of Light in Water gives us a historical, 
social, and personal context for these texts. For example, Delany explains the 
connection between The Fall of the Towers trilogy and the Vietnam conflict 
and the emerging Women’s Movement. This historical background is nec-
essary because of the “cognitive estrangement” of Delany’s science fiction. 
Although Delany later examines the turbulent period of the 1960s in great 
detail and with little speculative distance in Dhalgren (1974), he utilizes the 
estrangement techniques of time and space to discuss contemporary issues in 
his early works. For example, The Ballad of Beta-2 addresses both science and 
race through the novum of galactic anthropology. However, its chronologi-
cal and spatial distance obscures its connection to the Civil Rights and Black 
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Power Movements of the 1950s and 60s. This is one reason that The Bal-
lad of Beta-2 garners little attention within the science fiction community. 
Slusser, for example, ignores the text completely in his critical evaluation of 
Delany’s early career. McEvoy very briefly discusses the text, but asserts that 
“The Ballad of Beta-2 must count among Delany’s minor work” and that 
“[i]ts significance here is chiefly as a good example of how important texts 
are to Delany’s entire output” (46). However, in addition to this linguistic 
focus, The Ballad of Beta-2 illustrates Delany’s melding of the racial analy-
sis of African-American literature and the cognitive estrangement of science 
fiction. As a result, his texts must be placed within the literary contexts of 
both fields to reveal fully the texts’ revisionist nature and Delany’s underlying 
individuality. Specifically comparing The Ballad of Beta-2 with representa-
tive texts from science fiction and African-American literature will illustrate 
Delany’s difference(s) more concretely.
Robert A. Heinlein’s oeuvre offers a fruitful site of comparison for 
Delany’s early works. First, Heinlein is a productive, critically acclaimed, and 
popular science fiction author. He also represents the older, more traditional 
generation of science fiction writers, whose works Delany, Zelazny, and oth-
ers were trying to revise during the 1960s. In this context, Heinlein provides 
a specific example of Delany’s revisionist attitude. Delany frequently uses 
Heinlein’s works as representative examples for his science fiction theory and 
criticism, and he validates Heinlein’s use of race in Starship Troopers (1959). 
However, Delany also revises Heinlein’s protagonists and engages in an ideo-
logical dialogue with his texts.23 In his introduction to Heinlein’s Glory Road 
(1963), Delany summarizes his paradoxical and influential relationship with 
Heinlein through a comparison: “Marx’s favorite novelist was Balzac—who 
was an avowed Royalist. And Heinlein is one of mine” (Delany, Introduc-
tion xii). Heinlein, “as much as any writer while [Delany] was growing up, 
taught [him] to argue with the accepted version” (ibid). In a 1990 Callaloo 
interview, Delany explains his revisionist, but not “revolutionary,” attitude 
towards science fiction: “What I am doing in almost all my books is the 
genre equivalent of ‘gender bending.’ That’s how all genres expand, progress, 
survive. It’s a paradox that when the results look most revolutionary, that’s 
when the writer is most attending to the tradition” (Silent 226). Furthermore, 
Delany claims that any attempt to portray him as
somehow fighting against the genre from which [he] draw[s] all [his] 
sustenance, inspiration, and strength is doomed to the same sorts of 
mystification that we are all too familiar with: the argument that sees 
every successful black as one who has successfully fought—or fought 
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down—the socially detrimental factors that make all blacks into 
muggers, thieves, drug addicts, prostitutes, and sociopaths. (226–27)
This specific racial context or comparison, unusual in Delany’s criticism 
as a whole, paradoxically emphasizes Delany’s individuality. Critics who 
emphasize an adversarial or “revolutionary” position within the genre imply 
an exceptional or ‘abnormal’ position as well. Therefore, Delany’s strenuous 
resistance to such a reading reveals a desire to be taken on the merits of his 
thematically conservative or traditional science fiction and not his ‘excep-
tional’ or marginal race within the science fiction community (Silent 225).24 
He places himself squarely and fixedly within the traditions of the science 
fiction genre and in specific contrast to more “radical writers in SF terms” 
(227). Likewise, Delany stresses thematic and/or linguistic connections 
between his works and that of other science fiction writers over (authorial) 
racial similarities.
Comparing Delany’s 1965 text, The Ballad of Beta-2, with Heinlein’s 
1964 text, Farnham’s Freehold, overtly supports Delany’s claims of generic 
conventionality. Although Heinlein utilizes a time discontinuum in Farn-
ham’s Freehold, he openly focuses on white/black race relations. As we shall 
see, such a topic is closer to African-American literary texts during this time 
period than other science fiction texts.25 However, Farnham’s Freehold also 
highlights the racial stereotyping Delany helped to revise within the science 
fiction genre. The positive white isolationism depicted in Farnham’s Freehold 
contrasts with the racial hybridity promoted by Delany in The Ballad of Beta-
2. According to the dust jacket, Farnham’s Freehold is “Science Fiction’s Most 
Controversial Novel.” Writing in 1979, Delany asserts that “Farnham’s Free-
hold has sustained an almost constant attack” since its publication in 1964 
(Introduction xi). The controversy around the novel springs from both its 
unusually direct and detailed focus on race and Heinlein’s conservative poli-
tics. As Delany notes, “[o]ur argument is never with the truth value of Hein-
lein’s syllogism[but] with the premises: Since P, Q, R are not the situation of 
the present world, why constantly pick fictional situations, bolstered by sci-
ence fictional distortions, to justify behavior that is patently inappropriate for 
the real world?” (Introduction xii). In his discussion of race, Heinlein overtly 
reveals the Anglo-centrism underlying the genre. Delany writes that “Hein-
lein’s novels have inspired a small bibliography of novel-length responses” and 
that these texts “give some indication of how relevant Heinlein’s arguments 
continue to appear, even to those who disagree with them” (Introduction 
vii). While Delany does not specifically list his own “novel-length responses” 
to Heinlein’s texts, The Ballad of Beta-2 can be placed within this context, as 
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well as Delany’s later novel Trouble on Triton (1976).26 The Ballad of Beta-2 
may be thematically more traditional than Farnham’s Freehold, then, but it 
also embodies an ideological revision of Heinlein’s text.
Similar to its neglected position with science fiction, The Ballad of 
Beta-2 is ‘unknown’ within the African-American literary community. Ideo-
logically, it stands in marked contrast with other speculative fiction by Afri-
can-Americans writers during the time period as well. Sam Greenlee, Warren 
Miller, and William Melvin Kelley, for example, all wrote alternate history 
texts highlighting the collective racial ideology of the Civil Rights Move-
ment and the Black Power Movement. Like Schuyler’s texts, these novels 
from the 1950s and 1960s remain solidly in the field of African-American 
literature. Specifically comparing Delany’s The Ballad of Beta-2 (1965) with 
William Melvin Kelley’s A Different Drummer (1959) helps to answer why 
two texts of speculative fiction dealing with racial issues, and written by Afri-
can-Americans during roughly the same time period, have had such differ-
ent generic and critical histories. While Delany is rarely mentioned within 
the African-American literary community, Kelly’s text surfaces again and 
again in critical texts valorizing a collective racial identity. The racial hybrid-
ity of The Ballad of Beta-2, then, simultaneously revises the Anglo-centrism 
of the science fiction genre and challenges the collective racial ideal under-
lying African-American literature. In this way, Delany builds on the racial 
and literary convictions of George S. Schuyler. Delany also shares Schuyler’s 
scientific emphases. Delany’s more positive portrayal of anthropology, in his 
fiction and criticism, and his linguistic theory of science fiction, founded on 
“technological discourse,” would make his texts even more controversial than 
Schuyler’s within the African-American literary community (Delany, Trouble 
286). Finally, Delany’s extensive utilization of poststructural and postmodern 
theories simultaneously challenges the essentialist bias of African-American 
literary critics and the narrative, ‘pulp’ tradition of the science fiction genre. 
His explorations of the fragmented and unstable nature of postmodern sub-
jectivity, in particular, revise key character conventions in both genres.
Beginning with a specific examination of texts in the science fiction 
field, Heinlein’s earlier text, Starship Troopers, reveals the subtle use of race 
more typical in science fiction dealing with race, mentioned earlier, and his 
later text, Farnham’s Freehold, embodies the overt discussion of race more typ-
ical of African-American literature. In “Appendix A: From the Triton Journal: 
Work Notes and Omitted Pages,” Delany tells the now well-known story of 
the powerful, positive effect Robert Heinlein’s Starship Troopers (1959) had 
on him as a young reader: “[w]hat remains with me, nearly ten years after my 
first reading of the book, is the knowledge that I have experienced a world 
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in which the placement of the information about the narrator’s face is proof 
that in such a world the ‘race problem,’ at least, has dissolved” (Trouble 287). 
Delany discusses Starship Troopers as an example of the unique possibilities 
of the science fiction genre. According to Delany, “[t]he hugely increased 
repertoire of sentences science fiction has to draw on (thanks to this relation 
between the ‘science’ and the ‘fiction’) leaves the structure of the fictional 
field of s-f notably different from the fictional field of those texts which, by 
eschewing technological discourse in general, sacrifice this increased range 
of nontechnological sentences” (Trouble 286). Therefore, Heinlein’s gloss 
on race resonates with new meaning because of the science fiction context. 
Within this science fiction “textus,” as Delany calls it, Heinlein can posi-
tion race in an imaginative social environment impossible within the generic 
parameters of realistic fiction (287). In Scholes and Rabkin’s chapter on race 
in Science Fiction: History, Science, Vision, “Sex and Race in Science Fiction,” 
they retell Delany’s story about Starship Troopers as an example of the gener-
ally progressive racial attitude of the science fiction community (188). Scho-
les and Rabkin acknowledge, however, that the transfer of “xenophobia” to 
an alien race of “Bugs” makes this general elision of human races possible 
(ibid).
There has been some critical controversy about the reliability of Dela-
ny’s assertion that the protagonist of Starship Troopers is “black” (Trouble 287). 
Edward James, for example, notes that he has “been unable to find this pas-
sage in my copy [ . . . ;] the hero is Johnny Rico, apparently Puerto Rican 
in origin but clearly from a rich and privileged family” (“Yellow” 47). As I 
mentioned earlier, this type of racial elision, while intended to show racial 
‘progress,’ can backfire in its very subtlety.27 The textual signs point to a per-
son-of-color: a protagonist from Buenos Aires named Juan (his mother calls 
him the diminutive form of Juan—Juanito), whose father’s name is Emilio 
Rico, and whose female interest is named Carmencita Ibanez (with thick 
black hair) (88,175). The issue, I believe, is how much color, not is there any 
color? In labeling Juan “black,” Delany follows the ‘one-drop’ rule of Ameri-
can racial ideology, the collective racial ideology promoted during the 1960s, 
and his personal racial background as a reader of the text. Certainly there is 
textual support for Delany’s racial interpretation. The 1997 movie adapta-
tion of Heinlein’s book, on the other hand, is similar to the cover of But-
ler’s Dawn, as it highlights the ideological pressure and racial norms which 
quickly and easily subvert the (subtle) racial specificity of the original text. 
Juan “Johnnie” Rico becomes a blue-eyed, blond-haired actor named none 
other than Casper Van Dien.28 Immediately following the movie’s release, 
this racial inversion was a hot topic on science fiction listservs—apparently 
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many other readers picked up on the textual clues and identified Rico as a 
person of color as well. Yet, Paul Verhoeven, the director of the film, could 
easily justify his casting because race is not a significant factor in this futuris-
tic terrestrial society. Therefore, reverting back to the traditional white male 
hero follows the letter, if not the spirit, of such racial elisions.
In Farnham’s Freehold (1964), Heinlein utilizes a more direct strategy to 
discuss race. Not only does the text include a major African-American char-
acter, Joseph, but also his race and that of the protagonist Hugh Farnham are 
key elements of the plot. Edward James sees Farnham’s Freehold as offering 
a “more complex” message than Heinlein’s earlier text Double Star (1956) 
because “it depicts a future (into which Hugh Farnham and his household 
have been involuntarily thrown) ruled by vicious slave-owning African blacks. 
But Heinlein’s point is that an evil system is not the result of race, but of 
circumstance” (“Yellow” 36). Presumably, then, Heinlein’s underlying theme 
remains constant—that race should not be important. These related points 
can be discerned in the character of Joe or Joseph, an African-American stu-
dent who also works as a servant in the Farnham household. Mistreated by 
Farnham’s racist son Duke before the atomic war which transports them to 
the future, Joseph proves himself a worthier man than Duke and eventually 
becomes romantically attached to Farnham’s daughter in the future. Within 
the racial reversal of the futuristic society, however, Joseph becomes one of 
the Chosen (the colored elite), and Duke, Hugh, and the rest of the Anglo 
Farnham family become slaves. This racial reversal of historical American 
slavery makes variable what once was considered static. Slavery is not depen-
dent on racial essentialism within this context; any person or group poten-
tially could be enslaved or be an oppressor. When Farnham questions the 
morality of Joseph’s decision to accept the futuristic slavery, Joseph responds, 
“Have you ever made a bus trip through Alabama. As a ‘nigger’?” (Farnham’s 
269). Joseph sees that “[t]he shoe is on the other foot, that’s all—and high 
time” (267). In this way, Heinlein effectively illustrates the immorality of 
racist ideology and social structures for a white audience. Indeed, when the 
shoe is on the other foot, the repercussions of racism become much clearer, 
sharper, and personal. Gary Westfahl notes that Farnham’s Freehold would be 
offensive to a black reader due to its use of racist stereotypes (83–4).29 How-
ever, a racist white reader would be incensed as well—by the extremity and 
vividness of Heinlein’s reversal. Duke’s highly racist reactions to the slavery, 
before his “temper[ing],” model such a response (Farnham’s 269). Likewise, 
the racial inversion reveals the power, privilege, and normative position of 
whiteness in western society, attributes normally hidden for white readers by 
the very privilege attached to their racial classification.
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The racial inversion also highlights the illogical, extreme, and (there-
fore) absurd nature of racist ideology. For example, Farnham’s ‘owner,’ Ponse, 
utilizes an inverted form of the white ethnographic gaze described by Har-
away and Pratt and embodied in Burroughs’ John Carter. Ponse describes the 
free whites who hide in the wilderness as “[s]avages. Poor creatures who have 
never been rescued by civilization. It’s hard to save them, Hugh. [ . . . ] 
They’re crafty as wolves [ . . . ] and they are very destructive of game. Of 
course we could smoke them out any number of ways. But that would kill 
the game, can’t have that” (228). The intended paternalism of Ponse’s dis-
course quickly deteriorates under the valuation of animals over humans. In 
this way, Farnham’s owner exhibits the hunting interests of white males in 
colonial India and Africa. Heinlein links such racial paternalism to the ante-
bellum South as well. Farnham’s owner tries to justify his slavery because 
Farnham is physically better off than when he was in the wilderness: “‘Then 
you know how much your condition has improved. Don’t you sleep in a 
better bed now? Aren’t you eating better? [ . . . ] When we picked you up, 
you were half starved and infested with vermin. You were barely staying alive 
with the hardest sort of work [ . . . ]. Isn’t all that true?’” (229). Farnham 
does agree, but he continues to insist, “‘I prefer freedom’” (ibid). It is here 
that a more pessimistic reading of the text can begin. When Heinlein inverts 
the racial hierarchy, the white protagonist becomes the sympathetic hero and 
the historically oppressed groups—the Hindus, Africans, and African-Amer-
icans—become the collective villains.
In Farnham’s Freehold, Heinlein continues the earlier science fiction 
(and his own) tradition of a single, white, highly individualistic male 
protagonist. While critics agree that Heinlein places Farnham within this 
normative heroic context, they disagree whether Farnham is a success or a 
failure and whether Heinlein intentionally created him as such. Philip E. 
Smith II, for example, sees a “happy ending” which validates Farnham and 
the values he represents (164).30 Alexei Panshin, on the other hand, argues 
that Farnham reveals no agency and that that text is “almost a study in the 
varieties of impotence” (109). In “The Racism of American Science Fiction,” 
Gary Westfahl summarizes these two critical positions in order to counter 
with a more critical authorial model. Westfahl believes the text has been 
traditionally misread because critics have too easily and quickly collapsed the 
author with the protagonist, similar to Schuyler’s critical evaluations within 
the African-American community. Without Schuyler’s satiric signposts, 
Westfahl argues, critics have missed Heinlein’s indictment of his own racism, 
through the more extreme racism embodied in his protagonist: “I believe 
that Heinlein was aware of the racism he was projecting; that Farnham’s 
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Freehold in particular was crafted as a scathing self-criticism of the racism in 
Heinlein and people like him; and that, after achieving this insight, Heinlein 
still found it impossible to change himself, and hence impossible to change 
Farnham” (Westfahl 72). According to Westfahl, Heinlein accomplishes this 
“scathing self-criticism” by undermining the heroic status of the protagonist. 
Westfahl argues that “Farnham fails at everything he attempts to do until 
the end, when he achieves only the smallest victory. Surely, if Heinlein had 
wished to make Farnham an heroic figure, he would have provided him with 
a genuine achievement or two” (73). Westfahl surveys the “major events” of 
the text in order to prove this inadequacy (ibid).
However, several ‘failures’ Westfahl lists have alternate functions in the 
plot. First, the ‘faulty’ fall-out shelter Farnham builds is a vehicle for the time 
travel Westfahl subsequently mentions (Westfahl 73). Likewise, the rising 
radiation within the shelter heightens the tensions and suspense of the plot 
and gives Farnham and Barbara Wells an excuse (we’re going to die anyway) 
to reveal their attraction to one another. Westfahl also mentions the death of 
Farnham’s daughter Karen: in the future, “Farnham set out to build his own 
little society; but the illusion of his competence is shattered when Karen dies 
in childbirth under his supervision” (ibid). Here Westfahl overlooks at least 
two additional reasons Karen must die. First, she is pregnant out of wedlock 
(conception occurred before the war), and second, she has an interracial rela-
tionship when she becomes romantically attached to Joseph after the war. In 
breaking these sexual and romantic taboos, Karen incurs the extreme societal 
punishment of death. Heinlein does not overtly judge Karen within the text, 
however. Having Farnham condone Karen’s pregnancy and her relationship 
with Joseph, in direct contrast to the disapproval of her mother, allows Hein-
lein to overtly preach liberalism and racial tolerance.31 Yet, having Karen 
already impregnated and then die in childbirth prevents the consummation 
of her relationship with Joseph. In other words, Karen serves as a roman-
tic interest for the interracial relationship Heinlein sets up, but a specific 
description of that relationship and/or a sexual component would be too 
controversial—for Heinlein, the science fiction community, and/or society 
as a whole. Westfahl notes Joseph’s excessive modesty, to the point of appear-
ing “asexual,” and attributes it to Heinlein’s desire to “counter the stereotype 
of the male African as sexual predator” (82). Other comments made by Farn-
ham throughout the text confirm such an interpretation. However, Joseph’s 
overt celibacy also suppresses the issue of sexuality.
Contrasting Karen and Joseph’s relationship with that of Farnham and 
Barbara illustrates more fully the impact of race on Heinlein’s portrayal of 
sexuality in the text. Barbara and Farnham have an overt sexual encounter 
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while Farnham’s wife slumbers nearby, complete with “‘Barbara, Barbara!’/
‘Hugh darling! I love you. Oh!’/‘I love you, Barbara.’/‘Yes. Yes! Oh, please! 
Now!’/‘Right now!’” (Farnham’s 38). Barbara becomes pregnant from this 
encounter, and the couple later have healthy twins. While enslaved for a 
period of time, as Westfahl notes, eventually the couple and their children 
do, in fact, escape and the text ends with the family happily ensconced in 
their post-holocaust Freehold (taking place in a future free from the Cho-
sen). Conversely, Karen only speaks to Barbara and Farnham about Joseph’s 
possibilities as a suitor, and she denies any sexual attraction between them 
(she even claims to prefer her father as a sexual partner) (117–18). We finally 
hear of their relationship only as Karen goes into labor (and then dies); she 
tells her father, “‘Something to tell you. I asked Joe to marry me. Last week. 
And he accepted’” (136). In the text, there is no direct dialogue between 
Karen and Joseph about their relationship or physical contact described. 
Through these multiple elements of plot, characterization, and indirect dia-
logue, Heinlein creates a chaste, suppressed interracial romance. In this, he 
follows the old example of Burroughs’ John Carter and Dejah Thoris. Even 
the conservative Burroughs envisioned offspring for his couple, however.32 
When Karen and her baby die, the possibility of a familial and/or biologi-
cal interracialism is effectively forestalled in Heinlein’s text. On the other 
hand, the sexualized, fertile, and healthy Hugh and Barbara have already 
begun their roles as a new Anglo Adam and Eve, destined to repopulate the 
New World. As Westfahl admits, Farnham purposely isolates himself and 
his family from African-Americans and other races in their Freehold: “[f ]ar 
from taking any steps to overcome racial divisions, Farnham seems intent on 
maintaining them” (80).33 Finally, many parallels exist between Barbara and 
Karen. They are young, Anglo, female students who become pregnant out 
of wedlock and who are transported into the future with the same group of 
people. The fact that Barbara prospers in this situation and Karen dies rein-
forces the importance of race to the equation. The key difference between 
the two women is their ‘destined’ male partner, and the key difference Hein-
lein portrays between the two men is their race.
Therefore, if Heinlein’s intention was to undermine the position of the 
protagonist, to make Farnham appear foolish, inadequate, and unacceptably 
racist, then the critique is too subtle and the ending too ambiguous. For 
example, in contrast to the “mythic” individualism of the new Farnham fam-
ily, Delany ends Trouble on Triton with the original white male protagonist 
completely alone, psychotic, and transformed into a woman (Franklin 154). 
While there is some ambiguity about the protagonist’s exact mental state, 
there is no question that Delany has created an “anti-hero” (Fox, “Politics” 
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49).34 Perhaps Westfahl’s identification of the author with the protagonist, 
which he initially denies but then reestablishes, explains this contradiction 
between authorial intention and final textual product. Rather than a “scath-
ing self-criticism,” Farnham’s Freehold reflects the racial tensions, conflicts, 
and, finally, defensive strategies of Heinlein, an Anglo male writer focusing 
on race within a modern context. Heinlein is not incapable of “self-criti-
cism,” but this project is sabotaged by the very racism supposedly being cri-
tiqued, as well as the primacy of his own experiences and position in society 
(73). In fact, Heinlein does not “know exactly what he is doing,” as West-
fahl confidently asserts (82). For example, the relationship between Karen 
and Joseph promotes racial equality in theory, but in application, the textual 
description is truncated and subverted. Such racial equality lives a very brief 
and sickly half-life in the interim future but, according to Heinlein’s char-
acters, would not be pursued within historical American society and does 
not exist in either of the potential futures Heinlein envisions. Heinlein is 
unwilling to fully envision the ramifications of racial egalitarianism—unwill-
ing, not unable. When Westfahl writes that Heinlein “found it impossible to 
change himself, and hence impossible to change Farnham” (my emphasis), 
his language reveals a defensive strategy as well (72). If the project of racial 
understanding and unification Westfahl suggests for Farnham and Heinlein 
is “impossible,” why does he bother critiquing Heinlein, or the science fiction 
community more generally? According to Westfahl, this inability to change 
also applies to the larger science fiction community: “Heinlein explains why 
American science fiction often projects racism, and why its well-meaning 
writers cannot overcome their own racist attitudes” (ibid). This vocabulary of 
“cannot” does not bode well for a more inclusive and egalitarian racial future 
for science fiction.
Finally, Farnham’s positive characterization rests, in large part, upon a 
vivid moral contrast with a racial Other. Unlike Delany’s alien Other in The 
Ballad of Beta-2, Heinlein creates a human Other embodying the negative 
traits of both white slaveholders and (black) primitive cannibals. How can 
Farnham not appear a hero when he is the only person resisting the futuris-
tic black leadership which practices both white slavery and cannibalism? He 
may not be very successful, as Westfahl suggests, but his position seems the 
only morally acceptable one presented. While the text reflects a complex and 
sometimes ambiguous view of racism and race relations, the well-meaning 
white protagonist opposed to the gratuitous, unadulterated moral degrada-
tion of the black-dominated society reveals an underlying racial hierarchy 
which is not critiqued within the text. Westfahl believes this futuristic society 
represents the “racist fears of an uneducated version” of Heinlein, namely 
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Farnham (79). According to Westfahl, Farnham “is explicitly identified as a 
less educated and less worldly version of Heinlein” (ibid). Yet, Farnham is a 
“junior enlisted man” and then a commissioned officer in the Navy, and, as 
Westfahl himself notes, Heinlein graduated from the Naval Academy (90). 
In addition, Heinlein is (in)famous for his glorification of the armed forces. 
For example, the armed forces are portrayed as racially inclusive and egalitar-
ian in Starship Troopers.35 Likewise, Farnham relates an experience abroad, 
in which he saw blacks in positions of power over whites: “[he] recalled an 
area of Pernambuco he had seen while in the Navy, a place where rich planta-
tion owners, dignified, polished, educated in France, were black, while their 
servants and field hands—giggling, shuffling, shiftless knuckleheads ‘obvi-
ously’ incapable of better things—were mostly white men” (Farnham’s 296). 
This contemporary experience is reinforced by Farnham’s historical knowl-
edge. Referring back to the Roman Empire, Farnham concludes, “any ‘white 
man’ of European ancestry was certain to have a dash of Negro blood” (297). 
Farnham even acknowledges his own “statistically certain drop of black 
blood” (ibid). Given all the other biographical similarities between Heinlein 
and Farnham that Westfahl relates, and the theory of self-criticism, I do not 
think there is sufficient textual support for a categorical educational or expe-
riential distinction between them.
Furthermore, Westfahl argues that “[f ]rom an even broader perspec-
tive, we can interpret events in the novel not as serious predictions, but as the 
predictable, though absurd, fantasies of an ignorant person like Farnham—to 
argue that the entire story is like a game being played inside Farnham’s head” 
(78). At this point, the distinction between author and character breaks 
down again. In trying to expand the distance between Heinlein’s authorial 
point of view and that of Farnham and the text as a whole, Westfahl ends 
up conflating the author and protagonist in a different way than the other 
critics. In Westfahl’s interpretation, Farnham occupies an authorial position; 
Heinlein might not agree with everything Farnham says, but that is because 
the story springs from the protagonist and not the author. There are several 
problems with such an interpretation. First, in calling this futuristic soci-
ety a “fantasy” and a “game,” Westfahl contradicts the realism, stability, and 
gravity of the text itself. Within the historical parameters of the story, this 
society actually exists. In addition, Heinlein does not undermine this illusion 
of reality and/or in any way connect this society to Farnham’s psychology. A 
first-person, unreliable narrator would have been an obvious choice if that 
were Heinlein’s intention. Finally, if Farnham plays a game, it is a deadly seri-
ous one with grave repercussions for himself and his family. Heinlein could 
have used overt satire, as Schuyler did in Black No More, if he had wanted to 
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undermine the serious tone of the text. There is no black humor or carica-
tures in Farnham’s Freehold, for example. Instead, the degradation and peril 
of Farnham’s situation reflects the terrible realities of American slavery, and 
Heinlein’s explicit textual parallels invite such a comparison. Rather than a 
fantasy or a game, Heinlein creates an inverted image of American slavery.36 
Within this context, Farnham’s failed escape attempt reveals the historical 
reality of the black slave—the need for travel passes, the difference in skin 
color, the difficulty in communicating with other slaves undetected, tracking 
dogs, etc. Farnham does not escape, on his first attempt, because these sig-
nificant hurdles prevented him; Heinlein is trying to be historically accurate 
and realistic.
In addition, Heinlein needed a vehicle to return Farnham and Barbara 
to the past. Simply escaping from his slavery, but remaining in the future, 
would not allow Farnham to go back in time, learn from his mistakes, and 
begin Farnham Family: Part Two. In this way, Heinlein closes off the pos-
sibility, the threat of this racially inverted future, while paving the way for 
the new, improved Anglo family. In fact, the opportunity of time travel 
acts as a moral test for the original Farnham family group. Joseph, Duke, 
and Farnham’s former wife all choose to remain in the future because they 
have been corrupted. Farnham and Barbara, on the other hand, pass the 
test when they choose possible death, but freedom, over racial servitude. 
Heinlein reinforces this positive portrayal by having Farnham and Bar-
bara continue to make racially egalitarian statements after gaining their 
freedom (Farnham’s 323–4). These statements highlight the sincerity and 
depth of their racial liberalism, in marked contrast to the indictment of 
the futuristic black society’s cannibalism. Furthermore, Farnham does not 
have to assert himself, to reach out in a mission of racial understanding and 
harmony because Heinlein changes the past as well. Farnham and Barbara 
note the small changes they encounter when they return, and Farnham 
happily asserts, “It could be importantly different. If the future can change 
the past, or whatever, maybe the past can change the future, too. Maybe 
the United States won’t be wholly destroyed. Maybe neither side will be 
so suicidal as to use plague bombs. Maybe—Hell, maybe Ponse [the black 
slaveowner] will never get a chance to have teenage girls for dinner!” (331). 
By changing the past, then, Heinlein accomplishes several objectives simul-
taneously. First, it is another tool (like the bomb shelter) to bring Farn-
ham and family through the war alive. Second, it spares Farnham from an 
aggressive campaign of racial reform; he can isolate his family without a 
guilty conscience. Lastly, it implies that such a racially-inverted future will 
not be a reality the second time around.
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The basic flaw in Westfahl’s argument about this futuristic society is 
that it does not really matter if it were based on Farnham’s “absurd” fears 
rather than Heinlein’s (78). Like the melodrama of Schuyler’s Black Empire, 
the text stands on its own merits, and the author’s attitude towards the text 
is a moot point, only of interest for authorial characterization. Furthermore, 
Heinlein valorizes such fears in imagining such a society and giving it 
realistic textual life. People-of-color do take over the world, enslaving, 
drugging, castrating, breeding, and, most outrageously, eating whites. This 
“shocking revelation of Black cannibalism” came in the last installment of 
the text’s original serialization (Franklin 158–9). Bruce Franklin connects 
Heinlein’s “spectacular popular success” with his “extraordinary ability 
to project the fantasies of his audience” (156). With Farnham’s Freehold, 
Heinlein chooses the “most deep-seated racist nightmare of American 
culture”; “Just as the one nation that has ever used nuclear weapons has 
recurring fantasies about nuclear weapons being used upon it, the nation 
most notorious for enslaving and oppressing Black people has recurring 
fantasies about being enslaved and oppressed by Blacks” (Franklin 157).37 
Joseph, for example, illustrates the larger concept reflected in the black-
dominated futuristic society—that given the opportunity, blacks would 
oppress and enslave others also. He asks Farnham, “‘do you expect me to 
weep? The shoe is one the other foot, that’s all—and high time [ . . . ] 
do you think I would swap back, even if I could? For Duke? Not for 
anybody, I’m no hypocrite. I was a servant, now you are one. What are 
you beefing about?’” (Farnham’s 269). Within the context of slavery, such 
race reversals propose people-of-color possess a similar desire and ability to 
enslave whites (as did whites to blacks).38 Not only is this not grounded in 
any historical fact, it implies there is nothing exceptional about American 
slavery or European colonialism. As a result, any lingering white guilt or 
responsibility is appeased. When Edward James finds Heinlein’s simple 
racial reversal an anti-racist argument, because “Heinlein’s point is that an 
evil system is not the result of race, but of circumstance,” he overlooks the 
historical specificity (as does Heinlein) which has not made it possible for 
Anglo-Americans to be enslaved by African-Americans, nor revealed any 
collective desire to do so on the part of African-Americans (“Yellow” 36). 
As Delany notes, only within the speculative parameters of science fiction 
can such an “evil system” (James 36) be created (Delany, Introduction xii). 
Heinlein’s supposed ‘color blindness,’ or switching of racial groups without 
regard for historical or cultural differences, is what Baker and Tucker 
oppose; it is a false egalitarianism because it elides white privilege and black 
oppression—past and present.
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In contrast to Heinlein’s portrayal of vindictive and power-hungry 
blacks, contemporary Caribbean author Jamaica Kincaid and science fiction 
author Ray Bradbury emphasize an increased tolerance, understanding, and 
compassion. In Kincaid’s Annie John (1983), for example, her young pro-
tagonist ponders Caribbean history thus:
we, the descendants of the slaves, knew quite well what had really hap-
pened [during colonization], and I was sure that if the tables had been 
turned we would have acted quite differently; I was sure that if our 
ancestors had gone from Africa to Europe and come upon the people 
living there, they would have taken a proper interest in the Europeans 
on first seeing them, and said, “How nice,” and then gone home to tell 
their friends about it. (76)
Kincaid’s focus on a historical, black perspective leads to a positive portrayal. 
In “The Other Foot” (1951), Ray Bradbury also gives African-Americans a 
similar choice as Joseph. After the mass migration of African-Americans to 
Mars, the rest of Earth is largely destroyed by an atomic third world war. 
When representatives from Earth come to Mars seeking help, the “shoe is 
on the other foot” (Heinlein 269). Heinlein’s subsequent mirroring of Brad-
bury’s language (Joseph’s speech and Bradbury’s title) implies an intentional 
reference to and, more importantly, revision of Bradbury’s earlier text. Writ-
ing during the 1950s, Bradbury creates a positive version of the Civil Rights 
Movement. After a brief period when some blacks think about lynching and 
segregation, the Martian blacks collectively decide to forgive past wrongs 
and to allow the Earthlings to come to Mars. As Bradbury’s main character 
learns, “‘Now everything’s even. We can start all over again, on the same 
level’” (“Other” 91). Ellen Bishop ties the dissolution of racial revenge to 
the changed location in space. Like Delany in The Ballad of Beta-2, Brad-
bury accelerates both time and space: “Bradbury shows us (former) African 
Americans who are able to see the complex relation of self and other vested 
in racial differences that the white man had for so long denied, because they 
are able to occupy another territory (a psychological time-space that come 
to be literally represented as Mars) from which a different view is possible” 
(Bishop 92).
Placed within the historical context of the1950s and 1960’s, Farn-
ham’s Freehold also enters a debate about black independence movements.39 
Heinlein’s highly negative portrayal of such a black-governed state condones 
resistance to these civil and foreign movements. The basic message of the 
Chosen’s government, and Joseph’s collaboration with it, is that blacks will 
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turn on whites, taking advantage of any weakness. Furthermore, isn’t the 
atomic war a “circumstance” which enables the “evil system” of white slavery 
to come into existence (James, “Yellow” 36)? The racial equality of “circum-
stance,” then, means that not only would African-Americans have enslaved 
whites, but that they might in the future if present societal trends continue. 
While such a “nightmare [ . . . ] dates back in literary expression at least 
to Cannibals All! or Slaves Without Masters, George Fitzhugh’s 1857 pro-slav-
ery tract,” Heinlein uses it for the first time in his work in Farnham’s Free-
hold (Franklin 157). Bruce Franklin theorizes that Heinlein wrote Farnham’s 
Freehold in reaction to “very specific events in the 1960s”: the 1963 March 
on Washington; the Mississippi Freedom Summer; and, most importantly, 
“the urban revolts of 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, climaxing in April 1968, 
during the week following the murder of Martin Luther King, with mas-
sive uprisings in 125 U.S. cities” (158).40 In contrast to Bradbury’s 1951 
text, then, “[i]t took little prescience to realize in mid-1964 that the days 
of the non-violent Civil Rights movement were numbered” (ibid). When 
Delany shares Isaac Asimov’s racial comment at the 1968 Nebula awards 
ceremony, he suggests that times of high “anxiety” and conflict bring racist 
discourse and ideology to the social surface (“Racism” 390–91). This is the 
case with Heinlein’s Farnham’s Freehold.41 In this way, Heinlein’s text follows 
the example of Schuyler’s Black Empire serial. Writing during the socially and 
politically unstable 1930s, Schuyler advances the black militancy with which 
he believes his black audience sympathizes. Similarly, Heinlein’s intention 
might have been to analyze and criticize white racism (look what will hap-
pen if we continue to ignore racial injustice and oppression in the U.S.), but 
in doing so, he created a horrifying vision of black leadership and morality 
which actually supports white racism, bolsters the moral image of his pro-
tagonist, and undermines historical black independence movements. With 
the focus on the white protagonist and white identity, as Westfahl himself 
acknowledges, perhaps it is not that surprising that the text as a whole is 
white-biased. It is not until Delany specifically takes on this subjective and 
ideological challenge in Trouble on Triton that Heinlein’s ‘failure’ is shown to 
be author specific and not inevitable.42
Heinlein’s racial reversal of historical American slavery, oppression, and 
resistance places his text in dialogue with other speculative texts written dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s. His detailed and relatively direct discussion of con-
temporary racial events links him not only with Bradbury’s short stories, but 
also the alternate history novels of the African-American literary community. 
For example, Sam Greenlee, Warren Miller, and William Melvin Kelley all 
wrote texts examining the oppression, segregation, and collective resistance 
Delany 129
of African Americans. Therefore, these authors compare favorably with Kin-
caid rather than Heinlein in their emphasis upon the historical oppression 
of African-Americans. Greenlee, Miller, and Kelley posit separate but equal, 
race-based societies as the most radical alternative to the contemporaneous 
situation. Miller explores the formation of a separate political state in Harlem 
for African-Americans in The Seige of Harlem (1964). In The Spook Who Sat 
by the Door (1969), Greenlee chronicles the establishment of a black revolu-
tionary underground in the United States. Finally, Kelley’s A Different Drum-
mer (1959) follows the story line of Ray Bradbury’s short story, “Way in the 
Middle of the Air” (1950)–the mass exodus of blacks from the South. Like 
Schuyler’s oeuvre, these texts remain solidly in the field of African-Ameri-
can literature and criticism. For example, The Spook Who Sat by the Door, 
was republished in 1990 as part of the “African American Life” series. Simi-
larly, Kelley’s text has been paired with Schuyler’s Black No More by critics of 
African-American literature, and recently A Different Drummer has surfaced 
in the poststructuralist debate due to Kelley’s use of the Caliban figure. A 
Different Drummer’s critical popularity within the African-American literary 
community and neglect by the science fiction community stem from Kelley’s 
portrayal of individual and collective racial identity. The historically-specific 
racial focus of all of the above texts, however, stands in marked contrast to 
the racial elision and estrangement of the science fiction genre as a whole. 
Bradbury and Heinlein are the exceptions in this area rather than the rule. 
Therefore, in its direct racial focus, Farnham’s Freehold is closer to these Afri-
can-American literary texts than Delany’s science fiction. Even in his early, 
terrestrial texts, Delany transforms, distances, and suppresses the historical 
racial elements,43 hence his claim that “thematically” he is an “extremely 
conservative” writer (Silent 225). However, Delany’s inclusive, integrationist 
racial philosophy underlies his more radical use of science fiction’s cogni-
tive estrangement. The Ballad of Beta-2, discussed shortly, illustrates Dela-
ny’s detached and integrationist approach to race within this volatile time 
period.
Due to its popularity and theme, Kelley’s A Different Drummer is an 
ideal representative text from African-American literature to compare specifi-
cally to Delany’s The Ballad of Beta-2. In his1970 introduction to Schuyler’s 
Black No More, Charles R. Larson utilized A Different Drummer as a measur-
ing stick for Schuyler’s text. Larson asserts that, at the end of Black No More,
one is reminded that at least one black American novelist, treating 
a similar theme, took advantage of all the things Schuyler ignored 
in Black No More. The novel is William Melvin Kelley’s A Different 
130 The Subject of Race in American Science Fiction
Drummer (1962) which also ponders the importance of the black 
American’s “racial culture,” satirically presenting a story similar to 
Black No More: the reduction of the black population in a part of the 
United States. (12)
Given all these textual similarities, it is surprising that Larson does not 
explain what “all the things Schuyler ignored” might be. Apparently he felt 
the differences between the two texts were so obvious that an explanation was 
superfluous. Within this context, I surmise that the key difference between 
the two texts, to which Larson refers, is their portrayal of racial identity; 
in contrast to Schuyler, Kelley valorizes collective racial identity and action. 
John M. Reilly also praises A Different Drummer, in contrast to Black No 
More, but on aesthetic grounds rather than “racial culture.” In “The Black 
Anti-Utopia” (1978), Reilly claims that “[o]f the two writers, Schuyler and 
Kelley, the latter is certainly the artist. Still, I believe it is useful to pair the 
two, as I have done here. If my description of anti-utopia has validity, then 
these two novels indicate the presence of the genre in Afro-American writ-
ing” (109). Reilly’s context of African-American literature highlights the con-
tinued division of the two genres of African-American literature and science 
fiction. Over thirty years after the publication of Schuyler’s text, an alternate 
history text by an African-American is still not considered science fiction. 
It is telling that Reilly must stretch to formulate a genre of two texts, rather 
than acknowledge the strong connections to the science fiction genre. Con-
sidering these two works within the context of science fiction reveals their 
relationship to Delany’s texts as well.44 Delany’s negative attitude towards an 
emerging sub-genre of African-American science fiction will be discussed in 
more detail later; however, it springs from such generic divisions and obfus-
cation.45 Finally, the African-American literary context affords a converse 
critical evaluation of Schuyler and Kelley’s texts for both Larson and Reilly: 
whereas a science fictional context leads to a more positive evaluation of 
Schuyler’s text, the opposite is true of Kelley’s text. Comparing Kelley’s essen-
tialist portrayal of race to the poststructuralism of Delany and other contem-
porary science fiction writers illustrates the difficulty of avoiding negative 
racial stereotypes within an essentialist framework, even with the author’s 
best intentions of more egalitarian and liberal politics.
These multiple, interrelated issues of racial identity, critical reception, 
and generic placement underlie Houston A. Baker, Jr.’s 1986 article “Cali-
ban’s Triple Play.” Baker briefly mentions Kelley’s text because of its charac-
ter Tucker Caliban, and Baker connects Kelley’s use of Caliban with that of 
George Lamming and James Baldwin. According to Baker, “Caliban’s Triple 
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Play” is “the three-personed god of ‘natural’ meanings, morphophonemics, 
and, most important, metamorphoses” (393). Within the Shakespearean 
context, Baker explains this more specifically as a return to a “pre-Prosperian” 
island, “revising or deforming the contraries of Western civilization in order 
to return to a ‘natural’ signification. Such a world would witness Caliban 
not as student of ‘culture as a foreign language’ [ . . . ], but rather as an 
instructor in a first voice, resonant with ‘a thousand twangling instruments’ 
in nature” (392). In addition, Baker believes that African-American critics 
must become like Caliban: “[t]he Afro-American spokesperson who would 
perform a deformation of mastery shares the task of Sycorax’s son insofar as 
he or she must transform an obscene situation, a tripled metastatus, into a 
signal self/cultural expression” (ibid). Baker’s emphasis on triples reveals his 
intention to “escape, or explode, [the] simplistic duality” of Western culture 
(389).46 However, Baker maintains these dualities in his continuation of the 
Prospero/Caliban trope, including the connection of Caliban with nature. 
First, Baker connects Caliban with animals in his discussion of the phaneric 
display of gorillas (390). Then, he explores Caliban’s knowledge of the forms 
and language of nature (392). The colonized, then, maintain their ‘natural’ 
place in western dualities. Baker’s emphasis on an original and natural state 
for people-of-color raises the issue of essentialism as well. In attempting to 
give Caliban a voice, a specific vernacular sound, Baker essentializes lan-
guages, as Fuss has noted. This essentialism goes beyond language, however. 
Underlying Baker’s poststructuralist language and theory is a form of bio-
logical essentialism.
Baker’s description of critics of African-American or black literature 
reveals this essentialism most clearly. In Fuss’ discussion of Baker and Gates, 
she directly addresses the role of a critic’s race in Gates’ theories of African-
American literature. She points out that, against essentialist notions of race, 
Gates makes a disjunction between “black critic” and “critic of black litera-
ture” (Gates; qtd. in Fuss 85). While Fuss does not directly address Baker’s 
increasing essentialism, her note that Baker’s “own affinity lies, even now, 
with the Black Aestheticians” points in this direction (87). In contrast to 
Gates, Baker seems very concerned in “Caliban’s Triple Play” to link the 
author with the text in a display of ‘authentic’ racial identity:
If we fail to hear long choruses of Caliban’s triple playing in the issue 
[Critical Inquiry; “Race,” Writing, and Difference], still the collection 
creates an occasion for several signifying black academics—those who 
have already journeyed back to the vale and asked their mommas and 
daddies what did they do to be so very black and to sound such funky 
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blues—to sound racial poetry in the courts of the civilized. Such sound-
ings, I believe, augur new world arrangements, because the answers 
given by the mommas asked (and the black daddies, too) is, ‘You’s dif-
ferent, son, and the future.’ (“Race,” Writing, and Difference 395; my 
emphasizes added)
Baker’s references to the family reinforce the racial connection begun with 
“black academics.” As José David Saldívar notes in The Dialectics of Our 
America: Genealogy, Cultural Critique, and Literary History, “[t]he Caliban-
istic self that Baker describes does not exist in empty space but in an organic 
human collective—in what he calls the family. For this reason, the Calibanic 
self that he lays bare is not alienated from itself; it is in his own folk” (148). 
Baker’s emphasis on family and kinship recalls Werner Soller’s theory of 
descent, in contrast to consent. Within this context, a (knowledgeable and 
legitimate) critic or author of black literature must be black. Furthermore, to 
be racially authentic, a black author should use the vernacular.47
Kelley’s use of the Caliban trope mirrors that of Baker in several ways. 
First, a main character of A Different Drummer, Tucker Caliban, embodies 
key elements of Baker’s Calibanic self. Like Shakespeare’s Caliban, Tucker 
Caliban is in a position of servitude, in this case to a Southern white family. 
Like Baker’s Caliban, Tucker Caliban revolts against this racial oppression. He 
mysteriously decides to leave his home, destroying his house and possessions 
and salting the soil so that no one else can farm the land. Several explanations 
are put forward for Caliban’s unusual behavior by various characters, but no 
definitive reason is ever given—by the narrator or by Caliban himself. In 
the void left by Caliban’s silence, the points of view of the other characters 
shape Caliban’s characterization. The first explanation for Caliban’s 
departure is given by Mr. Harper, a venerable old (white) man from Sutton. 
According to Harper, Caliban’s revolt is a long-delayed manifestation of the 
African “blood” of his initial slave ancestor (Kelley 15). Kelley uses racial 
essentialism positively in Harper’s story of the African, emphasizing the great 
physical and mental strength, charisma, resistance, and courage of Caliban’s 
ancestor. As a result, Kelley supports Baker’s familial connections and the 
importance of descent. Similarly, Caliban’s white employer, David Willson, 
ponders Caliban’s actions in a diary: “He HAS freed himself; this had been 
very important to him. But somehow, he has freed me too. [ . . . ] Who 
would have thought such a humble, primitive act could teach something to 
a so-called educated man like myself?” (151). Willson’s portrayal of Caliban 
as “humble, primitive,” and uneducated constructs a natural man. These 
cultural racial characteristics build on the biological racial essentialism of 
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Harper’s story of descent. In this way, Kelley’s text illustrates the negative 
potential of Baker’s naturalistic racial theories, which are too closely linked to 
older, biological constructions of race built on the idea of racial essentialism.48 
Despite being the titular protagonist, Caliban is effectively silenced by this 
naturalist characterization, and contrary to Baker’s promotion of Caliban’s 
indigenous sound, the white characters continue to tell Caliban’s story for 
him. A Caliban entails a Prospero.
A Different Drummer does include a diverse number of character view-
points,49 but they are all white. The older man, Mr. Harper, a young white 
boy named Mr. Leland, David Willson, Dymphna Willson, Dewey Will-
son III, and Camille Willson each have a separate chapter devoted to their 
story, their point of view. Mostly first-person, some of these narratives are 
more focused on their connection to Tucker Caliban than others. Thus, Kel-
ley spreads out the ‘Prosperian’ perspective over a group of people. However, 
David Willson most directly represents Prospero. Willson’s narrative conveys 
the unhappiness and impotence of an “educated [white] man” who eventu-
ally finds ‘salvation’ though the instinctual agency of his employee, Caliban 
(Kelley 151). Furthermore, while there are other major African-American 
characters besides Tucker—his African ancestor, his wife Bethrah, and Rev-
erend Bradshaw, for example—their stories are also told through that of the 
white characters. Kelley considerably stretches the narrative perspective of 
his white characters in order to include these black characters indirectly. For 
example, Dymphna Willson’s first-person narrative includes lengthy direct 
quotation of conversations with Bethrah, as well as conversations Bethrah 
and Caliban have outside of Dymphna’s presence (see the next paragraph 
for one such quotation). In this combination of white narratives and black 
silences, Kelley may be realizing Baker’s claim that the sound of Caliban is 
“incomprehensible” to whites: “It is, of course, the latter—the [guerilla’s] 
‘hoots’ of assurance that remain incomprehensible to intruders—that pro-
duce a notion (in the intruder’s mind and vocabulary) of ‘deformity.’ An 
‘alien’ sound gives birth to notions of the indigenous—say, Africans or Afro-
Americans—as deformed” (390). However, the white characters sympatheti-
cally portray Caliban in Kelley’s text, and Kelley portrays these characters 
sympathetically as well. Thus, Kelley does not suggest that these multiple 
white viewpoints are unreliable, and their various interpretations of Caliban 
and his actions build upon one another, rather than conflict. In fact, Kelley 
follows Bradbury’s lead, in “Way in the Middle of the Air,” in largely focus-
ing on the reactions of whites to the exodus of the African-Americans. From 
this viewpoint, the motivation of the African-Americans is elided and, again, 
the sound of Caliban is silenced. Like Heinlein, Kelley focuses on the white 
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point of view (sympathetic as it may be), and the black point of view remains 
the effectively silenced Other as a result.
Finally, Kelley implies that the white point of view is basically accu-
rate through the corroborating dialogue of the other black characters. For 
example, Caliban’s wife Bethrah, an educated black woman, initially does 
not understand his actions and viewpoints either. At one point she explains 
Caliban’s decision to leave the employment of the Willson family to Dym-
phna Willson (the narrator of this particular chapter) as follows:
I don’t really know, but maybe those of us who go to school, Dewey, 
myself, not so much your mother, I guess your father, maybe we lost 
something Tucker has. It may be we lost a faith in ourselves. When we 
have to do something, we don’t just do it, we THINK about doing it; 
we think about all the people who say certain things shouldn’t be done. 
And when we’re through thinking about it, we end up not doing it at 
all. But Tucker, he just knows what he has to do. He doesn’t think about 
it; he just knows. And he wants to go now and I’m going too. [ . . . ] 
I think maybe, if I do whatever he tells me to do, and don’t think about 
it, well, for a while, I’ll be following him and something inside him, but 
I think maybe some day I’ll be following something inside me that I 
don’t even know about yet. He’ll teach me to listen to it. (Kelley 114)
Even to his African-American wife, then, Caliban is following some kind of 
instinct, which she hopes to develop also. Presumably the rest of the Afri-
can-Americans in the state follow Caliban in his exodus for similar reasons. 
Therefore, the text as a whole portrays Caliban as a ‘natural’ man, without 
consciousness, who simply acts and does not think. Bethrah’s comments, and 
the subsequent actions of the collective racial group, suggest that all African-
Americans need to return to this less educated and instinctual natural state.
In addition, Kelley contrasts Caliban’s actions with collective racial 
groups like the National Society for Colored Affairs, a fictional version of the 
NAACP. A chapter officer tells Caliban that the Society works to improve 
education and “is fighting your battles in the courts” (Kelley 111). Caliban 
replies, ‘“Ain’t none of my battles being fought in no courts. I’m fighting 
all my battles myself. [ . . . ] And ain’t no piece of cardboard making no 
difference in how it turns out’” (ibid). Kelley seems to be promoting a form 
of grass roots, individual action on the part of ‘the folk.’ This interpreta-
tion is strengthened by the negative portrayal of Reverend Bradshaw as a 
cynical parasite on the black community. An educated man, like David Will-
son, Bradshaw can do nothing but marvel that Caliban motivates a collective 
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black rebellion, something Bradshaw has never been able to do. At the end 
of the text, Bradshaw is the one African-American who does not leave and, 
therefore, he is lynched by the angry, racist whites. Kelley constructs Caliban’s 
revolt as an example of positive racial liberation for all African-Americans, as 
well as for the white descendents of slave owners, like David Willson. Kelley’s 
solution to ‘the race problem,’ then, is to have both blacks and white forget 
what they have learned and to follow their basic human instincts instead. 
However, these ‘instincts’ prompt a massive separation of the two races in the 
South. Is Kelley constructing an essentialist basis for racial separatism or does 
the historical legacy of racism in the South simply necessitate a departure, a 
new social beginning for African-Americans (similar to Bishop’s reading of 
Bradbury)? Tucker Caliban’s approval for young Mister Leland’s social educa-
tion in racial egalitarianism supports the latter interpretation. In this case, 
the Caliban trope encourages a racial essentialism at odds with the compet-
ing message of social construction and variability.
Reilly believes A Different Drummer “relates to anti-utopia in that his 
characters’ crucial behavior defies rational explanation” (109). Here Reilly 
highlights the dichotomies of rational versus instinctual or natural, as do Kel-
ley and Baker. Kelley and Baker go further, however, in valorizing the natural 
over the rational, the civilized, the educated. In connecting this dichotomy 
only to genre (anti-utopia), Reilly overlooks the racial ramifications of privi-
leging the natural over the civilized. When Kelley and Baker promote a natu-
ral, essential state for blacks, they reinforce racial stereotypes and the western 
dichotomies upon which these stereotypes are built. Utilizing the Caliban/
Prospero trope, Kelley and Baker argue within the existing parameters of 
these social and ideological constructions. Ironically, Baker levels this very 
charge at Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (383) and the anthology “Race,” Writing, 
and Difference more broadly. Baker perceives a “firm inscription of the dual-
ity suggested by the venerable Western trope of Prospero and Caliban—fig-
ures portrayed in terms of self-and-other, the West and the Rest of Us, the 
rationalist and the debunker, the colonizer and the indigenous people” (389). 
At the end of his essay, Baker returns to a reconciliation of these dualities 
through the Caliban figure: “Caliban’s triple play consists in what I described 
earlier as supraliteracy; it is a maroon or guerrilla action carried out within 
linguistic territories of the erstwhile masters, bringing forth sounds that have 
been taken for crude hooting, but which are, in reality, racial poetry” (394). 
Baker believes he has avoided promoting one side of the duality over the 
other, as well as a divided position—”[t]he colonial subject’s borderlining, 
his or her heroic and literate stance between two worlds” (389).50 However, 
the naturalist and essentialist foundations of Baker’s Calibanic theory, of 
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self and literature, continually subvert his larger project of reconciliation. If 
Baker truly seeks to “explode” these dualities, he should forsake the Caliban 
and Prospero trope altogether and look elsewhere for alternative theoretical 
and literary models (389). Delany would be the first to suggest science fic-
tion as a good place to start.
According to Delany, science fiction creates a “textus” through the 
interplay between “more conventional sentences” and the “new sentences 
available to s-f ” (Trouble 287). This textus “allows whole panoplies of data 
to be generated at syntagmatically startling points” (ibid). As mentioned 
earlier, Delany offers Starship Troopers and Heinlein’s gloss on race as one 
such “startling point.” More generally, Delany argues that “the science-fic-
tional-enterprise is richer than the enterprise of mundane fiction. It is richer 
through its extended repertoire of sentences, its consequent greater range of 
possible incident, and through its more varied field of rhetorical and syntag-
matic organization” (ibid). Thus, Delany specifically describes the much-her-
alded ‘possibility’ of the science fiction genre. Delany does not claim all, or 
even the majority, of science fiction texts fully realize this potential, but “on 
repeated exposure to the best works” (288), the “apparent ‘simple-minded-
ness’ of science fiction” (287) “falls[s] away—by the same process in which 
the best works charge the textus—the web of possibilities—with contour” 
(288). Furthermore, this “web of possibilities” includes “tropes of great origi-
nality” for Baker to discover (288).51 The expanded potential of science fic-
tion, however, is rather like a revolution in that it is difficult to stop at a 
certain prescribed point. From Baker’s perspective, science fiction poses a 
distinct threat to the sanctity of racial identity. The textus which allows for 
new tropes also invites new concepts of identity and race. In addition, half 
of the science/fiction textus is based on science: “[s]cience fiction is science 
fiction because various bits of technological discourse (real, speculative, or 
pseudo)—that is to say the ‘science’—are used to redeem various other sen-
tences from the merely metaphorical, or even the meaningless, for denota-
tive description/presentation of incident” (Delany, Trouble 284–5). Baker’s 
resistance to rationalism, objectivity, and science poses a significant hurdle to 
an acceptance of this fundamental aspect of science fiction. Therefore, if A 
Different Drummer illustrates many aspects of Baker’s racial theory, Delany’s 
The Ballad of Beta-2 offers a challenge.
In the Ballad of Beta-2, Delany depicts the scientific transformation of 
ordinary sentences into literal events. In his first interplanetary text, Delany 
follows the adventures of a student of galactic anthropology, Joneny Horatio 
T’waboga, as he tries to decipher “The Ballad of Beta-2,” a folk ballad from 
the Star Folk. Joneny’s professor insists that he complete a “historical analysis 
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of that ballad—from primary sources,” but Joneny believes both the Star 
Folk, a group of humans who traveled across space for 12 generations, and 
their ballad are a waste of his time (Ballad 9). Joneny argues that the Star 
Folk are “just a dead end, with no significance at all. They were a very minor 
transition factor that was eliminated from the cosmic equation even before 
its purpose was achieved” (6). Likewise, the collection of ballads from the 
Star Folk does not include “a single metaphor or simile that could possibly be 
called original or even indigenous to life on the Star Ships. There’s nothing 
but semi-mythical folk tales couched in terms of sand and sea and cities 
and nations [ . . . ,] complete fantasies with no relation to the people 
living and dying on the ships” (8). Delany uses Joneny’s dismissive and 
derogatory interpretation here as a vehicle for the plot, as an examination 
of the unique linguistic constructs of science fiction, and as an example of 
a common attitude towards science fiction. In addition, Joneny mirrors 
the enthnographic point of view of Burroughs’ John Carter. However, the 
“cosmic” focus of galactic anthropology illustrates Delany’s lesser interest 
in individual human races (Delany, Ballad 6). As the plot unfolds, Joneny 
realizes how wrong his initial assumptions were. He, and everyone else besides 
the few remaining Star Folk, made the mistake of overlooking the scientific 
context which transforms the fantastic language of the ballad into a historical 
chronicle of the events experienced by the Star Folk on their journey.
Within this context, the plot becomes a detective story, through 
which Joneny connects the linguistic and historical ‘clues’ conveyed by the 
ballad. For example, the first stanza of the ballad reads, “Then came one to 
the City,/Over sand with her bright hair wild,/With her eyes coal black and 
her feet sole sore,/And under her arms a green-eyed child ” (Ballad 10). Joneny 
learns that, within the social and linguistic contexts of the Star Folk, “the 
City” is one of their star ships, Beta-2, and the woman is a specific captain 
of one of those star ships, Leela RT-857. In Captain Leela’s Log Book, 
Joneny reads of her journey to one of the other starships, under attack 
by an unknown force, and her return to Beta-2 in her shuttle boat. Thus, 
the “bright hair” is the shuttle’s exhaust, “her eyes coal black” represents 
the lack of visual contact with the shuttle, and the “sand” is a meson field 
in outer space. Likewise, Joneny eventually realizes that the “green-eyed 
child” is an alien/human hybrid who has been his companion during his 
time on the Star Folks’ ships. Captain Leela returned to Beta-2 with this 
child “under her arms,” or impregnated by an alien entity. Joneny eventu-
ally pieces together an entire alternate historical text through a combination 
of linguistic discoveries. First, he learns that the Star Folk heavily utilized 
euphemisms, in their ballads and also in their day-to-day discourse. The 
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new physical and social environment (outer space and their space ships) led 
to changes in their language as well. The lack of gravity, for instance, made 
legs practically interchangeable with arms so that all four appendages even-
tually became known as arms.52 Similarly, the Star Folks’ “Market” was a 
place to genetically engineer children, not buy fruits and vegetables. With-
out direct contact with Earth, the new generations adapted their language 
to suit their only known environment.
Through the ballad, and its misunderstanding, Delany reveals the 
importance of a science fictional context. As noted earlier, in the “science” 
part of science fiction, the “various bits of technological discourse (real, spec-
ulative, or pseudo) [ . . . ] are used to redeem various other sentences from 
the merely metaphorical, or even the meaningless, for denotative descrip-
tion/presentation of incident” (Delany, Trouble 284–5). Therefore, the Star 
Folks’ euphemisms initially act as “meaningless” metaphors. Without the 
“technological discourse” of interplanetary travel, they are “complete fan-
tasies,” “cotton-candy effusions” (Ballad 8). Joneny represents the reader of 
realistic fiction who expects hair and eyes to refer to the human body and not 
a small space ship. He places the ballad within his cultural textus rather than 
that of the Star Folk, with its extended possibilities. As his professor points 
out, the Star Folk are worthy of study because no one else has done what 
they have—lived and traveled through outer space for an extended period of 
time (8–9). Therefore, Joneny cannot say that they did not discover anything 
new. Once Joneny places himself in the physical environment of the Star 
Folk, “[i]mpossibilities fluttered in his mind like moths” (54). Joneny’s first 
instinct is to deny what he sees, rejecting the impossible. However, “[t]he 
same thing which made him collect impossibly cumbersome books in a 
world of recording crystals made him look closely at all the impossibilities 
around him now” (ibid). As he does, he is given another semantic clue—the 
name of his companion, “The Destroyer’s Children” (55). Delany specifically 
places Joneny’s misunderstanding of this name within the context of linguis-
tics: “Joneny, as has been pointed out, was not semantically alert enough to 
catch all he had been told by that statement” (56). Once Joneny realizes that 
the Star Folks’ language is “for denotative description/presentation of inci-
dent” (284–5), Joneny experiences a “syntagmatically starling point” of his 
own: he realizes his companion’s true identity, along with his full capabili-
ties (Trouble 287). The Destroyer’s Children is not one person, but a group 
of identical boys. The original “green-eyed child” has cloned himself (123). 
Furthermore, they share a common alien father, called The Destroyer by the 
Star Folk because it was he who destroyed several of their star ships. At this 
point, Joneny reaches the status of an experienced science fiction reader, one 
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who knows the unique linguistic characteristics of the textus and, therefore, 
gains an accurate and meaningful understanding of the ballad (Trouble 285).
By remaining open to the (im)possibilities and learning the linguistic 
conventions of the science fiction textus, Joneny earns a reward. He discovers 
the extraordinary potential of The Destroyer’s Children for communication 
purposes. Not only can they withstand the physical environment of outer 
space without protection, but also they “exist a little outside of time” and can 
read minds (Delany, Ballad 123). Their mind-reading abilities mirror that of 
Rydra Wong in Babel-17 and Arkor and the other giants in The Fall of the 
Towers trilogy. The prevalence of this characteristic in Delany’s fiction reveals 
both the great importance he attaches to language and how his perspective 
on essentialism differs from that of Baker. In opposition to a single natu-
ral language rooted in a human race, Delany creates characters who change 
the known universe through their polyglot abilities. Overcoming linguistic, 
cultural, national, and/or racial barriers is the priority and not maintaining 
them, as with Baker, Kelley, and Heinlein. The first alien/human child (Jone-
ny’s companion) can clone himself at will also. Furthermore, they have access 
to their father—an alien being of tremendous physical power who also shares 
the mind-reading and time-manipulating abilities of his offspring. Therefore, 
The Destroyer’s Children can act as translators for humans—throughout 
space and time. In this way, they expand beyond even the galactic (spatial) 
scope of The Fall of the Towers and Babel-17.
As a student of galactic anthropology, Joneny is understandably excited 
by his discovery. He will return to his university with the next step in human 
evolution at his side. Compared to humans, the Destroyer’s Children are a 
superior race, mentally and physically; they fulfill The Destroyer’s promise 
to Captain Leela that her descendants would “live among the stars” (Delany, 
Ballad 114). In this highly positive portrayal of The Destroyer’s Children, 
Delany promotes collective consciousness and racial hybridity. The Destroy-
er’s Children are “one” with each other, as well as their father, and they can 
communicate with any sentient being (124). This collective consciousness 
“explodes” the subjective duality Baker critiques, without access to a natu-
ral or essentialist state (389). In fact, the racial hybridity of The Destroyer’s 
Children also “explodes” the concept of a static, essentialist racial identity.53 
In this way, Delany refutes the negative portrayal of a mixed (whether double 
or multiple) physical or cultural background. Because of their racial hybrid-
ity, The Destroyer’s Children do have a fragmented subjectivity, but all of 
these factors only increase their beneficent power. Within the specific context 
of American race relations, Delany’s alien/human hybrid mirrors the mixed 
racial position of mulattos. Thus, The Destroyer’s Children belie the motif of 
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the tragic mulatto. The unlimited fertility of The Destroyer’s Children plays 
on the scientific fallacy of the sterility of mulattos also.54
Delany highlights the promise of The Destroyer’s Children through a 
specific contrast to the remaining Star Folk. Captain Leela becomes impreg-
nated voluntarily because she sees the increasing intolerance and rigidity 
of the Star Folk, physically and culturally. She fears that by the time they 
reach their destination, the Star Folk will have regressed so far that they will 
be unable to survive, let alone complete their mission of contacting alien 
civilizations. A human/alien hybrid race seems to be the best chance for 
their survival. As Joneny later relays, Captain Leela was correct. Joneny first 
describes the Star Folk as “a bunch of chauvinistic, degenerate morons” (6) 
with a “primitive-barbaric stage” of “civilization” (Delany, Ballad 7). After 
his arrival on one of the starships, he sees the physical degeneration of the 
Star Folk first hand: “through the tubes loped men—or men and women, he 
couldn’t tell: their eyes were small and pink, probably half blind. They were 
bald. Their ear trumpets had grown to their skulls. Round-shouldered, with 
nubby, nailless fingers, they paused and groped mechanically at instrument 
dials and nobs” (43). In this way, Delany connects the cultural and physical 
regression of the Star Folk. Because they feared change, the majority of Star 
Folk began to ostracize and persecute the minority who believed in diver-
sity—cultural, social, intellectual, and physical. Eventually the dominant 
majority used the concept of a very narrow and rigid Norm, both cultural 
and physical in connotation, to kill those who deviated in any way. Through 
executions, pogroms, and riots (in conjunction with the mass destruction 
caused by The Destroyer), all of the One-Eyes, the deviant minority, were 
killed. Thus, the social and physical isolation or ‘inbreeding’ of the Star Folk 
led to an actual devolution over time. The message is clear: those who value 
stasis, racial purity, and isolationism are on their way to “extinction” (7).
This message speaks to both Heinlein’s Farnham’s Freehold and Kelley’s 
A Different Drummer. While both authors explore inter-racial relationships 
(romantic, platonic, economic, homicidal) during the course of the text, 
they ultimately reinforce racial divisions. In Farnham’s Freehold, an Anglo 
Adam and Eve consciously separate themselves from the rest of humanity 
partially because of their negative experiences with blacks in the future. Kel-
ley removes all African-Americans from the South in order to escape their 
past and present oppression. In these ways, both authors promote a separate-
but-equal, segregationist racial policy. On the other hand, within the social 
and political context of the 1950s and 1960s, Delany becomes the racial 
integrationist. He rejects the white privilege, social conservatism, and racial 
isolationism of Heinlein and the dominant white majority in the United 
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States. However, he also rejects the Negritude and Black Power standpoint of 
Kelley. Furthermore, Delany’s racial integration involves both social/cultural 
and physical elements. In Sarah Phillips (1984), for example, Andrea Lee 
reflects on the qualified integration advocated by many African-Americans 
(and Anglo-Americans). While actively striving for a general social integra-
tion, they reject romantic and physical integration (sexual and/or reproduc-
tive) with other racial or ethnic groups.55 Finally, by placing the entire plot 
of The Ballad of Beta-2 in the future, Delany can assume a racially mixed 
human population even before the human race comes in contact with alien 
races. Delany’s fairly positive portrayal of racial integration with aliens also 
stands in marked contrast to the transfer of human racial xenophobia to an 
alien Other (Scholes and Rabkin 188).56
Unlike Heinlein and Kelley, Delany chooses to use the greater possi-
bilities of science fiction, in The Ballad of Beta-2, to distance the story from 
the contemporary historical racial situation. The distance in time and space 
affords a metaphoric exploration of race relations, and this metaphoric dis-
tance lessens the volatility of the text’s racial message. The Ballad of Beta-
2 also illustrates the common connection in science fiction between space 
and time disruptions (or hyper extensions) and a deconstruction or elision 
of racial identity. For example, the historical specificity (cultural and geo-
graphic) of African-Americans is elided in The Ballad of Beta-2. The science-
fictional context (space and time) blunts the general racial message, then, 
and this estrangement combines with the deconstruction of racial identity to 
repel readers interested in the promotion of collective racial identities. Thus, 
The Ballad of Beta-2 does not overtly challenge the generic conventions of 
science fiction, but it lies outside the normative parameters of African-Amer-
ican literature. The importance of the “technological discourse” in The Bal-
lad of Beta-2 also foregrounds the scientific aspect of science fiction (Delany, 
Trouble 284). For example, astronomy and astronautics, physics, engineering, 
and, of course, galactic anthropology (combining linguistics, cultural stud-
ies, and race) all play roles in the text. Joneny’s role as a student of galactic 
anthropology specifically recalls Disher’s impersonation of an anthropologist 
in Schuyler’s Black No More. However, Delany does not satirically and cyni-
cally undermine the profession in the way Schuyler does. If Tucker criticized 
Schuyler for his qualified portrayal of science, rationality, and objectivity, 
what of Delany’s straightforward promotion of the sciences?57
When Tucker critiqued Schuyler’s “scientific rationality” in the 1990s, 
he was building on the anti-rationalist, anti-scientific arguments of Baker in 
“Caliban’s Triple Play” (Tucker, “Can” 143). While Baker asserts that he “is 
not interested simply in taking pot shots at ‘science,’” he believes that science 
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“is simply one system in a series of ‘interlocking information orders’ that 
often subserve state power” (386). More specifically, “a black group initia-
tive [is] contrary to the interests of the academically isolated whitemales [like 
contemporary anthropologists] who have always done whatever was neces-
sary (fudging data in twin studies and so forth) to make science work” (ibid). 
In contrast, Baker highlights the “debunking” power of Mary Louise Pratt’s 
essay, “Scratches on the Face of the Country; or, What Mr. Barrow Saw in 
the Land of the Bushmen,” which appears in “Race,” Writing, and Differ-
ence along with Baker’s essay (Baker 387). Baker explains that Pratt’s “deeply 
intelligent and witty awareness of the necessity to deconstruct a disastrous 
scientific ‘objectivity’ and ‘informational’ neutrality as covers for state power 
and oppression bring her essay into harmony with what [he] would call ver-
nacular rhythms” (387). Furthermore, texts like Pratt’s “will make a differ-
ence where ‘difference’ is concerned in the future. ‘Science,’ by contrast, will 
more than likely continue to march to stately drums” (ibid). This pessimistic, 
broadly negative attitude towards science comes from one of the more liberal 
academicians within the African-American literary community as well.
On the other hand, Delany’s promotion of the sciences in The Ballad 
of Beta-2 reflects a deep and abiding interest in science. A significant portion 
of Delany’s autobiography, The Motion of Light in Water: Sex and Science Fic-
tion Writing in the East Village, 1957–1965, is devoted to his multifarious 
and intensive scientific activities as an adolescent. Delany notes that, “[a]s a 
child, I was fascinated by science and math,” and he attended the Bronx High 
School of Science (9). Delany’s primary interests in science and writing, as 
well as music, are reflected in his vocational leanings. At various points in his 
life, Delany thought he would be a scientist, a musician, or a writer. Delany’s 
choice to combine these interests in his career as a science fiction writer is 
explained by a story he shares about his then-wife Marilyn Hacker. When 
asked by an interviewer, “Why, in this age of science [ . . . ] do you want 
to be an artist?,” Hacker responded: “I don’t really see that much difference 
between them [ . . . ]. Both are based on fine observation of the world” 
(97). Delany continues, “It was a pretty clear expression of her aesthetic back 
then—and one I was happy to take as my own” (ibid). Hacker and Delany’s 
conflation of art and science mirrors the later scientific analysis of Donna 
Haraway in which she argues for the fictive nature of science and its ability 
to tell stories.58 In fact, Haraway’s critical project is a realization of Delany’s 
belief that “self-critical models are desirable things” (Jewel-Hinged 82); in this 
case, Haraway is critical of science and traditional scientific objectivity. In a 
critical essay entitled “Shadows,” Delany expands on his view of scientific 
objectivity:59
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Somewhere, in science, especially the human ones, we have to commit 
ourself to objectivity. And, especially in the human ones, objectivity can-
not be the same as disinterest. It must be a whole galaxy of attractions 
and repulsions, approvals and disapprovals, curiosities and disinterests, 
deployed in a context of self-critical checks and balances which, itself, 
must constantly be criticized as an abstract form capable of holding all 
these elements, and as specific elemental configurations. (Jewel-Hinged 
81–2)
This critical model of objectivity complicates the simplistic, traditional 
definition of objectivity. It more accurately describes the qualified scientific 
rationality Schuyler portrays in Black No More, for example. Furthermore, 
Delany goes on to explicitly highlight the utilization of anthropology as a 
“self-critical model [ . . . ] with which to criticize our own culture” (Jewel-
Hinged 82). In this context, the galactic anthropology of The Ballad of Beta-2 
(as its name suggests) is a logical combination of the self-critical models of 
anthropology and science fiction.
Delany explains this self-critical purpose of the “best science fiction” 
later in “Shadows” (Jewel-Hinged 99). While “[m]uch science fiction inad-
vertently reflects the [scientific] context’s failure,” “the best science fiction 
explores the attack” upon this context in contemporary society (ibid).60 
Moreover, not only the “scientific context” but also the “social context” is 
“under an internal and informed onslaught” by “Women’s Liberation, Gay 
Activism, Radical Psychiatry, or Black Power” (ibid). Delany links the scien-
tific failure to “integrate its specialized products in any ecologically reason-
able way” to the social failure: the scientific failure is
painfully understandable in a world that is terrified of any social syn-
thesis, between black and white, male and female, rich and poor, verbal 
and non-verbal, educated and un-educated, under-privileged and privi-
leged, subject and object. Such syntheses, if they occur, will virtually 
destroy the categories and leave all the elements that now fill them radi-
cally revalued in ways it is impossible to more than imagine until such 
destruction is well underway. (98)
The Ballad of Beta-2 is one such act of imagination. Its racial “synthesis” 
destroys the “categories” of race and “radically revalue[s]” “the elements” 
which they contain. As Delany breaks down these western dichotomies in his 
science fiction, he takes Baker’s “guerilla action” one step farther than Baker 
is willing to go (394).
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Finally, Delany’s deconstruction of race corresponds with current sci-
entific racial theories. The scientific focus of science fiction entails a gen-
eral coordination between contemporary scientific thought and the scientific 
theories of the text. While fiction, a science fiction text cannot diverge too 
far, or in too many ways, from contemporary scientific thought and get pub-
lished and/or sell well. For example, Edgar Rice Burroughs’ essentialist and 
hierarchical concepts of race(s) coincided with turn-of-the-century scientific 
theories of race and the restrictionist side of the immigration debate. Con-
versely, later writers like Delany, Octavia Butler, and Marge Piercy would 
find it difficult to publish texts which overtly contradict the current scientific 
and poststructuralist theories which advocate a constructed concept of race. 
Delany’s interest in science and inclusive racial views allow him to utilize 
such theories with little qualification.
In his full utilization of the science fiction textus, with its technologi-
cal discourse and thematic conventions, Delany challenges Baker’s racial 
boundaries for African-American literature. For example, the technologi-
cal discourse of The Ballad of Beta-2, and Delany’s other science fiction 
texts, conflicts with the general valorization of the vernacular in theories of 
African-American literature. In addition, a significant portion of Delany’s 
generic criticism involves his linguistic theory of science fiction, in opposi-
tion to the normative thematic foundation.61 The subtitle of Delany’s first 
full-length critical text, The Jewel-Hinged Jaw: Notes on the Language of Sci-
ence Fiction, highlights the early manifestation of Delany’s language-based 
generic theory. Published in 1977, the collection consists of a number of 
essays previously published between 1967 and 1976. In the 1977 introduc-
tion to the collection, Delany writes, “[r]ereading the pieces, for this edition, 
I am pleased with a consistency in their movement toward a language model 
[ . . . which] is, after all, their object” (12). Delany’s second collection of 
essays, Starboard Wine: More Notes on the Language of Science Fiction, was 
published in 1984. In the critical texts of both collections, Delany not only 
promotes a linguistic generic theory, but in doing so, he utilizes the academic 
discourse Baker rejects (in theory if not always in practice).
In his alternate history novel Dhalgren (1974), Delany does make 
significant use of the vernacular. Because Dhalgren takes place in an alternate, 
contemporary United States, rather than on another planet or in the 
distant future, Delany includes the historical language of the underground 
subculture(s) he describes. This alternate history format is more similar to 
Farnham’s Freehold and A Different Drummer than Delany’s earlier novels. 
As McEvoy notes, “[i]f Bellona [the specific city in which the action takes 
place] had been on Mars, it could be dismissed as just science fiction, not 
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relevant to today’s problem. But by having it take place in middle America, 
and changing a few details, he can make the book relevant to today” (109–
10). In fact, by using Bellona as a place name in both Dhalgren and an earlier 
novelette, “Time Considered as a Helix of Semi-Precious Stones,” Delany 
explicitly draws attention to the terrestrial setting of Dhalgren due to its 
contrast with the extraterrestrial setting of the earlier text.62 McEvoy connects 
Dhalgren’s greater similarity to American society to a more autobiographical 
authorial perspective as well:
[i]t is in Dhalgren that we get closest (of his earlier works) to Delany as a 
person. No longer does he hide behind the predominantly heterosexual 
characters that have been the focus of his earlier books. Most of the 
characters in Dhalgren are gay, and the depictions of gays is drawn in 
a way that is seldom seen in heterosexual literature. Delany knows gay 
bars, and by the time the reader has read the book, the reader has a clear 
picture of what a gay bar looks like and how some of the interactions go 
on inside one.
The same applies to blacks and their separate, usually unseen by 
whites, culture. (116–17)
McEvoy’s emphasis on authorial autobiography, and its links to the specific 
portrayal of sexuality and race in Dhalgren, raises several issues related to the 
vernacular. Most broadly, Delany utilizes the specific, historical vernacular of 
these various sub-cultures because they accurately reflect the social contexts 
he describes. Delany’s extended use of the vernacular in this more realistic 
or mundane text, then, highlights the (variable) cultural foundation of all 
languages.63 As the title of Barbour’s Worlds Out of Words: the SF Novels of 
Samuel R. Delany highlights, the new cultural context of science fiction in 
time and/or space calls for linguistic changes.The evolution of the Star Folk’s 
language in The Ballad of Beta-2 is one such example. Similarly, in Babel-17, 
learning the alien language of Babel-17 corresponds to ideological, logical, 
and even practical shifts in mental processes (from targeting a new adversary 
to locating the fastener in an unfamiliar restraint). Delany’s knowledge of 
and interest in semantics leads him to explore such linguistic changes, and 
their effects, in his other texts. While the majority of science fiction writers 
do not pay more than lip service to such linguistic details, the (black) ver-
nacular is still lost due to their unfamiliarity with it. As Westfahl argues in 
the context of Heinlein’s racial texts, the normative white authorial position 
in science fiction does not include first-hand or detailed knowledge of black 
culture(s) and, therefore, of the black vernacular.
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Delany’s personal experiences with the black vernacular allow him to 
utilize it, when the social, cultural, and/or linguistic context is appropriate. 
McEvoy does not expand on specific characteristics of the black culture he 
describes; however, Delany specifically addresses the issue of the black vernacu-
lar in “Shadows.”64 Describing his early childhood in Harlem and the private 
elementary school he attended, Delany asserts, “[b]lack Harlem speech and 
white Park Avenue speech are very different things. I became aware of language 
as an intriguing and infinitely malleable modeling tool very early” (Jewel-
Hinged 119). Delany continues, “I always felt myself to be living in several 
worlds with rather tenuous connections between them, but I never remember 
it causing me much anxiety. [ . . . ] Rather, it gave me a sense of modest 
(and sometimes not so modest) superiority” (119).65 Here Delany does not 
support Baker’s negative evaluation of a divided subjectivity.66 Like his posi-
tive portrayal of racial hybridity and multiple consciousness in The Ballad of 
Beta-2, Delany sees the added communicative potential instead. His experi-
ences in multiple social contexts—black and white, privileged, poor, educated, 
heterosexual and homosexual (etc.)—allow him to act as a translator, like The 
Destroyer’s Children, among these multiple, largely separated, and sometimes 
hostile groups. The protagonist of Dhalgren, Kid, also circulates freely among 
diverse social contexts—a gay bar; a street gang; a formal dinner party; the 
home of a stereotypical white, middle-class family; a classroom; etc. In this 
context, Kid’s general ‘amnesia’ symbolizes the amorphous nature of his sub-
jectivity and the “freedom” this entails (McEvoy 106).67 Baker’s essentialist, 
monolithic concept of racial identity, on the other hand, restricts this subjec-
tive, social, and linguistic freedom. Therefore, Delany’s use of the vernacular in 
Dhalgren meets Baker’s linguistic qualification for African-American literature, 
but the text as a whole exceeds his theoretical limitations. The most obvious 
sign of this is Delany’s racially-inclusive use of the vernacular; both black and 
white characters utilize what is more accurately called a street or gang vernacu-
lar.68 Dhalgren is an example of Baker’s “supraliteracy,” but he cannot see this 
because of his racial blinders (394).69 Since Delany does not essentialize sound 
nor privilege the vernacular, he can utilize any discourse: the vernacular in por-
tions of Dhalgren, the technological discourse of science fiction in many of 
his texts, the “subtle” academic discourse of much of his criticism, etc. (Baker 
389). Delany chooses the one(s) most appropriate to the context of his writing 
and, if necessary, revises an existing one to suit a new (imaginative) cultural 
context. As we have seen, Delany learned the “infinitely malleable” nature of 
language at an early age.
As Dhalgren comes closer to fulfilling African-American literary criteria 
than Delany’s other texts, it is no coincidence that is controversial within 
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the science fiction community. The same historical realism which called for 
the vernacular, and a corresponding subtlety of the technological discourse, 
prompted many science fiction readers to question Dhalgren’s status as sci-
ence fiction. Writing under a pseudonym, K. Leslie Steiner, Delany refuted 
this criticism of the novel:
Dhalgren was a science fiction novel that (What? Yes, it is science fiction: 
the hero enters over a bridge into a parallel world—see, silly!—into an 
alter-version of an American city where” . . . the ordinary laws of 
time and space,” as they used to say, “no longer apply.” I mean, really!) 
attacked the field by being a great book [ . . . ] in just those ways 
most science fiction is not even good: by density of psychological con-
struction and depth of social insight. (Delany, Straits 93)
McEvoy also felt compelled to specifically address the science fictional ele-
ments of Dhalgren (111), even as he acknowledged its unexpected realism 
(109–10). In addition to its realism and great length (even for mainstream/
mundane fiction), McEvoy posits the experimental quality of Dhalgren as a 
reason for its controversial reception (103–105). Dhalgren presents the inter-
esting paradox in that it has had record sales for a science fiction text, but the 
total “response with the science fiction community—fandom and the profes-
sionals of the SFWA—has been generally negative, or at the best averaged 
out to a slightly disavowing neutral” (Barbour 90).70 Presumably, then, the 
majority of Dhalgren’s sales lay outside the science fiction community. As a 
result, Dhalgren serves as an example of the difficulty in merging the African-
American and science fiction genres, at least in terms of rigid generic charac-
teristics (and expectations). Perhaps this is why Delany has refused to limit 
his writing to a single genre—writing science fiction, fantasy (including the 
sub-genre of sword-and-sorcery), autobiography, criticism, autobiographical 
criticism, pornography, etc. In doing so, Delany has challenged his readers, 
but as he notes in a Callaloo interview, the popularity of Dhalgren, Trouble 
on Triton, and the Nevèrÿon series suggests that “[t]oo many people have 
already found something in them of value” to deny a receptive audience for 
his generically revisionist and fluid texts (Silent 226).71
Despite Delany’s optimism, however, the controversy surrounding his 
career persists, even growing stronger over time. Delany asserts that “themat-
ically” he is “an extremely conservative SF writer” (225), but admits “[w]hat 
I am doing in almost all my books is the genre equivalent of ‘gender bend-
ing’” (Silent 226). In his early and continued exploration of linguistic and 
cultural theories (the ‘soft’ sciences), Delany flaunted both the essentialist 
148 The Subject of Race in American Science Fiction
bias of the African-American literary community and the traditional conven-
tions of science fiction. The Ballad of Beta-2 (1965), Babel-17 (1966), and 
The Einstein Intersection (1967), for example, are early, fictional manifesta-
tions of Delany’s interest in language and culture. Within the science fiction 
community, this linguistic exploration and experimentation won Delany 
his first Nebula awards. However, Delany’s experiences at the 1968 Nebula 
Awards banquet illustrate the power struggles going on between the older, 
more traditional science fiction writers and the younger, more experimental 
writers. Slusser’s 1977 critical text on Delany specifically centers on his repre-
sentative embodiment of a “structuralist imagination” and the importance of 
language to structuralism (3).72 Even with his wider critical focus, McEvoy 
stresses the importance of texts and writing to the vast majority of Delany’s 
oeuvre (45–6). McEvoy theorizes that Delany’s dyslexia played a role in his 
linguistic interests: “[t]his difficulty with texts became a concern with texts 
and perhaps an obsession with words, which is especially evident in Delany’s 
remarkable The American Shore, a 243 page critique of a short story by Tom 
Disch!” (46).73 The increasing sophistication of Delany’s linguistic discus-
sions, in his fiction and non-fiction, has raised the theoretical bar for his 
readers.
By the 1995 publication of The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction, John 
Clute and Peter Nicholls assert, “[t]here is no doubt that by the 1980s [Dela-
ny’s] fiction (and criticism) had become less accessible, and the real debate 
about his career must be whether or not he gained more than he lost with his 
adoption of a denser style towards the later 1970s” (317). As a result, Clute 
and Nicholls theorize “different audiences at different points” in Delany’s 
career: “a very wide, traditional science fiction readership up to and including 
Dhalgren [ . . . ] and a narrower, perhaps more intellectual, campus-based 
readership thereafter” (ibid). Certainly, Delany understands the linguistic 
and theoretical challenges he presents to his readers. In a 1988 essay titled 
“Neither the First Word nor the Last on Deconstruction, Structuralism, Post-
structuralism, and Semiotics for SF Readers,” Delany explicitly attempts to 
explain these difficult linguistic, literary, and cultural theories to the science 
fiction community (Shorter). Of course, an understanding of these theories 
would aid readers of Delany’s texts (fictional and non-fiction), but Delany 
gives additional reasons why “science fiction readers [should] be interested 
in such debates” (Shorter 148). The third, “personal” reason is “positioned at 
the very interface of [the] first two”:
[Delany] would like to see a debate about our own practices of equal 
interest grow up, here, within the precincts of science fiction—a debate 
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informed by the same disposition toward analytic vigilance, with the 
same willingness to historify and demystify the vast range of sediments, 
unquestioned self-evident positions, and givens under which our genre, 
its fandom, its readership struggle, along with energetic attempts to 
deconstruct those oppositions at which so much discussion of science 
fiction stalls: “technology” vs. “science,” “reviewing” vs. “criticism,” 
“pro” vs. “fan,” “commercial” vs. “quality,” and “craft” vs. “art.” (Shorter 
150)
Delany’s resistance to these specific science fiction dichotomies parallels Baker’s 
resistance to the larger dualistic nature of western culture. As we have seen, 
however, Delany’s reliance on structuralism, poststructuralism, and semiotics 
flies in the face of mainstream African-American criticism.
Therefore, Delany’s detailed and pervasive utilization of structuralist and 
poststructuralist theories not only challenges his science fiction readers, but 
also combines with his scientific interests to make his texts even more objec-
tionable than those of Gates in the field of African-American Studies. Baker’s 
theory of the Calibanic Self, with its natural soundings and ties to family and 
kinship, implicitly criticizes Afro-American writers who do not subscribe to 
these tenets (and reflect them in their work)—they are ‘inauthentic,’ not racial-
ized, not ‘black.’74 As a result, most of Samuel Delany’s non-fiction and much 
of his fiction, without an extensive use of the (black) vernacular and with an 
emphasis on technology (vs. Baker’s nature), would indict Delany himself as 
somehow not being true to his authentic racial self, to his racial heritage, to his 
people. Certainly, Delany resists such theories of identity and literature. In an 
interview, he emphasizes difference and not uniform notions of identity which 
allow a person to be categorized: “Whatever identity you have, be it the iden-
tity of a black person or a gay person, of a male, of a female, is what allows you 
to be put in a category [ . . . ]. Identity is not what makes you an individual. 
Difference is what makes us individual” (Beckerman). Delany’s “difference” 
here is not the racialist, essential difference utilized by Baker, but more like 
the Derridian “différance” which is constructed through contrast with others 
(Freedman 148).75 In the context of gay identity, Delany makes his stance on 
the construction of identity even more clear: “For me, Gay Identity [ . . . ] is 
an object of the context, not of the self” (Longer 143). There is nothing ‘natu-
ral,’ then, about Delany’s concept of racial identity, and Baker’s connections 
between naturalness, nature, and race do not apply to Delany’s discussion of 
(various concepts of ) race in science fiction.
The threat Delany posses to literary theories that are based on race—
like the African-American literary theories of Joyce, Baker, and Gates—is 
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clearly seen in his postmodern view of the “black artist” and the sub-genre 
of African-American science fiction (“Racism 392). Delany believes that 
the small ‘b’ for black artist is “a very significant letter, an attempt to ironize 
and detranscendentalize the whole concept of race, to tender it provisional 
and contingent” (ibid). Also, with the advent of such writers as Octavia 
Butler in the 1970s, Steven Barnes in the 1980s, and Nalo Hopkinson in 
the 1990s comes the increased threat of racial/racist labeling and grouping. 
Today, Delany questions the relatively new category of “African-American 
science fiction” (395). In “Racism and Science Fiction” (1994), Delany first 
shares his positive experiences at Clark Atlanta University’s African-Ameri-
can Science Fiction Conference (395). However, “[t]his aware and vital 
meeting to respond specifically to black youth in Atlanta is not [ . . . ] 
what usually occurs at an academic presentation in a largely white univer-
sity doing an evening on African-American science fiction” (ibid). Delany 
asserts that “as long as racism functions as a system, it is still fueled by 
aspects of the perfectly laudable desires of interested whites to observe this 
thing, however dubious its reality, that exists largely by means of its hav-
ing been named: African-American science fiction” (ibid). It is in this con-
text that Delany objects to consistently being placed with Octavia Butler 
at conventions, conferences, and in interviews (395–6). In terms of his 
writing and his influence in the field, Delany believes that he has more in 
common with “cyberpunk writers” like William Gibson than Butler (ibid). 
Yet, he has appeared only once with Gibson and more than six times with 
Butler (396). Delany resists a label like “African-American science fiction” 
because it racially segregates otherwise dissimilar writers from the genre as 
a whole. He simultaneously promotes individual difference and inclusive 
intermingling because “what racism as a system does is isolate and seg-
regate the people of one race, or group, or ethnos from another” (“Rac-
ism” 393). For Delany, then, any reform of the science fiction community 
would involve greater inclusiveness, but not greater compartmentalization. 
In this we can see Delany joining Schuyler in resisting an over-simplified 
categorization as an African-American writer. Such a category or label is 
not only inaccurate, but also restricting and separatist.
Delany insists on exploring a dazzling multiplicity of issues in his 
texts, reflecting the multiplicity of his interests and his subjectivity. There-
fore, any critical study of his texts poses the challenge of selection and the 
problem of elision. In his section on Delany and his 1984 novel, Stars in 
My Pocket Like Grains of Sand, Carl Freedman acknowledges this diffi-
culty.76 In addition to the “politics of gender and to specifically feminist 
concerns,” Delany
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pursu[es] a close examination of the politics of sexual orientation and of 
that entire complex of social marginalities designated in earthly terms 
by such rubrics as race, ethnicity, and nation. Very few novels, within 
science fiction or beyond it, have ever tried to do as much as Delany’s 
magnum opus. If the personal interest [ . . . ] that Delany has main-
tained in the texts of critical theory makes his work an inevitable or 
at least “natural” reference point for a study like the current essay, the 
immense scope of his finest novel makes it an extremely difficult text 
with which to come to terms. (Freedman 147)
Within the present work, Delany is also an essential “reference point.” Not 
only does Delany investigate the intersection of subjectivity with race in his 
science fiction, but his extensive critical writings are an invaluable resource 
as well. Finally, the timing of Delany’s entrance into the science fiction com-
munity offers a unique vantage point from which to critique the field after 
Schuyler. However, Delany’s autobiography, The Motion of Light in Water, 
offers a more accurate presentation of his diverse interests and the many fac-
ets of his postmodern subjectivity.
Delany’s 1988 autobiography explores the personal basis for his multi-
ple interests. Sexuality, gender, race, and vocation are ideological sites where 
the social “impinges” on the psychological, or the object “contour[s] and 
constitute[s]” the subject (Starboard 188).77 Not just serving as a historical/
social background for Delany’s fiction, then, the autobiography embodies his 
multiple subjectivity and its associated freedom, contradiction, and tension. 
Early on Delany shares a feeling of “pivotal suspension” between the many 
dichotomies dividing American society:
 I was a young black man, light-skinned enough so that four out of 
five people who met me, of whatever race, assumed I was white. [ . . . ] 
I was a homosexual who now knew he could function heterosexually.
 And I was a young writer whose early attempts had already gotten 
him a handful of prizes, a few scholarships [ . . . ].
 So, I thought, you are neither black nor white.
 You are neither male nor female.
 And you are that most ambiguous of citizens, the writer.
 There was something at once very satisfying and very sad, placing 
myself at this pivotal suspension. It seemed, in the park at dawn, a kind 
of revelation—a kind of center, formed of a play of ambiguities, from 
which I might move in any direction. (Motion 52)
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First, Delany’s personal “satisfaction” stems from the “romantic ambiguities” 
of subjective positions in the “center” of these dualities and the possibility 
of freedom, agency, and/or individuality attached to such neutral positions 
(242). His “sadness” is the flip side to this neutral coin, in that Delany does 
not fit within the existing, dualistic categories of American society. There-
fore, he is an outsider who also faces intense social pressure to conform, to 
make himself fit these categories at whatever personal cost.
In fact, Delany later shares his revision of this “revelation” and places a 
reexamination of these issues of subjectivity in the context of a mental break-
down (Motion 52). In the hospital he “began to see that what [he’d] taken as a 
play of freedom and mystical possibility had actually meant something quite 
different” (242). The difference includes the oppressive ideologies of race 
and sexuality which, especially pre-1960’s, “pull you toward the most con-
servative position you might inhabit, however poorly you might be suited for 
it” (ibid). As a means of self-examination, Delany tentatively lists three labels 
and subjective positions which place him within the existing social catego-
ries, but not in the “most conservative position[s]”: “A black man . . . ?/A 
gay man . . . ?/A writer . . . ?” (212). He proceeds to take each of these 
fragments of his subjectivity individually and use it as a lens to zoom in on 
the corresponding sections of his life experiences. In this way, readers (join-
ing Delany in his voyage of discovery) learn additional information about 
Delany’s life not previously related in the autobiography, although overlap-
ping in time. We also follow the process of interrogation or critical analysis 
through which Delany matures, coming to terms with the multiple elements 
of his identity and learning strategies of resistance to the way these elements 
were (are) “hugely devalued in the social hierarchy” (ibid).
Delany’s personal struggle here seems to illustrate the extreme dispersal 
of identity discussed by Diana Fuss. Fuss suggests: “It does seem plausible 
that, like the female subject, the Afro-American subject (who might also 
be female [and gay]) begins fragmented and dispersed [ . . . ]. If so, then 
for both the female subject and the Afro-American subject, ‘the condition 
of dispersal and fragmentation that Barthes valorizes (and fetishizes) is not 
to be achieved but to be overcome’” (95).78 Delany continues the process 
of fragmentation begun by Fuss, adding sexuality and vocation to race 
and gender. While Delany does not specifically address gender in this 
one section, elsewhere in his autobiography he spends considerable time 
examining emerging feminist concerns during this time period, particularly 
through the vehicle of his wife Marilyn Hacker. In all of his writings, Delany 
takes the divided racial subjectivity of Du Bois and Schuyler and fragments 
it much further. Even the overarching format of the autobiography reflects 
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this fragmentation. Small segments or “arbitrary fragments” from different 
contexts and time periods are numbered by individual fragment and by larger 
sections or groups of fragments (Motion 300).79 For example, Delany begins 
with section “1” and continues through “85,” but breaks up section “8” into 
everything from “8.1” to “8.103” and “8.29.” Brian McHale addresses this 
postmodern “disintegration” in his book Constructing Postmodernism (254):
Postmodernism’s shift of focus to ontological issues and themes has 
radical consequences for literary models of the self. A poetics in which 
the category ‘world’ is plural, unstable and problematic would seem to 
entail a model of the self which is correspondingly plural, unstable, and 
problematic. If the world is ontologically unstable (self-contradictory, 
hypothetical or fictional, infiltrated by other realities) then so perhaps 
am ‘I.’ (253–4).
McHale’s theoretical pluralism here parallels Delany’s autobiographical plu-
ralism, as well as its connection to science fiction’s culture-building project 
(multiple worlds).80
As both Fuss and McHale imply, a “dispersed” (Fuss 95) or “plu-
ral,” “self-contradictory,” and “unstable” subjectivity can be “problematic” 
(McHale 253–4). However, Fuss’ suggestion that such fragmentation or 
division should be “overcome” does not mean an indiscriminate merging of 
the elements into a monolithic, static identity. As Delany attempts to show 
in this autobiography, the multiple subjective elements should be identified 
and explored, and their connections to the social context critically examined. 
They also need to be reconciled with one another as much as possible. For 
example, the three elements of race, sexuality, and vocation are set side-by-
side and connected to other elements of his autobiography. In this way, they 
are ‘united’ in one life story and a single artistic endeavor, yet they remain 
distinctly recognized individually as fundamental elements of Delany’s sub-
jectivity. At the end of the three sections, Delany no longer questions, but 
confidently asserts: “A black man. / A gay man. / A writer” (Motion 242). 
He also implies that these multiple subjective positions serve as bridges or “a 
rhetoric that joins each [column]—however tenuously—to the other” (212). 
The “two columns” to which he refers here are the public and private dichot-
omy of western discourse and its embodiment in his “two accounts” of his 
life (212)—“one resplendant and lucid with the writings of legitimacy, the 
other dark and hollow with the voices of the illegitimate” (29–30).81 While 
these two “columns” or “accounts [ . . . ] seem as if they take place on 
different planets,” Delany “insists that the gap between them, the split, the 
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flickering correlations between, as evanescent as light-shot water, as insub-
stantial as moonstruck cloud, are really all that constitute the subject: not 
the content, if you will, but the relationships that can be drawn out of that 
content, and which finally that content can be analyzed down into” (212). 
Delany values bridges between subjective divisions, then, and not the main-
tenance of discrete units. Given his inclusive and dynamic fiction, it is fitting 
that Delany emphasize fluid connections rather than static separations in his 
autobiography.
TROUBLE ON TRITON
As the example of Delany’s autobiography highlights, the fragmentation of 
subjectivity relies on social context. Therefore, not only is identity or sub-
jectivity fragmented, but the fragments are a matter of context also—a very 
unstable and potentially disconcerting subjective position. In opposition to 
an interior, static essentialism, a constructed or provisional subjectivity relies 
on exterior materials—the social and physical environment. Thus, subjec-
tivity is provisional due to the tension between the fragments and the fluid 
social context. The object focus of science fiction provides an ideal location 
for exploring this social fluidity and, logically, the corresponding provisional 
nature of subjectivity as well. In Delany’s science fiction criticism, he dis-
cusses the unique relationship between the subject and the object in science 
fiction. In Trouble on Triton, he specifically revises the ideological position 
of the static, essentialist protagonist of traditional science fiction.82 Imag-
ine John Carter traveling to the Outer Satellites, a new social context, and 
finding himself the outsider, the Other. Without the traditional white, male 
hero, the reader must look elsewhere for viable, attractive subjective alter-
natives. Through the gradual deconstruction of the static protagonist and 
corresponding shift toward the dynamic minor characters, Delany not only 
critiques a heroic model, but also the larger failings of traditional science fic-
tion. The object focus of science fiction, the change in social setting, logically 
entails a change in subjectivity. If subjectivity is constructed through the 
social environment, the protagonist should not simply change the world(s) 
in which ‘he’ comes into contact, but also be changed by that world. How-
ever, this focus of attention on the object, or world setting, has historically 
functioned to obscure the subject altogether in science fiction.
In “Reading at Work, and Other Activities Frowned on by Authority: A 
Reading of Donna Haraway’s ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, 
and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s’” (1985–88), Delany places his multiple 
consciousness in a causal relationship with his physical context: “my eye lifts 
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from the text and again strays, glances about, snags a moment at a horizon, a 
boundary that does not so much contain a self, an identity, a unity, a center 
and origin which gazes out and defines that horizon as the horizon is defined 
by it; rather that horizon suggests a plurality of possible positions within it, 
positions which allow a number of events to transpire” (Longer 117).83 This 
“horizon,” object, context, or world results in similar “positions” as Delany’s 
autobiography. At the end of his reading of Haraway’s essay, Delany tries 
“to articulate the positions from which [he] write[s], as a male, as a black 
male, as a gay black male, as a gay black male whose works is the writing 
of paraliterary fictions” (ibid). These subjective positions (or fragments) 
reflect particular social contexts and they lead to a specific interpretation of 
Haraway’s text. Therefore, Delany invites the reader to interpret Haraway’s 
text also, “restructur[ing]” his interpretation and potentially opening up 
additional interpretive “positions” (118). This collective or dialogic model 
of reading reflects Delany’s “ontology of the open horizon—which relativizes 
discourse to rhetoric, refuses closure and the transcendence of history, places 
the subject back into its object-context, and privileges the active, social self 
over the passive sovereign self ” (K. James xxxvii).
In “Aversion/Perversion/ Diversion” (1991), Delany more fully explains 
the constructed and provisional nature of subjectivity in the context of his 
“gay” position (Longer). Delany asserts, “[t]he point to the notion of Gay 
Identity is that, in terms of a transcendent reality concerned with sexuality 
per se (a Universal similarity, a shared necessary condition, a defining aspect, 
a generalizable and inescapable essence common to all men and women 
called ‘gay’), I believe Gay Identity has no more existence than a single, 
essential, transcendental sexual difference” (Longer 142). This is the point 
at which Schuyler discards race as a meaningful concept—of positive value 
for African-Americans. Delany too notes the two “strategies” composing Gay 
Identity (similar to those of race); one used negatively for the “heterosexist 
oppression of gays” and the other used positively to promote “gay rights” 
(ibid). However, Delany goes on to offer a qualified endorsement of the 
second of these two strategies (particularly necessary, presumably, because of 
the first), “even if, at a theoretical level, [he] questions[s] the existence of that 
identity as having anything beyond a provisional or strategic reality” (ibid).84 
This “provisional or strategic reality” comes into play in terms of the social 
and historical contexts of Gay Identity. “For [Delany], Gay Identity—like 
the joys of Gay Pride Day, weekends on Fire Island, and the delight of tickets 
to the opera—is an object of the context, not of the self—which means, 
like the rest of the context, it requires analysis, understanding, interrogation, 
even sympathy, but never an easy and uncritical acceptance” (Longer 143). 
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Therefore, Ken James believes Delany’s “interest in such recondite analytical 
practices as Marxian critique, deconstructive criticism, and discourse analysis” 
lies in their “exploration of the social constitution of the individual subject” 
(xxi). In addition to the social context, Delany emphasizes the importance 
of a historical context. For example, Delany noted in his autobiography that 
the terms “gay” and “black” did not exist in the early 1960s as we know 
them today (Motion 242). Because of their contextual basis, their “meanings, 
usage,” and rhetoric change over time (ibid).
Delany argues that this “concept of ideohistory” is very common in 
science fiction, in contrast to mundane fiction (Jewel-Hinged 272–3). Along 
with the “convention of idiocentric omissions (or opacities),” the concept 
of ideohistory “allow[s] science fiction to treat ideas as signifiers—as com-
plex structures that organize outward in time and space (they have causes, 
they have results)” (273). By simultaneously historicizing an idea like ‘gay’ 
or ‘race’ and treating it as “a new idea” (the ideocentric omission), then, sci-
ence fiction is freed “from the stricture that has held back so much mod-
ern thought, of treating ideas as signifieds—as dense, semantic objects with 
essential, hidden, yet finally extractable semantic cores” (ibid). As a result, 
science fiction is one vehicle for the required “analysis, understanding, inter-
rogation” of such ideas (Longer 143). Science fiction highlights the historical 
and social fluctuation of ideas because of its object-focus, its foreground-
ing of the contextual background (in mundane fiction) (Starboard 188). In 
“Shadows,” Delany explains how science fiction writers examine this context, 
this exterior “world”:
Nothing we look at is ever seen without some shift and flicker—that 
constant flaking of vision which we take as imperfections of the eye 
or simply the instability of attention itself; and we ignore this illusory 
screen for the solid reality behind it. But the solid reality is the illusion; 
the shift and flicker is all there is (Where do s-f writers get their crazy 
ideas? From watching all there is very carefully.) (Jewel-Hinged 51–2)
Therefore, not only does the context fluctuate due to time, spatial, and social 
differences, but also in its very apprehension and its metaphysical nature. 
Through its contextual and speculative emphases, science fiction illuminates 
this “shift and flicker” more than the “solid reality” portrayed by mundane 
fiction.
In “Dichtung und Science Fiction,” Delany discusses the difference 
between the object focus of science fiction and the subject focus of other 
literary genres (Starboard 188–9). According to Delany, the other “literary 
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modes [ . . . ] are all characterized—now, today—by a priority of the sub-
ject, i.e., of the self, of human consciousness” (Starboard 188). In contrast, 
“as a paraliterary mode,” science fiction is “concerned with the subject, cer-
tainly, but concerned with those aspects of it that are closer to the object: 
How is the subject excited, impinged on, contoured and constituted by the 
object?” (ibid). This unusual literary hierarchy raises several issues. First, the 
object focus of science fiction is another factor in the longevity of the tradi-
tional white male hero. Displacing subjectivity as the center of the narrative 
encourages a stable, static, relatively unimportant protagonist. What fluc-
tuates instead is the context—the physical and social environment and the 
specific adventures the protagonist experiences. For example, John Carter’s 
psychology, and its development, is not the focus of Burroughs’ Mars series. 
The first text becomes a full-length novel and then an extended series through 
the varying settings. Thus, the object focus of science fiction maintains an 
essentialist theory of subjectivity through neglect. However, as Delany’s sci-
ence fiction criticism highlights, if an author specifically addresses subjectiv-
ity, the object-focus of science fiction encourages a more accurate portrayal. 
The emphasis on the social and physical context shows us how the subject 
is “excited, impinged on, contoured and constituted by the object”—how 
subjectivity is constructed, in other words. Furthermore, the contextual and 
the speculative elements of science fiction emphasize subjective instability, 
variation, and the potential for change. Delany incorporates both of these 
subjective trends in Trouble on Triton.
The protagonist of Trouble on Triton, Bron Helstrom, is the traditional 
white, male hero of science fiction. He is not significantly influenced by his 
environment, and his “simplexity [ . . . ] is in essence a form of solipsism” 
(Barbour 127).85 If Trouble on Triton is an exception to the general science 
fiction rule of subjective neglect, Delany chooses to explore the very psychol-
ogy which has been elided. Furthermore, Delany uses the context or object-
focus of science fiction to critique this static, isolated, selfish subjectivity. The 
discrepancy between Bron’s point of view and the context leads the reader to 
question Bron’s reliability and begin to see his subjective type as an anachro-
nism.86 In this case, Delany uses the context to illustrate how an individual’s 
subjectivity is not significantly “contoured” by a new environment (Star-
board 188). The new environment of Trouble on Triton is the Outer Satellite 
moon of Triton, and its contrast to Bron’s home planet of Mars grounds the 
social and subjective critique of the text. The socially and politically more 
conservative planets, Mars and Earth, become political allies in a war against 
the more radical Outer Satellites. Bron is the reader’s narrative focus for this 
larger social context. Within a traditional science fiction narrative, therefore, 
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Bron would be the warrior/hero largely responsible for winning the war on 
behalf of the ‘good guys.’ However, Bron’s actual wartime activities under-
mine this stereotype. Furthermore, Delany contrasts Bron, his subjectivity 
and actions, to that of other Outer Satellite residents. They represent the 
new subjective possibilities which Bron rejects. Unlike Kid in the terrestrial 
Bellona of Dhalgren, Bron will not take full advantage of the new freedoms 
offered by his altered social context.87
Delany’s choice of a white, male protagonist in Trouble on Triton con-
tinues his dialogue with Robert Heinlein. In written communications to 
Michael W. Peplow, Delany revealed one of his inspirations for Trouble on 
Triton and, specifically, Bron Helstrom—Heinlein’s 1963 Glory Road (Pep-
low, “Meet” 120). Peplow summarizes Delany’s reaction to Glory Road as 
follows: Delany “liked the pure adventure aspects of the story but hated its 
hero—’an incredibly conservative, “normal” six-foot blond hero (190 pound 
ex-athletic star)’” (ibid).88 As a result, Delany intended Trouble on Triton to 
be a “cutting, if not killing, dissection of just what I think a primarily hetero-
sexual blue-eyed blond male is” (qtd. in Peplow 120).89 Delany takes the same 
traditional, heroic, white male, science fiction protagonist as Heinlein and 
offers a more radical critique than Farnham’s Freehold. In addition, Delany’s 
“dissection” and critique of the white, heterosexual male psyche inverts the 
normative psychological and literary ‘pathologizing’ of homosexuals, women, 
and blacks. In fact, as Bron models this process of psychological Othering in 
his daily life, he reveals his own disabling limitations and psychological dis-
order to the reader. In this way, Trouble on Triton affirmatively answers the 
question left by Farnham’s Freehold—can an author focus on a white male 
protagonist and his subjectivity without undermining the author’s critical, 
revisionist intentions?90
In Bron Helstrom, Delany takes a traditional science fiction hero and 
fleshes out his psychology, highlighting the negative potential of such per-
sonality characteristics. First, Bron desperately desires subjective unity, to be 
an integrated ‘whole.’ He pleads with his romantic interest, the Spike, “‘Help 
me. Take me. Make me whole’” (Trouble 107). Neil Easterbrook argues that 
Bron “fetishizes himself as a clear and distinct Cartesian subject [ . . . ]. 
Cartesian subjectivity and hierarchy appeal precisely because they are clear, 
certain, coherent, stable—and so by the principle of parsimony, prefer-
able” (67).91 What Easterbrook’s accurate and inclusive description lacks is 
a specific articulation of the racial, gender, and sexual components of Bron’s 
“Cartesian subjectivity” and the privilege attached to these positions.92 The 
“hierarchy” Easterbrook briefly mentions entails something besides “parsi-
mony.” When he notes that “Bron wants to be ‘at the center’ (306) within a 
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culture with none,” Easterbrook implies what needs to be stated explicitly—
the normative and privileged position of the white, heterosexual male (Bron) 
in western culture and the science fiction genre more specifically. Barbour is 
one of the few critics to foreground the importance of Bron’s racial status:
Bron Helstrom is Delany’s first WASP protagonist, a member of the 
dominant racial and economic group in our Western world [ . . . ]. 
He is the symbolic bearer of the social attitudes associated with the 
Richards in Dhalgren and singled out for attack in Delany’s ‘Sex, 
Objects.’ That he is also the first protagonist in Delany’s science fiction 
with whom we are compelled not to identify assumes great importance 
in this context. (122)
Without this direct and detailed ideological placement, Delany’s social, 
generic, and subjective critique is limited. Within the generic context, for 
example, we would not see Bron Helstrom as the distant ancestor of Edgar 
Rice Burroughs’ John Carter or a step-brother to Heinlein’s protagonist in 
Glory Road. Only such men can utilize a theory of integrated subjectivity 
because they are so centrally located that the ‘margins’ do not overlap their 
subjective boundaries. Furthermore, their corresponding social (economic, 
political, etc.) privilege supports this illusion of subjective independence. Du 
Bois’ theory of a double-consciousness for African-Americans, Fuss’ applica-
tion to women of such a multiple theory of subjectivity, and Delany’s autobi-
ographical explorations of his sexuality highlight several groups who do not 
make use of such an integrated theory of subjectivity. When Delany places 
Bron within a new social context that displaces the historical centrality and 
privilege of the “WASP” male, he joins Fuss and Huyssen in highlighting the 
false universalism of this specific, limited subjective position.93 Bron becomes 
simply one of many on Triton, who is only different in his continued resis-
tance to such social and subjective egalitarianism.
In its unity and sameness, then, a monolithic subjectivity rejects the 
Other and reveals a fear of possible racial, gender, or sexual ‘contamination.’ 
Bron’s frequent critical label of “solipsistic” (Barbour 127) or “narcissistic” 
(Massé 53) highlights this subjective isolation, rejection of the Other, and 
repetition of the same. As Michelle Massé notes, Bron desires an “acknowl-
edgement of [his] uniqueness and superiority” (53). His persistent resistance 
to being a “type” (5) and his longing for ‘the good old days’ spring from these 
desires (Delany, Trouble 254). According to Bron, the past [our present] was 
more “simple” in its overt sexism (254). Delany implies that Bron glorifies 
this historical period because it would ‘justify’ his now marginal ideological 
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position(s) and its related sexism, heterosexism, and racism (ibid).94 Bron’s 
utilization of the past as a defensive mechanism reveals his limited under-
standing that he is an anachronism in the heterotopic world of Triton. As an 
anachronism, Bron “still thinks in binaries”—man/woman, owner/owned, 
client/servant, and so forth” (Easterbrook 66). Bron utilizes these outdated 
“binaries,” and their hierarchical organization in western culture, to “classify 
others to establish his own difference” (Massé 54). In his classification, Bron 
limits by definition and misrepresents by stereotype. Therefore, he represents 
the ‘anachronistic’ divisions, prejudices, and psychological defenses prevalent 
in contemporary western society. More specifically, Bron mimics the eth-
nographic gaze of the western explorer/naturalist/anthropologist. However, 
Delany strips the superficial objectivity and false universalism from the clas-
sification and hierarchical ranking of a Carl Akeley, Theodore Roosevelt, or 
a John Carter.95 As a result, the three characters closest to Bron in the text— 
Lawrence, the Spike, and Sam—become “inferior types, who show moreover 
no consciousness of their ‘lowly’ status: the Spike is a woman, Sam a black, 
Lawrence old and gay” (Massé 56). Similarly, “Bron is the only character 
in the novel who frequently uses racist and sexist terms—‘crazed lesbian,’ 
‘obnoxious faggot,’ ‘nigger,’ ‘cock-sucker,’ ‘whore,’ and ‘dyke’” (55). Bron’s 
anachronistic terminology, then, reflects his anachronistic ideology and val-
ues, and it overtly and vividly reveals the bias of his formerly normative sub-
jective position.
Delany also critiques the psychology of the traditional science fiction 
protagonist through the related characteristic of stasis. Bron’s monolithic, 
enclosed subjectivity does not change, even when subjected to the pressure 
of new social and/or physical environments. “In Triton’s flux, Bron is a 
static character” (Massé 52). According to Delany’s science fiction theory, 
of course, Bron should change; a new subject should result from a new 
object. Bron’s exception to the rule is not an oversight, however; it is the 
very basis of Delany’s generic critique. Not only should the object focus of 
science fiction lead to new subjective models, but also the traditional science 
fiction protagonist supposedly embodies the larger progressive characteristics 
of western society and the white race. Within this traditional dualistic 
context, western cultures and their representatives were politically, culturally, 
historically, and even geographically moving toward a more advanced, positive 
stage of development. On the other hand, people-of-color and their ‘native’ 
cultures were incapable of cultural or psychological change.96 Therefore, 
Bron’s psychological and cultural stasis illustrates the contradiction and 
hypocrisy within the (theoretically) dynamic, progressive characterization of 
the traditional science fiction hero. Furthermore, Bron’s persistent Othering 
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reveals the motivation behind the traditional hero’s stasis—it protects him 
from cultural and biological contamination and ensures his triumph against 
the inferior, usually adversarial natives. If he assimilated (i.e. changed) socially 
and/or sexually (including reproduction), he could not maintain his superior 
position. Within this larger context of racial essentialism, Bron’s subjective 
essentialism reflects a desire to keep the larger ‘race’ pure—biologically, 
culturally, and psychologically. Thus, individual stasis protects posterity.
Bron’s interest in the ‘survival of the species’ connects to stasis in this 
way (Delany, Trouble 232). As Lawrence informs Bron, his chances of meeting 
a woman with “a mutually compatible logical perversion” (212) are approxi-
mately “one out of five thousand” (213). With these statistical odds in mind, 
Bron decides to become a woman, in order “to preserve the species” (232). 
Bron believes that only in preserving and passing on his beliefs, his anachronis-
tic cultural norms can “mankind” survive or have any positive value (231). In 
an interesting twist from the alien cloning of The Ballad of Beta-2, Delany has 
Bron attempt to reproduce through sexual and psychological alteration of him-
self. After his alterations, Bron’s counselor tells her, “[i]n one sense, though you 
are as real a woman as possible, in another sense you are a woman created by a 
man—specifically by the man you were” (251). This reproduction of the Self, 
the same, is doomed to failure in the heterotopic society of Triton, however.97 
Unlike Hugh Farnham and Barbara in Heinlein’s Farnham’s Freehold, this new 
Eve will not ‘go forth and bear fruit.’98
After the fact, Bron realizes the impossible situation s/he has created. She 
must be passive in order to attract the type of man she used to be, but then her 
chances of finding ‘Mr. Right’ are very slim to non-existent (Delany, Trouble 
263). Furthermore, Bron’s ‘feminine’ passivity basically continues her passivity 
as a man. According to Massé, “in the main [Bron] is passive in his actions and 
relationships”; “he is dependent upon the responses of others to maintain his 
image” (57). This critical evaluation of Bron’s passivity not only contradicts 
the agency and assertiveness of traditional Western manhood and the science 
fiction hero, but also brings us full circle back to Bron’s request to the Spike 
to “make [him] whole” (Delany, Trouble 107). Bron’s plea reveals not only his 
desire for a monolithic subjectivity, but also his paradoxical reliance on oth-
ers for this ‘independent’ subjectivity. Thus, Delany utilizes Jacques Derrida’s 
theory of linguistic “différance” to highlight the logical impossibility of Bron’s 
subjective position. As Carl Freedman points out, Derrida’s theory of différance 
has important ramifications for identity:
Not only does every signifier differ from every other; it also thereby 
defers to every other, in the sense that the differential determination of 
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its own meaning is always to be found elsewhere. Accordingly, mean-
ing—and therefore all thought and all identity—cannot be securely 
achieved in any particular act of signification. On the contrary, it oper-
ates in a fitful, problematic way throughout the entirety of the signify-
ing system. (148)
Therefore, what Bron refuses to acknowledge is the fundamental diffusion 
of his theoretically monolithic, isolated identity. It is only “elsewhere,” in 
relationship with others that his poststructuralist subjectivity can be con-
structed.
As a result, Bron’s sex and gender changes are not enough to extricate 
her from “the hopeless tangle of confusion, trouble, and distress” she had 
hoped to leave behind on Mars (Delany, Trouble 277). The underlying sub-
jective stasis eventually overcomes all of Bron’s defensive mechanisms, and 
she projects her subjective stasis upon the objective world. Trouble on Triton 
ends with Bron firmly believing that “dawn [ . . . ] would never come” 
(ibid). In Appendix B, Delany has the fictional philosopher and mathemati-
cian Ashima Slade sympathetically comment on Bron’s precarious subjective 
position:
Our society in the Satellites extends to its Earth and Mars emigrants, 
at the same time it extends instruction on how to conform, the materi-
als with which to destroy themselves, both psychologically and physi-
cally—all under the same label: Freedom. To the extent they will not 
conform to our ways, there is a subtle swing: The materials of instruc-
tion are pulled further away and the materials of destruction are pushed 
correspondingly closer. (Trouble 302–3).
Bron’s mental breakdown at the end of the text is one example of such 
psychological “destruction.” In a moment of metafictional reversal, Delany 
also compares himself to Slade as follows: “for Slade the concept of landscape 
is far more political than it was for the author [Delany] of the older work 
[Trouble on Triton]” (302). With Slade, Delany returns to the importance of 
“landscape” or the object/world to the construction of subjectivity. In Triton’s 
different “landscape,” the positive qualities of the traditional science fiction 
hero are revealed to be flaws. On Triton, heroic “male aloneness” (216) 
becomes a “logical perversion” and leads to unhappiness, dynamic becomes 
passive, stasis leads to infertility, independence relies on others, and finally 
male becomes female (212). A traditional science fiction hero, like Bron, 
would not be able to survive in the poststructuralist world of difference fully 
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realized in Triton. As Delany asserts, when the results look most revolutionary, 
that’s when the writer is most attending to the tradition” (Silent 226).
Delany’s critique of the traditional science fiction protagonist relies on 
the heterotopic society of Triton. First, the changed social context illustrates 
the concept of an “ideohistory” (Delany, Jewel-Hinged 273). Bron’s anachro-
nistic sexism, for example, shows how the concepts of gender and sexuality 
have changed over time. These changes explain why Bron is now the unhappy 
minority in Triton society. When Ashima Slade notes that “there is no class, 
race, nationality, or sex that it does not help to be only half ” (Trouble 302), 
Fox declares that this “precept [ . . . ] reinforces the attack on an ideol-
ogy of absolute categories and ‘pure’ identities, positing instead the need for 
(minimally, at least) an acceptance of dualism, of fusions rather then separa-
tions” (“Politics” 51). Therefore, Bron’s repetition of the same contrasts with 
the multiplicity embodied in Triton’s society, a multiplicity affecting sexuality, 
gender, race, politics, and religion. John Fekete explicitly contrasts Trouble on 
Trition: An Ambiguous Heterotopia with Ursula Le Guin’s The Dispossessed: An 
Ambiguous Utopia (1975) because of this multiplicity.99 According to Fekete, 
“Le Guin’s interest is in the emergence of the liberatory novum, of individual 
initiative [ . . . ]; she works [ . . . ] toward the classical utopian aspira-
tions of Western philosophy: reconciliation in the potential harmony of all. 
Delany, by contrast, presents the dominance of dispersion” (131). As we have 
seen, this “dispersion” applies to the construction of individual subjectivity, 
but this reflects a larger social “dispersion” in Delany’s text as well. Triton’s 
society simply does not have a ‘center.’ The extraordinary range of accept-
able sexual practice on Triton illustrates this heterotopic quality. The Spike 
summarizes this aspect for the reader early on: “I mean, when you have forty 
or fifty sexes, and twice as many religions, however you arrange them, you’re 
bound to have a place its fairly easy to have a giggle at” (Trouble 99). Since 
Triton society rests on the inviolability of the subjective, every aspect of soci-
ety is tremendously expanded to meet the subjective demands of its citizens 
(277).
The subjective and social “dispersion” of Trouble on Triton is reflected 
in the major characters. First, Delany allows the other characters, represent-
ing the Other, to speak for themselves to a much greater extent than either 
Heinlein or Kelley. The discrepancy between their words and actions and 
those of Bron aides in undermining his subjective point of view. As readers 
continue through the text, they perceive that Bron’s point of view is unreli-
able and that his subjectivity embodies the Other of Triton society. Within 
this context, the other characters serve as examples of subjective alterna-
tives. Bron’s ‘friends,’ those people who get close to him and who also serve 
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as the other major characters in the text, each represent an alternative to 
one of Bron’s subjective positions. Lawrence, for example, offers a site for 
exploring Bron’s heterosexuality and the position of homosexuality in Tri-
ton society. Lawrence’s overt and socially-accepted homosexuality contrasts 
with the suppression of homosexuality in Heinlein’s texts (Delany, Trouble 
287), and the underlying heterosexism of The Dispossessed. In “To Read The 
Dispossessed,” Delany faults Le Guin for her “fictive thinness” in portraying 
Bedap, a homosexual man (Jewel-Hinged 297). For example, Le Guin resorts 
to “cliché” and “mystifie[s]” Bedap’s homosexuality and its relationship to 
offspring and familial groups on the world of Annares (292-4). Delany cre-
ates the various co-ops and communes of Triton society to revise Le Guin’s 
exclusion of homosexuals from familial groups. Furthermore, within the 
“systems-off ” system of reproduction on Triton, Bron’s great concern about 
the survival of the species is unusual (Shorter 340). Finally, Delany places 
sexuality within the same constructionist grid as biological sex and race. Any 
person on Triton can undergo a simple psychological procedure to change 
their sexual “fixation,” from “an ordinary, bisexual, female-oriented male,” 
for instance, to any of the other many options (Trouble 227–9). Both Bron 
and the Spike undergo such a procedure during their lifetimes.
Bron’s other friend, Sam, and Bron’s love interest, the Spike, bring the 
issues of race and gender to the fore. Sam, a black man, primarily serves 
as a vehicle for investigating race on Triton, but later in the text, the issue 
of gender surfaces in an unexpected way. A white woman, the Spike is the 
primarily site for exploring gender issues. In the second note of “Appendix 
A: From the Triton Journal: Work Notes and Omitted Pages,” Delany writes, 
“Everything in a science fiction novel should be mentioned at least twice 
(in at least two different contexts)” (Trouble 282). Race and gender act as 
two such contexts, along with the previously-mentioned sexuality. Delany 
refuses to simplify his ‘heterotopic’ interests, either in the multiple subjective 
positions available to people or in the enabling social context. In this ‘love 
story’ gone awry, race serves as a prologue to the more extensive discussion 
of gender in the text. For example, Bron’s relationship with Sam sets up 
his later ‘failure’ with the Spike. Because Sam, the Spike, and Lawrence all 
embody the ideological positions Bron rejects, he treats them in the same 
self-centered, callused manner. Conversely, they successfully function within 
the heterotopic, egalitarian social environment of Triton. Their relationships 
with Bron, despite his shortcomings, exemplify an openness to difference he 
lacks. In this regard and in his combination of race and gender, Sam offers 
a convenient single site for discussing Bron’s subjective limitations. Sam also 
illustrates the maintenance of racial identity within the poststructuralist, 
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postmodern world of Triton. Delany’s portrayal of an individualist, 
constructed, provisional concept of race answers the challenge of African-
American literary criticism. However, like the science fiction readers of 
Trouble on Triton, the critics might be shocked, offended, and/or challenged 
by his ‘answer.’ In fact, Delany consciously intends for his portrayal of 
race to be “disturbing,” as his quote from Michel Foucault’s The Order of 
Things emphasizes: “Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they make 
it impossible to name this or that, because they shatter or tangle common 
names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax with 
which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes 
words and things (next to and also opposite one other) to ‘hold together’” 
(Trouble 292). In Trouble on Triton, race cannot be easily “named” because 
it does not “hold together” in the essentialist, collective manner desired by 
many African-American literary critics.
Delany first illustrates the limits of Bron’s point of view in his portrayal 
of Sam, a black man in his “all-male” sexually ‘unspecified’ co-op (Trouble 
27). In his unhappiness and insecurity, Bron obsessively compares himself to 
others, always aware of and manipulating power relations and jealous of any-
one who appears more ‘successful,’ better adjusted, etc. Therefore, Bron per-
sists in applying stereotypes and limiting Sam’s subjectivity through singular, 
narrow classifications. At first, Sam is “handsome, expansive, friendly with 
everyone (including Bron), even though his work kept him away eleven days 
out of every two weeks. All that bluster and backslapping? Just a standard, 
annoying type” (25). Bron even admits his “dislike” for Sam based on these 
positive personal characteristics (ibid). In addition, Sam’s physical description 
and demeanor play into common, contemporary black stereotypes. First, he 
is happy, easy-going, and almost ‘grinning’: “Sam leered hugely, jovially, and 
blackly over the rail” at the men of the co-op (ibid). Sam’s physical body is 
the focus of attention as well: “[h]e had a large, magnificent body which he 
always wore (rather pretentiously, Bron thought) naked” (ibid). The reader 
also sees “a broad, black hand” and “black fists on narrow, black hips” within 
the three short paragraphs of Sam’s entrance and introduction (ibid). Buying 
into this stereotypical portrayal of the ‘happy Negro’ and his physical attri-
butes, the reader might join Bron in his later “revelation” that “Sam was not 
so average. Under all that joviality, there was a rather amazing mind” (26). 
Similarly, when Bron concludes that Sam “was as oppressed by the system as 
anyone else,” his friend Lawrence tells him that “‘oppressed by the system’ 
was just not Sam at all: Sam was the head of the Political Liason Department 
between the Outer Satellite Diplomatic Corps and Outer Satellite Intelli-
gence; and had all the privileges [ . . . ] of both” (ibid). Sam’s subjective 
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complexity simply will not fit Bron’s narrow stereotypes then. In addition, 
Sam’s personal, social, and economic success conflicts with Bron’s negative 
readings.
When Bron is forced beyond a one-dimensional portrayal of Sam, he 
changes tactics and utilizes his standard defense mechanism of projection. 
Placing Sam in his own position, Bron surmises, “[t]he fact that Sam chose 
to live in an all-male nonspecific [co-op] probably meant that, underneath 
the friendliness, the intelligence, the power, he was probably rotten with 
neurosis; behind him would be a string of shattered communal attempts and 
failed sexualizationships” (Trouble 27). Bron’s final ‘illusion’ of Sam’s hidden 
“neurosis” is shattered by the knowledge that he is part of a family com-
mune also (ibid). Left with no areas of weakness to exploit, Bron again turns 
to projection. He confronts Sam, asking “what are you hanging out with 
a bunch of deadbeats, neurotics, mental retards, and nonaffectives like us 
for [ . . . ]? Does it make you feel superior? Do we remind you how won-
derful you are?” (ibid). Bron’s narcissism is so strong, he cannot conceive of 
personal motivations or psychological mechanisms beyond his own. Delany 
describes Bron’s “protective reaction”100 as follows: “what Bron usually does 
to justify his behaving in the selfish and hateful ways that make him such a 
hateful man is manufacture perfectly fanciful motivations for what every-
one else is doing—motivations which if they were the case, would make his 
actions acceptable” (Shorter 335). Of course, Sam again contradicts Bron’s 
projections, explaining that he comes to their co-op as a personal refuge, to 
escape politics for a while (Trouble 27). Bron is finally at an utter loss. How-
ever, rather than incorporate this new information about Sam into a larger 
understanding of and respect for the differences of others, Bron decides to 
avoid the whole issue by simply returning Sam’s friendliness (28). Bron has 
lost this particular battle, then, but not the larger subjective war, for he has 
avoided moving beyond the limits of his enclosed and defensive subjectivity. 
As Bron progresses through the text, his avoidance, projection, and self-delu-
sions must become more extreme in order to protect this monolithic, static 
subjectivity.101
In this implicit comparison between Sam and Bron, Delany places 
the white male under intense psychological scrutiny. This is an effective 
reversal of Schuyler’s and Fanon’s analyses of the black man and his troubled 
psychology. In Delany’s text, it is a white man who feels alienated from 
society, who has neuroses, who cannot build healthy sexual/romantic 
relationships and who, ultimately, turns to physical modification in an 
attempt to remedy his situation. In contrast, the black man occupies the 
center—the social, political, and economic position of privilege and power. 
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Sam seems to be genuinely happy and fulfilled as well. Thus, Delany makes 
the black man (and the woman and the homosexual) the dynamic character 
and not the traditional science fiction hero/protagonist. Unlike Bron’s stasis, 
Sam has successfully adapted to the changed physical and social environment 
of the moons. Sam, then, continues to serve as a gauge, a testing ground for 
Bron, and the reader, throughout the text. However, Delany also utilizes Sam 
to undermine essentialist concepts of race and to promote an individualist 
approach to subjectivity.
When Bron joins Sam on a political mission to Earth, he learns that 
Sam has undergone extensive physical modifications. Sam once was “a rather 
unhappy, sallow-faced, blonde, blue-eyed (and terribly myopic) waitress” 
(Trouble 126). In addition to the physical attributes of Bron’s biological sex 
change, then, Sam gained the physical characteristics associated with the 
black race: darker skin, hair color, and eye color, as well as increased muscu-
lature and possibly height. Sam reveals that her physical model was “the six-
foot plus Wallunda and Katanga emigrants who had absolutely infested the 
neighborhood” at Lux on Iapetus (ibid). Just as Bron has modified his expec-
tations, assumptions, and stereotypes about Sam, as a black man, the rug is 
pulled out from under his feet again by these revelations. Bron is shocked out 
of his complacency, as is the reader. In Schuyler’s Black No More the reader 
is always privy to the ‘origins’ of the characters, and we can laugh along with 
Disher and Schuyler at the joke played upon the ignorant (racist) whites who 
do not know Disher was once a Negro. In Delany’s text, the reader more 
immediately and, perhaps, uncomfortably, faces a thorough deconstruction 
of racial beliefs. Delany’s scene is a test, an evaluation of the extent to which 
humans continue to base identity on gender and race. Bron’s response to 
Sam’s revelation, our own response as readers, and the motivation behind 
Sam’s modification all serve as ‘evidence.’
Sam’s physical sex and race changes invert several specific social and lit-
erary norms. First, we see another unhappy white person who turns to physi-
cal modification for help. Similar to Bron in this respect, Sam differs in the 
racial modification and the subsequent success of her changes. Therefore, in 
the context of race, Sam is more similar to Schuyler’s character Max Disher. 
The inversion in this case is the race which is linked to personal happiness 
and a successful career. Sam’s decision to change into the likeness of a black 
man brings sexual and romantic satisfaction, social acceptance, economic 
affluence, and political power and prestige. In this way, Delany builds on the 
general inversion of racial norms at the end of Black No More, when whites 
tan to make themselves look fashionably darker, and he clearly avoids an 
assimilationist label for his character.102 Sam’s motivation for her sex and race 
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changes also modifies Schuyler’s portrayal of inter-racial couples. Both Max 
Disher and Sam are attracted to white women, and their racial modifications 
spring from a desire to fit the romantic/sexual ideal of these women. As Sam 
relays, she had “a penchant for other sallow, blonde, blue-eyed waitresses, 
who, as far as the young and immature me could make out then, were just 
gaga over the six-foot-plus Wallunda and Katanga emigrants” (Trouble 126). 
Delany plays on the social taboo of sexual and romantic relationships between 
white women and black men, as does Schuyler. However, Delany reverses the 
site of the attraction, the agency in the coupling, from the black men to the 
white women. It is the white waitresses in Delany’s example who desire the 
black emigrants. Furthermore, Sam’s subsequent success with white women 
seems to affirm her earlier belief about their desire for black men. Bron meets 
a “blonde, blue-eyed woman [ . . . who] was part of Sam’s family com-
mune,” for example, and Bron herself makes a play for Sam at the end of the 
novel (128).
Sam’s racial modification illustrates her openness to difference and 
change as well. Both Sam and Bron undergo a physical sex change, but 
Bron’s change springs from a desperate need to maintain the same, to create 
an appropriate Eve for her anachronistic Adam. Sam’s change stems from 
desire, and she will incorporate any difference in order to more easily fulfill 
that desire. In his autobiographical writings and in his fictional texts, Delany 
privileges desire. First, it stands on its own as a defining element of subjectiv-
ity:
I am the sweeping tapestry of my sensory and bodily perceptions. I am 
their linguistic reduction and abstraction, delayed and deferred till they 
form a wholly different order, called my thought. I am, at the behest 
and prompting of all these, my memory—which forms still another 
order. I am the emotions that hold them together. Webbing the four, 
and finally, I am the flux and filigree of desire around them all. (Longer 
150)
The strong and pervasive influence of desire also fosters contact with Others. 
Sam, for example, successfully manipulates the desire of the white women 
for a racial, national, and sexual Other. As Robert Elliot Fox asserts in the 
context of Delany’s pornographic novel, The Tides of Lust, “[t]he sexual plane 
becomes the level on which opposites literally come together” (“Politics” 
53).103 In his autobiographical writings, Delany also describes large groups 
of men, from different racial and economic backgrounds, gathering to ful-
fill homosexual desire. In The Motion of Light in Water, for instance, Delany 
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describes his multiple sexual experiences in a group of trailers; a particu-
larly detailed narrative includes two men, one white and one black (130–1). 
Even in the meeting places that predominantly drew men from a particu-
lar racial or national group, a variety of racial and economic characteristics 
are described: “a young man, white, with dark hair, of about twenty-five, 
who usually wore a suitjacket—in a population largely black and Hispanic 
and usually in jeans and sport shirts” (Longer 120). Delany’s more long-term 
relationship with Bob Folsom also fits this pattern of desire-motivated con-
nection with economic, racial, and/or geographic Others.104 Finally, Delany 
fictionally combines this more short-term sexual and long-term ‘romantic’ 
desire in the couple of Marq Dyeth and Rat Korga in his 1984 novel Stars in 
My Pocket Like Grains of Sand. Carl Freedman specifically discusses their rela-
tionship in the context of “how desire functions as cognition in the compre-
hension (in some sense) of difference” (161). In these varying social contexts, 
both fictional and non-fiction, desire promotes communication, integration, 
and more egalitarian relationships.
The success of Sam’s modification also stems from the compatibility of 
her change with the larger social norms. Unlike Bron, Sam’s change dramati-
cally increases her chances of finding a satisfactory partner. These subjec-
tive and social differences converge in the idea of a heterotopia. Both Bron’s 
and Sam’s incorporation of the (sexual and/or racial) Other in their physical 
bodies symbolizes the already existing multiplicity of their subjective posi-
tions, a multiplicity based on a fragmentation into multiple categories—like 
race, sex, and gender—and also the “range of possibilities” within each of 
these larger, ideological categories (Trouble 50). Delany’s multiple subjective 
positions in his autobiography, for example, reflect some of these larger cat-
egories. The full “range of possibilities” within each category can be seen in 
the further breakdown in Triton society into “forty or fifty different sexes, 
falling loosely into nine categories” (Trouble 99). Delany vividly conveys this 
categorical multiplicity and complexity through a visual evaluation of Bron’s 
sexuality: “‘You could be a male who is partway through one of a number of 
possible sex-change processes. Or you could be a female who is much further 
along in a number of other sex change operations [ . . . ;] you might have 
begun as a woman, been changed to male, and now want to be changed to—
something else [ . . . ;] Or [ . . . ] you could be a woman in very good 
drag’” (Trouble 219). Bron, of course, rejects such multiplicity and ambiguity 
of sexuality and gender.
The same type of visual ambiguity applies to color, a primary charac-
teristic of race. As a preface to the more detailed and direct account of a mul-
tiple sexuality (above), Bron discusses the ‘whiteness’ of the Taj Mahal with 
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a character specifically identified as of African descent: “‘The significance 
of “white,” like the significance of any other word, is a range of possibilities. 
Like the color itself, the significance fades quite imperceptibly on one side 
through gray toward black, and on another through pink toward red, and 
so on, all the way around, toward every other color; and even toward some 
things that aren’t colors at all’” (Trouble 50). White, like black or any other 
color, cannot be discretely named and contained. The same principle applies 
to a name or category like “‘white’” or “black,” denoting a human race. Of 
course, the irony of Bron’s elaborate and knowledgeable, theoretical lecture 
lies in his racism in personal practice. While he possesses a ‘logical’ under-
standing of the heterotopic nature of subjectivity, his narcissism and need for 
status prevent any direct and practical application of this knowledge to his 
own subjectivity. Thus, even his sex and psychological changes are an ineffec-
tual ‘rebellion’ because Bron cannot admit the multiplicity, dispersion, and 
ambiguity of his own subjectivity—before and after the changes. As a result, 
Bron breaks down into “real psychosis” at the end of the novel, alone and 
locked within her room (Shorter 338).
Within the heterotopic society of Triton, individuals can literally 
construct their subjectivity through physical and psychological modifications. 
This “mutability and freeplay” is based in the founding principle of Triton 
society—subjective inviolability (Freedman 159). This great political = 
personal freedom combines with the technological advances of Triton 
to afford the type of individuality Delany promotes in the Beckerman 
interview. In contrast to identitarianism, Delany believes “[d]ifference is 
what makes us individual” (Beckerman).105 Sam is an excellent example 
of a heterotopic, mutable individuality and an embodiment of Tritonian 
subjective inviolability. Sam first illustrates her refusal to be limited to a 
single, essential identity through her physical changes. In changing both her 
sex and race, Sam mirrors an earlier exchange between Bron and the Spike. 
When Bron comes to pick up the Spike clothed completely in black attire and 
a black mask, she responds by enveloping herself from head to toe in a white 
costume. The Spike tells Bron, “Now [ . . . ] we can roam the labyrinths 
of honesty and deceit, searching out the illusive centers of our being by a 
detailed examination of the shift and glitter of our own, protean surfaces”; 
“Now, proofed in light and light’s absence, we can begin our wonderings” 
(Trouble 98). Readers enter into a similar process of investigation, and they 
might question the concepts of “honesty and deceit,” as Bron does, when 
discovering Sam’s former identity. The readers too must “search out the 
illusive center of [Sam’s] being” because “of the shift and glitter of [her] 
protean surface.” When race and sex become like costumes, taken on and 
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off at will, any form of essentialist identity is impossible. A costume is an 
apt analogy for Sam’s physical changes because of their mutual grounding 
in a playful, individual concept of race as well. Delany joins Schuyler in 
emphasizing an individual rather than collective racial identity. In Trouble on 
Triton, race can take the form of personal expression.106
This racial individuality highlights the cultural basis of race. First, Sam’s 
personal changes rely on larger cultural conceptions of race; she modifies her 
color and musculature in order to fit a particular racial image. Therefore, in 
keeping with the costume analogy, Sam performs the part of a black man, 
physically and psychologically. These complex intersections of culture, biol-
ogy, and race bring up the issue of racial authenticity. While Sam ‘imitates’ the 
African immigrants physically, and perhaps psychologically as well, she biologi-
cally modifies her body and her imitation is a success. Therefore, Sam lives the 
daily reality of a black man. When Lawrence notes the common oppression of 
women, in opposition to men, he raises the possibility of authenticity being 
based in a shared cultural experience(s) (Trouble 212). Thus, even though Sam 
has not always been black, his subsequent cultural experiences as a black man 
could accurately place him within that racial category. Bron’s racial othering 
suggests that racial prejudice still exists, although rare in the Outer Satel-
lites. Delany qualifies an either/or racial categorization, however. While Sam 
becomes a black man, he cannot erase his past as a white woman. After her sex 
change, for example, Bron protests that she does not feel “all the time, every 
minute, a complete and whole woman” (249–50). Her counselor responds,
“being a woman is also a complicated genetic interface. It means having 
that body of yours from birth, and growing up in the world, learning to 
do whatever you do—psychological counseling in my case, or metalogics 
in yours—with and within that body. That body has to be yours, and 
yours all your life. In that sense, you never will be a ‘complete’ woman. 
We can do a lot here; we can make you a woman from a given time on. 
We cannot make you have been a woman for all the time you were a 
man.” (251)
Bron’s dissatisfaction with her sex change stems from her obsession with 
singularity and wholeness. She still resists a multiple subjectivity, even if it is 
experientially based. In Sam’s case, he is ‘authentically’ a black man, “from a 
given time on” only. However, in her acceptance of difference, her motivation 
of desire, and the relative lack of racial prejudice on Triton, Sam does not 
feel Bron’s need for a single sexual or racial categorization. This “free play,” 
in opposition to rigid, static dichotomies, is what makes Sam an attractive 
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subjective alternative to Bron and Triton a potentially attractive social 
alternative to Earth (Freedman 159).
In the reality of fluctuation, Delany highlights the contextual basis of 
sexual or racial identity, similar to his personal definition of gay identity. This 
changing context has serious implications for cultural theories of race. First, 
it raises the possibility of a diminishment of racial prejudice and oppression 
over time, as on Triton. Prejudice based on the human races, as we know them 
today, might disappear entirely or be subverted to another group. With a com-
mon oppression, or any other cultural factor(s), as the basis for racial identity, 
such changes would threaten its very existence. Also, racial identity based in 
common oppression maintains the ‘racial problem’ argument and does not 
afford an affirmative utilization of race. Octavia Butler, for instance, objected 
to the overwhelmingly negative response to a proposed “anthology of science 
fiction by and about black people”: “Most of the stories that we got [ . . . ] 
were about racism, as though that was the sum total of our lives. Especially, 
and I hate to say it, all the stories we got from white people were about racism 
because that was all they apparently thought that we dealt with” (“Black” 18). 
Finally, both a diminishment of oppression and a positive valuation of race 
highlight the variability of personal experience. Basing racial identity on com-
mon oppression, then, relies on a false totalization, a reduction of multiple, 
varying racial experiences into a single, normative racial identity. Within this 
context, all blacks who seek racial authenticity must enact the cultural char-
acteristics related to race in their society. They must also suppress individual 
differences or cultural anomalies.107
Delany explores the viability of a purely cultural theory of race through 
Sam, but also offers a more traditional example of black identity through a 
woman of African descent named Miriamne. First, through Sam, Delany 
answers a challenge later articulated by Walter Benn Michaels in Our America: 
Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism (1995):
If race really were culture, people could change their racial identity, sib-
lings could belong to different races, people who were as genetically unlike 
each other as it’s possible for two humans to be could nonetheless belong 
to the same race. None of these things is possible in the United States 
today. And, were they possible, we would think not that we had finally 
succeeded in developing an anti-essentialist account of race but that we 
had given up the idea of race altogether. (133–4)
Obviously Sam does change her racial identity, and the concept of race is 
maintained. Furthermore, Sam’s openness to racial and sexual changes 
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reflects a larger multiplicity of identity. When Lawrence contradicts Bron’s 
erroneous, simplistic judgments of Sam, we learn of Sam’s multiple inter-
ests, relationships, and categories. Not content with a single commune, for 
example, Sam has multiple, diverse living arrangements. Most importantly, 
Sam’s active, voluntary participation in the subjective and social heterotopia 
Delany creates results in a very different personal outcome than Bron. In 
contrast to Bron’s social isolation and subjective failure, Sam ends the text in 
the midst of a busy nightclub, happily trying to “get laid” (Trouble 262).
While Sam represents the great and positive potential of subjec-
tive inviolability on Triton, Delany also includes a character representing 
a more traditional racial identity. Bron meets a woman named Miriamne 
who not only fits the physical description for black identity (“dark and 
frizzy-haired”), but also offers a contrast to the other characters in her open 
acknowledgement of her personal background (Trouble 45). When Bron 
asks her how she takes her coffee, for example, Miriamne responds, “Black 
[ . . . ] as my old lady [ . . .—] That’s what my father always used to say. 
[ . . . ] My mother was from Earth—Kenya, actually; and I’ve been try-
ing to live it down ever since” (48). Miriamne’s comment about “living it 
down” might refer to racial prejudice. Within Triton social norms, however, 
it more likely refers to the social taboo of mentioning personal background, 
especially ties to the more conservative societies on the planets. Tritonian 
subjective inviolability means people can construct an identity, a life any 
way they desire, without direct reference to prior experiences. Bron’s men-
tal response to Miriamne’s comments supports this more general reading. 
Certainly capable of racist stereotypes and vocabulary, Bron simply thinks, 
“Typical u-l [unlicensed zone or person living in this area] . . . always 
talking about where they come from, where their families started” (ibid). 
Furthermore, Delany uses their dialogue to first introduce this social 
norm: Bron “never” talks about his own parents “in concession to a code 
of politeness almost universal outside the u-l that, once he had realized it 
existed, he’d found immensely reassuring” (49). The subjective inviolability 
of Triton, then, provides a space for Sam’s successful changes, but it also 
suppresses personal history and descent. Only persons living in the zone 
explicitly outside of Triton laws, and social norms more generally, comfort-
ably speak of their personal background. Thus, this social and subjective 
freedom is a double-edged sword. Like the terrestrial New World, Triton 
offers equality and unprecedented opportunities to ‘make oneself,’ but only 
if you are willing to give up the past and your previous identity and/or 
status within it. Bron is a negative example of someone unwilling to do 
this; Miriamne is a more positive example. While she is apparently less 
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well-off financially than Bron, Miriamne is clearly the sympathetic victim 
of Bron’s sexual jealousy and not the target of Delany’s authorial criticism. 
Furthermore, Miriamne may live in the u-l, but she has the freedom to 
maintain connections to her past, including racial affiliations. In this way, 
Delany illustrates the possibility of primarily cultural and descent-based 
theories of race existing simultaneously, and without apparent conflict, in 
a given social context. Finally, Miriamne’s emphasis on descent parallels 
Sam’s physical alterations. Delany does not completely divorce race from 
the body.
Walter Benn Michaels’ racial analysis also reveals the limitations or 
impartial nature of Delany’s cultural concept of race. While mutable, race 
remains tied to the physical body. Like Schuyler, Delany uses modern tech-
nology to ‘construct’ racial identity through physical elements. Advances in 
scientific understanding of the body allow Delany to expand on Schuyler’s 
‘cosmetic’ changes as well. Delany also explores the complex connections 
between the physical body and subjectivity. In contrast to both the earlier 
writing of Schuyler and the later writing of Octavia Butler, Delany explores 
how subjective elements lead to physical changes and, conversely, how 
physical changes impact a person’s subjectivity. Schuyler and Butler explore 
diverse racial bodies, but leave a static, essentialist subjectivity intact.108
In Triton’s society, changes are both physical and psychological. 
Delany begins by explicitly acknowledging the importance of culture in 
a quote from Mary Douglas prefacing Trouble on Triton: “the social body 
constrains the way the physical body is perceived”—by others and by the 
individual. The social/cultural half of the racial debate has been largely 
covered already. In Longer Views, Delany stresses a more balanced role for 
the physical body:
I am the sweeping tapestry of my sensory and bodily perceptions. I 
am their linguistic reduction and abstraction, delayed and deferred 
till they form a wholly different order, called my thought. I am, at 
the behest and prompting of all these, my memory—which forms 
still another order. I am the emotions that hold them together. Web-
bing the four, and finally, I am the flux and filigree of desire around 
them all. [ . . . ] Am I the sexual surge and ebb that cannot quite be 
covered by any of the above, but that impinge on all the others and 
often drown them? What of the bodily apparati in general, as they fall, 
pleasingly or painfully, into the net of myself? I am always an animal 
excess to the intellectual system that tries to construct me. I am always 
a conscious sensibility in excess of the animal construction that is I. 
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And that is why I am another, why my identity is always other than 
I. (150)
First, “[S]ensory and bodily perceptions” begin and ground Delany’s sub-
jectivity. In addition, “desire” and this “sexual surge and ebb” seem to be 
partially based in “the bodily apparati.” More generally, this “animal excess” 
suggests a power and autonomy beyond containment by the mind. Thus, 
although we only get a very brief synopsis of the changes Sam undergoes 
as a result of the physical modification, the drastic improvement in his 
general situation suggests they are quite radical, with psychological, emo-
tional, social, as well as physical effects. Similarly, after Bron’s sexual modi-
fication, she changes not only in physical circumstances (literally having 
corporeal changes, having to change abodes, etc.), but also psychologically. 
Delany illustrates the intimate connection between a person’s body and 
psyche through the racial and sexual changes of Sam and Bron. In doing 
so, he enters into a debate between “essentialists and constructionists” over 
the importance of the body to subjectivity (Fuss 53). Fuss, for example, 
discusses Adrienne Rich’s “distinction [ . . . ] between the body and my 
body [ . . . ] as a useful place to begin the project of reintroducing biol-
ogy, the body as matter, back into poststructuralist materialist discourse” 
(Fuss 52). Fuss joins Delany in asserting a balance between the body and 
culture: we “cannot ignore the role social practices play in organizing and 
imaging ‘the body,’ but nor can [we] overlook the role ‘my body’ plays in 
the constitution of subjectivity” (Fuss 52).
Fox places this body/mind debate with the larger context of global 
culture and the dichotomies of western civilization. Acknowledging Dela-
ny’s quotation of Douglas, Fox situates Douglas’ analysis specifically within 
“the West” and contrasts it to “traditional societies” in which “the physical 
self gives articulate expression to the social” (“Politics” 51). Katherine Fish-
burn similarly links such “embodiment” to African-Americans and their 
narratives (xii). First, Fishburn believes that,
the indisputable fact of their embodiment in a culture that valued the 
mind at the expense of the debased body faced these early writers with 
two interrelated narrative dilemmas. One was how to demonstrate their 
own capacity to reason without minimizing the physical horrors of 
enslavement, the accounts of which were necessary to the abolitionist 
cause. The other, which is the obverse of the first, was how to dem-
onstrate the fact that, however imbued with reason they already were, 
African Americans still needed a fundamental change in their material 
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circumstances if they were ever to achieve their full human potential. 
(ibid)
In addition, trying “to elude the dualistic thinking that separates mind from 
body, by valorizing mind over body,” Fishburn realized the “importance of the 
body to slaves and ex-slaves” (ibid). The African-Americans, in effect, “were 
not trying to write themselves into Western metaphysics as equal to whites, 
but were instead, more radically and daringly, rethinking metaphysics itself ” 
(ibid). This is the mind/body, West/traditional society, white/Other dichot-
omy to which Fox refers and which Delany questions in his texts. As a result, 
Delany’s complex balance between the body and subjectivity takes part in 
a larger African-American challenge to the western hierarchy of the mind 
over and in opposition to the body.109 While Fishburn specifically refers to 
early African-American writers, a similar focus on the body inspires the racial 
essentialism of later critics of African-American literature.
BEYOND DELANY
Within science fiction, Schuyler and Butler join Delany in utilizing the body 
as a site of racial exploration. However, their psychic essentialism obscures 
the effect(s) of the body on subjectivity. In Schuyler’s Black No More, for 
example, little seems to change about Disher’s personality when he becomes a 
white man. Schuyler focuses on how the world perceives Disher and how his 
exterior circumstances change. Likewise, in Butler’s Patternmaster series,110 
Doro ‘body hops’ for centuries. Originally an African male, Doro inexplica-
bly and frequently transfers his mind/spirit from one body to another. The 
‘hosts’ die a spiritual death, and Doro ‘occupies’ the male, female, young, 
old, African, African-American, European, and/or Anglo-American bod-
ies. However, each body Doro possesses seems to be little more than a tem-
porary host (perhaps because he does not occupy any for very long), and 
his personality surprisingly does not change. Unlike Sam’s undetected (i.e. 
successful) racial transformation, Doro is consistently portrayed as a black 
man. He usually occupies black male bodies when he is physically present 
in the narrative, for example. While Butler frequently mentions his other 
female and/or Anglo bodies, these bodies are generally occupied ‘off stage’ 
or quickly discarded. Furthermore, Doro identifies himself as a black man, 
despite having transferred from his original body when only a teenager. Both 
of these factors result in the other characters perceiving him as a black man 
as well. They are shocked, surprised, or unsettled when he occupies a white 
body. For example, Doro’s daughter Mary is relieved when he visits her in a 
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black male body because when he came in a white body, “All [she] saw was 
this big stranger sitting on the side of [her] bed” (Butler, Mind 20). Likewise, 
Doro seduces Anyanwu, the protagonist of Wild Seed, by choosing a black 
male body he knows will please her (225–6; 233). The texts as a whole sup-
port the characters’ perceptions as well. Unlike Delany’s careful and accurate 
use of the correct pronoun, Butler always uses a masculine pronoun in refer-
ence to Doro.111 In these ways, Butler creates a much greater disconnection 
between the body and the mind/soul/emotions than either Schuyler or par-
ticularly Delany. In fact, the larger plot of the Patternmaster series, with its 
telepathic theme, emphasizes the mind and its independence from the body.
Doro’s example is supported by the other main character of Wild Seed, 
Anyanwu. Born an African woman, Anyanwu can modify her existing physi-
cal body to become every type of person that Doro can, plus take animal 
form. Yet, her psyche also remains remarkably stable considering these radi-
cal physical changes. As she explains to Doro, “you have not understood how 
completely that one body can change. I cannot leave it as you can, but I can 
make it over. I can make it over so completely in the image of someone else 
that I am no longer truly related to my parents. It makes me wonder what I 
am—that I can do this and still know myself, still return to my true shape” 
(Butler, Wild 194). She tells Doro that the body of a young, dark-skinned 
African woman is “the shape [which] flows back to [her] most easily. Others 
are harder to take” (13). Unlike the genetic changes of Sam or Bron, then, 
Anyanwu retains an original, more authentic “true shape.”
When comparing Butler’s Patternmaster series to Delany’s Trouble on 
Triton, Butler’s treatment of the body initially seems the most destructive 
to any concept of race. The corporeal flux is overwhelming, almost a ‘small 
world’ of bodies, and Doro and Anyanwu travel throughout the globe and 
live for centuries so there remains no historical or cultural similarity on 
which to base race either. Yet, both characters are consistently portrayed 
as a black man and a black woman psychically, and this psychic configura-
tion influences their choices of physical form. There seems to be a form 
of psychic essentialism at work here, with racial and sexual connotations. 
The lack of logical explanation or scientific grounding for the changes of 
the two characters only reinforces this essentialism. Doro does not undergo 
a physical operation to ‘construct’ a race; he simply is. In this context, no 
matter how often a body is modified or completely replaced, or in which 
culture a person lives, he/she will always maintain the same racialized and 
sexualized identity. In contrast, Delany has a much more complicated, 
extensive (and realistic, in my opinion) view of the implications of even 
constructed notions of race. He explores how physically changing a ‘race’ 
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(i.e., taking on the exterior features associated with a particular ‘race’) 
would impact the “intellectual system” of an individual in ways Schuyler 
and Butler neglect (Delany, Longer 150).
Contemporary science fiction writer Marge Piercy takes Butler’s dis-
sociation of race and the human body one step further. One of science 
fiction’s most radical reinterpretations of race consciousness involves the 
postulation of societies in which the culturally-constructed aspects of race(s) 
are explicitly assumed by groups other than those historically attached to 
them. Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976), for example, describes 
a society which takes up the challenge Walter Benn Michaels offers at the 
end of Our America: Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism, namely that “[i]f 
race really were culture, people could change their racial identity, siblings 
could belong to different races, people who were as genetically unlike each 
other as it’s possible for two humans to be could nonetheless belong to the 
same race” (133–4). In Piercy’s text, a Mexican-American woman, Connie 
or Consuelo, mind travels to the future and visits a society in which,
“Decisions were made forty years back to breed a high proportion of 
darker-skinned people and to mix the genes well through the popu-
lation. At the same time, we decided to hold on to separate cultural 
identities. But we broke the bond between genes and culture, broke it 
forever. We want there to be no chance of racism again. But we don’t 
want the melting pot where everybody ends up with thin gruel. We 
want diversity, for strangeness breeds richness.” (Woman 103–4)
In the village Connie visits most often, a black man tells her that the 
“‘Wamponaug Indians are the source of our flavor of culture. Our past. 
Every village has a culture’” (96). When Connie implies that his association 
with this culture must be the result of poor self-esteem and a racial inferiority 
complex, he tells her of another nearby village: “‘I have a sweet friend liv-
ing in Cranberry dark as I am and her tribe is Harlem-Black. I could move 
there anytime. But if you go over, you won’t find everybody black-skinned 
like her and me, any more than they’re all tall or all got big feet’” (ibid). 
Furthermore, while generally people remain most attached to the “culture” 
in which they were raised, “[w]hen you grow up [ . . . ,] you can fuse into 
another” (104). Michaels asserts that in such a situation, “we would think 
not that we had finally succeeded in developing an anti-essentialist account 
of race but that we had given up the idea of race altogether” (134). Indeed, 
ethnicity might be a more appropriate term for the cultural connection Con-
nie encounters. Piercy never actually uses the word ‘race’ in her text (only 
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racism). However, when Connie speaks of “black Irishmen” and “black Chi-
nese,” it is clear that notions of race are being invoked (104).
Piercy’s maintenance of racial connotations serves several functions. 
First, the reader, like Connie, is forced to confront the situatedness of our 
racial concepts. If we choose to foreground the “constitutive differences—
cultural specificity, group history, political position”—of races, as Tucker 
does, we would likely reject Piercy’s reconceptualization of race conscious-
ness because it purposely and rather randomly scrambles the cultural signi-
fier and the physical signified (“Can” 148).112 In fact, Piercy is creating new 
kinship groups to replace the old. A revision of Werner Soller’s terminology 
becomes helpful here as we depart from natural childbirth altogether; Piercy’s 
futuristic society operates along familial lines of ‘new descent.’ While consent 
can be a factor, the society is characterized by a general focus on descent. In 
addition, Piercy’s ‘race consciousness’ becomes not only an awareness of how 
race has historically operated, as in Schuyler and Fanon, but also advocacy of 
race’s positive “power to shape human lives in a very real way” (Tucker, “Can” 
148). Where the other authors deconstruct (biological) race in order to work 
towards a (politically, socially, ideologically, and culturally) ‘raceless’ society 
or, at most, a society with an individualist concept of race, Piercy revises race 
in a positive, collective context.
Margaret St. Clair does something very similar in The Dancers of Noyo 
(1973), where the culture of the Pomo Indians of California is taken up by 
Euro-American ‘hippies’ and their descendents. Through a ‘performance’ of 
the Pomo Indian culture, the Euro-Americans experience an ‘authentic’ spiri-
tual vision which connects them with the original Indian inhabitants of the 
land (and symbolizes a validation of their tie to the culture). A ‘new descent’ 
is established here also. In this sense, Piercy’s and St. Clair’s texts foreground 
a purely cultural concept of race or ethnicity, but establish a new physical 
tie as well. The vocabulary of village, tribe, and family associated with his-
torical and biological concepts of race is retained. In this way, Piercy and St. 
Clair parallel the ‘carry-over’ of Butler’s psychic essentialism and Schuyler 
and Delany’s continued utilization of the body. In their widely-varying racial 
revisions, Piercy, St. Clair, Butler, and Delany embody Schuyler’s paradoxical 
position of focusing on race, but in such a way that the concept is radically 
redefined and revalued.
The proliferation of racial issues in contemporary science fiction, and 
the ease with which science fiction lends itself to such discussions, coun-
ters Houston A. Baker’s uneasiness about a neglect (or discarding) of race 
in the context of science and technology and an emphasis on its construc-
tion. Certainly, ‘Race’ has not been ‘erased’ by the quotation marks placed 
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around it in the field of science fiction. A new group of writers focusing on 
race in science fiction and fantasy includes Neal Stephenson, Steven Barnes, 
Nalo Hopkinson, and Mike Resnick.113 Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash pro-
duced quite a splash in the science fiction community in 1992. His emphasis 
on technology and its intersection with ethnicity compares favorably with 
Marge Piercy’s 1991 novel, He, She, and It. Stephenson and Piercy use cyber-
space, cyborgs, and robots to investigate the complex construction of racial 
subjectivity in a postmodern era.114 In their focus on technology and com-
puterization, both authors develop issues generally eschewed by Butler and 
only briefly discussed by Delany.115
Philip E.Baruth’s critical discussion of Stephenson’s Snowcrash, pub-
lished in Into Darkness Peering: Race and Color in the Fantastic, raises several 
questions important to this new area of extrapolation. Joining other critics 
from the anthology, Baruth emphasizes the utopian possibilities of the fantas-
tic/science fiction, particularly in the context of computerization. He asserts 
that Snowcrash “experiments with the notion that racism itself may have a 
historical half-life, and that the process of its extinction may in fact be accel-
erated by out-of-body interaction and the shared computer protocols that 
make such interaction possible” (117). However, when Baruth calls the “nov-
el’s climactic match-up” between Hiro Protagonist and Raven, both “histori-
cal victims” of color, one of “dueling identity politics” (115) and admits that, 
within the novel, “skin color and nationality are all but beside the point” 
(116), he raises but does not discuss two important issues. First, if Stephenson 
has “moved aside the persistent question of race to expose the more pervasive 
question of the world’s uneven distribution of wealth,” how does this impact 
the intersections of subjectivity, politics, and race (117)? More specifically, 
how might a person of color form a personal and/or political identity without 
race as a viable concept? As Tucker maintains, “[a]ttacks on identity politics 
[ . . . ] are attacks on the conceptual tools that raced groups, women, and 
sexual minorities have used to recognize and organize themselves in order 
to critique, to speak back to a centered subjectivity that does not need an 
‘identity politics’ because they have not had an identity imposed upon them” 
(Sense 24). Tucker also believes that “given the value of race pride as suste-
nance and a shield against continuing attacks on black humanity, [he] does 
not see African Americans opting out of identity because of its constructed or 
phantasmagorical nature any time real soon” (27). Within this context, the 
physical world of Hiro comes into shaper focus; even if Stephenson offers the 
Metaverse as a more socially progressive version of reality, with racism and its 
consequences lessened, Hiro still physically lives in a “‘U-Stor-It’” and kills 
racist whites (114). A second issue raised by Baruth’s criticism, then, is the 
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connections between race, class, and technology. In blithely substituting class 
for race in terms of the “black-and-whites” and their access to technology, 
both Stephenson and Baruth elide these connections. We need to consider 
who has access to computers and advanced technology and in what contexts? 
Furthermore, this issue is not just about money, but cultural values as well. 
For example, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. claims that even with a consistent class, 
race can be a powerful influence on the level of interest in the computer and 
the motivation to utilize it (“One”).116
Finally, Stephenson constructs a facile, Anglo-biased image of Western 
imperialism. Despite his physical hardships, Hiro tells Raven, “‘I understand 
the depths of your feelings [ . . . b]ut don’t you think you’ve had enough 
revenge?’“ (448). When Raven refuses to forgive the historical oppression of 
his people, Hiro ends up killing him to ‘save the world.’ Within this “duel” 
of “identity politics,” then, Hiro’s great magnanimity is the first issue; unlike 
Tucker’s general assertions above, Hiro does choose to largely “opt[ . . . ] 
out of identity” (Sense 27). More importantly, however, he feels compelled 
to kill his alter-ego. Within the historical context of racism and oppression, 
making the assimilated, forgiving victim battle and kill the threatening, 
vengeful victim offers too easy a reconciliation of past wrongs for Anglos. 
The perpetrators of these wrongs do not need to acknowledge, ask forgive-
ness for, and/or make reparations for their actions. Basically, the victims 
‘battle’ it out—one losing his life and the other becoming a murderer—and 
the perpetrators reap the benefit. For this reason and the issues mentioned 
above, I do not think Tucker would find Stephenson’s portrayal of a cyber-
based subjectivity an acceptable “alternative” to contemporary identity poli-
tics (Sense 27).117 Stephenson’s portrayal of imperialism and its legacy is facile 
and the intersection of ethnicity with technology is under-developed. None-
theless, investigation of this new area of science fiction is sorely needed. As 
the promotions for Snowcrash attest, the novel is an “apotheosis of the infor-
mation age,” a “future America [ . . . ] you’ll recognize [ . . . ] immedi-
ately.” More broadly, the global, cyber focus of cyberpunk can work to lessen 
the importance of particular ethnic/racial/national groups, similar to science 
fiction generally. Yet, unlike science fiction generally, the global focus also 
necessitates at least a token acknowledgment of such groups. In this tension, 
cyberpunk continues the contradictory stance of most earlier texts dealing 
with race—visibly highlighting race while simultaneously undermining its 
contemporary usage.
In addition to Stephenson’s cyberpunk, Steven Barnes and Nalo 
Hopkinson illustrate a second new trend in science fiction: the incorporation 
of magical realism and the marketing of ethnic fiction within the science 
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fiction genre. Barnes began his series on Aubrey Knight in 1989 with Gorgon 
Child and continued with Firedance in 1994. He also wrote Blood Brothers in 
1996.118 While Barnes utilizes high technology/science in the Knight series 
(genetics in particular), he primarily focuses on magic and the supernatural in 
Blood Brothers. The text is similar to Octavia Butler’s Kindred in the focus on 
slavery and the moral dilemmas involved in cooperating with slave owners, as 
well as the use of time travel. However, in his violently supernatural approach 
to the theme, Barnes comes closer to horror fiction than science fiction in 
the text. Labeled and marketed as science fiction regardless, Blood Brothers 
is a good candidate for the speculative fiction label. While rejected by some 
readers/critics, speculative fiction can be a useful term.119 In its more inclusive 
boundaries, it would more accurately describe some multi-generic texts and 
larger oeuvres. In fact, author Charles Johnson calls Barnes’ 2002 book, 
Lion’s Blood, “speculative fiction” in the review excerpt at the beginning of 
the text.120 A similar option is the ‘fantastic’ generic label. Within the library 
cataloging system, for example, Blood Brothers is labeled “fantastic fiction,” 
rather than science fiction. Likewise, a prominent science fiction, fantasy, 
and horror organization is collectively titled the International Association for 
the Fantastic in the Arts. While better than an all-inclusive science fiction 
label for oeuvres like Barnes,’ the ‘fantastic’ generic label (as well as magical 
realism) has a drawback which the speculative fiction label does not; it lies 
further away from mundane fiction on a generic spectrum.121 Going beyond 
the paraliterary, a speculative fiction label could also help foster connections 
between fiction currently labeled mundane, like Toni Morrison’s Beloved, 
and (supposedly) science fiction texts like Barnes’ Blood Brothers. Like a 
multi-generic labeling for Schuyler, the point of making such connections 
is not to try and ‘legitimate’ science fiction, but to be as accurate as possible 
in categorization and also open more doors for readers, critics, and writers. 
Why might not a reader of Morrison’s text also appreciate Butler’s, Barnes,’ 
or Hopkinson’s, or vice versa?
Yet, a reader looking at the cover of Nalo Hopkinson’s Brown Girl in 
the Ring would be hard-pressed to make such a connection because she fits 
a similar template to Barnes. Hopkinson has written many short stories, 
as well as two novels—Brown Girl in the Ring (1998) and Midnight Rob-
ber (2000).122 She utilizes little science or technology, relying instead upon 
magic, rituals, and supernatural characters. However, the cover of Brown Girl 
in the Ring specifically identifies the text as science fiction in three ways: the 
label on the spine, the explanation about Hopkinson winning the Warner 
Aspect search for “science fiction’s voices of the future,” and the endorsement 
by Octavia Butler. In this case, the positive reputation of science fiction is 
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being utilized to garner an established audience, more specifically, the audi-
ence built up by Butler over many years and many texts. This is the type of 
reader ‘advertisement’ between paraliterary and mundane fiction that would 
be useful to readers searching for new reading material and writers/publish-
ers looking for the widest possible audience for a text. In particular, these 
types of marketing and categorical connections could help foster connections 
between the African American literary community and the science fiction 
community.
Mike Resnick also joins Barnes and Hopkinson in the 1990s. His por-
trayal of a futuristic African-inspired community sparked some controversy 
in 1998 because he challenges the validity of racial authenticity. The fact 
that Barnes, Hopkinson, and Resnick all significantly utilize Africa in their 
texts highlights the racial inversion that has taken place in the field; the racial 
focus which had to be suppressed in the past, now is a primary marketing 
feature of this developing branch of science fiction.123 These newer authors 
can emphasize ethnicity and integrate African studies and science fiction 
to a much greater degree than either Delany or Butler at the time of their 
entrance in the field. Indeed, if Hopkinson is one of “science fiction’s voices 
of future,” than such fiction should continue to grow in size and prosperity. 
The fact that Hopkinson’s second novel, Midnight Robber, was “a finalist for 
the Hugo and Nebula awards” supports such a prediction.124
The increasing number of science fiction authors utilizing race/eth-
nicity in their texts, in turn, will promote critical growth and an expanded 
readership. Into Darkness Peering: Race and Color in the Fantastic (1997) is 
a promising start, but as its editor, Elisabeth Anne Leonard, asserts, “I am 
aware that there are still many holes, many works to be discussed [ . . . ]. 
I have [ . . . ] seen this anthology as an opportunity to begin a discussion 
rather than an attempt to have the last word, and I hope that any readers 
who find this volume inadequate [ . . . ] take it upon themselves to con-
tinue the project and expand the examination of race” (11). This was my goal 
in the present text, and yet I also must acknowledge the incomplete nature 
of my endeavors. Unfortunately, I only had time to touch upon the last two 
trends in science fiction—computerization and magical realism. Similarly, I 
would wish the time and space to go beyond the boundaries of American sci-
ence fiction. The Canopus series of Doris Lessing, in particular, would be a 
valuable addition to the present discussion of race and subjectivity in science 
fiction.125 In addition, Jeffrey A. Tucker has recently published a full-length 
investigation of Samuel R. Delany and his connections to African-American 
Studies, A Sense of Wonder: Samuel R. Delany, Race, Identity, and Difference 
(2004).126 I hope critical texts such as these will foster more interest in the 
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area of race and science fiction—from other critics, science fiction writers, 
and readers. In this way, Samuel R. Delany’s revision of the traditional sci-
ence fiction triangle will continue to expand and enrich the science fiction 
genre. More broadly, in its speculative basis and future focus, science fiction 
can offer a site for reflection on current racial issues and imagining new sub-
jective possibilities and more adequate race relations. In a job interview, I was 
once asked, if race is not an overt and prevalent issue in science fiction, why 
are you interested in it? Answers that first came to mind included a revision-
ist history for science fiction, personal preference, and criticism which fully 
addressed the texts of writers dealing with race in science fiction. However, 
the most important reason was this imaginative space opened up by science 
fiction and its possible influence on American society broadly. It is this belief 
that unites my work and the work of the science fiction authors discussed 
here. It is also what will fuel a continued investigation of race, by critics, writ-
ers, and readers of science fiction. Every time a reader of science fiction has 
an experience similar to Delany’s first reading of Heinlein’s Starship Troopers, 
the trend is strengthened. Indeed, the seed of the present text was my own 
reading of Burroughs’ Mars series. The black pirates of Barsoom afforded 
an equivalent experience for me, and I hope for more such experiences, for 





1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.
1896 World’s Columbian Exposition, attended by Edgar Rice 
 Burroughs and Franz Boas.
1897 W. E. B. Du Bois’ “The Conservation of Races” presented at 
 the American Negro Academy.
1906 Franz Boas invited by W. E. B. Du Bois to give commence-
 ment address and attend Negro conference. Du Bois’ The
 Health and Physique of the Negro American published.
1907–1910 Dillingham Commission on Immigration of the U.S. Con-
 gress.
1910 Franz Boas’ speech from the Second National Negro Confer-
 ence of May, 1910 published in The Crisis as “The Real Race
 Problem.”
1911 Franz Boas’ Dillingham Commission study and The Mind of 
 Primitive Man published. Boas and W. E. B. Du Bois attend
 First Universal Races Congress in London. Du Bois’ editorial
 published in The Crisis.
1912 Burroughs’ A Princess of Mars serialized in All-Story Magazine, 
Feb.- July. Tarzan of the Apes also serialized in Oct.1
1913 Burroughs’ The Gods of Mars serialized in All-Story Magazine, 
Jan.-May. The Return of Tarzan serialized in New Story, June-
Nov.
1914 Burroughs’ The Warlord of Mars serialized in All-Story, Dec. 
1913-Mar. 1914. The Beasts of Tarzan serialized in All-Story 
Cavalier, May-June.
1924 Immigration Act of 1924.
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1926 Schuyler’s “The Negro Art Hokum” and Langston Hughes’ 
“The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain” published.
1931 Schuyler’s Black No More: Being an Account of the Strange and 
Wonderful Workings of Science in the Land of the Free, A. D. 
1933–1940 published.
1936-38 Schuyler’s The Black Internationale: Story of Black Genius 
Against the World serialized under the pseudonym of Samuel 
I. Brooks in the Pittsburgh Courier from Nov. 21, 1936 to July 
3, 1937. Black Empire: An Imaginative Story of a Great New 
Civilization in Modern Africa also serialized under Samuel I. 
Brooks in the Pittsburgh Courier from Oct. 2, 1937 to Apr. 16, 
1938.
1940 W. E. B. Du Bois’ Dusk of Dawn published.
1944 Schuyler’s “The Caucasian Problem” published in What the 
Negro Wants.
1945 Franz Boas’ Race and Democratic Society published.
1952 Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks published as Peau 
Noire, Masques Blancs.
1962 Delany’s The Jewels of Aptor published.
1965 Robert Bone’s The Negro Novel in America published.
1966 Schuyler’s autobiography, Black and Conservative, published.
1971 Schuyler’s Black No More republished with Introduction by 
Charles Larson. Octavia Butler publishes “Crossover.”
1976 Michael Peplow’s article on Schuyler published in The Crisis.
1977 Death of Schuyler.
1978 John M. Reilly’s and Ann Rayson’s articles on Schuyler pub-
lished in Black American Literature Forum.
1991 Schuyler’s The Black Internationale and Black Empire serials 
published together as a book, Black Empire.
1992 Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s article on Schuyler published.
1997 Jeffrey A. Tucker’s article on Schuyler published in Race Con-
sciousness: African-American Studies for the New Century. Into 
Darkness Peering: Race and Color in the Fantastic published.
1999 Modern Library edition of Schuyler’s Black No More pub-
lished. 




NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1. E. James joins other prominent critics of American science fiction who link 
more mainstream writers with the genre. In New Worlds for Old: The Apoca-
lyptic Imagination, Science Fiction, and American Literature, David Ketterer 
not only goes back to the 19th century for the roots of American sf (singling 
out Edgar Allan Poe as one such author), but also he pairs mainstream texts 
with sf texts to explore the connections between them.
2. See Taliaferro 16.
3. See Darko Suvin’s Metamorphoses of Science Fiction and Delany’s linguis-
tic theory of science fiction (discussed in chapter 3) for two such alternate 
viewpoints on the genre.
4. The dual denotation of race as (1) multiple ethnic, biological, or kin groups 
within humankind and also as (2) collective humanity foregrounds the con-
structed nature of the term and also its utilization within Self/Other dichot-
omies.
5. See The Works of Theodore Roosevelt (1925) for examples from Roosevelt’s 
own writings: Vol. 2: The Wilderness Hunter: An Account of the Big Game of 
the United States and its Chase with Horse, Hound, and Rifle (1893); Vol. 5: 
African Game Trails: An Account of the African Wanderings of an American 
Hunter-Naturalist (1909); and Vol. 6: Through the Brazilian Wilderness and 
Papers on Natural History (1902).
6. Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark offers a brief introduction to this phe-
nomenon within the context of African-Americans. Brian V. Street’s The 
Savage in Literature is a more extensive examination of the same phenom-
enon in regard to Native Americans. Also, Hector St. Jean de Crévecoeur 
offers insight into early colonial America and the competition and prejudice 
among white settlers—English, Scottish, German, etc. (45).
7. In addition to the New Immigration, Doyle rightly emphasizes the connec-
tion between the eugenics movement and African-Americans and women.
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8. The distinction often made in contemporary discourse between race and 
ethnicity was not generally utilized in the first half of the twentieth century. 
What would be considered an ethnic or culturally similar group today, such 
as Italians or Jews, was conceived as a physically distinct group by most sci-
entists and society more generally.
9. Ross’ negative, biological utilization of the racialized Caliban figure will be 
revised by Houston A. Baker, Jr. in “Caliban’s Triple Play.” See 130-37 in 
the present text for more on the Caliban trope.
10. See The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain 1800–1960.
11. Prominent anthropologist Franz Boas became a strong opponent of these 
racial theories in the first half of the twentieth century. In collections of his 
work, like Race and Democratic Society (1945) and Race, Language and Cul-
ture (1940), he joined defenders of the New Immigrants like Jane Addams 
and Grace Abbott in foregrounding the importance of environment over 
heredity and the more democratic potential of cultural assimilation over 
racial essentialism. See the present work, 67-70, for more on Boas.
12. See Taliaferro 215 and 219.
13. Samuel R. Delany addresses the issue of Burroughs’ popular fiction in “Let-
ter to a Critic: Popular Culture, High Art, and the S-F Landscape” (1973). 
Similar to my own analysis, Delany acknowledges the “slapdash writing, 
sloppiness, and vulgarity” of Burroughs’ science fiction (Jewel-Hinged 15). 
However, he goes on to assert that “[s]ome art survives in spite of [this]” 
(ibid). More specifically, “in some [texts], the good is so infested with [the 
above negative characteristics] you cannot separate it out (Edgar R., and 
William S., Burroughs, gnawing at the idea of civilization from their respec-
tively fascist and radical positions)” (ibid).
14. Toni Morrison, for example, asserts that “in matters of race, silence and 
evasion have historically ruled literary discourse. Evasion has fostered 
another, substitute language in which the issues are encoded, foreclosing 
open debate” (9). As we shall see, the transformation of ethnic, racial, and/
or sexual Others into aliens within science fiction is one such “substitute,” 
“foreclosing [an] open debate” of race within the field.
15. Similar to Disney’s The Lion King, the emphasis shifts to environmentalism 
in Tarzan, a current and more politically correct topic/moral than evolution 
and racialism.
16. For example, De Witt Douglas Kilgore can only name two “full-length 
studies” discussing “the political and social future of racialized beings in 
the genre” (9): Daniel Leonard Bernardi’s Star Trek and History: Race-ing 
Toward a White Future (1998) and Michael C. Pounds’ Race in Space: The 
Representation of Ethnicity in Star Trek and Star Trek: The Next Generation 
(1999). As Kilgore notes, both of these texts focus on Star Trek alone. Of 
course, Kilgore’s own text, Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia 
in Space, is an attempt to remedy this situation. Kilgore does address the 
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works of Robert A. Heinlein and Arthur C. Clarke in detail; however, his 
focus as a whole is more on popular science than science fiction. In this 
context, he does not address Burroughs or George S. Schuyler, and Samuel 
Delany and Octavia Butler surface only as minor notes.
17. I refer here to Apache culture as portrayed by Burroughs.
18. Of course, as the earlier discussion of the transformation of ethnic or racial 
terrestrial Others into aliens makes clear, the connections between aliens 
and racial Others can be either, and sometimes both, positive and nega-
tive. The common practice in science fiction of suppressing racial Others 
by transforming them into aliens also highlights the ubiquitous attempt to 
avoid race in the genre.
19. Kilgore makes these claims specifically within the context of astrofuturism, 
a literary/scientific/popular phenomena starting after World War II. How-
ever, I believe these general claims apply to the earlier need for a new area 
of exploration also. Kilgore’s connection to the American West supports this 
more general application: “[t]he idea of a space frontier serves contempo-
rary America as the west served the nation in its past: it is the terrain onto 
which a manifest destiny is projected, a new frontier invalidating the 1893 
closure of the western terrestrial frontier” (1). Kilgore’s parallel emphasizes 
the dual nature of science fiction as well. In addition to “its renewal of the 
geographic tradition of imperialism,” astrofuturism “represents an extension 
of the desire to escape the logic of empire and find some space beyond the 
reach of old powers and obsolete identities” (11).
20. Of course the archaic tendency of science fiction has continued up through 
contemporary texts. George Lucas’ Star Wars trilogy offers the best known 
contemporary example of such a combination of hand-to-hand sword fight-
ing and advanced mechanical travel. Lucas’ focus on an individual white 
male hero mirrors that of Burroughs and much early sf as well.
21. See Haraway and Taliaferro.
22. Here and throughout my discussion of Burroughs, I frequently utilize the 
terminology of the time period and Burroughs’ racial perspective. Certainly, 
this does not mean I subscribe to this point of view. In fact, one of the 
underlying motivations for this chapter, as well as my entire project on the 
intersection of race and science fiction, is to question such terminology and 
hierarchies. However, if quotation marks were placed around every ques-
tionable term, the reader would be needlessly distracted.
23. See Nash, Chap. 3: “The Romantic Wilderness,” especially pages 51–2, and 
Lawrence, Chap. 5: “Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Novels.” Both 
Nash and Lawrence emphasize the discrepancy between the actual living 
conditions of ‘gentlemen’ writers and their occasional excursions into the 
wilderness or the lives of their fictional characters. Precisely because Wil-
liam Byrd, Washington Irving, and Cooper were not frontiersmen them-
selves and, therefore, held privileged and detached perspectives, they could 
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write more positively of the wilderness and its influence on civilized, Anglo 
man. Twentieth century writers follow the same pattern. Burroughs mir-
rored Zane Grey and other popular western writers in his largely urban 
background; see Taliagerro 189. In the same vein, precisely because the 
American wilderness and its native inhabitants were largely subdued, Bur-
roughs could create a fictional past and a romantic hero in a wilderness set-
ting which would appeal to a 20th-century audience.
24. See Taliaferro or Porges for biographical information on Burroughs.
25. The tropics were an elsewhere as well; Burroughs never even visited Africa. 
Of course, outer space was not a viable travel destination for anyone at the 
time.
26. As mentioned earlier, however, Burroughs resists such an extreme assimila-
tion of the European or Anglo-American to ‘savage’ behavior, such as scalp-
ing, in his western narratives. Even before he learns of his white ancestry, 
Shoz-Dijiji instinctively knows that he should not scalp people, despite 
being raised within a Native American culture which valorizes scalping as 
an accepted and expected activity for males during combat. Of course, this 
‘authentic’ Native American culture is a fictionalized creation of Burroughs 
as well.
27. See Frederick Douglass, especially his second autobiography, My Bondage 
and My Freedom, for an analysis of the autocratic, undemocratic, and there-
fore unAmerican institution of southern slavery. In chapter 4, for exam-
ple, Douglass describes the plantation of his childhood: “In its isolation, 
seclusion, and self-reliant independence, Col. Lloyd’s plantation resembles 
what the baronial domains were, during the middle ages in Europe” (64). 
The hierarchical basis of southern individualism is further emphasized in a 
later passage: “The idea of rank and station was rigidly maintained on Col. 
Lloyd’s plantation,” equally among the whites as the blacks (78).
28. When Carter first introduces himself in A Princess of Mars, he says “My 
name is John Carter; I am better known as Captain Jack Carter of Virginia. 
At the close of the Civil War [ . . . ]” (11).
29. Herzog is quoting from Daniel G. Hoffman, 78.
30. See my discussion of Delany and Fishburn for more on western metaphys-
ics, the mind/body split, and race (176–7).
31. Of course, this is only a limited understanding and sympathy; Wells’ lan-
guage here clearly reveals a negative colonial and racial hierarchy.
32. What is especially interesting to note here is the ease with which Nash him-
self unselfconsciously utilizes the language and theory of western progress 
and the way in which he too collapses white, western man with “universal 
man” (Haraway 186). In the “Preface to the Revised Edition,” Nash reveals 
the influence of recent (1960s) scientific work in the natural sciences on 
the revised edition of his book, including the quoted material. Ironically, 
in the remainder of his book (written earlier) in which he focuses on later, 
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more limited time periods, Nash much more consciously makes distinc-
tions between various cultural ideologies and these viewpoints and his own 
authorial perspective.
33. Pearce quotes here from Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes, first 
published in 1625.
34. This bodily focus will be continued in the next paragraph on the communal 
nature of the green Martians’ reproduction.
35. However, two of Roosevelt’s autobiographical texts reveal an attempt to com-
bine the scientific as well: Vol. 5: African Game Trails: An Account of the Afri-
can Wanderings of an American Hunter-Naturalist (1909) and Vol. 6: Through 
the Brazilian Wilderness and Papers on Natural History (1902) (Works).
36. As Peckham asserts, “the grand thesis of metaphysical evolutionism—from 
simple to complex means from good to better, infinitely or finitely, as your 
metaphysical taste determines—not only received no support from the Ori-
gin but, if the book were properly understood and if the individual involved 
felt that a metaphysic should and could have scientific support, was positively 
demolished” (29).
37. Peckham’s distinct separation between subjective “values” and objective 
description will be questioned shortly in my discussion of Haraway. How-
ever, Peckham’s more specific point about Darwin’s works is still useful. The 
greater scientific objectivity of Darwin’s texts has been obscured and subverted 
towards direct and predominantly subjective ends. I believe Delany’s discus-
sion of the objective intent of scientific discourse is useful for maintaining a 
necessary distinction between science and fiction, while acknowledging the 
subjective aspects of scientific discourse and practice (see 144). It is the strict 
and pure, either/or dichotomy which needs to be broken down, not the larger 
categories themselves.
38. While Dejah Thoris symbolizes white womanhood in a terrestrial context, she 
is literally ‘of color’ as an extraterrestrial.
39. Haraway connects science and fiction in two ways. First, “the history of sci-
ence appears as a narrative about the history of technical and social means 
to produce the facts. The facts themselves are types of stories, of testimony 
to experience” (4). Haraway’s radical questioning of even the objectivity of 
“facts” reflects her more specific assertion that “[s]cientific practice and sci-
entific theories produce and are embedded in particular kinds of stories. Any 
scientific statement about the world depends intimately upon language, upon 
metaphor. The metaphors may be mathematical or they may be culinary; in 
any case they structure scientific vision” (ibid).
40. See Torgovnick Chap. 1 and Street Chap. 2.
41. Burroughs’ choice to begin with the American West and the western genre 
and not to utilize technological means for space travel illustrates his ambig-
uous attitude towards science fiction and technological western progress as 
well.
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42. This positive portrayal of a quasi-military group and the beneficent effects 
of Anglo leadership on natives mirrors that of American imperialism and 
British colonialism as well. The imperial or colonial superstructure is ratio-
nalized to prevent conflict between smaller, competing native groups (eth-
nic, racial, religious, etc.). Of course, there is also the infamous “white man’s 
burden,” described by Rudyard Kipling (1899). Given their superior cul-
tural attributes (with an underlying foundation of essentialist racial superi-
ority), Europeans have a duty to share and/or institute these cultural (social, 
political, and economic) norms. Of course, this is where Christianity and 
capitalism come in with Native Americans, as discussed earlier.
43. In Starship Troopers, Robert Heinlein similarly portrays military institutions 
positively despite the contradictory values they embody. On a related note, 
the movie version of Heinlein’s text obscures the racial component of the 
text in the same way the racial implications of ERB’s written texts have been 
generally overlooked due to subsequent visual versions. See 118–120 for 
more on Heinlein and Starship Troopers.
44. The multiple, and often confusing, definitions of race are illustrated here. 
In referring to multiple human races as well as the human race as a whole, 
‘race’ is a good example of the contradictory race-specific and universal 
connotations of many scientific terms, and the historical/scientific context 
which explains such contradictions (see Haraway).
45. This is not to say that no platonic, romantic, and/or sexual relationships 
developed between Native Americans and Anglo Americans. However, a 
general policy of separation was promoted, especially by Anglo-Americans 
(similar to the color line for African-Americans).
46. In this way, Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary theories are representative of 
Social Darwinism, or the Darwinisticism described by Peckham.
47. Torgovnick, for example, notes the “upbeat, heroic tone of Burroughs’ biog-
raphies [published in the 60s and 70s]: their brand of buoyant, macho opti-
mism” (44–5).
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. See the appendix for a chronological listing of Schuyler’s works and relevant 
criticism.
2. The 1991 republication of the two serials, Black Empire, contains a select 
annotated bibliography of the stories Schuyler is known to have written, 
under his own name and under pseudonyms, for the Pittsburgh Courier 
between 1933 and 1939. In total, Schuyler wrote over “four hundred pieces 
of fiction” for the Courier during the 1930s (Hill and Rasmussen 260).
3. “The Black Internationale” was published between November 21, 1936 and 
July 3, 1937. “The Black Empire” was published between October 2, 1937 
and April 16, 1938 (Black Empire xvii).
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4. Again, see the appendix for a chronological listing of Schuyler’s texts and 
the critical responses to them.
5. In his article “Racism and Science Fiction,” Samuel R. Delany expands 
on Du Bois’ positive review of Black No More (Delany, “Racism” 384). 
Du Bois’ assertion that the text was “bound to be ‘abundantly misunder-
stood’” because it was a satire coincides with Peplow’s discussion of the 
satiric nature of the text (qtd. in Delany, “Racism” 384)).
6. Of course, their personal viewpoints and political perspectives are another 
large component. My point is the strong tendency to write and publish 
criticism which coincides with the larger political climate.
7. First publishing in the 1960s, Samuel Delaney is still the best known of 
these authors. Octavia Butler joined him in the 1970s.
8. That is not to say that Schuyler and his texts should not remain situated 
in the African-American literary context as well. Ideally, his works will be 
discussed within multiple contexts. Certainly his continued focus on race 
in the science fiction genre invites such multiple readings.
9. The critical debate between Langston Hughes and Schuyler in the 1920s 
mirror this latter debate. See note 30 below.
10. A more thorough discussion of Schuyler’s racial revision in Black No More 
commences on 78.
11. Schuyler uses the new lens of science to discuss a concept utilized by 
other African-American writers in works of fiction. For example, Nella 
Larsen’s Passing was published just two years earlier, in 1929, at the tail-
end of the Harlem Renaissance. James Weldon Johnson’s influential fic-
tional text, The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man, was published in 
1912.
12. In this one paragraph, Schuyler quotes anthropologist Ruth Benedict.
13. See Haraway’s 1989 text Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the 
World of Modern Science.
14. See my discussion of Burroughs for a more detailed discussion of Har-
away’s text and its ties to adventure fiction and science fiction.
15. These include Donna Haraway’s Primate Visions and Nancy Stepan’s The 
Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800–1960. Also, T.F. Gossett’s 
Race: The History of an Idea in America and George Stocking’s Race, Cul-
ture, and Evolution.
16. This sentence and the next were taken from Herskovits, Franz Boas: The 
Science of Man in the Making.
17. Herskovits was also a student of Boas,’ along with Ruth Benedict and 
Zora Neale Hurston (Hyatt xii).
18. See the “Heritage” chapter in Walter Benn Michaels’ Our America: Nativ-
ism, Modernism, and Pluralism for a discussion of Herskovits’ scholarly 
connection to African-American studies in the first half of the twentieth 
century (123–35).
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19. Nancy Stepan and Sander Gilman discuss the “rejection of scientific racism” 
by African-Americans and Jews in “Appropriating the Idioms of Science: 
The Rejection of Scientific Racism.” Acknowledging that this criticism took 
place largely outside the scientific community and did not have a significant 
impact on scientific racism within the field up to the 1930s, the authors still 
emphasize that the work of dissenting African-Americans and Jews “created 
modes of representation and knowledge essential for the stereotyped them-
selves” (103). Stepan and Gilman highlight W. E. B. Du Bois as one such 
prominent dissenting voice.
20. Unfortunately, Gilman and Sander only address Boas and his resistance to 
scientific racism in a footnote in their article, “Appropriating the Idioms of 
Science: The Rejection of Scientific Racism” (74).
21. For example, in Dusk of Dawn Du Bois writes, “[t]he main result of my 
schooling had been to emphasize science and the scientific attitude” (50).
22. See Doyle, Stepan and Gilman, and Beardsley, for example.
23. Thomas F. Gossett gives a more detailed examination of race, as a self-con-
sciously studied term, in the 18th and 19th centuries in Race: The History of 
an Idea in America.
24. See Gould.
25. According to Tucker, the black conservatives, like Schuyler, are “attracted 
to claims of objectivity and ‘truth’ because they lack a real constituency—
among either blacks or whites—and need some sort of tool to help them 
gain credibility” (“Can” 137). Such an assessment elides the context of sci-
ence and the norm of objectivity in the field. Also, Stepan and Gilman’s 
analysis here may help explain some tensions within Schuyler overarching 
view of science. First, Schuyler seems sincere in his promotion of rational-
ity and related dissemination of contemporaneous scientific findings under-
mining race. Yet, he simultaneously satirizes and critiques the discipline of 
science generally, focusing on its pervasive subjectivity and bias.
26. Stepan and Gilman only mention Boas in a footnote, but his methods, 
viewpoints, and works fit their criteria for resistance to scientific racism. 
Given Boas’ prominence and influence, to which their footnote alludes, it 
is surprising they do not address his work and its impact on the scientific 
community.
27. Subsequently published in Papers in Inter-Racial Problems Communicated 
to the First Universal Races Congress Held at the University of London, July 
26–29,1911, Ginn and Company, Boston, 1911.
28. Boas presented his paper, “Instability of Human Types,” in the Second Ses-
sion, entitled “Conditions of Progress (General Problems)” (Spiller). Du 
Bois presented “The Negro Race in the United States of America” in the 
Sixth Session, “The Modern Conscience in Relation to Racial Questions 
(the Negro and the American Indian)” (Spiller).
29. See pages 18–21.
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30. See Langston Hughes’ “The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain” and 
Schuyler’s “The Negro-Art Hokum.” Tucker also gives a summary of their 
arguments in his article on Schuyler (“Can” 142).
31. Tucker concludes his essay on Schuyler with the assertion that, “[t]he recog-
nition of constitutive differences, not their denial, serves as a tool for black 
empowerment, and is in turn a key step toward America’s realization of 
what Du Bois called the ‘ideal of human brotherhood’” (“Can” 148). How-
ever, Rusty L. Monhollon’s discussion of race relations in Lawrence, Kansas 
between 1969–1970 (also in Race Consciousness) emphasizes the potentially 
divisive effects of ‘race consciousness.’ As African-Americans “embraced 
Black Power,” “[t]he results, like American race relations in general, were 
paradoxical. While it was empowering for blacks, it also contributed to a 
polarization of the entire community along racial lines” (Monhollon 258). 
Monhollon’s position is more closely aligned with that of Schuyler; both 
indict white racism but, at the same time, do not see black race conscious-
ness as a solution to America’s ‘race problem.’ As Monhollon notes, “blacks 
and whites in America confront each other in a society they have constructed 
together and in which they share a common history, as well as similar reli-
gions, values, ideals, and cultures” (259). Monhollon and Schuyler stress 
these political, social, and cultural similarities and see them as the key to 
an egalitarian society. Schuyler’s additional focus on the physical, biological 
and genealogical, commonality of blacks and whites only serves to further 
emphasize an artificial and false nature for any racial concept and the error 
of race consciousness for blacks as well as whites.
32. See my discussion of Delany’s Trouble on Triton (165–173) for a more thor-
ough discussion of Sam.
33. Hill and Rasmussen provide a brief discussion of Dr. Belsidus’ relationship 
with Gaskin (282–3). I am indebted to them for highlighting this particular 
quote.
34. See Hill and Rasmussen for Schuyler’s apparent endorsement of this stereo-
type (282).
35. In the second half of this quotation, Peplow quotes from Joyce Nower. 
However, he does not document this source further, either in an in-text cita-
tion or in a bibliography.
36. As we shall see, Samuel Delany’s protagonist in Trouble on Triton, Bron 
Helmstrom, is also an anti-hero. However, his anti-hero characteristics are, 
overall, more negative. Bron is not only selfish, but also relatively cowardly 
and powerless. In contrast to Disher and Belsidus, Bron does not know how 
race operates in his society, nor does he understand how to manipulate the 
social norms of his culture to his advantage. As a white male, Bron does not 
feel a compulsion or see the necessity of learning more about these norms. 
Robert Elliot Fox, for example, labels Bron an “antihero,” “given the extent 
to which he is (unwittingly) a self-antagonist” (“Politics” 49). Bron does not 
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overcome racial oppression, by any means necessary, but succumbs to neu-
rosis despite his egalitarian position in Triton society. See 158–164 for more 
on Bron and 167–169 for a specific comparison and contrast of Bron and 
Disher.
37. Belsidus seems to manipulate the sexual aspects of a cultural concept of 
race; like Ralph Ellison’s invisible man, white women seem to be continu-
ally attracted to him and he, in turn, never expresses an interest in women-
of-color.
38. Kink-No-More is a historically real product.
39. The ethnicity of the doctor and engineer highlights the connections between 
African-Americans and other groups oppressed due to ‘race.’ In practice, the 
Japanese were often associated with the Chinese, the first group to be legally 
excluded from the United States on the basis of race (1882). The Chinese 
and Japanese joined Jews, Italians, and Eastern European immigrants more 
generally to make up the so-called New Immigration (1880–1920). The 
New Immigrants were categorized as racially different and inferior from ear-
lier groups of immigrants to the New World—English, French, Dutch, and 
even the Irish, for example. Of course, a common denominator between 
the new immigrant groups, besides time period, was darker skin and hair 
color. The anti-immigration movement culminated in the Immigration Act 
of 1924, which effectively cut off immigration from these new areas, while 
allowing large quotas for the countries of origin for the older immigrant 
groups. See my discussion of Burroughs for more on the New Immigration 
and the Immigration Restriction Movement.
40. See page 62 in reference to this sentence and the next.
41. Hill and Rasmussen make a similar point in the context of the Black Empire 
serials (267).
42. Fuss gives a useful summary of Joyce A. Joyce’s critique of what Joyce calls 
“the poststructuralist sensibility” and its application to the field of Afri-
can-American literature (Fuss 77). Joyce’s Afro-centric critical position 
was expressed in two articles in New Literary History: “The Black Canon: 
Reconstructing Black American Literary Criticism” and “‘Who the Cap 
Fit’: Unconsciousness and Unconscionableness in the Criticism of Houston 
A. Baker, Jr. and Henry Louis Gates, Jr.”
43. While Du Bois’ language here does not explicitly define “American” as 
‘white,’ the following passage clarifies his racial intention: the “American 
Negro [ . . . ] would not Africanize America, for America has too much 
to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a 
flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message 
for the world” (Souls 9).
44. Crookman summarizes the process as follows: “it is accomplished by elec-
trical nutrition and glandular control. Certain gland secretions are greatly 
stimulated while others are considerably diminished” (Black No More 13).
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45. John M. Reilly identifies Walter Williams as Walter White (107).
46. Disher also manipulates the general scientism or scientific positivism of 
Americans in his role as an anthropologist. Schuyler’s satiric portrayal of the 
manipulation of scientism by a black lay person has interesting connections 
to Schuyler’s own use of scientism in his non-fiction and potential appeal to 
the scientism of his audience (see 66 in the present text).
47. The white characters are deceived by both their ignorance of blacks and 
their related beliefs in racial stereotypes and rigid racial boundaries—they 
would not imagine a Negro capable of talking like a white/educated/scien-
tist.
48. ‘Authentic’ does not denote positive or negative here.
49. Reilly more generally discusses Black No More as a dystopia, or “anti-utopia” 
(107) He does not specifically address multiple subjectivity as one aspect of 
Schuyler’s negative perspective.
50. As Tucker accurately notes, “[a]] satire is by definition a humorous critique 
intended to change behavior or thinking” (“Can” 143).
51. In his introduction to the 1990, Library of America edition of The Souls of 
Black Folk, John Edgar Wideman identifies this potential for change as a 
primary element of Du Bois’ text as well:
The color line raises the issue of identity. Theirs. Yours. Mine. Will 
we blend, change, survive, or is the color line one more measure of 
the limits of our collective imagination, our cultural graveyard of 
either/or terminal distinctions: black/white, male/female, young/old, 
good/bad, rich/poor, spirit/flesh? It is possible to imagine ourselves 
other than we are, better? These are the monumental questions rever-
berating in The Souls of Black Folk, matters unresolved by the last one 
hundred years, which have tumbled us, bloody and confused, onto 
the threshold of the twenty-first century. (xiii)
 Wideman’s “imagination” corresponds with the speculative element of science 
fiction also.
52. Hill and Rasmussen assert, “Intellectually, Schuyler held out for a distinctly 
non-racialist view of the world” (297). They quote from his 1937 Views & 
Reviews editorial column in the Pittsburgh Courier to support this assess-
ment: “‘Personally, I am opposed to worship of things Nordic as I am of 
things Negroid’” (ibid).
53. Du Bois too rejects an “either-or” proposition (Fanon 203). However, his 
alternative differs from that of Schuyler in that he seeks to simultaneously 
maintain both a black and a white consciousness: “[t]he history of the 
American Negro is the history of this strife,—this longing to attain self-con-
scious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this 
merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost [ . . . ]. He simply 
wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American” 
(Souls 9).
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54. Like Schuyler, Fanon, and Appiah, Fields highlights the negative power of 
race.
55. This is, of course, where Appiah’s critique of Du Bois comes into play. In 
Dusk of Dawn, Du Bois attempts to rationally and logically substitute a 
strictly cultural definition of race for the original biological foundation. As 
Appiah reveals, an illogical argument results.
56. See my discussion of Delany for more on the idealistic elision of race in sci-
ence fiction and Delany’s individualist use of race.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. Babel-17 (1966) and The Einstein Intersection (1967) won Nebula Awards. 
See Samuel R. Delany: A Primary and Secondary Bibliography, 1962–1979 for 
a complete listing of Delany’s texts during this time period (Peplow and Bra-
vard).
2. Once again, Michael W. Peplow gives an excellent overview. In “Meet Samuel 
R. Delany, Black Science Fiction Writer,” Peplow covers Delany’s early career 
(pre-1979) and provides an especially good introduction for readers outside of 
the sf community.
3. Delany’s critical texts include The Jewel-Hinged Jaw: Notes on the Language of 
Science Fiction (1977), The American Shore: Meditations on a Tale of Science 
Fiction by Thomas M. Disch-Angouleme (1978), Starboard Wine: More Notes on 
the Language of Science Fiction (1984), Wagner/Artaud: A Play of 19th and 20th 
Century Critical Fictions (1988), The Straits of Messina (1989), Silent Inter-
views: On Language, Race, Sex, Science Fiction, and Some Comics (1994), Lon-
ger Views: Extended Essays (1996), and Shorter Views: Queer Thoughts & The 
Politics of the Paraliterary (1999). His two autobiographical texts are Heavenly 
Breakfast: An Essay on the Winter of Love (1979) and The Motion of Light in 
Water: Sex and Science Fiction in the East Village, 1957–65 (1988).
4. Seth McEvoy’s 1984 text, Samuel R. Delany, follows George Edgar Slusser’s 
1977 The Delany Intersection: Samuel R. Delany Considered as a Writer of Semi-
Precious Words, Douglas Barbour’s 1979 Worlds Out of Words: The SF Novels 
of Samuel R. Delany, and Jane Branham Weedman’s 1982 Samuel R. Delany. 
Also, Jeffrey A. Tucker’s Sense of Wonder: Samuel R. Delany, Race, Identity, and 
Difference has been published since the initial writing of the present text.
5. Jay Schuster’s web page on Delany provides a sampling of such public involve-
ment (1998–2001). Schuster also lists Delany’s numerous literary nomina-
tions and awards.
6. Freedman names Robert Elliot Fox’s work as one exception to this “general 
neglect” (160). Since the publication of Freedman’s book, Jeffrey A. Tucker 
also published A Sense of Wonder: Samuel R. Delany, Race, Identity, and Dif-
ference (2004). Tucker explicitly and primarily places many of Delany’s texts 
within the context of African-American Studies. In the first chapter, he notes 
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Delany’s recent inclusion into the African American literary “canon” (1997), 
but still questions “the extent to which his work has been part of recent schol-
arship and teaching in the field” (48–9). Shorter examples include Peplow’s 
1979 article in The Crisis, “Meet Samuel R. Delany, Black Science Fiction 
Writer,” and the Black American Literature Forum’s 1984 (18.2 Summer) issue 
devoted to Delany, Octavia Butler, and Charles R. Saunders.
7. McEvoy discusses the many “factors” that led to Delany’s first sf or fantasy 
novel, The Jewels of Aptor (19). In his autobiography, Delany similarly men-
tions his initial, recurrent dream or “nightmares” (the basis of Jewels) and his 
wife Marilyn Hacker’s job at Ace Books (a company which published much 
science fiction) (Motion 75–6).
8. Ironically, Delany attributes the relative lack of racial prejudice in the sf com-
munity to another factor as well—the lack of black writers. He believes that 
once the percentage of black writers in the field reaches “thirteen, fifteen, 
twenty percent of the total. At that point, where the competition might be 
perceived as having some economic heft, chances are we will have as much 
racism and prejudice here as in any other field” (“Racism” 386).
9. Peplow is quoting from Delany’s letter here.
10. The Fall of the Towers trilogy (1970) is a revised collection of three previously-
published novels: Captives of the Flame (1963), The Towers of Toron (1964), 
and City of a Thousand Suns (1965). Delany offers an overview of his revisions 
in the “Author’s Note” at the beginning of the 1970 trilogy edition.
11. See his autobiography, The Motion of Light in Water: Sex and Science Fiction 
Writing in the East Village, 1957–1965, for example. Seth McEvoy’s early 
chapters on Delany also highlight Delany’s attempts at feminist revisions in 
female characterization (19, 24–27, 37–41).
12. In A Sense of Wonder: Samuel R. Delany, Race, Identity, and Difference, Jeffrey 
A. Tucker also focuses on race in Delany’s fiction, particularly his later fic-
tion.
13. Of course, this is the racial and moral dichotomy Edgar Rice Burroughs uti-
lizes in the Mars series, particularly A Princess of Mars.
14. The Xenogenesis trilogy is composed of Dawn (1987), Adulthood Rites (1988), 
and Imago (1989).
15. Donna Haraway also notes the cover of Dawn in Primate Visions (381).
16. Other examples include the covers of Delany’s The Fall of the Towers trilogy 
and Babel-17, which stereotypically foreground a female character with ample 
cleavage revealed.
17. In a freshman English course I taught, many of the students expressed their 
confusion and/or admitted to misreading the text based on the strength of 
this first impression.
18. James explores this issue in more detail near the end of his essay (“Yellow” 
39–44). See also Gary K. Wolfe, The Known and the Unknown: The 
Iconography of Science Fiction.
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19. In a 1986 interview, Butler asserts, “Science fiction writers come from sci-
ence fiction readers. I think that as more and more blacks begin to read sci-
ence fiction, then more blacks will take up writing science fiction, and this 
is already happening to a certain degree” (“Black” 16).
20. See the next sub-section (115) for more on the differences between these 
texts and their portrayal of race.
21. Similarly, Fuss advocates maintaining the concept of race, “even though we 
may recognize its essentializing usages,” because “to see ‘Blackness’ as an eth-
nic marker (equivalent to Germaness or Jewishness) has historically worked 
to homogenize black identity, to de-particularize the black subject” (92). In 
addition, “to substitute ‘ethnicity’ for ‘race’ would be to e-race [ . . . ] the 
rich and color-full history of ‘race’ in Afro-American culture” (93).
22. See 88–89 for more on Fuss. Fuss joins me in connecting Baker’s scientific 
and poststructuralist resistance (93).
23. See the following sub-section on Trouble on Triton (155) for a detailed dis-
cussion of how Delany revises a Heinlein protagonist in that text.
24. As we shall see, Delany somewhat overstates his case here. His extensive and 
graphic depictions of sexuality and gay identity, for example, are unusual 
within science fiction.
25. I realize these are false divisions in terms of the texts alone. Later, I will 
discuss the illogical nature of this generic division. As Schuyler’s texts exem-
plified, the deciding factors seem to be the race of the author, the author’s 
literary affiliations, and/or the author’s position on race. This stands in 
direct contrast to Delany’s linguistic basis for science fiction.
26. Delany’s Introduction to Glory Road was published in July 1979. It is espe-
cially interesting that Delany does not specifically refer to his own text, 
Trouble on Triton (1976), in his “bibliography of novel-length responses” 
to Heinlein’s texts (Introduction vii) since he had previously admitted to 
Michael Peplow that Trouble on Triton was an intentional response to Hein-
lein’s Glory Road (Peplow, “Meet” 120). Peplow’s article, “Meet Samuel R. 
Delany, Black Science Fiction Writer,” was published in April 1979, and his 
information was taken from letters written by Delany in 1978 (121). See 
159–160 for more on Peplow’s article and Trouble on Triton as a response to 
Heinlein’s text. Also, Tucker highlights Delany’s admission that The Fall of 
the Towers was a response to Heinlein’s Starship Troopers (Tucker, Sense 280; 
Delany, Shorter 322).
27. James joins Fred Erisman in seeing four other Heinlein texts as “being a 
deliberate attempt at education in racial tolerance” (E. James 34). The first 
three juvenile books (1954–56) and the fourth text, Double Star (1956), are 
“powered by [the] contemporary debate about civil rights” (ibid).
28. Likewise, Denise Richardson was cast as Carmen. All the major characters, 
in fact, are visibly Anglo in the film.
29. See Westfahl’s Note 3.
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30. This quote and the following were suggested by Gary Westfahl’s summary 
of the two texts (73).
31. Franklin discusses this technique in more detail (156–7).
32. Delany’s description of the sexual activity between Captain Leela and the 
alien, The Destroyer, in The Ballad of Beta-2 also highlights Heinlein’s sex-
ual suppression here.
33. Elsewhere Westfahl argues more generally that, “as Heinlein came to realize, 
the stance of the Self-Reliant or Society-Generating Individual is necessarily 
racist” (74). Franklin emphasizes Farnham’s isolation within a broader con-
text as well (154).
34. See the next sub-section on Trouble on Triton (155).
35. Heinlein could be distinguishing between various branches of the armed 
forces. Farnham, for example, is in the navy, and Johnny Rico is in the 
futuristic equivalent of the army. Without any overt comment on Heinlein’s 
part within the text, however, there is no basis for such a distinction. Inter-
estingly, Schuyler also highlights his positive experiences with the army in 
his autobiography, Black and Conservative. While far from fully egalitarian, 
the army offered the possibility of respect, money, and travel for African-
Americans.
36. Heinlein does use games, and particularly bridge, as a trope for the text. 
However, his portrayal of the ‘game’ of bridge seems to be in line with the 
highly serious and ‘competitive’ portrayal of race relations in the text.
37. Toni Morrison explores a similar use of the “Africanist presence” by white 
authors, particularly American males, in Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and 
the Literary Imagination (6). As we shall see, her ideological focus is in tune 
with Delany’s revision of Heinlein’s typical white, male protagonist in Trou-
ble on Triton.
38. In The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon asserts that “[t]he native is an 
oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the persecutor” 
(53). See the next paragraph on Kincaid and Bradbury for a refutation of 
this assertion. Even granting the general applicability of Fanon’s assertion, 
however, his “dream” falls short of actual practice/historical manifestation. 
Either through the restriction(s) of inequitable power relations or personal 
inhibitions, these “dream[s]” have not become a collective reality.
39. Herrmann Lang’s The Air Battle: a Vision of the Future (1859) contains an 
early example of a fictional black-dominated society, in this case a very posi-
tive portrayal. Steven Barnes has also recently written an alternate history 
novel about slavery in the United States; see footnote 120 .
40. Franklin also specifically and convincingly links the Chosen with Black 
Muslims, especially their negative portrayal by the media during this time 
period (158–9).
41. Heinlein’s Sixth Column also fits this pattern. Serialized in 1941 and 
published as a novel in 1946, it springs from the anti-Asian ideology 
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surrounding World War II (see Westfahl 71–2). It was subsequently 
reprinted as The Day After Tomorrow in 1951.
42. See the next sub-section on Trouble on Triton (155).
43. The Fall of the Towers trilogy (1963–65), for example, takes place on a futur-
istic Earth, like Farnham’s Freehold. However, Delany does not reenact the 
same (even if inverted) racial divisions as historical Earth (American) history. 
Instead, he transforms Heinlein’s ‘black cannibals’ and Burroughs’ black and 
green (Native American) ‘savages’ into the most advanced, telepathic race in 
the society. However, the dark-skinned tribal members are morally neither 
better or worse than the other races composing Toron society. Furthermore, 
as the trio of protagonists symbolizes, each gender, race, economic class 
(etc.) is responsible for and included in the rehabilitation of their shared 
society. This more inclusive and even integrationist philosophy (as seen in 
The City of a Thousand Suns, for example) also finds embodiment in The 
Ballad of Beta-2.
44. Other black, male writers do not follow Schuyler’s lead until the 1960s, 
a time of increased racial consciousness and conflict (and general social 
upheaval—the Women’s Movement, Anti-War Movement, Sexual Revolu-
tion, etc.). Is there a connection between times of turbulent social events/
movements and a turning towards the speculative elements of sf? When 
more traditional mores are being questioned and undermined, perhaps new 
ideas are usefully formulated and envisioned within sf.
45. See the end of this section (151).
46. See Slusser’s structuralist analysis of triples in Delany’s The Fall of the Towers, 
especially Book One: Captives of the Flame or Out of the Dead City, as it was 
later renamed (23–4).
47. Baker also makes a rather vague reference to “vernacular rhythms” (387). In 
his implied definition of this term, the emphasis seems to be on a particular 
ideological or political perspective rather than language alone. It is in this 
context that Delany’s revisionist attitude towards science fiction comes clos-
est to meeting Baker’s literary criteria.
48. On the other hand, Mike Resnick’s recent stories of Kiranyaga illustrate the 
impossibility of trying to reconstruct a pre-Prospero Calibanic self. A medi-
cine man of the Kikuyu people of Kenya travels to another world to establish 
an ‘authentic’ Kikuyu society. All of the pre-modern, pre-western elements 
of Kikuyu culture are reestablished without revision. What the narrator 
comes to realize (through a long process of struggle, conflict, and death) is 
that his ‘people’ do not want such a society and that he is an “anachronism” 
(8). Racial constructions, reconstructions of culture and identity, do have 
“power to shape human lives in very real ways,” as Tucker asserts, but Resn-
ick joins Schuyler and Fanon in focusing on the negative potential of these 
racial constructions (especially for women) (Tucker, “Can” 148).
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49. Presumably this is why Reilly finds A Different Drummer “a more complex 
and well-developed, illustration of the Black anti-utopia” (108). However, 
while Reilly notes the “alternative viewpoints,” he does not discuss the race 
of these characters as a factor in the story (109).
50. Baker offers Derek Walcott as an example of such a divided position. Fanon 
would also fit this description. In addition, Don L. Birchfield’s sf story, “Lost 
in the Land of Ishtaboli,” includes a Native American man trapped between 
native and modern cultural elements. Double-consciousness (or multiple) 
can be perceived as both positive and negative—as a gift which allows more 
extensive communication or as artificial, imposed, coercive, and harming 
the human psyche through division and conflict. The Caribbean concept 
of creolization or Creoleness is similar to Baker’s concept of “supraliteracy” 
(394); both of these theoretical concepts attempt to unify disparate cultural 
and racial elements, especially with the intention of avoiding disabling dual-
isms. According to Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, and Raphaël Confi-
ant, “[b]ecause of its constituent mosaic, Creoleness is an open specificity 
[ . . . ]. It is expressing a kaleidoscopic totality, that is to say: the nontotali-
tarian consciousness of a preserved diversity” (892). Of course, there usually 
are more than two elements in the Caribbean. Therefore, Creoleness can-
not rely as easily on a natural or essential racial state, like Baker’s Calibanic 
self. Samuel Selvon’s epilogue to Foreday Morning, “Three into one can’t 
go—East Indian, Trinidadian, West Indian,” is a more specific example of 
this multiplicity.
51. Of course, the Caliban/Prospero trope exists in science fiction as well. Rob-
ert Shelton, for example, discusses Wells’ The Island of Doctor Moreau (1895) 
in these terms (8). He builds on the idea of Prospero as “the original model 
of the mad scientist” put forth by Robert Plank in The Emotional Signifi-
cance of Imaginary Beings: A Study of the Interaction Between Psychopathology, 
Literature, and Reality in the Modern World (1968). Brian Aldiss also briefly 
mentions the Dr. Moreau-Prospero connection in his chapter on Wells in 
both Billion Year Spree and Trillion Year Spree. In “Quarks,” even Delany 
briefly notes the Calibanic nature of a character in The Stars My Destination 
(1957). However, in Bester’s text, Caliban is caucasian and he is opposed 
to the positive, “Arcadian” character, “black Robin” (Delany, Jewel-Hinged 
147). Delany’s critique of Bester’s book involves Robin’s “eventual marriage 
to the only other non-caucasian in the book,” not the larger Caliban trope 
(ibid).
52. Joneny identifies this as “[t]he spiral of decreasing semantic functionality” 
(Delany, Ballad 48).
53. Delany’s racial diversity is muted, however, by the actual embodiment of the 
new, hybrid race. The Destroyer’s Children are white males, and the cloning 
form of reproduction ensures this similarity perpetually.
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54. Of course, the sterility theory for cross-breeds had been proven to be a 
biological falsehood in the mid-1800s by Charles Darwin. However, the 
specific sterility of mulattos continued to be a topic of discussion in the 
United States into the twentieth century.
55. Lee’s story portrays African-American parents from the Civil Rights Era 
dealing with the effects of social integration on their children. When 
their son brings home a Jewish girlfriend, they reject her (63–4). Their 
son responds angrily: “You and Daddy spend all of your lives sending 
us to white schools and teaching us to live in a never-never land where 
people of all colors just get along swell, and then when the inevitable 
happens you start talking like a goddam Lester Maddox!” (64).
56. Delany’s portrayal of aliens and alien/human integration can be fruitfully 
paired with Octavia Butler’s Xenogenesis series.
57. This may be one reason Tucker primarily focuses on Delany’s later 
texts in A Sense of Wonder: Samuel R. Delany, Race, Identity, and Differ-
ence (2004). Delany’s connection to science would be weakest in these 
texts: the fantasy of the Return to Nevèrÿon series, the “‘mundane’” fic-
tion of Atlantis, and Delany’s pornography (Tucker, Sense 199). Tucker 
also devotes a chapter to both Dhalgren and Delany’s autobiography, The 
Motion of Light in Water. As discussed shortly, the first text is often con-
sidered marginally sf (see 197), and the second text is non-fiction. Not 
coincidentally, Tucker finds the above texts most illustrative of African-
American literary techniques and themes. While placing Delany within 
the context of African-American Studies, then, Tucker largely maintains 
the division between the two genres of sf and African-American litera-
ture.
58. See my earlier discussion of Haraway (7–8; 63).
59. Published in Delany’s collection of critical texts, The Jewel-Hinged Jaw: 
Notes on the Language of Science Fiction, “Shadows” was also published in 
two parts in Foundation (6 and 7/8). In addition, some of the text was 
published as part of the “Appendix A” in Trouble on Triton.
60. “Shadows” was published in its different manifestations (see above note) 
between1974 and 1977.
61. In the introduction to Worlds Out of Words: the Sf Novels of Samuel R. 
Delany, Douglas Barbour emphasizes how unusual is Delany’s linguistic 
basis for the genre (7–14).
62. Delany uses the Martian context again in Trouble on Triton.
63. Mundane is Delany’s term for mainstream fiction. Mundane highlights 
the generic characteristics of the text rather than an ideological position 
(mainstream versus marginal—science fiction).
64. Given Delany’s extensive writings on linguistic issues, the relatively small 
space devoted to the black vernacular illustrates his inclusive racial views. 
He refuses to limit himself linguistically, as do Baker and Gates in their 
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essentialism of (a specific, authentic racial) sound. Within his purely cul-
tural linguistic context, all discourses are potentially available for his use.
65. Delany’s autobiographical comments here, where he connects language 
with “worlds,” also explain his early and sustained discussion of the cultural 
basis of language and its connection to the sf enterprise of ‘culture building’ 
(Jewel-Hinged 119).
66. This positive portrayal is an early recollection in Delany’s chronological life-
time, however, as The Ballad of Beta-2 is a text from his early career. While 
ultimately emphasizing connections, bridges, and communication across 
divisions, Delany qualifies this early idealism in both the autobiography (see 
152–155 in the present text) and in later writing (see footnote 51 in the 
Schuyler chapter for Delany’s more pessimistic quote from his Introduction 
to Shade).
67. See McEvoy for a detailed analysis of one, representative aspect of this larger 
textual “freedom”—the sexual (106–109).
68. Nightmare and Dragon Lady, for example.
69. By racial blinders, I mean the limitations imposed by Baker’s theories of 
race. Not just Dhalgren but also Delany’s other texts (fiction and non-fic-
tion) serve as “guerilla action carried out within linguistic territories of the 
erstwhile masters” (Baker 394). However, Delany’s “guerilla action” is not 
solely racial in emphasis and motivation, but also in terms of sexuality, gen-
der, economics, etc. Similarly, Baker’s resistance to scientific discourse pre-
vents him from acknowledging Delany’s sf texts.
70. SFWA stands for the Science Fiction Writers of America. Douglas Barbour 
gives a nice overview of the major critical reviews of Dhalgren (89–90). He 
also offers some reasons why Dhalgren might appeal to a more general audi-
ence (90). In 1984, McEvoy bases his assertion that “90% of the sales of 
Dhalgren were outside of the science fiction audience” precisely on the fact 
that it “sold more than 700,000 copies”—600,000 more copies than “a 
good-selling science fiction novel” (102). McEvoy also discusses the gener-
ally negative response to Dhalgren within the sf community throughout his 
chapter on the text.
71. The Neveryon series consists of Tales of Nevèrÿon (1979), Neveryóna (1983), 
Flight from Nevèrÿon (1985) and Return to Nevèrÿon (1994). In A Sense of 
Wonder: Samuel R. Delany, Race, Identity, and Difference, Jeffrey A. Tucker 
discusses the series in the context of African-American Studies (Chapter 3, 
“The Empire of Signs: Slavery, Semiotics, and Sexuality in the Return to 
Nevèrÿon Series”).
72. Slusser acknowledges that the term “structuralist imagination” comes from 
Robert Scholes (3).
73. Beyond the great breadth and depth of Delany’s linguistic interests, McEvoy 
suggests that Delany intentionally made Dhalgren difficult to understand in 
order to obscure the explicit and widely varying sexual content (117).
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74. Tucker gives several examples of such critical responses to Delany’s works 
(53), and asserts that “[p]erhaps the principle obstacle facing African Amer-
ican SF writing [ . . . ] is the discourse of black authenticity” (Sense 51).
75. Also see the next sub-section (162).
76. In the first chapter of A Sense of Wonder, Jeffrey A. Tucker also explains his 
focus on the connections between Delany’s texts and the field of African-
American Studies, while simultaneously acknowledging the multifarious 
“ways in which we identify” (54).
77. See the beginning of the next sub-section (155) for a more detailed analysis 
of this phenomenon in the context of science fiction.
78. Fuss quotes Nancy K. Miller here, from her 1986 article “Changing the 
Subject” (109). See my chapter on Schuyler (95–96) for the beginning of 
this argument.
79. Delany’s autobiographical format would ideally suit the hypertext medium.
80. Joanna Russ’ The Female Man (1975) is an excellent example of the connec-
tion between a plurality of worlds and a plural subjectivity.
81. After writing the two “parallel narratives, in parallel columns,” he specifi-
cally addresses this division in section 8.103:
If it is the split—the space between the two columns (one resplendant 
and lucid with the writings of legitimacy, the other dark and hollow 
with the voices of the illegitimate)—that constitutes the subject, it is 
only after the Romantic inflation of the private into the subjective 
that such a split can even be located. That locus, that margin, that 
split itself first allows, then demands the appropriation of language—
now spoken, now written—in both directions, over the gap. (29–30)
82. Trouble on Triton (1996) was originally published as Triton (1976). I have 
chosen to use the title Trouble on Triton because this is the edition of the text 
from which I quote.
83. I am indebted to Ken James for drawing this particular quote to my atten-
tion in his introduction to Delany’s Longer Views (xxxvii).
84. In chapter 1 of A Sense of Wonder: Samuel R. Delany, Race, Identity, and Dif-
ference, “Dangerous and Important Differences: Samuel R. Delany and the 
Politics of Identity,” Jeffrey A. Tucker acknowledges that he
do[es] not completely agree with the critiques of race and identity just 
described and apparently endorsed and performed by Delany—or more 
accurately, their deployment as critiques of social movements called 
“identity politics.” As valuable as such critiques can be as strategies 
against racisms that reduce the diversity of African American commu-
nities to a single type, or against languages of authenticity that employ 
a similar logic, it is [his] belief that “identity” and “race” still have their 
uses, particularly for African Americans. (21)
He summarizes the project of the entire book as an attempt to “navigate a 
path through Delany’s writing between the Scylla of universalisms and 
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disavowals of ‘race’ and ‘identity’ made without regard for their progressive and 
constitutive uses, and the Charybdis of a discourse of race nationalism and 
racial authenticity that allows the immensity of race in America to blind us to 
the multiplicity of being” (54).
85. The term simplexity originates in Delany’s Empire Star.
86. See Easterbrook, 65–66.
87. Delany’s 1984 novel, Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand, revisits this con-
trast between more conservative and more radical societies. Once Delany has 
addressed, and rejected, the traditional sf hero, he can focus on one of the 
new subjective characters. In Stars, Marq Dyeth illustrates a new subjectivity, 
shaped by almost total freedom. Delany contrasts Marq’s subjectivity and the 
social context which shaped it with that of a slave named Rat and his more 
conservative society.
88. Peplow’s quotations come from the letters Delany wrote to him in preparation 
for the article in The Crisis. Some of the foregrounded quotes are specifically 
dated, but those in the body paragraphs are not. In an author’s note at the end 
of the article, Peplow generally acknowledges that “the biographical informa-
tion was supplied by Samuel R. Delany in letters sent to me between June 26 
and August 12, 1978. The author also very kindly read my manuscript for 
factual errors and made several suggestions that I have incorporated” (“Meet” 
121).
89. Elsewhere, Delany relates another inspiration for the text: “[a] couple of things 
were devilling my memory, including a recent dinner at a French restaurant 
not far from our flat in London, where I’d watched some people behave with 
what had struck me as unthinkable insensitivity to someone else at their table” 
(Shorter 319). Subsequently, he began writing a “fictive letter a woman might 
write to tell a truly unpleasant boyfriend it was all over”—the Spike’s farewell 
letter to Bron near the end of Trouble on Triton (ibid). This biographical inspi-
ration involves similar issues as the literary one of Heinlein’s text.
90. Peplow, however, does not believe Trouble on Triton completely fulfills Delany’s 
stated critical intention. Whereas Delany describes Bron as “a protagonist who 
is seen by the other characters as a ‘thorough louse,’” Peplow asserts that “Bron, 
with all his obvious faults, emerges as a human being. He’s too human for 
Delany’s obstensible purpose” (“Meet” 120). Furthermore, “Triton is not the 
black man’s revenge that some readers might expect” (ibid).
91. Easterbrook also compares Heinlein and Delany’s texts. However, he focuses 
on Heinlein’s The Moon is a Harsh Mistress (1966) and Triton. Also, he dis-
cusses the political nuances of the texts more generally and does not address the 
authors’ textual representations of race in any detail.
92. Michelle Massé’s otherwise excellent discussion of Bron lacks specific gender 
and racial components as well. She comes closest to acknowledging Bron’s spe-
cific ideological position in her discussion of his reactions to the other charac-
ters and his need to negatively classify or label them (55, 56). In addition, she 
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connects Bron to Delany’s earlier novels, but only in terms of Delany’s self-cri-
tique of “what seems now an impossible heroism” (53).
93. See my discussion of Schuyler for more on Fuss and Huyssen.
94. Of course, Bron makes these specific comments as a woman. However, I will 
argue shortly that this sexual and gender change only reinforces the stability of 
his earlier position (as a white male).
95. See my earlier discussion of Burroughs and Haraway’s third chapter of Primate 
Visions, “Teddy Bear Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, New York 
City, 1908–36.”
96. See my discussion of Burroughs for a more detailed explanation of this dichot-
omy.
97. Michelle Massé also notes this repetition of the same in Bron’s change, con-
necting it to his dependence on others as well: “he becomes his own mirror 
image as well as incorporating at least the appearance of the Spike and Sam 
before his sex [and race] change” (60).
98. The female Bron is also an interesting rendition of the biblical Eve in that she 
is literally formed from the male Bron/Adam’s rib.
99. Bulent Somay, Easterbrook, and Tom Moylan also compare the two novels.
100. This term comes from one of the interviewers and not Delany.
101. See Delany’s explanation for the importance of Bron’s lying to Audrey and the 
ending of the novel in Shorter Views, 334–6.
102. Sam’s physical change, from white to black, is more similar to the main char-
acter of William Hjortsberg’s Grey Matter (1971), who “chooses to move his 
consciousness into a black body because of its beauty” (E. James, “Yellow” 27). 
As Edward James notes, however, after the initial change, “the reader loses any 
sense of ‘race’ as being special” (ibid). Clearly, this is not the case with Sam. 
Not only does Delany place her racial change outside of the chronology of the 
text, but he also uses Sam as a vehicle for discussing the complexities of a post-
modern concept of race.
103. Published in 1973, The Tides of Lust has a variant title of Equinox.
104. See McEvoy for the connections between the “triple” of Folsom, Delany, and 
Hacker and the “triples” of Babel-17 (55).
105. Freedman discusses Delany’s negative portrayal of identitarianism and positive 
portrayal of “mutability and free play” in the context of the Family and the 
Sygn in Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand (159).
106. This is similar to “Appiah’s vision of recreationally deployed racial identities” 
(Tucker, Sense 18; Appiah and Gutmann). However, I prefer the term individ-
ualistic because it does not elide the potentially long-term, powerful effects of 
such identity; “recreational” only connotes fun, a hobby, relative insignificance, 
etc. See also Edward K. Chan’s “(Vulgar) Identity Politics in Outer Space: 
Delany’s Triton and the Heterotopian Narrative.”
107. For example, Delany’s financial status and educational experiences growing 
up contrasted with the collective Harlem norm; see Delany’s autobiography, 
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The Motion of Light in Water. Tucker also addresses this issue in the context 
of Delany’s Atlantis: Model 1924 (Sense 200).
108. More on Butler shortly.
109. Of course, this hierarchy is yet another reason to discard the Caliban/Pros-
pero trope and its traditional privileging of the mind of Prospero over the 
body of Caliban.
110. Butler’s Patternmaster series consists of Patternmaster (1976), Mind of My 
Mind (1977), Survivor (1978), Wild Seed (1980), and Clay’s Ark (1984).
111. Delany’s use of pronouns is most marked in his description of Ashima Slade 
and his/her multiple sex changes (Trouble 297).
112. I should note that technically Piercy is maintaining “constitutive differences” 
like “group history”; however, I do not think her random reassignment of 
these differences to new descent groups fits the spirit of Tucker’s argument.
113. Other recent fiction texts of interest include Starhawk’s The Fifth Sacred 
Thing (1993) and Stanley Kim Robinson’s Mars series.
114. Darryl A. Smith also investigates the intersection of race and technology 
in his short story about robots specifically constructed with African-Ameri-
can identities and physical features (published in Dark Matter). Of course, 
Smith’s story raises the issue, articulated by Edward James, of robots as sub-
stitutes for (human) racial others (“Yellow”).
115. That is not to say that Delany does not use computers in his texts; however, 
they are not the primary focus in the text. Computers are not the organizing 
principle of the text and/or its encompassing context (like cyberspace), and 
they are often more organically integrated into the text. See the human-like 
consciousness of PHAEDRA in The Einstein Iintersection, for example. Also, 
the ‘cyborgs’ of Babel-17 have relatively minor computer implants, largely 
for the purposes of personal expression and the construction of a physical 
image. I hope to discuss this issue of computerization in more detail in a 
subsequent work; similarly, the following discussion of magical realism in sf 
only touches the surface of this issue. I simply seek to mark out some rela-
tively new trends in sf and raise some questions I think should be addressed 
in future examinations of race in the field.
116. Feminist critics have made similar claims in terms of gender and its influ-
ence on computer usage and the technology/science fields more generally. 
See Shirley M. Tilghman “Science versus the Female Scientist” and also Part 
IV: “Gender and Technology” of Literacy, Technology, and Society: Confront-
ing the Issues.
117. Tucker is quoting Robert Reid-Pharr here.
118. Barnes also published Iron Shadows in 1998 and Charisma in 2002. He has 
co-authored novels with Larry Niven as well.
119. Delany addresses his rejection of the term speculative fiction in “The Sec-
ond Science-Fiction Studies Interview.” Delany admits that he used the term 
for one of his texts, Driftglass, due to its combination of “SF and fantasy” 
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(Shorter 346). This inclusiveness is exactly what recommends the term even 
today. However, Delany believes the term has devolved since the late 1960s 
to mean generally “‘high-class SF’“ (347); this is not the context in which I 
have recently seen the term used, and it certainly is not the context I intend 
here. I do not believe that connections to mundane fiction need to be made 
in order to ‘legitimate’ sf. In addition to the positive reasons for these con-
nections listed shortly, I agree with Tucker that such connections can “lead 
to fascinating interpretative possibilities” (Sense 39). Tucker also addresses the 
term speculative fiction and Delany’s response to it in Sense of Wonder (39).
120. Lion’s Blood is also overtly labeled science fiction on the spine. An alternate 
history novel, it centers around a racially-inverted, slave-holding ‘America,’ 
like Heinlein’s Farnham’s Freehold, only in the past rather than the future. In 
terms of the genre and publishing issues raised here, two additional review 
excerpts are pertinent—one from Octavia Butler (on the back cover) and the 
second from Nalo Hopkinson (at the beginning); more on this type of ‘adver-
tisement’ in the next body paragraph.
121. I believe this is one reason for the consistent science fiction label for this type 
of magical realism/fantasy (a consistent marketing strategy for an auther is 
another). In terms of a generic hierarchy in the United States, science fiction 
holds a privileged position over fantasy; within these stereotypes, sf is seen as 
more ‘serious’ and closer to mundane/realistic fiction, i.e. ‘literature’ or art, 
than fantasy.
122. Hopkinson also published a collection of short stories, Skin Folk, in 2001.
123. Barnes’ use of a ‘New Africa,’ ruled by an authoritarian (despotic) black man 
recalls Schuyler’s Dr. Belsidus in “Black Empire: An Imaginative Story of a 
Great New Civilization in Modern Africa” (Black Empire).
124. This information serves as advertisement for Hopkinson’s latest book, Skin 
Folk (placed on the back cover).
125. The Canopus series consists of 5 books, collectively titled the Canopus in 
Argos: Archives. Shikasta was published in 1979, The Marriages Between Zones 
Three, Four, and Five in 1980, The Sirian Experiments in 1981, The Making of 
the Representative for Plant 8 in 1982, and Documents Relating to the Sentimen-
tal Agents in the Volyen Empire in 1983.
126. Both Tucker’s text and my own began as dissertations (1997 and 2004, respec-
tively). This is another sign that a new group of writers/scholars is becoming 
interested in the field. Likewise, the interest of publishing companies in such 
texts bodes well for the future of critical investigations of race in the sf field.
NOTES TO THE APPENDIX
1. Some of these publishing dates for Burroughs’ texts came from Irwin Porges’ 
Edgar Rice Burroughs: the Man Who Created Tarzan. See his “List of ERB’s 
Complete Works” for additional publishing dates (787–99).
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